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ABSTRACT 
Open source software (OSS) technologies have become increasingly important in the 
information and communication sectors, materialized for example, in the fom1 of 
customized software solutions, but also community-developed web browsers and 
deviee systems such as Android, derived from open source Linux. Among scholars, 
OSS has also spurred a great deal of theoretical tension in management, organization 
science and economies. As an exan1ple, sorne of the emerging questions are those 
relating to the motivations of OSS developers, their incentives for benevolent 
contributions, the systems of governance put in place and how OSS can be the basis 
for a private business model. Such inquiries have led to the development of synthetic 
theories such as "private-collective innovation mode!" (von Hippel & von Krogh, 
2003). Despite these efforts, many key questions relating to the mechanisms of 
collaboration of OSS firms remain unanswered by extant strategie management and 
economies literature. One of the reasons for this has do with the nature of the 
technology. OSS is a highly modular technology that shares many properties of a 
public good, in addition to being highly dependent on extemalities (network and 
organizational leaming). These conditions depart significantly from the basic 
assumptions underlying economie (e.g., transactions cost, resource based view) 
theories of management that have been used to explain strategie alliances and 
collaborations in other industries. 
This research aims to explore, describe, and explain the multifaceted notion of OSS 
technological collaborations (OSSTC) of OSS R&D and innovation processes 
(RDIP). More specifically, it seeks to provide a finer-grained understanding of OSS 
value creation processes, how they are interrelated to one another, and in what ways 
their interdependencies influence the overall success and sustainability of 
collaborations. 
The research employs interview and secondary data to uncover the process by which 
for-profit OSS firms collaborate - often without formai agreements - with OSS 
communities in order to develop OSS solutions for their clients. Using grounded 
theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and participant observation 
techniques of data collection and analysis, this research unpacks the logic (e.g. , so 
called "Borromean Links" and "water purifier" models) behind co-development and 
co-maintenance of OSS platforms. It also discusses how the context of such 
collaborations affects the sustainability of OSS projects. Finally, it proposes the 
mechanisms by which technology management, coordination, and leadership 
functions are achieved when OSS firm project leaders occupy dual-purpose 
leadership roles, supporting both community and their private interests so as to best 
develop the latent value of the technology. 
Results of the analysis of the qualitative data ( e.g., axial and selective coding) are 
presented in terms of a gestalt mode! formed by five main conceptual categories. 
These categories correspond to the main factors (i.e. , conceptual constructs) that 
influence success and sustainability of firm and community collaborations. Emerging 
from this analysis are theoretical propositions which are further refined in fotm of 
empirical hypotheses to be tested in further research. These propositions suggest, how 
the types of actors and the role they play within the community can impact the nature 
and sustainability of OSS fitm-community collaborations, as weil as the Iong-tem1 
sustainabi lity of the resulting projects. 
Finally, these findings are compared and contrasted to the strategie alliance literature, 
so as to better delineate and define them with respect to this received theory. One 
emerging difference is that while the strategie alliances literature views inter-partner 
learning as a race (among partners) which can negatively influence the cohesion and 
viability of a joint venture, the OSS collaborations case illustrates just the opposite. 
It suggests that inter-partner leaming has a positive spillover effect which can 
strengthen the collaborative development of an OSS project having strong network 
effects (e.g. , an infrastructure platform). Stated in terms of economie theory, the need 
for dynamic learning equilibria in OSS justifies continuous inter-partner learning 
made possible through firm-community collaborations. In this regard, this research 
makes contributions to the fields of open source software management, open 
innovation and open business model theory. It has also implications for managerial 
practice in OSS organizations and public agencies. 
Keywords: Open source software innovation, open source management, inter-firm 
collaboration, technology platform development, strategie alliances, Linux, 
community development, software R&D, grounded theory methods. 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Les teclmologies à code source ouvert représentent maintenant une plus grande part 
du secteur des technologies de l' infom1ation et de la communication (TIC). Cette 
expansion se concrétise de différentes façons : solutions applicatives personnalisées, 
navigateurs Web développés par la communauté et même des systèmes d' exploitation 
pour appareil mobile tel qu ' Android - lui-même une solution dérivée du noyau 
Linux. À l' intérieur même de la communauté universitaire, les logiciels à code source 
ouvert ont également bouleversé beaucoup de théories dans des domaines aussi divers 
que la gestion, 1' organisation scientifique et la science économique. À titre 
d'exemple, pensons à certaines questions émergentes vis-à-vis les différents éléments 
de motivation des développeurs de logiciels à code ouvert, ce qui les incite à faire des 
contributions sans rémunération monétaire directe (bénévolement), les systèmes de 
gouvernances mis en place pour une saine gestion de projets ou encore comment des 
entreprises privées peuvent utiliser les technologies à code source ouvert comme base 
d' un modèle d' affaires rentable. De tels questionnements ont mené au développement 
de théories comme « private-collective innovation mode! » (von Hippel et von Krogh, 
2003). Malgré ces efforts, la littérature économique ainsi que la littérature sur les 
stratégies de gestion laissent de nombreuses questions clefs relatives aux mécanismes 
de collaboration d' entreprises privées ayant les technologies à code source ouvert 
comme modèle d'affaires sans réponse. Une des raisons à cette absence de réponse 
est due à la nature même des technologies. Les technologies à code source ouvert sont 
des technologies très modulaires qui partagent beaucoup de caractéristiques avec le 
bien commun en plus d' être fortement couplés avec des dépendances externes telles 
que le réseau et l'apprentissage organisationnel. Ces deux caractéristiques à elles 
seules démarquent significativement les technologies à code source ouvert des 
hypothèses de bases proposées par les théories de la gestion économique. (ex. : le 
coût des échanges et la gestion basée sur les ressources) ainsi que les hypothèses 
proposées par les théories de la gestion utilisées pour expliquer les alliances 
stratégiques et les collaborations mises en place dans d' autres industries. 
Cette recherche se donne comme objectif d'explorer, de décrire et d' expliquer les 
différentes facettes de la collaboration telle que proposée et appliquée dans le 
domaine des technologies à code source ouvert ainsi que les processus de recherche et 
développement et d' innovation. Plus précisément, cette recherche veut foumir une 
compréhension plus précise des processus de création de valeur par les technologies à 
code source ouvert, de la manière dont ils sont interdépendants et de quelle manière 
leurs interdépendances influence le succès général et la durabilité des collaborations. 
Cette recherche utilise un processus d' entrevues et des données secondaires pour faire 
émerger le processus par lequel les entreprises à but lucratif en teclmologie à code 
source ouvert collaborent- souvent sans accords fom1els - avec la communauté afin 
de développer des solutions à code source ouvert pour leurs clients. En utilisant la 
théorie ancrée (Strauss et Corbin, 1990, Glaser et Strauss, 1967) et des techniques 
d'observation participative pour collecter et analyser les données, cette recherche met 
en lumière et explique la logique collaborative (ex. : le modèle des « anneaux 
borroméens » et le modèle du « purificateur d ' eau ») derrière le codéveloppement et 
le soutien collaboratif des plate-formes à code source ouvert. Elle explique également 
comment le contexte de ces collaborations affecte la durabilité des projets à code 
source ouvert. Enfin, cette recherche propose un modèle par lequel les fonctions de 
gestion, de coordination et de leadership sont atteintes lorsqu' une entreprise joue un 
rôle de leader en soutenant à la fois les intérêts de la communauté et ses propres 
intérêts privés afin de développer au mieux la valeur technologique latente. 
Les résultats de l' analyse des données qualitatives (ex. : par codage axial et codage 
sélectif) sont représentés par des modèles gestaltistes formés principalement par cinq 
catégories conceptuelles. À partir de cette analyse, il a été possible de dériver 
différentes propositions théoriques qui ont été raffinées sous forme d' hypothèses 
empiriques à être testées dans le cadre de recherches plus approfondies. Ces 
propositions définissent comment les différents acteurs et le rôle qu' ils jouent à 
l' intérieur de la communauté influencent substantiellement la nature et la durabilité 
des collaborations entre les entreprises privées et la conmmnauté des technologies à 
code source ouvert ainsi que la pérennité du succès des projets qui en découlent. 
Finalement, ces résultats sont comparés et confrontés aux théories proposées par la 
littérature sur les alliances stratégiques afin de les décrire de façon plus robuste et les 
définir en fonction des théories acceptées. Une différence notable est que la littérature 
sur les alliances stratégiques considère l' apprentissage inter-partenaires comme une 
course (entre lesdits partenaires) qui peut influencer négativement la cohésion et la 
viabilité d 'une alliance stratégique alors que les cas de collaboration dans le domaine 
des technologies à code source ouvert démontrent le contraire. Cette dernière suggère 
plutôt que l' apprentissage inter-partenaires a des retombées positives qui peuvent 
renforcer la collaboration dans le cadre du développement d' un projet à code source 
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ouvert. Conformément à la théorie économique, la nécessité d ' équilibrer les 
apprentissages dynamiques dans le cadre de projet à code source ouvert justifie un 
apprentissage continu entre les partenaires rendu possible par des collaborations 
solides entre les entreprises privées et la communauté. À cet égard , cette recherche 
apporte des contributions aux domaines de la gestion de projets à code source ouvert, 
de 1' innovation ouverte et de la théorie des modèles commerciaux ouverts. Cette 
recherche apporte également une contribution sur l' application pragmatique de 
modèle de gestion dans les organisations basées sur un modèle ouvert ainsi que dans 
les organismes publics. 
Mots clefs : innovation en logiciel à code source ouvert, gestion de projet à code 
source ouvert, collaboration inter-entreprises, développement de plate-formes 
technologies, alliances stratégiques, GNU/Linux, communauté, programmation, 
recherche et développement logiciel , méthode de la théorie ancrée 
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CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Open Source Software (OSS) is software technology created collectively through 
communities of developers who collaborate to develop the software that they or their 
organizations need. It has been a major cultural, economie and social phenomenon 
(e.g. , von Hippie & von Krogh, 2003), and it has spurred theoretical tension as it 
deviates sharply from the predictions and explanations of existing theories in 
different fields of economies, sociology, and organization science (e.g., von Krogh & 
Spaeth, 2007; Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2003), and software development economies 
(Ajila & Wu, 2007). Its social impact is measured by turning software into a public 
good (Holtgrewe & Werle, 2001), while its economie impact has been that of 
revolutionizing the Information and Communications Technologies (ICI) sector and 
ali other downstream industries that feed on it (Fosfuri, Giarratana, & Luzzi , 2008). 
OSS reduces the social loss resulting from restrictions posed on software 
modification by allowing users to freely learn, and by offering a novel model for 
creating and capturing value in ICI. As a testament to these benefits, consider that a 
majority of the European governments have already shifted from deploying 
proprietary software to OSS, in order to gain autonomy, control, as weil as reduce 
costs and enhance their ICT's privacy and security. Consequently, OSS has become a 
preferred option due to offering security, reliability, flexibility, stability, control, 
auditability and quality at lower cost, especially in the last decade in which we have 
been observing the emergence of strategie and commercial OSS (Fitzgerald, 2006). 
A few examples shall clarify this issue further. For instance, in developing countries 
they use OSS to pralong the life of computers in schools when costs of upgrading 
required by proprietary providers are simply unbearable. Similarly, the Ville de 
Montréal was faced with dilemma of spending about 7 M$ on migration from 
Windows XP to the Windows 7; or, to switch to OSS which is royalty free 
(Normandin, 2014). Likewise, to ensure flight safety, airliners have integrated OSS 
modules into their ICT systems so much so that from cockpit control system to seat 
monitors, ali deviees (e.g. , a range of embedded systems) run on OSS. The logic is 
actually simple: once you have unrestricted access to every line of code, you have 
freedom to modify it, and guarantee security of the overall system. This 
immeasurable impact of OSS is the result of applying ' open methodology' to 
software research and development (R&D) and innovation process (RDIP). This 
methodology also spurs and facilitates the collective effort of the network of 
individuals to innovate and it leads to a faster diffusion of innovations. 
However, while the transparency as the fruit of openness can create opportunities for 
improvements and further technological developments, the actual implementation of 
OSS development methodology can at times be problematic. If the heterogeneous 
skills, incentives and expectations of contributing individuals, private as well as 
public organizations are not effectively coordinated and led towards achieving 
milestones, success of OSS Technological Collaborations (OSSTC) and sustainability 
of the collaborative R&D efforts can be nothing but a mirage. Therefore, the 
Achilles ' heel of OSS projects is not only the lack of resources, but also aligning 
incentives, coordinating as well as effectively leading resources so as to enable OSS 
projects to gain attraction in the market where an OSS product may compete not only 
with a proprietary (i .e., mainstream) one, but also with other OSS products. 
Past research has looked into the emergence and survival of the OSS phenomenon 
from different angles. Several authors have focused their attention on the 
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' motivations' which induce behavior in users and developers and explain the 
underlying reasons for their contributions to OSS projects (Lerner & Tirole, 2002; 
Lakhani & Wolf, 2005; Roberts, Hann, & Slaughter, 2006). Others have been 
intrigued by 'governance' issues within OSS communities (Kogut & Metiu, 2001 ; 
Shah, 2006; O'Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; Schaarschmidt, Walsh, & von Kortzfleisch, 
2015). Some other researchers have found the 'organization' of OSS projects and 
communities of importance and devoted their efforts to explore the topic (Scacchi 
2002; West & O'Mahony, 2005). Yet a few researchers (e.g. , Feller & Fitzgerald, 
2000; von Krogh et al. , 2003; von Hippel, 2005) have made an effort to explore and 
un box the unorthodox innovation process of OSS development. 
Despite these insightful efforts, we still know little about this complex and 
multifaceted form of collaborative technology development (see, Linux Foundation, 
2014). As a case in point, in the seminal work ofvon Hippie and von Krogh (2003), 
authors try to resolve the perplexing issue of OSS innovation mode! by arguing that 
OSS represents a middle ground solution. lt is a happy marriage between private 
investment mode! (Demsetz, 1967) and collective action mode! (Oison, 1967). This 
third option is called "private-collective" innovation mode! that offers enough 
incentives for both models to coexist. However, the proposed hybrid mode! invites 
further research concerning the role and nature of leadership in relation to sustaining 
the ongoing activity in OSS projects and communities. For example, sorne authors 
believe that as the OSS community gets larger arid larger, it becomes more obvious 
that .they need to establish a central authority or leadership in order to monitor the 
members' activities and impose sanctions on free-riders (Hard in, 1982; Swanson, 
1992). The importance of leadershjp role in developing OSS projects has been 
already raised (Pavlicek, 2000); yet, the nature of leadership seems to have remained 
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as an elusive concept' . For example, one of the norms of hacker community is that 
the to-be-done tasks cannot be forced by the leader (Raymond, 1999; Himanen, 
Torvalds, & Castells, 2001 ; Kelty, 2008); and the intricacies as how the job is done 
have not been illuminated. 
Fmthermore, we have fuzzy knowledge and limited understanding about severa! key 
OSS-related issues such as the following. For instance, the nature of technological or 
commercial success and the factors contributing to it is still underexplored. Similarly, 
we stilllack clear understanding about what makes OSS R&D and innovation process 
(RDIP) a sustainable process, especially when sustainability is central to avoid having 
orphan OSS projects. In a similar vein, despite hearing that OSS offers ' flexibility ' 
and 'cost reduction ' benefits through different media and publications (see, e.g., 
Linux Foundation, 2014), we still do not know if these mean the same to different 
enterprise or individual users. Nor do we know what factors significantly contribute 
to the formation of these constructs, 'how' ; and, 'under which conditions' firms, 
organizations and individual can fully benefit from them. For example, if a firm Jacks 
the necessary technological capability to connect and collaborate with OSS platform 
participants, then they may not be able to optimally benefit from ' flexibility ' as 
enabled by the openness associated with OSS technology platforms. On the other 
hand, if creating such capability is not economically feasible or weil justified, then 
flexibility is not an advantage any more. Above ali , we need to have a theoretical 
frame of reference that comprehensive! y connects the dots, and meaningfully relates 
and binds together ali vital interdependent elements at micro leve! so that we make 
sense ofthe whole R&D and innovation system. 
Thus, in spite of the significance and ubiquity of OSSTC and increasing academie 
and commercial interest in its adoption by firms, governments and individuals (see, 
· 
1 Sorne exceptions to this argument include, for example, the paper published by Li, Tan, and Teo 
(20 12) who investigate the relationship between an OSS project leader' s leadership style and a 
developer's motivation to contribute to the software development. 
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e.g., Linux Foundation, 2014, 20 16), we have still inadequate detailed understanding 
of the subject matter. In line with this argument, this research aims at exploring, 
describing, and explaining the multifaceted notion of OSSTC embedded in OSS 
RDIP through adopting a mix of qualitative methodological approaches. 
1.2 Problem statement and study purpose 
1.2.1 Research problem from academies' perspective 
A) Is 01 paradigm an adequate theory? 
Authors have tried to understand and explain OSS technology development process 
from different perspectives: social capital perspective (Méndez-Dur6n & Garcia, 
2009), motivational issues (Lemer & Tirole, 2002), project governance (Kogut & 
Metiu, 2001 ; O'Mahony, 2003), organizational issues (West & O'Mahony, 2005). 
However, more recently, the literature of distributed and collaborative R&D and 
innovation (e.g., von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003), has tightly associated OSS with the 
concept of 01 (e.g., Gruber & Henkel , 2006; Maxwell, 2006; Chesbrough & 
Appleyard, 2007). 
This association has extended to the point that severa! authors perceive OSS as "the 
poster child" or "a great exemplar" of 01 concept, and treat OSS as a fertile ground to 
study and theorize about 01 (Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007 ; West & Gallagher, 
2006; Morgen & Finnegan, 2010; Lundell & van der Linden, 2013). Even in the 
conceptual intersection of 01 and 01-based BM or open business model (OBM), OSS 
has been popularized through the lens of 01. lt has been studied as a showcase by 
those whose objective is to look deep into the OSS firms ' processes and explain how 
OBM functions (e.g., Perr et al. , 2010). More specifically, 01 has become a more 
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relevant framework to study how private enterprises have ventured into exploiting the 
opportunities offered by OSS sector (West & Gallagher, 2006). 
Although the past research attempts2 have been insightful, to a certain degree, with 
regards to clarifying the concept of 01 (and lm·gely drawing on empirical data from 
OSS projects) , there are still caveats associated with the past research which cast 
doubts on the validity and relevance of sorne arguments and provide impetus for 
further research on the overlap or connection between OSS and 01. 
Fundamentally, open innovation paradigm (OIP) is criticized on three major fronts. lt 
lacks solid theoretical underpinning ( e.g., Lichtenthaler, 2011; van de Vran de et al. , 
2009) - an issue which is still valid (Vanhaverbeke & Cloodt, 2014). 01 has been 
built upon fuzzy pillars so much so that it has been labelled for being "old wine in 
new botties" (Trott & Hartmann, 2009) - meaning that, such thing as closed 
innovation (which has been used to justify 01) has never existed. Moreover, there are 
severa! research shortcomings, many uncharted research domains, and dearth of 
extemal validity ofthe concept. 
Based on these caveats, one should take the usefulness and appropriateness of 01 
concept in studying OSSTC with a grain of salt. This has, therefore, motivated me to 
further examine the 01 concept, its relevance and its usefulness in relation to OSSTC. 
For instance, although OSS projects (or their development technological platforms) 
demonstrate a great deal of openness- a characteristic shared with OIP- they do not 
resemble conventional enterprises or organizations. Therefore, a firm-based or 
dominantly firm-centric approach such as 01 (see, Piller & West, 2014, p. 29) may not be 
able to explain the underlying logic and associated complexities of OSSTC and their 
supporting platforms. 
2 For example: Gassmann, (2006); Henkel (2006); West and Gallagher (2006); Dittrich and Duysters 
(2007); van de Vran de et al. (2009); Enkel et al. (2009); Gassmann et al. (20 1 0). 
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B) Do conventional strategie alliances adequately explain OSSTC? 
An OSSTC enables participants to: a) find optimum solutions to complex programing 
issues; b) reduce cost and duration of software R&D; c) mitigate the risk associated 
with software development and allay uncertainty with new software inventions; and 
d) learn know-how and capabilities which cannot be easily codified and leamed 
otherwise. Therefore, when the underlying rationales for collaboration are 
acknowledged, we may observe that OSS collaborations share sorne resemblance 
with 'strategic/technological alliances/collaborations ' 3, and that they can be explained 
by the similar theories ( e.g., transaction cost economies or resource-based view) that 
have already illuminated strategie alliances. 
However, the literature on OSS has shed light on informai, non-contractual, and trust-
based/social relationships of collaborators as conduits for collaboration, knowledge 
sharing and knowledge creation ( e.g., Lerner & Tiro le, 2002; ; Bonaccorsi & Rossi , 
2003; von Hippie & von Krogh, 2003; Mendez-Duron & Garcia, 2009). Such 
distinguishing characteristics are basis for a theoretical di/emma that does not let us 
sharply categorize OSSTC under strategie alliances that are mainly studied as R&D 
elements govemed by long-term le gall y binding con tracts ( e.g. , Niosi , 1995). 
Thus, in order to better understand and resolve this dilemrna, and formulate a clearer 
theoretical identity for OSSTC- that not only respects the prior theoretical 
development of their ancestors (i.e. , strategie alliances), but also further clarifies the 
nature of these particular collaborative efforts- 1 intend to lay the conceptual 
foundations of an inductive and eclectic theory of OSSTC, and position them vis-à-
vis strategie alliances and informai cooperation. 
3 The seminal work of Hagedoom ( 1993): "Understanding the rationale of strategie technology 
partnering .. . " provides a comprehensive overview of motives underlying formation of (strategie) 
interftrm technology cooperation. 
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C) To what extent does the business mode! concept explain open value creation 
processes? 
A critical review of the business mode! (BM) literature (see Chapter 2, Section 5) 
shows, BM, as it seems, is still very corporate-centric, focused on finn-leve! 
sustainable competitive advantage, customer segment and revenue concentrated, and 
that it is focused on the internai structure ofthe firm. 
Although the bulk of the literature tends to position the concept in the thinking of 
conventional strategie management- i.e. , Porter' s five forces (1980a)- recently 
scholars have acknowledged that BM expands firm boundaries through adoption of 
an open strategy (e.g., Appleyard & Chesbrough, 2016) and that it is becoming more 
focused on value creation processes (Zott, Amit, & Massa, 2011). A BM, despite 
being perceived as a fuzzy concept (Zott et al. , 20 11 ; Teece, 2010; Morris et al. , 
2005) is a powerful tool to unlock the latent value from a piece of technology 
(Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). The recent literature (Zott et al. , 2011 ; Teece, 
201 0) highlights the complexity of the 'value creation pro cess' and 
' interconnectedness of exchange relationships and activities' entailing a federation of 
players including the focal finn. Yet, BM does not seem to have become 
comprehensively attuned to open and distributed innovation concepts (e.g. , OIP, user 
innovation, etc.) where value creation and capture processes are not readily situated 
within organizational boundaries. lt certainly is poorly suited to explain the core and 
nuances of OSSTCs. 
This is mainly the case because within OSS context, shared R&D and innovation 
process (RDIP) hosts a unique value creation process that includes numerous and 
heterogeneous actors (individuals, software/non-software public/private finns, 
communities, etc.) and encompasses different types of relationships which are 
embedded in open platfonns. Such collective value creation process demonstrates a 
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complex set of interactions, and leadership challenges, to name a few. lt defies 
traditional secretive software project management which is firm-centric (e.g., Apple 
Inc.) by making its development process openly visible and its artifacts publicly 
available over the web (Scacchi , 2002). OSS development process also challenges the 
conventional business and economies wisdom when it demands and motivates the 
private firms to share sorne of the important results of their private R&D in public 
domains (i.e., commons or open technology platforms). 
Prior literature has placed the interrelationship between OSS development and user 
communities under the spotlight as these communities are an indispensable part of 
OSS development process (e.g. , von Hippel, 2005). However, much less attention has 
been given to the role of the firms in the community, and how they can profit from 
their participation (van de Vrande et al. , 2010)- with some exceptions (e.g., 
Dahlander & Magnusson, 2005). More importantly, literature has remained less 
focused on 'how', 'why', and ' under what circumstances ' firms (not only software or 
OSS firms) should make a meaningful contribution to OSS development, enhance the 
success and sustainability of OSS projects and its RDIP in order to influence the 
technology trajectory, create positive network externalities, and shape the future 
standards of their technology domain. For instance, the investments that a firm or a 
consortium of organizations makes (i .e., boundary spanning collaborations) on 
developing a shared OSS platform (e.g., FFmpeg, Odoo, Liferay, etc.) in order to 
create new knowledge, can be considered as a unique value creation process which 
has pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits for the participants. 
Sorne authors have claimed that the vast majority of contributions within user 
communities are made by a few (Lakhani & von Hippel , 2003) where communities 
portray a core-periphery structure with a cohesive subgroup of core actors and a set of 
peripheral actors who are loosely connected to the core (e.g., Borgatti & Everett, 
1999). However, we need to know more about the nature of value creation processes 
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to better explain why sorne remain, or position themselves as core to the OSS RDIP 
while others may shy away from an active engagement in the shared R&D process. 
Yet, sorne ' highly professional ' participants4 are not necessarily among the core 
development team, but they prefer to invest in the technology development process 
for they have incentives to do so. Further, what are the consequences for actors when 
they play different roles concerning their engagements with and resources 
endowments to OSS projects? 
Thus, in line with bridging the conceptual gaps within the BM literature and progress 
the concept of open BM through investigating open, distributed and collaborative 
value creation process, 1 will study OSSTC and aim to unpack the value creation 
elements embedded in shared OSS RDIP. 
1.2.2 Research problem from a practitioners' perspective 
Collaborative software development based on a wide range of OSS technologies has 
been increasing in the past decades (Linux Foundation, 2014). Today, OSS has 
become "the go-to platform" for organizations (e.g., Technologie Systems, Microsoft, 
etc.) to build software and technology products (Linux Foundation, 2016, p. 3). Based 
on a survey data gathered from more than 400 hiring managers at corporations, 
SMEs, government organizations, and staffing agencies worldwide as well as 
responses from more than 4,500 OS professionals, Linux Foundation report (20 16) 
clearly illustrates the increasing "enthusiasm" and "professionalization" of OSS 
throughout IT industry. 59% of the respondents (i.e., hiring managers) claim that they 
are looking for OS talent in the job market. In fact, there is a new BM emerging 
where companies across different industries come together to share their development 
4 For instance, consider the case of sorne engineers from product engineering team of Savoir-faire 
Linux and their significant contribution to Linux kernel and FFmpeg projects (e.g., Savoir-faire Linux, 
2017). 
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resources and build common OS technology platfonns (i.e. , tools and components) 
which they can later use to differentiate their own products and services- examples 
include AllSeen Alliances, Code Aurora Forum, OpenDaylight, OpenMDM, to name 
a few (see, for more details, Linux Foundation, 2014). 
Subsequently, OSS solutions have been seriously discussed about, argued upon, 
adopted and even contributed to by private and public sectors. OSS is now at the 
center of attention among many European Union (EU) members where sorne already 
have their systems migrated to OSS versions while severa! others are seriously 
considering their action plan (see European Commission Joinup ' s website for 
complete up-to-date news )5. For instance, city of Munich- having in place an OS 
strategy focused on sustainability issue- has already completed their migration, 
LiMux project (i.e., "Die IT-Evolution"), to OS desktop (i.e. , Ubuntu Linux operating 
system and OS applications) in which case 15,000 desktops run on OS (Hillenius, 
2013).6 
A) Macro level 
At a macro level (i.e. , government leve!), in Quebec, during the past years, adoption 
of OSS solutions by the Quebec government agencies has become a growing 
5 Joinup is a collaborative platform created by the European Commission and funded by the European 
Union via the lnteroperability Solutions for European Public Administrations (JSA) Program. lt offers 
severa) services that aim to help e-Govemment professionals share their experience with each other. 
They also support organizations to find, choose, re-use, develop and implement interoperability 
solutions. Retrieved from https: //joinup.ec.europa.eu/ on January 2016. For more information on the 
latest communications among private sector and governments, please refer to ' Open Source 
Observatory' which can be retrieved from 
https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/community/osor/communications/all 
6 LiMux - The IT evolution is a project by the city of Munich (third-largest city in Germany) to 
migrate their software systems from closed-source, proprietary Microsoft products to free and open-
source software. The project was successfully completed in late 2013 , which involved migrating 
15 ,000 persona) computers and laptops of public employees to free and open-source software. The 
description of LiMux project is retrieved from Wikipedia website on January 22, 2016 available at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LiMux. 
Il 
controversial issue. 7 On the one hand, switching to OSS solutions is advantageous as 
the government can save huge amounts oftaxpayers ' money and ensure Quebecers to 
enjoy higher security and freedom. For example, only "En 2012, le gouvernement a 
choisi de renouveler une série de licences de gré à gré, pour un coût total évalué à 1 ,4 
milliard $. S'il avait plutôt opté pour des logiciels libres, il aurait pu réaliser des 
économies d'au moins 19 %, soit 265 millions $" (Therrien, 2013)8. Similarly, 
proponents of protection of citizens' information and digital privacy view adoption of 
OSS solutions at the heart of "la stratégie culturelle numérique" (i.e., the strategy of 
digital culture).9 On the other hand, the government is left with little empirical 
research evidence in the context of Quebec, and Canada for that matter, in order to be 
confident about the capacity and reliability of OSS projects to depend upon. The 
government has also made large path-dependent investments with large corporations 
(e.g. , Microsoft, IBM) which has led to proprietary lock-in situation (Deglise, 2013). 
Therefore, it is high time to look into the black box of OSSTC embedded in shared 
OSS R&D and innovation projects to provide an unbiased explanation about their 
internai workings and mechanisms. The findings of this empirical investigation have 
implications for policy makers, as they help them gain a finer-grained understanding 
of the subject matter. Particularly, this study is useful in the context of Que bec where 
7 This has also led to sorne lawsuits against government actions and decisions with regards to adoption 
of OSS solutions through contracting with private sector' s OS firrns . For an exarnple, please read the 
following reports. Nowak, P. (2008, Aug 27). Quebec govemment sued for buying Microsoft software. 
CBCnews. Retrieved from http: //www.cbc.ca/news/technology/quebec-government-sued-for-buying-
microsoft-software-1.762879. Nowak, O. (20 10, June 3). Quebec broke law in buying Microsoft 
software. CBCnews. Retrieved from http: //www.cbc.ca/news/technology/quebec-broke-law-in-buying-
microsoft-software-1 .962964. 
8 In English : " ln 2012, the government has decided to renew a series of licenses, for a total cost 
estimated at $ 1.4 trillion. Had the government opted for OSS, they could accomplish savings of at 
least 19%, or$ 265 million" 
9 For a reference, please read : a) Le Devoir. (20 14, June 18). Mutations numériques «On ne subit pas 
l'avenir, on le fait». Retri eved from http://www.ledevoir.com/societe/science-et-
technologie/411 245/mutations-numeriques; b) le manifeste (20 14). pour un Québec numérique libre et 
ouvert. Information website: http://www.notreavenirnumerique.net/; and c) Communautique (2010, 
October 16). Manifesta: A Digital Framework for Quebec. Retrieved from 
http :/ /www. corn rn u na uti que.q c.ca/reflex ion -et -enjeu xli ntern et -citoyen/mani festo-d igi ta 1-
framework.htrn 1. 
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the government is in a transition phase and challenging with severa! issues such as 
OS licensing (Hillenius, 2016). Policy makers need to be better informed of the 
nature of OSS value creation process. This will consequent! y help them to ensure that 
their efforts about regulating the OSS licensing based on the government needs will 
not restrict the openness of OSS development methodology. 
B) Meso-Micro level 
At meso-micro leve) (i .e. , group or firm leve) involving individual developers), 
effective OSS development requires meaningful collaboration among firms, groups of 
people, individuals, and developer communities. Many OSS projects carry a lot of 
potential, but the problem is that the communities creating them are not necessarily 
cohesive. With different cultural values, economie incentives and even technical 
backgrounds, the slightest disagreement among developers (from firms, large 
corporations, joint networks, or even simply individuals) is often enough to provoke 
an abandoning of the project and independent development by a subset of developers 
(i.e. , project forking phenomenon 10). Forking is a double-edged sword. It can kill 
projects, and it may sometimes lead to a new flourishing project. However, despite its 
ubiquity within OSS ecosystem, forking is mostly viewed as something negative and 
it is frowned upon. Our preliminary pilot research shows that if a project is lacking 
adaptation capability in order to respond to real market needs, it will finally become 
an orphan and will eventually disappear due to a dwindling user-base. So far, OSS 
has been mainly perceived as social phenomenon comprising a network of 
individuals who have gained mutual trust and respect through meritocracy and 
reputation effect. But in view of strategie and commercial OSS which corn petes with 
proprietary closed software products manufactured and packaged by large 
10 According to Kelty (2008, p. 136): " Forking genera lly refers to the creation of new, moditied source 
code from an original base of source code, resulting in two distinct programs with the same parent". 
13 
corporations, the role of firms in developing OSS platforms and teclmologies is more 
under spotlight specifically when they can influence the success and sustainability of 
the projects through their collaborations and resources endowments. 
In fact, this is due to the fact that OSS is dynamic software always unfinished and 
constantly in the state of flux. This does not mean that OSS cannot be used 
effectively because it is changing and bejng improved upon continuously. It simply 
means that the users (and in sense of strategie and commercial OSS mainly firms 
from different industries) need to be aware of its evolutionary nature and remain 
connected to the core software hosted by community around the project in order to 
ensure interoperability. Therefore, take-and-give-back captures the nature of 
interactions among actors (under certain conditions). Users adopt a solution, work 
with it, and share back their experiences with the software with the community of 
users through a number ways. The sharing-back ranges from giving a simple 
feedback by mentioning how the software reacts on their hardware (does it crash?), 
highlighting a glitch in their systems, to more complicated contributions such as 
writing the patch, submitting it to the community for a review, and getting involved 
in its revising process until the clean code is integrated into the core. However, to 
engage in such interactive process, one shall be familiar with severa! issues, and 
capable ofperforming severa! tasks. Put simply, firm's IT department representatives 
need to be aware of core issues such as how and why interdependence among 
collaborators influence technical and commercial success of OSSTC and OSS shared 
RDIP. Furthermore, they need to know what capabilities are required to play an 
active role and if creating such capabilities can become economically justified before 
their top management. 
Although OSS service providers (i.e. , OSS firms) have mastered these issues, still a 
large group of non-software firms which form a big portion of OSS user base seem to 
be only aware ofthe tip ofthe OSS RDIP ' s iceberg. The clients may have heard that 
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adoption of OSS solutions saves their IT department sorne costs, but they may have 
been ignorant or unaware of the fact that if a firm relies on an orphan project that 
Jacks continuous supports and further development, the issue of cost is no longer an 
advantage. lt is because an orphan project is not an effective problem solver. Thus, in 
this research, we shed light on vital details associated with OSS RDIP, and explain 
the core issues (e.g. , nature of leadership in OSSTC) in order to assist firms to make 
better informed decisions with regards to choosing what role , and to what extent, they 
want to play when engaging in OSS adoption process (i.e., migrating toward OSS 
solutions). 
1.3 The design of the research questions 
1 believe arriving at valuable research questions is a research project on its own. In 
this research, two processes have influenced the research questions ' development: a) 
the literature review process; and b) the pilot study. The former informs me about the 
'ins and outs ' of the key notions such as 01, BM, strategie alliances, and OSS 
projects (from an academie perspective). lt also helps me form sorne opinions about 
the interconnections among these topics. The latter, however, influences my 
understanding of OSS technology and its development process more significantly 
from practitioners' perspectives. My five preliminary interviews with industry 
practitioners such as R&D managers of software and OSS firms located in Montreal, 
Waterloo and Ottawa, as well as a high rank policy maker form Quebec City directed 
me to formulate questions that are more specifie. These questions not only 
correspond to the gaps 1 have identified based on literature review but also they 
address queries that practitioners may have. 
For instance, in the OSS literature, Weber (2004, p. 216) highlights "the role of the 
' customer' in the production process, specifically as it plays out within business 
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models" a central conceptual question to be further studied in the context of OSS 
RDIP. Later, in my pilot interviews with the founder as weil as the chief technology 
officer of Savoir-faire Linux lnc., 1 became engaged in discussions that would fu1iher 
lead to importance of the interconnection between OSS communities, OSS firms and 
the enterprise clients. However, the interviewees mention that the client ' s role and its 
significance is a matter of investigation and that it is subject to change as each case 
could be a different one. 
Thus, such preliminary investigations (both conceptual and practical) and the 
information load they carry tend to influence my judgment and direct me towards 
formulating questions that are more context-specific. Some may view this as a source 
of investigator' s bias. 1 personally believe that this cannot be necessarily a downside, 
although it can limit a researcher ' s window of openness to a certain extent. The fact 
of knowing that there may be another element such as enterprise clients involved in 
collaborations embedded in OSS RDIP can affect the dimensions of my thoughts. 
However, since 1 do not possess any specifie knowledge of how, why, and under 
what circurnstances such interconnectedness influences OSS RDIP and its 
dimensions, 1 remain confident that 1 am entering the field study with a blank slate. 
Below, 1 propose a set of primary and secondary questions (see Table 1.1 ). These 
questions play the role of the catalyst for my exploratory investigation. 
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Table 1.1. Research Questions 
Item no. Primary and secondary research questions 
Collaboration-driven questions 
PQI 
SQs 
What is the nature of "OSS va lue creation processes"; and what key factors 
shed light on its complexities? 
a) Who are the main independent actors; and how are they interrelated to 
one another, i.e., what is the nature oftheir interdependencies? 
b) What are the underpinning mechanisms, relationships, capabilities, and 
challenges that form open, distributed and collaborative value creation 
process? 
c) How or in what significant ways, do the actors ' technological 
collaborations lead to enhancing the success and sustainabi lity of 
collaborations and shared R&D and innovation processes? 
d) How do openness and open collaboration influence project success and 
sustainability? 
e) How are the second or third-partner dependencies managed and led in 
order to be effective? 
Market (client) -driven questions 
PQ2 
PQ3 
How may organizational users (e.g. , enterprise clients) influence 
collaborations and OSS RDTP? 
How may organizational users (e.g. , enterprise clients) affect sustainability of 
OSS RDTP? 
Leadership-driven questions 
PQ4 
PQS 
a) What are the key capabilities of a leader? How do they influence the 
governance of OSS technological collaborations and projects? 
b) How is leadership viewed when there is a plethora of independent 
actors? Does leadership of OSS technological collaborations take on a 
different color by leaning on different sorts of capabilities and 
demonstrating a unique set of performances? 
a) What organizational challenges are imposed by involving the third actor 
- e.g. , clients - into the innovation process? How can they be addressed 
properly by OSS firms and community of developers to make sure they 
will not negatively influence success and sustainability of OSS projects. 
ln other words, how can OSS firms and communities realize the clients ' 
potentials in spite of the challenges associated with their utilization? 
Note: PQ: Primary question ; SQs: Secondary questions 
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1.4 Research methodology 
Tl1ree main considerations have influenced my decision to choose qualitative research 
methodology, drawing upon a mi x of three variants of it: case study (Yin, 2009); 
grounded theory approach, GTA (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990); 
and, participant-observation (Becker & Geer, 1957; DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002). These 
considerations include the nature of the research problem, study purpose and type of 
research questions. Thus, in order to realize this research project, 1 must adopt the 
qualitative approach. 
1 intend to explore, describe, and explain the core issues associated with OSSTC and 
OSS shared RDIP. This includes studying the experiences of individuals 
(representing their organizations and themselves) actively involved in OSS RDIP-
their sense making, coilaborative knowledge sharing and knowledge creation 
activities, their strategies, as weil as their decision-making. My goal is not to prove or 
disprove any hypotheses, rather to inductively develop theoretical constructs, a gestalt 
theoretical framework, and core propositions that explain how actors and constructs 
are interconnected as weil as how different variables influence the proposed 
interrelationships. Furthermore, based on foilow-up discussions, 1 will propose 
severa! testable hypotheses to guide further empirical, theory testing, and quantitative 
research approaches. 
Yin (2009, p. 18) characterizes case study as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident". The case 
study method, therefore, is suitable for examining a phenomenon such as OSS RDIP 
that is very context-dependent where boundaries between firms, communities and 
individuals become very blurry and porous. 
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Adopting participant observation in combination with case study is also 
advantageous because it is a powerful analytical tool and a data collection method 
that enhances the quality of data collection, and data interpretation (DeWalt & 
DeWalt, 2002). In addition, the grounded theory approach (as described and 
commented on in Chapter 4) is an appropriate approach because it aids the researcher 
to systematically follow an ernie or inductive approach to data collection, analysis 
and theory building (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
To collect data, I conducted the participant-observer and the in-depth main case study 
in Savoir-faire Linux !ne. ' s Montreal headquarters for one year. Ali along this 
process, relying on purposive and snowballing (theoretical) sampling techniques, I 
have extended the number and nature of my cases to include different types of 
enterprise clients, OSS firms, and OSS communities. In total, I have conducted 40 in-
depth and focused interviews with chief technology officers, R&D managers of OSS 
firms and projects, OSS community project leaders and highly active OSS developers 
who have held maintainer' s positions in different projects. I have also talked 
informally, face-to-face, with a number of developers on OSS-focused occasions such 
as workshops and seminars being held at Google Montreal, Computer Research 
Institute of Montreal (CRIM), HackerNest Montreal at Notman House, to name a 
few. The interview contents are then analyzed based on the systematic procedures 
such as constant comparative method (CCM) explicated in severa! major works 
including Glaser and Strauss (1967), and Strauss and Corbin (1990). 
Finally, since ' generalizability' is a major concem to most researchers to the extent 
that it may cast doubts on the usefulness of the research results (e.g. , see Lee & 
Baskerville, 2003), it is necessary to discuss my research findings in light of the 
generalizability matter. 
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First, Lee and Baskerville (2003 , p. 221) highlight that "many IS researchers, both 
quantitative and qualitative, have restricted themselves to just one particular notion of 
generalizability- namely, a statistical, sampling-based notion". Such narrow view of 
the concept has caused IS researchers to even impose "this particular notion even 
outside the bounds of statistical , sampling-based research" (Lee & Baskerville, 2003 , 
p. 221). The present research ' s findings, however, fall under the "Level-2 inference" 
building or "analytical generalization" notion which, according to Yin (1994, p. 31 ), 
is generalizing from case study findings to the ory. Th us, following Yin (1994 ), and as 
emphasized by Lee and Baskerville (2003 , p. 222), "statistical generalizability is 
inappropriate as a measure of the quality of case studies because they involve not 
only a different form of inference (inference from case study findings to theory rather 
than from a sample to population characteristics [i.e. , Level-1]), but also inference at 
a different level (Level 2 rather than Level 1 )". 
Second, Lee and Baskerville (2003 , p. 232) claim, " .. . the outputs of generalizing (the 
"generalizing notions") can be either theoretical statements or empirical statements, 
and the inputs to generalizing (the "particular instances") can be either theoretical 
statements or empirical statements. Thus, based on their four classifications, this 
research falls under the second: ET; i.e. , "generalizing from description to theory. 
This involves the researcher' s job to generalize from empirical statements to 
theoretical statements (Lee & Baskerville, 2003 , p. 235). Such form of generalization, 
according to these authors, corresponds with Yin (1984, 1994)' s synonyms for 
generalizing from empirical to theoretical statements such as: "analytical 
generalizability", "Level-2 inference", and "generalizing to theory" . In fact, 
generalizing from case study findings ( e.g. , empirical descriptions and rich details) to 
theory is a form of generalizing from empirical to theoretical statements. The 
outcomes of this research that are constructs, the relationships among them in form of 
propositions and hypotheses, thick descriptions, as well as models are indeed the 
theoretical statements. 
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1.5 The significance and rel evan ce of the research 
This is study is significant because it addresses the questions that are both relevant 
and important to academies, policy makers and industry practitioners who are 
interested in ·oss technology. The theoretical field of OSS is a rich research domain 
but it has not reached its critical mass yet. More particularly, as OSS is a socio-
economic technology it has been studied from different perspectives and in an 
interdisciplinary fashion, therefore, its research field is quite fragmented . Thus, my 
work is important as it pro vides a multifaceted understanding of the subject matter. lt 
studies OSS and its relation to OI, strategie alliances, and BM. 
Primarily, by untangling OSS from OI conceptual camp, and delineating the two 
literatures, I have progressed our understanding of both OI and OSS. Academies do 
not necessarily need to rely upon insights from OI framework to study and theorize 
OSSTC. This is because OI is not a very specifie and comprehensive explanatory tool 
to encompass the multiple dimensions of such intricate and multifaceted technology. 
For instance, considering that OI is still a work in progress (e.g. , Trott & Hartmann, 
2009), and that the "Theories that can be aligned with open innovation [ e.g. , RBV] 
still have to be modified to grasp open innovation" (Vanhaverbeke & Cloodt, 2014, p. 
274). We cannot put ali our eggs in one basket, and rely much on OI theory to 
ad vance our detailed understanding of OSS boundary spanning collaborations. 
Next, by looking deep into OSSTC and OSS RDIP through adoption ofthe bottom-up 
approach, I will provide a finer-grained understanding of key minute conceptual 
building blocks as weil as core categories which both academies and practitioners 
may find very challenging to explain as weil as highlight their interconnections 
through a gestalt framework. For instance, breaking down the two concepts of 
success and sustainability of OSS projects or OSS shared RDIP can benefit 
academies with their deductive research designs to test OSS-related hypotheses with 
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higher degree of precision. In order to design a sm·vey study, researchers can create 
items (variables) that are discussed in this research, and therefore increase the content 
validity of their survey tools. Practitioners (e.g. , OSS firms' sales, communications 
and marketing departments, and OSS community administrators) can also integrate 
this research's findings and discussions into their information sessions, and creation 
of marketing and business intelligence tools in order to communicate the ir message to 
commercial clients more effectively and justify why they are seeking their active 
collaboration and long-term conm1itment with OSS projects. Even, IT departments of 
clients can benefit from these research findings to further justify their request for 
more support (resources, empowerment, etc.) from their top management on 
occasions their firm's IT strategy involves migration toward OSS teclmologies. 
In addition, this research positions OSSTC as a new breed of conventional strategie 
alliances and distinguishes it from informai cooperation. Therefore, academies who 
are interested in theorizing about either strategie alliances or OSSTC can benefit from 
the theoretical perspectives developed in Chapters 5 and 6 in order to be more 
specifie in their explanations of the collaboration phenomenon and typology 
development efforts. Similarly, 01 and OBM researchers can have a more detailed 
look into the black box of open, distributed and collaborative value creation processes 
within OSS context and enrich their OBM theory development efforts by drawing on 
this research' s results. 
Furthermore, policy makers who always need more recent and detailed research on 
OSS teclmology may find this research' s findings interesting and relevant to their 
decision making. They must to know why, how, and to what extent they need to be 
engaged with OSS communities and projects. Even sorne governrnent bodies that 
serve their own downstrearn multiple clients can benefit from the results of this 
research. In fact, the framework and core propositions developed in Chapter 5 can 
extend policy makers' gestalt as well as detailed understanding of OSSTC and OSS 
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shared RDIP. Once they know about micro and macro factors involved in the OSS 
development process (particularly through a simple and plain language and examples 
used in this dissertation), they can enter decision making sessions with a broader 
perspective and knowledge of the repercussions of their decisions on the viability of 
the upstream OSS projects that they are planning to integrate into their information 
systems. 
Last but not least, it is also important to pay attention to the consequences of not 
doing this research. Prior important works on OSS (e.g. , Weber, 2004; Kelty, 2008)-
mainly based on interviews with developers of two cases (Linux and Apache) have 
explained key issues such as individuals' motivation to engage in software 
development, the complexity of OSS, and the coordination among large numbers of 
developers among other things. Y et, they have paid little attention to OSS as a 
commercial and profit generating software wruch is developed on an open and 
collaborative technology platform (OCTP). Such open platform can include a diverse 
demographies and for this reason it is important to know how different groups of 
participants such as ' enterprise clients' as users can be factored in the equation of 
OSS firms plus community of developers in developing, steering, sustaining and 
profiting from OSS projects. 
As a case in point, Weber (2004, p. 216) highlights "the role of the ' customer' in the 
production process, specifically as it plays out within business models" a central 
conceptual question to be further studied. Weber (2004, p. 216), cites Eric Allman 
(2001) ' s argument that: "from a business perspective unsophisticated customers are 
free riding in the classical sense and tend to degrade the value of software"; and he 
further claims that this may be the case because the client' "business mode! has not 
figured out how effectively to channel the knowledge flowing in the other direction 
into the software rather than ]etting it be dispersed". To not know how and why OSS 
firms and community leadership deal with ' commercialization challenge ' of OSS 
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teclmology impedes our understanding of sustainability of the OSS collaborations. In 
fact, the puzzle of sustainability (as evident in cases of BigBlueButton and Tiki Wiki 
CMS Groupware) can be better resolved by knowing more about the interplay 
between long/short-term profit making, and sustainable technology development. 
For these important reasons and many more, this research intends to provide value for 
academie and industry readers. 
1.6 Limitations 
This research contains a number of inherent limitations that have been beyond the 
bounds of my direct control and have had an impact on it. The major limitations in 
brief are mentioned below, while they are explained in more detailed in the final 
chapter (i.e., Chapter 7, Section 7.5). 
The first maJor shortcomings are classified under 'research logis tics and socio-
cultural related issues'. These include the requirements for strict confidentiality from 
private enterprises, anonymity, and privacy of the participating individuals. 
Furthermore, issues like availability (and not necessarily willingness) of managers 
(e.g., R&D project managers, Topnotch coders, etc.) in combination with time 
differences for those stationed in Europe or online accessibility for those stationed in 
other provinces in Canada provided challenges in the data collection process. Lastly, 
being an outsider to OS world that -having its own unique socio-cultural issues- has 
been an important factor. 
Second, the issue of the 'researcher 's theoretical sensitivity' played both an 
advantageous and disadvantageous role. My low theoretical sensitivity level has 
helped me to remain an impartial investigator in the course of this research. It has 
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been also a limitation, specifically in high-tech arena such as software world, and in 
particular, OSS world that is full with jargons and teclmical terms. Finally, there have 
been challenges of higher leve! of abstraction in the process of categorization and 
conceptual groupings activities associated with GT A and inductive them·y building. 
Third, 1 cannot claim that the theoretical statements that 1 have developed in this work 
will remain valid beyond the observed cases. Lee and Baskerville (2003 , p. 236) 
mention: "a theory generalized from the empirical descriptions in a particular case 
study has no generalizability beyond the given case". However, as difficult a task to 
accomplish generalizability is, Lee and Baskerville (2003 , p. 236) acknowledge that 
"this particular lack of generalizability is not only a feature of qualitative studies, but 
also statistical, sampling-based studies" . By comparing the notion of generalizability 
between case research and statistical research, Lee and Baskerville (2003, p. 236) 
draw a parallel between generalizing beyond a given field setting in the former and 
generalizing beyond the given population in the latter where "sample points may be 
generalized to sample estimates of population characteristics, but certainly have no 
generalizability beyond the given population". 
Having acknowledged the weaknesses of this research related to generalizability 
issue, other limitations have not critically inhibited this empirical investigation 
mainly due to adopting the participant observation method carried out during a 
yearlong industry intemship program that 1 have completed in OSS industry. 
1. 7 Dissertation outline 
The dissertation is comprised of seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the topic, 
highlights the research problems from academies' as weil as practitioners' 
perspectives, poses the pnmary and secondary research questions and the 
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methodology through which this research is conducted. It further emphasizes why 
this research is important and relevant to academies, and practitioners. And finally, it 
sheds light on major limitations of this study and concludes with this section- i.e. , the 
dissertation' s outline. 
Chapter 2 provides a critical review literature of 01 and its related paradigms. It 
describes what 01 concept is, and discusses openness as it lies at its core. lt further 
provides a review of theoretical developments on 01 including open strategy, 01 
business models, OSS business models and other major theoretical developments 
related to 01 framework. 
Chapter 3 defines, describes, and discusses origins and significance of OSS as an 
appropriate case to study open and collaborative technology development. It also 
identifies the inherent particularities of OSS technology. lt further reviews the 
theoretical perspectives on OSS development process and highlights the most valid 
and important empirical findings related to OSS research domain. lt emphasizes the 
transformation of OSS into a more strategie and commercial option that competes 
with closed proprietary software solutions. Finally, it highlights the problematic areas 
and stresses why we need to adopt an inductive approach to study OSS technological 
collaborations. 
Chapter 4 describes the research methodology and justifies the underlying reasons, 
the rationale, for choosing a qualitative research approach. It further highlights and 
explains why a combination of three variations of qualitative methodology is 
employed in this research. This chapter also explicates the research design by 
defining the unit of analysis, the major case and minor cases, sampling and data 
collection, as weil as data analysis methods. lt further discusses the issues of validity, 
reliability, generalizability, and ethical considerations, and finally closes the 
discussion by highlighting the methodological contribution. 
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Chapt er 5 and Chapter 6 are the fruits of this research. Chapter 5 pro vides the major 
and minor findings about an inductive them·y of sustainable OSS shared R&D and 
innovation process. It introduces the theoretical mode! of OSSTC, and identifies the 
key factors influencing the success and sustainably of collaborative OSS RDIP. 1t 
also proposes and explains a set of core propositions, discusses them and 
recommends testable hypotheses to guide further empirical investigations. Therefore, 
the theoretical model, propositions, and hypotheses, together, put the main conceptual 
categories, subcategories and their conceptual building blocks in perspectives-
therefore, offering a gestalt overview of the inductive theory developed in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 critically rev1ews the literature of strategie alliances, and the maJor 
management and economies theories employed in that context with the goal of better 
understanding and identifying the position of OSSTC in relation to conventional 
strategie alliances. Furthermore, building on the main findings of Chapter 5 and using 
the insights from the literature reviews (Chapter 2 and 3), Chapter 6 develops open 
and collaborative technology platform as an alternative perspective of OSSTC. 
Chapter 7, the final chapter, concludes this research endeavour by highlighting the 
theoretical contributions as weil as managerial implications of the results of this 
study. It further identifies the major study limitations and how they have been 
overcome. Lastly, it recommends severa! avenues to extend this research. 
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CHAPTER II 
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON OPEN 
INNOVATION 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter analytically focuses on the theoretical perspectives on OI concept. I first 
discuss the changing Jandscape of innovation and, drawing on the relevant literature, 
argue that although 'openness' is an essential condition for innovation and 
particularly adopting an OIP, it is not sufficient to succeed and compete in the 
industry. Next, I review and discuss major theoretical and empirical works conducted 
in the field of OI and highlight severa! of their shortcomings. Further, I explain how 
business model concept fits within OIP and where it falls short of catching up with 
the concept of OI. In addition, I touch upon open strategy, and open business model 
concepts as two enablers to adopt OIP. These discussions further lead to remaining 
caveats in the open business model research and its limitation to properly explain 
open and distributed value creation processes. Later, I try to be more objective and 
take a critical perspective toward OI. I, therefore, discuss its major weaknesses and 
reiterate the existing claim that OI is not a fully-fledged theory yet. 
2.2 Open innovation concept and the changing landscape of innovation 
Innovation is perceived as a necessity to a firm 's survival and growth. Innovation 
scholars, through challenging the oversimplified "linear" view of innovation 
(process), have highlighted severa! key realities about its inherent characteristics. 
They view innovation as "flexible" (Niosi, 1995), "interactive" and "complex, 
uncertain, somewhat disorderly, and subject to changes of many sorts" (Kline & 
Rosenberg, 1986, p. 275; von Hippie, 1988). They have further emphasized 
innovation as a "collaborative enterprise"- one that rests upon the blurring boundary 
of the firm (e.g., Gomes-Casseres et al. , 2006; Lindsey, 2008). 
In 2003 , Chesbrough (2003a: XXIV) coined the term OI to differentiate the changing 
landscape of innovation in modern era. He defines OI as "a paradigm that assumes 
that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internai ideas, and internai and 
external paths to market, as firms look to advance their teclmology". Later, 
Chesbrough and Bogers (2014) refine the definition of OI to further clarify it and 
bring conceptual uniformity to its field of research. They define OI as "a distributed 
innovation process based on purposively managed knowledge flows across 
organizational boundaries, using pecuniary and non-pecuniary mechanisms in line 
with the organization's business mode!" (Ibid. , p. 17). Having positioned the 'new' 
concept in the literature as the stark opposite of the 'closed ' innovation paradigm 
(CIP), Chesbrough (2003c, p. 38) highlights six fundamental princip/es of 01 (Table 
2.1). 
To state the obvious, OI has enjoyed an unprecedented upward trend in terms of 
popularity measured through academies and practitioners' publications (Chesbrough 
& Bogers; 2014). However, this does not mean that OI concept is a bed of roses! 
Quite the contrary, OI suffers from three major criticisms that 1 will discuss later in 
this chapter. 
Historically, large firms have been mostly dependent on internai R&D to make 
successful innovations happen. In fact, based on the tenets of the resource-based view 
(RBV), firms gain and sustain competitive advantages by deploying valuable 
resources and capabilities that are inelastic in supply (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 
1986, 1991 ; Peteraf, 1993). Therefore, large internai R&D laboratories have been 
viewed as a strategie asset and motor of innovation acting as an entry barrier for 
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potential rivais (van de Vrande et al. , 2009). Many firms used to profitably engage in 
internai R&D and their preference has been to use the proprietary R&D mode! 
"where internai R&D activities lead to products that are developed and distributed by 
the firm" (Chandler, 1990). While the proprietary and closed organizational design 
cannot be viewed as an absolutely obsolete mode! today, it can, in many cases, have 
its own limitations and renders itself Jess favorable concerning innovation process. 
Table 2.1. Contrasting Principles of Closed and Open Innovation 
Closed innovation principles 
The smart people in our field work for us. 
To profit from R&D, we must discover, 
develop, and ship it ourselves. 
If we discover it ourse Ives, we will get it to 
the market first. 
If we are first to commercial ize an innovation, 
we will win . 
If we create the most and best ideas in the 
industry, we will win . 
We should control our intellectual property 
(IP) so that our competitors don ' t profit from 
our ideas 
Open innovation principles 
Not ali of the smart people work for us so we 
must find and tap into the knowledge and 
experti se of bright individuals outside our 
company. 
External R&D can create significant value ; 
internai R&D is needed to claim sorne portion of 
that value . 
We don ' t have to originate the research in order 
to profit from it. 
Building a better business mode! is better than 
getting to the market first. 
Ifwe make the best use of internai and external 
ideas, we will win . 
We should profit from others' use of our IP, and 
we should buy others ' IP whenever it advances 
our business mode!. 
• This max im first came to my attention in a talk by Bill Joy of Sun Microsystems over a decade ago. See, for example, 
A. Lash, "The Joy of Sun," The Standard, June 2 1, 1999, http://thestandard .net. 
In line with this argument, Chesbrough ' s (2003a, b, c) OI model posits that the 
landscape of innovation; more precisely closed innovation, has been changing 
through the emergence of a number of "erosion factors" in the twentieth century. 
Chesbrough (2003c, p. 36) enumerates the most important of these factors: 1) the 
"dramatic rise in the number and mobility of knowledge workers" which imposes 
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fim1s the challenge of controlling their proprietary ideas and expertise; 2) the 
"growing avai lability of private venture capital" as it stimulates the 
commercialization of ideas that have "spilled outside the silos of corporate research 
labs" through providing the finances. 
Others (e.g. , Mina et al. , 2014, p. 853) have also emphasized such shift in the grand 
landscape of innovation regime where firms are developing "more outward-looking 
strategie approaches to research and development to source at least sorne knowledge 
of potential value from the broader environn1ent in which they operate". Influencing 
factors include vertical disintegration pressures (Langlois, 2003), modularisation and 
outsourcing (Prencipe et al. , 2003 ; Sturgeon, 2002), the growth of specialised 
technology markets (Arora et al. , 2001 ; Brusoni et al. , 2001) and difficulties in 
appropriating internai investments in intangibles (Chesbrough, 2003b). These factors 
encourage firms to develop more open and porous organizational boundaries by 
adopting the OIP. Such paradigm allows for more inclusion of extemal knowledge 
and paths to markets in the innovation management process. 
The open approach to innovation also benefits firms in a number of ways. It enables 
firms to better adapt to the dynamic market needs, pool their resources together and 
share the costs and risks associated with R&D among partners, and enjoy higher rates 
of commercial returns, to name a few (Chesbrough, 2003a; 2006b ). Partly due to its 
imperative and parti y because of its merits, increasing number of firms has embraced 
OIP and its embedded innovation strategies in recent years (Hagedoom, 2002; 
Kirschbaum, 2005 ; Huston & Sakkab, 2006; Roijakkers & Hagedoom, 2006). 
Irrespective of its advantages, OIP is also fraught with various challenges associated 
with disadvantages of openness. The selective openness associated with the 01 
strategy and OI Business Models (OIBM) induces a certain degree of revealing of the 
firm's internai knowledge to the extemal environment and sharing strategie resources 
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with the goal of collecting the returns through different mechanisms. Thus, smce 
openness lies at heart ofOIP, I discuss it in more detailed . 
2.3 ' Openness' : The essential condition to adopt open innovation paradigm 
Chesbrough and Appleyard (2007, p. 57) define openness as "the pooling of 
knowledge for innovative purposes where the contributors have access to the inputs 
of others and cannot exert exclusive rights over the resultant innovation" . Sorne 
aspects of the innovation process are open and others may be closed (Chesbrough et 
al. , 2006b ), however, researchers tend to view openness as a matter of degree rather 
than a black-and-white or on-and-off situation (see e.g. Dahlander & Gann, 201 0; 
Lazzarotti , Manzini & Pellegrini , 2011; Drechsler & Natter, 2012). For example, 
Dahlander and Gann (2010, p. 703) maintain that "if we accept that openness is a 
continuum, a non-controversial argument in the open innovation community, then we 
can seek to advance a greater understanding ofbenefits and costs of openness". 
As openness is the necessary condition to adopt OIP, research on openness has been 
continuously under spotlight in the 01 literature. For example, Lichtenthaler (2008) 
has paid close attention to the implications involved with the firn1 ' s emphasis on 
radical innovation. He finds that as a firm ' s degree of emphasis on radical innovation 
increases, the firm 's degree of openness seems to rise accordingly. This is even more 
obvious when the degree of external technology commercialization is under spotlight. 
Further, Lazzarotti et al. (2011), studying ltalian manufacturing firms , find out four 
different 01 models (open innovators; closed innovators ; integrated collaborators; 
and specialized collaborators) with respect to two variables which represent the 
' degree of openness' within a firm's BM. Lazzarotti et al. (2011) further classify the 
extent ofopenness into two: 1)partner variety (the number and type ofpartners); and 
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2) innovation phase variety (the number/type of phases of the innovation process 
which are actually open to external collaborations). Next, the authors investigate how 
four firm-specific factors (R&D intensity, size, approach to innovation, and 
organizational and managerial actions) affect the degrees of openness thereby leading 
to creation of different 01 models. 
Having perceived openness as a matter of degree, severa! scholars have focused their 
attention on the ' impacts of openness' . For example, Fey and Birkinshaw (2005) have 
been successful in showing that the greater the openness to new ideas in a firm, the 
higher the firn1 ' s R&D performance. While others like Laursen and Salter (2006a), 
based on a large-scale empirical study, maintain that there is an optimal degree of 
openness with regards to a fmn 's external search strategies. Following this line of 
argument and the premise that openness is a matter of degree (i .e., openness can be 
viewed from a continuum perspective), Drechsler and Natter (2012) use contingency 
theory (Ham brick, 1983) to empirically find out about the factors underlying the 
degree of openness. Contingency theory (Hambrick, 1983) emphasizes the 
importance of knowledge of antecedents to gain a better understanding of a particular 
business orientation, i.e. , the decision on how open a firm should be. 
The work ofDrechsler and Natter (2012) is ofparticular importance partly because it 
is a pioneering research in its kind, and partly due to its research framework. Based 
on this work, the main factors that relate to the degree of openness (i.e. , closed vs. 
various levels of openness) are four: 1) a firm 's innovation strate gy; 2) scarce firm 
resources; 3) the appropriability regime; and 4) market dynamics (Ibid., p. 439). 
These four factors are structured at two levels based on firm-specific or interna! 
factors as weil as external or environmental factors. The results of this study show 
that three main factors stop firms from opening up, and therefore remaining in the 
closed innovation zone. These factors are: 1) Jack of market and technological 
knowledge (knowledge gaps); 2) ineffective intellectual property (IP) protection 
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mechanisms; and 3) competitor' s threats such as market entries and imitation. 
Further, the most imp01tant factors that impact a firm 's strategie decision to opt for 
openness are two: 1) a firm ' s need for financial funding in innovation; and 2) the 
effectiveness of a firm's IP protection mechanisms. When higher degrees of openness 
are concerned, Drechsler and Natter (20 12) find that, still, scarce financial re sources 
and effective IP mechanisms are derivers for opening further up. 
Finally, long before OI scholars emphasize the notion of openness in terms of its 
degree, antecedents, or impacts, Niosi (1995) - conceptualizing innovation process 
(i.e. , R&D) as a flexible phenomenon which heavily relies on interfirm collaborations 
- find that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) tend to more frequently rely 
upon interfirrn R&D collaborations when compared to the large firms . Across 
different industries (e.g. , electronics, biotechnology and advanced materials), as Niosi 
(1995) explains, "size" appears to be one of the key explanatory variables 
underpinning the collaborative behavior of firms. For instance, SMEs in electronics 
sector, due to resources (pecuniary and human capital) shortages view collaborative 
R&D as a conduit to obtain "economies of scale" so much so that either they form 
larger number of collaborations and/or they allocate a larger portion of their R&D 
effort (i.e. , collaborations as percentage of R&D expenditures). In a nutshell, the 
smaller the firm is, the need to become more open and reach out for resources seems 
to be more pressing. 
These results inform us of different conditions under which a finn decides to open up 
or remain closed as weil as the conditions under which a firm decides to open up to a 
higher or a lower degree. The frrst preventing factor shows that a firm needs to have 
certain capability(ies) to primarily understand what it needs in terms of new 
technological knowledge appreciation and comprehension. This shows how much the 
firm-level innovation capability and absorptive capacity theories (e.g. , Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990) are still relevant when issue of openness is at stake. Second, IP 
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regime is still a strong mechanism for value capture and the majority of firms are 
unable to develop new strategies ( other than IP) in order to appropriate the value of 
their innovations in an 01 regime. Thus, this Jack of appropriation capability holds 
firms back from further adopting an OIP and engage in the opening-up process. 
Third, financial needs provide a strong motivation to open up the firm 's innovation 
process. This suggests that RBV of the firm is still a relevant theory which can be 
relied on in the field of 01 particularly when the strategie decision of open vs. close is 
at stake. 
To continue, m a more recent study, Felin and Zenger (2014) acknowledge that, 
based on ' firm-level aggregates ', the past literature on 01 has made a rather strong 
and positive case for more open govemance forms (for example, alliances and joint 
ventures, firrn boundary perrneability, etc.) in favor of a firm ' s innovation outcomes. 
However, the authors shift the spot light on the caveat which encompasses 
governance solutions at the micro-leve!; meaning that if a firm follows prescriptions 
based on aggregates, it may run the risk of making govemance (open versus closed 
govemance structure- i.e., management of innovation process) mistakes at the micro 
level. In so highlighting the issue, authors emphasize on the 'problem' which derives 
innovation as the focused process, and tend to argue that the decision to opt for open 
vs. closed govemance structure must be made so as to strike the right balance 
between problem type and governance form-i.e ., problem-govemance match making. 
The premise to this analysis is that "differing problems, in essence, demand differing 
approaches to solution search", according to Felin and Zenger (2014, p. 916). In this 
tentative theory, the manager is the principal actor who "seeks to effectively govem, 
manage and organize problem solving associated with innovation" (Ibid. , p. 915). 
Felin and Zenger (2014) develop a matrix in which there are two dimensions: 1) 
problem complexity; and 2) hidden knowledge. Further, authors identify two search 
dimensions: 1) the source of the direction guiding the search (simple, decentralized 
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trial and error, or theory-driven search); and 2) the mechanism which solicits 
participation in search ( centrally identified and selected vs. self-nominated and 
selected). Therefore, problems with different level of complexity are different in their 
need for knowledge exchange and knowledge discovery and so they need to be 
matched with their own governance forms. 
As a case in point, in a situation where problems are complex and knowledge 
required to solve the problem is hidden and dispersed, a firm may use users' 
communities. Android Inc., once a private firm which was later acquired by Google 
Corp. , decided to make Android operating system ( originally developed out of Linux 
kernel) an OSS so that the complex problems in the system become solved by diverse 
community of users. Felin and Zenger (2014) hold that firms tend to interact with 
innovation communities in highly complex ways as they seek to generate value and 
look for optimal ways to organize their problem solving and innovation. 
The se studies show that, first, openness (having porous organizational boundaries) is 
advantageous. Firms that opt for openness can us external knowledge to complement 
internai knowledge and fill the existing knowledge gaps (Lichtenthaler & 
Lichtenthaler, 2009; Chesbrough, 2006c). They can also access scarce financial and 
knowledge resources (Drechsler & Natter, 2012) to enhance their R&D and 
innovative performance (Fey & Birkinshaw, 2005; Laursen & Salter, 2006b); to 
reduce costs and risks of R&D, and to get involved early in new technologies and 
business opportunities (Vanhaverbeke, van de Vrande & Chesbrough, 2008). Second, 
the decision to open up and remain porous are not made blindly; meaning that a 
firm ' s innovation strategy, the capability to manage and integrate the external 
knowledge resources, governance mechanisms, and its ability to appropriate the value 
as created collaboratively drive its openness strategy (Drechsler & Natter, 2012). 
Third, the absence of the necessary absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal , 1990), 
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appropriate governance structure and appropriability mechanisms, can cast doubts on 
a fruitful openness process. 
However, "Too much openness can negatively impact companies' long-term 
innovation success, because it could lead to loss of control and core competences" 
(Enkel, Gassmann, & Chesbrough, 2009, p. 312). It is true that taking a closed 
approach to innovation "does not serve the increasing demands of shorter innovation 
cycles and reduced time to market" (Enkel et al., 2009, p. 312), but one cannot 
approach ope1mess without considering the context and its downstream 
consequences. For this reason, past research has emphasized that there is still a lack 
of a clear understanding of the underlying mechanisms of the degree of openness and 
that an appropriate balanced approach to OI is key to success (see, Dahlander & 
Gann, 201 0; Enkel et al., 2009). 
In summary, the review of the literature on openness informs us about three main 
realities. First, openness is the essential condition for adopting OIP. This simply 
means that if a firm does not adopt an open approach to its innovation processes, it 
cannot benefit from the advantages discussed in OI literature. Second, openness is not 
the sufficient condition of OIP. For instance, by merely seeking and integrating ideas, 
talents, IPs, and other enablers that exist beyond firm boundaries, a firrn cannot 
necessarily ensure firm-level innovation success and stronger or strategie market 
positioning. Thus, Issues like appropriate governance, managing network 
externalities, honing the right absorptive capacities, to nan1e a few, are among the 
significant factors that must be discussed at a higher organizational level. Third, and 
the main caveat in the openness literature, is the overemphasis of the existing 
literature in framing openness as dominantly a firm-centric phenomenon. Put simply, 
the decision to become more open at different phases of the innovation process has 
become subject to firrn-level managerial discussions. Such firm-based or dominantly 
firm-centric (see, Piller & West, 2014, p. 29), and limited conceptualization of 
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opetmess tend to inhibit our understanding from broader implications of the openness 
in the open and distributed innovation communities and innovation ecosystems. For 
instance, in case of OSS industry where there is a heterogeneous and voluminous 
involvement of different individuals as well as organizations from private and public 
sectors, high-tech and low-tech manufacturing or services industries, the nature of 
openness and the way it is governed and managed may be different. For this reason, 
OSS industry presents a special case for studying openness in a more detailed 
manner- an investigation that also expands the boundaries of this concept within OI 
literature. 
2.4 The theoretical perspectives on open innovation 
2.4.1 Open innovation: Modes, models, and mechanism_s 
Chesbrough (2006b, p. 1) defines 01 as "the use of purposive inflows and outflows of 
knowledge to accelerate internai innovation, and expand the markets for external use 
of innovation, respectively" . This conceptualization of 01 forms the basis for the 
majority of research development in the field. However, most recently, Chesbrough 
and Bogers (2014, p. 4) build upon this earlier perception of 01 and claim that 01 
"ought to be conceptualized as a distributed [ emphasis added] innovation process that 
involves purposively managed knowledge flows across the organizational boundary". 
The recent conceptualization, according to Chesbrough and Bogers (2014) , connects 
the 01 concept closer to its types: Outside-ln (inbound), lnside-Out (outbound), and 
Coupled 01, as well as to its associated mechanisms: pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
flows. 
According to Chesbrough and Bogers (20 14, p. 16), "purposive inflows and outflows 
of knowledge" connects the 01 practice with the spillovers' literature. Originally, 
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firms cannot be full y in control of the results of their R&D investments and therefore 
spillovers are, and can be perceived as a cost to the focal firm as it is difficult to 
completely avoid or manage them (see, Kenneth Arrow, 1962). However, OIP is 
distinguished from this view of wasteful R&D investment in that "in the open 
innovation mode! of R&D, spillovers are transformed into inflows and outflows of 
knowledge !hat can be purposively managed" (Chesbrough & Bogers, 2014, p. 17). 
Accordingly, following OIP, finns need to design "specifie mechanisms" to channel 
inflows and outflows of knowledge. Thus, taking into considerations spillovers ' 
concept and particular mechanisms to harness 01-based R&D investments, 
Chesbrough and Bogers (2014, p. 17) refine the 01 concept by defining it as: 
"A distributed innovation process based on purposively managed knowledge 
flows across organizational boundaries, using pecùniary and non-pecumary 
mechanisms in line with the organization 's business mode!." 
The purposeful management of knowledge spillovers also sheds light on two major 
modes of 01 based on the direction of knowledge flows across finn boundaries. 
These two are: 1) Outside-in (or inbound); and 2) lnside-out (or outbound) 01 
(Chesbrough, 2003a; Chesbrough & Bogers, 2014). The 'outside-in' mode of 01 
concerns the inflow of knowledge to the focal firm where emphasis is on taping into 
external sources of knowiedge and resources by deploying internai processes. The 
' inside-out' mode of 01, on the other hand, involves outflow of knowledge from the 
focal finn where emphasis is on commerciaiizing the internai knowiedge, for 
example, in fonn of untapped latent patents and inventions (see, for exampie, 
Chesbrough 2003a). 
Gassmann and Enkei (2004, p. 1) define the two modes of 01 in the following 
manners. The outside-in process refers to "enriching a company's own knowledge 
base through the integration of suppiiers, customers, and externai knowledge sourcing 
can increase a company's innovativeness", whiie the inside-out process concerns "the 
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external exploitation of ideas in different markets, selling IP and multiplying 
technology by channeling ideas to the external environment" . 
ln addition to these two modes (or types) ofOI, Gassmann and Enkel (2004; Enkel et 
al. , 2009) further identified a third mode based on an empirical analysis of 124 firms. 
The third mode of OI: "Coupled Process" refers to "linking outside-in and inside-out 
by working in alliances with complementary companies during which give and take 
are crucial for success" (Gassmann & Enkel, 2004, p. 1 ). Figure 2.1 shows the three 
modes ofOI based on Gassmann and Enkel (2004)'s approach to 01. 
Figure 2.1. De-Coupling the Locus of Innovation Process 
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Source: Adopted from Gassmann and Enkel (2004, p. 6) 
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Further, according to Gassmann and Enkel (2004)'s empirical data, a firm does not 
necessarily use ali three processes; rather, each firm opts for one primary process, yet 
it integrates sorne elements of other two. Additionally, Gassmann and Enkel (2004) 
mention that firms that follow coupled-processes approach are required to co-operate 
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with others in strategie networks where give and take of knowledge lies at the center. 
Following the classification made by Gassmann and Enkel (2004), in my opinion, the 
most challenging approach to openness is coupled-processes as they require a firm to 
create and joggle a combination of different set of capabilities involved with both 
processes. 
Gassmann and Enkel (2004) further specify different capabilities for each process. 
For example, absorptive capability is required for engaging a firm in the outside-in 
process while multiplicative capability (i .e. a firm ' s capability to multiply and 
transfer its knowledge to the outside environment) is needed to execute inside-out 
process. Further, multiplicative capability is a complex capability as it is tightly 
interrelated to a firm ' s knowledge transfer capability and the capability to select 
appropriate partners. Relational capability, on the other hand, is one used for coupled 
processes and it draws on the idea that a firm ' s value is strongly related to its 
capability to build and maintain relationships with partners to enable joint 
development in strategie alliances (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
More recently, Dahlander and Gann (201 0) classify OI approaches into four 
categories: 1) outbound innovation (non-pecuniary); 2) outbound innovation 
(pecuniary); 3) inbound innovation (non-pecuniary) ; and 4) inbound innovation 
(pecuniary). The authors also discuss advantages and disadvantages of each class of 
openness. For instance, firms that reveal their internai resources without expecting 
immediate financial rewards; yet, seeking indirect benefits to the focal finn ( e.g. , OSS 
companies) fall under the first category. 
In the recent book published on OI: "New Frontiers in Open Innovation" (edited by 
Henry W. Chesbrough, Wim Vanhaverbeke, Joel West, 2014), Chesbrough and 
Bogers (2014) officially incorporate the third mode of OI into the original conception 
and demonstrate the three through the classical innovation funnel (see Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2, demonstrates the inflow and outflow paths of knowledge across firm 
boundaries under 01 regime. lt further highlights the connection between upstream 
R&D to manufacturing and marketing and emphasizes downstream activities in the 
overall innovation pro cess (Bogers & Lhuillery, 2011 ). Chesbrough and Bogers 
(2014) claim that this overall mode) emphasizes "the importance of considering ali 
activities from invention to commercialization in order to create and capture value 
from ideas and technologies" (see also, Chesbrough, 2006a; West & Bogers, 2014). 
Figure 2.2. The Open Innovation Model 
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Despite the efforts of pioneering authors to conceptualize OIP through the three 
' core' processes (the inbound, the outbound, and the coupled), majority of research 
on 01, so far, has been focused on 'outside-in' 01 processes. This narrow focus has 
led to dearth of empirical evidence on the ' inside-out' and the 'coupled ' modes of 01 
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(Chesbrough & Bogers, 2014). For instance, out of 165 papers on 01, only 118 
articles are concerned with inbound 01, 50 of the reviewed papers focused on 
outbound 01, and 70 of the sampled articles consider coupled mode of 01 (West & 
Bogers, 2014, p. 818). 
The review of three 01 processes draws our attention to the dearth of understanding 
of "the interactive and reciproca1 nature of such coupled innovation processes" 
(Chesbrough & Bogers, 2014, p. 19. More specifically, in case of technological 
collaborations embedded in OSS projects, investigating the coupled processes gain 
significance. This is mainly because OSSTCs include multi-sided interactions among 
a p1ethora of firn1s, community of developers and freelance individuals who 
collectively develop software products and modules in the commons. 
2.4.2 Overlap between user innovation and open innovation perspectives 
User Innovation (UI) concept (see, von Hippel, 1988, 2005 , 201 0), like 01, provides 
an alternative perspective to closed innovation model. Ul places ' users ' on the 
driver' s seat of the innovation process, viewing them not as mere consumers but as 
empowered "self-manufacturers" who can create their own products and services out 
of necessity or for fun; individually or in group(s) (e.g. , collaborating through 
communities which includes firms and individuals). At the heart of UI's perspective 
lies three chief assumptions: 1) users have unique "sticky" information about their 
needs; 2) when enabled, they will create solutions to those needs; and 3) they may 
freely reveal their results to others (see, von Hippel, 2010). Recently, Piller and West 
(2014, p. 33) have mentioned that UI ' s literature has grown from being primarily 
focused on " innovating users" and has further developed into a conception which 
involves "interaction among users and firms". However, there is dearth of research 
investigating "in-depth the process of collaboration between users and firms". 
43 
Ul, despite being different from 01, shares certain traits with 01. Most important of 
ali , when it cornes to realizing that the knowledge necessary for innovation is widely 
dispersed beyond the conventional boundaries of the firm, the two current approaches 
to innovation; namely, 01 (Chesbrough, 2006b) and Ul (von Hippel, 2005) converge 
(for detailed discussion see, Bogers & West, 2012). Additionally, both concepts are in 
sharp contrast with the traditional vertically integrated Ïlmovation framework (see, 
Bogers & West, 2012, p. 64). 
However, despite having points of commonalities and overlap, the two approaches 
diverge because they tend to study "different phenomena" (Piller & West, 2014, p. 
29). While 01 is a rather "firm-centric paradigm that is primarily concerned with 
leveraging external knowledge to improve internai innovation and thus the firm 's 
economie performance"; Ul, on the other band, "is mainly about individuals using 
innovation to address the ir own ( often unique) needs, without regard to firm success 
and often as part of a social! y embedded community". 
In short, three main distinctions exist between Ul and 01 (Piller & West, 2014; see 
also, Bogers & West, 2012). Firstly, 01 success in private sector depends heavily on 
strong appropriability and aggressive IP enforcement ( e.g. , Chesbrough, 2003b; 
West, 2006) while UI paradigm mainly favors "free revealing" as in giving up the 
appropirability voluntarily in order to promote innovations (Harhoff, Henkel, & von 
Hippel, 2003; Henkel , 2006). Secondly, to secure economie incentive for the 
innovating firm, the private control model is implicitly built into 01 studies; while the 
expansion of UI model mostly fa vors collaboration among actors which also involves 
sharing of the benefits through collective or private-collective innovation models (see 
the major works on this front by von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003 ; West, 2003). 
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Thirdly, the distinction between ' money markets ' 11 and ' social markets' 12 also 
influence the organization of individuals' participation in the innovation process 
(Piller, Vossen, & Ihl, 2012). For example, those individuals who interact in social 
markets tend to expend more effort in exchange for no payment than they would 
expend when they receive low payment in monetary markets (Heyman & Ariely, 
2004). 
Thus, Piller and West (2014, p. 36) claim that these distinctions between 01 and UI 
can shed light on "areas of tensions between the interests of firms and those of 
individual users when they collaborate" . This reflects the contrast between persona] 
utility vs. private economie retums and the resulting tensions if they are not 
reconciled. 
In order to extend the research on coupled processes, Piller and West (2014) identify 
four important ' dimensions' of them along with proposing a ' four-phase model' of 
interactive coupled 01 and how firms can manage such mode] with individual users. 
Such mode] integrates the previous understanding on ' inbound' 01 with collaborative 
innovation (including collaborative tools and processes). 
The four dimensions of coupled 01 mode, as identified by Piller and West (2014, p. 
38) are: 1) external actor; 2) coupling typo/ogy; 3) impetus for collaboration; and 4) 
locus of innovation. 
The ' nature of the extemal actor' concerns firms, and individuals as weil as non-for 
profit organizations. This dimension therefore extends the earlier conception . by 
11 Money markets are markets for external innovation and are organized around economie (monetary) 
incentives exchanged for ideas and solutions (e.g. , Terwisch & Xu, 2008 ; Jeppesen & Lakhani , 201 0; 
Boudreau et al. , 201 1 ). 
12 Social markets are formed based on social exchange relations and are mainly built upon the non-
monetary incentives for participants such as enjoyment or task achievement (von Hippel & von Krogh, 
2003 , 2006), for outcome expectations that enhance their own use experience or that ofothers (Harhoff 
et al. , 2003), or through norms ofmutual cooperation and reciprocity (Lakhani & von Hippel, 2003). 
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including non-for profit organizations and individuals and consequently raising the 
issues of incentives, coordination and governance of the collaboration between two 
parties. Next is the ' typology of relationships ' with the external actors. This proposed 
typology includes dyadic (single partner), network (multiple partners) and community 
(a new inter-organizational entity) relationships. Further, the ' impetus for 
collaboration' distinguishes between top-down and bottom-up modes of initiating, 
directing and implementing collaboration. Lastly, ' locus of the innovation process' is 
concerned with two approaches: a) bidirectional; and b) interactive. 
Bidirectional approach to ilmovation captures the case in which two actors, which are 
typically two organizations, independently engage in the innovation activity, yet they 
also share useful knowledge. Piller and West (2014) view bidirectional approach a 
concept that closely describes what Gassmann and Enkel (2004) mean by combining 
inbound and outbound flows of knowledge, i.e. coupled process of 01. On a more 
extreme level, interactive approach captures a knowledge creation which takes place 
outside finn boundaries. lt differs from bidirectional approach in that the locus of 
innovation is not within collaborating finn; it also involves issues like how the joint 
knowledge creation process is governed, how the returns on investments are to be 
appropriated, and so on (see also Chesbrough, 2011). 
The contribution of Piller and West (2014) to build upon the couple 01 process is 
through breaking down the coupled mode of 01 into two and emphasizing the 
coupled process as "interactive, collaborative process ofjoint value creation" . Figure 
2.3 depicts the authors ' mode! of coupled mode of 01. 
Moving on towards building a ' four-phase process model ' of interactive coupled 01 
between finns and users, Piller and West (2014, pp. 40-46) propose four major steps 
of the process mode!: 1) defining; 2) finding participants; 3) collaborating; and 4) 
leveraging. The third phase is most relevant to the present research. 
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Figure 2.3 . Two Forms of Coupled Open Innovation 
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Collaboration involves the process of co-creating of the knowledge which does not 
necessarily exist within a single partner. As claimed by Piller and West (2014, p. 44), 
"research on the joint creation process of such knowledge [ extemal knowledge] has 
been comparatively rare in the open innovation literature". In fact, there is dearth of 
empirical research investigating the "structures and processes supporting 
collaborative knowledge creation with extemal actors" (Piller & West, 2014, p. 44) 
(see, e.g., Blazevic & Lievens, 2008). Further to this dearth of research, Piller & West 
(20 14, p. 45) mention that even "the original UI literature on lead users did not look 
upon the collaboration stage, except . . . for collaborations within communities of 
innovating users" (e.g., Franke & Shah 2003; von Krogh, Spaeth, & Lakhani, 2003). 
Additionally, these studies have not paid attention to collaboration between users and 
firms (Pi ller & West, 2014, p. 45). Therefore, Piller and West (2014, p. 45) classify 
the research gaps on the "collaboration stage of coupled OI" into three groups. These 
are: 1) governance of collaboration process (i .e., organizing, monitoring and policing 
collaborations); 2) tools and collaboration infrastructures facilitating governance 
(i.e., software tools); and 3) interna! attitudes and capabilities of focal firm 
supporting the collaboration (i .e., using the services of specialized intermediaries and 
brokers for 01). 
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To summarize, first , 01 is a rather "firm-centric paradigm" while Ul "is mainly about 
individuals" who do not concerna firm ' s profitability and economie success. Second, 
success of 01 heavily depends on strong appropriability and aggressive IP 
enforcement while that of UI rests upon free revealing to increase follow-up 
adoptions and expand network externalities. Third, as a firm-centric approach, OI 
favors private control models while UI favors collective innovation model and at 
times a mix of private and collective development. Fourth, the target market of OIP 
adopted by private firms is mo ney markets, while that of UI is mainly social markets. 
The distinction between market types influences individuals ' incentives for their 
contributions and their organization. 
In short, based on the above discussions, we can conclude that both OI and UI suffer 
from shortcomings that make them inadequate to explain intricacies of OSSTCs. 
Perhaps it is for these reasons that Piller and West (2014, p. 47) highlight the need for 
empirical research to clarify "hybrid models" of innovation where UI and OI are 
combined. OSSTCs is such case as they include close collaboration among 
individuals (usually free software developers who write codes under GNU GPL 
licensing) and professional IT firms (SMEs) as well as large software corporations 
(e.g. , Microsoft, Google, and IBM) that use these software tools, add to them and 
improve on them before integrating them into their proprietary products and finished 
goods. By studying OSSTCs, we can bridge both literatures (OI and UI) and extend 
our understanding of coupled and interactive shared innovation processes. 
2.4.3 Implications of private-collective action model for open innovation paradigm 
01 perspective can also theoretically benefit from conceptual developments made on 
the front of private (Demsetz, 1967) and collective (Oison, 1967) innovation models 
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as well as the (fairly) recent mixed approach proposed by von Hippel and von Krogh 
(2003). 
There are two major models of innovation: 1) Private investment mode!; and 2) 
Collective action mode!. ' Private investment mode] ' is based on the premise that 
innovation will be supported by private investment, and that private returns can be 
appropriated from investments made (Demsetz, 1967). That is why "property rights 
are an instrument of society and derive their significance from the fact that they help 
a man form those expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealings with 
others" (Demsetz, 1967, p. 347). Following Demsetz (1967)'s and several others ' 
(Arrow, 1962; Dam, 1995; as cited in von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003) line of 
reasoning, by granting innovators sorne limited rights to their innovations, a society 
encourages private investment in innovations. This reflects Demsetz (1967, p. 348)'s 
thought on the primary function of property right as "guiding incentives to achieve a 
greater intemalization of extemalities"; therefore, "any free revealing or 
uncompensated ' spillover' of proprietary knowledge developed by private investment 
will reduce the innovator's profits from its investment" (von Hippel & von Krogh, 
2003 , p. 213). However, a society adopting a purely private investment mode] will 
incur a certain loss as property rights block a portion of society to access innovations. 
However, von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) believe that society voluntarily suffers 
from this social loss in the hope that innovators have enough incentives to make 
further investments to create novel knowledge. 
Contrary to private investment mode! is the 'collective action mode!' pioneered by 
Oison (1967). This mode! applies to the provision of 'public good' (also known as a 
common or collective good) defined as "any good such that if any person Xi in a 
group X1, • • • , X?, . . ... Xn consumes it; it cannot feasibly be withheld from the others 
in that group" (Oison, 1967, p.14). In fact, under conditions of market failure, 
innovators tend to collaborate to produce a public good (von Hippel & von Krogh, 
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2003). The logic governing the collective action madel, therefore, requires that those 
who have invested in an innovation abandon their right and control of it thereby 
tuming that into a public good. This approach to innovation avoids society to incur 
socialloss that is indubitably imposed by the private investment madel ; yet, it causes 
another problem, i.e., it takes the incentive to innovate away from iimovators by not 
!etting them appropriate directly from their investments. This problem manifests itself 
in severa! forms one of which is the "free-riding" problem in collective action (see 
Hargrave & van de Ven, 2006; von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003 ; Bonaccorsi & Rossi, _ 
2003). 
In context of OSS technology, individuals have the choice to follow more or less both 
models by choosing a more liberal or more limiting licensing mode. However, in 
principal, one can access, and study any OSS ' source code no matter which licensing 
type is applied to it. The flexibility that leans more towards collective action madel 
has intrigued severa! scholars. 
For example, von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) developed a mix of the two models 
based on their empirical observation of OSS projects. The authors maintain that the 
two models have ignored a middle ground solution that is a happy marriage between 
private investment and collective action. They call this third option "private-
collective" innovation madel (PCIM) ("best of the bath worlds") which offers enough 
incentives for bath models to coexist. 
To begin with, PCIM eliminates the assumption in private investment madel which 
asserts that free revealing of innovations developed by private investors (innovators 
or code developers) will represent a loss of private profit. To support this argument, 
von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) draw on severa! issues 13 and conclude that under 
13 Firstly, private investment mode] ignores individual user-innovators which seek (direct internai-use 
benefits at the expense of placing too much emphasis on manufacturers as innovators who are looking 
for direct private commercial market benefits (e .g., von Hippel, 1988; von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). 
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sorne conditions (which hold for OSS projects) free revealing may actually result in a 
net gain in profit for the innovators. For example, as free revealing enhances the 
diffusion of OSS there is good chance that innovators will benefit from the profits 
associated with their innovation through network effects. 
Secondly, the PCIM defies the collective-action-model-based assumption which 
holds that a free rider will enjoy benefits from the completed public good just the 
same way contributors would enjoy those benefits. This deviation is based on the 
observation that there are certain private benefits associated with OSS projects as 
public goods which are not open to free riders. This argument implies that OSS 
projects are more process oriented (see also, Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2003) than product 
oriented. For this reason, a free rider' s benefits are rather limited vis-à-vis an active 
user-innovator/contributors. For example, the problem-solving process involved with 
OSS projects ' solutions development entails severa! benefits such as: technical 
leaming opportunities and enjoyment (Kohanski, 1998; Hermann et al. , 2000); sense 
of ownership and control over contributor' s work product (Lakhani & von Hippel , 
2000); the freedom of choice to work on what type of projects and taking a preferred 
technical approach, therefore, respecting self-interests of contributors (von Hippel & 
von Krogh, 2003). Similarly, Artur (1997) notes that the previous coding and the 
leaming obtained from its process can increase the user' s retums on learning in the 
future activities. Therefore, these benefits are considered as private benefits that are 
not obvious in typical collective action mode! of innovation. 
Furtherrnore, von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) describe a situation which concerns 
social integration of OS code developers. As these user/developers' incentives may 
Secondly, private investment mode! does not fi nd free revealing of novel codes sensible unless costs of 
free revealing are less than its benefits. Weil , as there is low leve! of rivalry between sorne potential 
contributors and adopters (e.g., Lakhani & Wolf, 2005), innovators incur low costs which are 
associated with freely revealing and diffusing the codes. This means that low leve! of rewards looks 
appealing too (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). These rewards can be elevated reputations, expected 
reciprocity, and incentives to build a community (Lerner & Tiro le, 2000). 
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change over time, their learning rewards may become exhausted, and the value of the 
social category (e.g. , listed and perceived as core-developer status), they have been 
assigned to, start depreciating. Therefore, it is likely that the developers' level of 
collaboration decreases. 
Additionally, PCIM potentially invites further research concerrung the "role and 
nature of leadership" in relation to sustaining the ongoing activity in OSS projects 
and communities. For example, sorne authors believe that as the OSS group gets 
larger and larger they need to establish a central authority or leadership to monitor the 
group members and impose sanctions on free-riders become more obvious (Hardin, 
1982; Swanson, 1992). The importance of leadership role in developing OSS projects 
has been already raised (Pavlicek, 2000); yet, the nature of leadership seems to have 
remained as an elusive concept. For example, one of the norms of hacker community 
is that the to-be-done tasks cannot be forced by the leader (Himanen et al., 2001; 
Raymond, 1999); yet the intricacies as how the job is done have not been illuminated. 
Therefore, it is important to gain more insights on the nature of leadership in OSS 
development process as representative of 01 practice. 
Overall , the case of OSSTC is one that follows PCIM. However, it is a very dynamic 
case because contributors' incentives change over time and thus, in the absence of 
strong legal and contractual bindings, the community leadership needs to adapt its 
strategies to align the interests and create new ones in order to keep the project on the 
right track. The significance of these interplays makes the study of OSSTC 
interesting. 
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2.5 Useful contributions of open innovation to open source software 
2.5.1 What open innovation teaches us about open strategy 
Based on observation of firms that have successfully adopted 01 practices, 
Vanhaverbeke and Cloodt (2006, p. 260) posit that "open innovation practices have to 
be embedded in fim1 's strategy". In this section, 1 touch upon "Open Strategy" 
(Appleyard & Chesbrough, 2016; Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007) and 'Business 
Model' (BM), two main topics that link 01 concept to strategy. Further, 1 review the 
empirical works conducted on the connection between 01 and strategy- paying more 
attention to the relationship between BM and 01 mainly because "business mode! 
thinking as part of firm's strategy is at the heart of open innovation" (Vanhaverbeke 
& Cloodt, 2006, p. 260). 
2.5.2 Open strategy 
The field of "open strategy" is being shaped in recent years (Appleyard & 
Chesbrough, 2016; Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007). Here, 1 briefly define strategy 
and then move towards the open strategy concept. 
Chandler (1962, p. 13) defines strategy as " .. . the determination of the basic long-
lerm goals and objectives of an entetprise, and the adoption of courses of action and 
the allocation of resources necessary for the carrying out of these goals ". In the field 
of business and management literature , Evered (1983) recomrnends Andrews 
(1980)'s definition of 'corporate strategy' as the best fitting one. He defines strategy 
as: 
"the pattern of decisions in a company that determines and reveals its 
objectives, purposes or goals, produces the principal policies and plans for 
achieving those goals, and defines the range of business the company is to 
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pursue, the kind of economie and human organization it is or intends to be, and 
the nature of the economie and noneconomic contribution it intends to make to 
its shareholders, employees, customers and communities." (Andrews, 1980, p. 
18) 
In context of 01, the term "open strategy" is used to link strategy with OIP. 
According to Chesbrough and Appleyard (2007, p. 58), "if we are to make strategie 
sense of innovation communities, ecosystems, networks, and their implications for 
competitive advantage, we propose that a new approach to strategy - open strategy -
is needed". 
To justify open strategy, Chesbrough and Appleyard (2007) claim that "traditional 
business strategy has guided firms to develop defensible positions against the forces 
of competition and power in the value chain, rather than promoting openness" 
(Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007, p. 57). In fact, they believe, "all traditional views 
[of strate gy] are based upon ownership and control as the key levers in achieving 
strategie success" (Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007, p. 60; emphasis added). The 
focus of a firm ' s strategie management, following the traditional view, has been 
largely on what is going on within the firm; i.e. , internai value chain to the exclusion 
of the potential value of ex tema! resources ( e.g., innovation comrnunities) not owned 
by the firm. 
Although "open strategy" sounds like a revolutionary topic in the IP dominant market 
economy, its mention rings the bell of the ideas put forward by Roger Evered in 
1983. Evered (1983) discusses the concept of strategy from a historical/military, 
business management as well as futures research perspectives in order to argue that 
the corporate conception of strategy is rather a mix of military conception of strategy 
and that of the futures research. He mentions that strate gy is " .... essentially that of 
collectively leaming [on] how to transform our collective selves" (Evered, 1983, p. 
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71 ). As so argued, key attributes su ch as Trust, openness, collaboration, 
organizational learning, error embracing and sharing which are unique to futures 
research become part of corporate strategy which mediates the other two modes of 
strategy. In view of Evered (1983)'s, perhaps, open strategy is a good start to expand 
the concept of traditional approach to strategie thinking in strategie management 
field . 
The core concept of open strategy; i.e. , making use of external resources, innovate 
collectively and gain competitive edge can also be captured in examples put forth in 
Eric von Hippel's 'Democratizing Innovation ' (2005 , p. 14). For example, the 
evolving pattern of the locus of product development in kite surfing illustrates how 
users can displace manufacturers from the role of product developer. In this industry, 
the collective product-design and testing efforts of a user ümovation community has 
clearly become superior in both quality and quantity relative to in-house development 
[R&D] efforts that manufacturers of ki te surfing equipment can justify. Accordingly, 
manufacturers of such equipment are increasingly shifting away from investing in 
brand-new product design by more focusing on product designs primarily developed 
and tested by user innovation communities. 
Therefore, Chesbrough and Appleyard (2007) recognize 'emerging anomalies ' ( e.g., 
OI products such as Linux operating system, MySpace, Wikipedia, as well as (user) 
innovation communities, etc.) and view them as the reasons which have shaken the 
basic tenets of traditional business strategy. They see these anomalies as agents of 
change which brought about the shift in our strategie focus from ownership to the 
concept of openness which in turn requires us to rethink the processes that underpin 
value creation and value capture. Open strategy, in such sense, balances the tenets of 
traditional business strategy with the promise of OI through use OI-based BMs and 
deployment of community driven innovations. (Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007). 
Duarte and Sarkar (2011 , p. 455 , Emphasis added), viewing OI strategy positively, 
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conclude that "open innovation strategies, whether formai or not, intend to increase 
the compet(veness of firms , in pm1icular the speed with which they introduce 
Ïlmovations in the market". 
Here, we can argue that severa! technological anomalies render the tenets of Porter' s 
Five Forces (Porter, 1980a), which are the basis for gaining competitive edge, 
counterintuitive. For example, "Microsoft' masterful cultivation of the Five Forces 
of Porter bas done little to slow Google's meteoric rise in market capitalization" 
(Chesbrough &Appleyard, 2007, p. 61 ). Another example would be the magic of 
Linux operating system that has defied the hazard of ' the tragedy of comrnons ' by 
empirically showing us that the more people work on and modify the product the 
more value is created. In fact, the value of the product increases by every consumer 
added to the system and the innovation process becomes that of a self-sustained one. 
Although one percetves open strategy a promtsmg highroad in many sectors, 
especially in view of the past success stories, one carmot ignore the perils of missing 
the balance between value creation and value capture. In fact, these two poles of the 
BM seesaw will never go out of fashion no matter what view of strategy one may 
take. 
As such, Linux, which is believed to be "the poster child for open innovation" 
(Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007, p. 62), has been institutionalized through the 
creation of Open Source Development Labs which is funded parti y by IBM, Intel, HP 
and Oracle. This has been an attempt to reach a self-funding model by monetizing 
open source opportunities that complemented Linux. This re-structuring move to 
capture further value, if perceived by a substantial portion of the comrnunity of 
developers as far from their ideals of a comrnunity-based meritocracy, may lead to 
the collapse of the comrnunity of developers (Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007). 
Therefore, in formulating an open strategy, how the value is created (open knowledge 
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creation and invention) and how the value is appropriated by actors remain elusive 
concepts which rely heavily on dynamics of the business ecosystem and accordingly 
constitute an area for further research. 
Following this line of argument, one can observe the interplay between the tenets of 
the traditional business strategy with concepts of open strategy in the four categories 
(development, hybridization, complements, and self-service) of Open Source 
Software Business proposed by Chesbrough & Appleyard (2007). For example, 
adopting hybridization BM requires the firm to make proprietary investments which 
rely on intellectual property ownership for add-ons (proprietary extensions) 
(Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007). This example highlights two issues. First, the open 
strategy differs from the traditional trend in that it draws on a firm ' s open BM in 
value creation. Second, open strategy approximates traditional approach by creating 
ownership to capture value. 
Thus, following the widespread consensus among scholars that every firm has a BM, 
and it needs to be functioning to make the firm relatively successful (Magretta, 2002). 
In addition to knowing that a BM's chiefrole is to create and capture value (e.g. , Zott 
et al. , 2011 ; Chesbrough, 2007a; Brandenburger & Stuart, 1996, to name a few), the 
challenge remains with adoption of an open strategy and how a firm can successfully 
strike the right balance between the value creation and value capture. In my opinion, 
open and traditional business strategies are complementary, and each firm needs to 
mix up its own cocktail to benefit from its BM optimally. 
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2.5.3 The relationship between BM and OIP 
There are two central themes to Chesbrough's concept of 01. The first concems the 
ideation part, while the second reflects the commercialization one. 14 ln fact, 
'ope!Uless' can be applied to either stages or both simultaneously. For example, a 
firm may develop a novel idea (internally) but does not bring it to market by itself. 
Rather, the company opts for collaborating with or even selling the idea to another 
firm that has the capacity, resomces and the expertise to commercialize it. Thus, to 
optimize or get the most out of OIP, firms must open their BMs by actively searching 
for and exploiting outside ideas and by allowing unused internai technologies to flow 
outside, where other firms can unlock their latent economie potential (Chesbrough, 
2007b, p. 22). Following this argument, we may shift the spotlight on BM discussions 
and how BM relates to OIP. 
As Teece (2010, p. 174) states, "the concept of a business mode) has no established 
theoretical grounding in economies and business studies" . BMs neither have a place 
in economie theory, nor have an acceptable place in organizational and strategie 
studies (Teece, 201 0). Teece (201 0, p. 175) fmther cautiously comments on the Jack 
of theoretical grounding of BM discussion in the field of economie theory by 
highlighting the possibility that such shortcoming may stem from "the ubiquity of 
theoretical constructs that have markets solving the problems that- in the real world-
business models are created to solve". 
On a more detailed note, Teece (20 10, p. 175) exp lains that value creation and value 
capture are merely perceived as assumptions so much so that "inventions are often 
assumed to create value naturally and, enjoying protection of iron-clad patents, firms 
can [therefore} capture value by simply selling output in established markets, which 
14 The original invention needs to be brought to the market to be considered an innovation 
(Schumpeter, 1934). 
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are assumed to exist.for ali products and inventions". In so thinking, creating a value 
proposition for customer and crafting value appropriation mechanisms are not 
important as customers eventually buy as long as the priee falls below the utility they 
gain with emphasis on competitive market priees (Teece, 2010). Y et, Teece (2010, p. 
175) claims that "equilibrium and perfect competition are a caricature of the real 
world ... customers don ' t just want products; they want solutions to their perceived 
needs". Following this argument, more attention will be given to developing theories 
that ex plain BM architecture and includes customers as part of BM strategie design. 
In consideration of these remarks, therefore, two major Issues anse. First, to 
understand OI business models (OIBMs) and make a theoretical contribution to its 
field of study, we need to gain a more insightful perspective on Business Model (BM) 
concept per se, and its components and then build a connection between BM concept 
and OIP; with OIBM being an indispensable part of it. 
Second, in the digital and knowledge-based economy firms are enabled by 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and have had the potential to 
experiment novel forms of ' value creation mechanisms' which are networked in the 
sense that value is created in concert by a firm and a plethora of partners for multiple 
users (Zott et al. , 2011 ). This reconceptualization of value has attracted the attention 
of management scholars, who have employed the concept of the BM in the ir attempts 
to explain value creation in networked markets (e.g. , Zott & Amit, 2009). In fact, 
recent review of research on BM and strategy reveals "a strong consensus that BM 
revolves around customer-focused value creation" (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 
2002; Mansfield & Fourie, 2004; as cited in Zott et al. , 2011 , p. 1031). Such 
perspective coupled with the doctrine of networked value creation process puts 
customers (and/or clients) under spotlight as playing a pivotai role in creating value 
and being the target for value creation. Similarly, Teece (2010, p. 176) emphasizes 
the connection between BMs and consumers by highlighting the role of BM as 
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"necessary features of market economies where there is consumer choice, transaction 
costs, and heterogeneity amongst consumers and producers, and competition". 
Therefore, the degree to which BMs are adapted to customer needs and their business 
environments is among distinguishing features of different BMs where "a good 
business model will provide considerable value to the customer and collect. . . a viable 
portion of this in revenues" (Teece, 2010, p. 179). 
2.5.4 Business model: Concepts, definitions, and perspectives 
Every firm has a Business Model (BM) even if it is not explicitly articulated (Teece, 
201 0; Chesbrough, 2007 a, p.12). lt is a concept often used in management practice 
and theory; yet BM is rather an opaque notion whjch lacks conceptual clarity and 
definition uniformity (Zott, Arnit, & Massa, 2011 ; Morris et al. , 2005; Chesbrough & 
Rosenbloom, 2002). As a case in point, Morris et al. (2005 , p. 726) mention, "no 
generally accepted definition of the term ' business model ' has emerged". Similarly, 
others have claimed that despite the term's ubiquitous usage, "it is seldom defined 
explicitly" (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002, p. 532). Even more recently, Zott et 
al. (20 11 , p. 1 022) have mentioned that "surprisingly, however, the business model is 
often studied without an explicit definjtion of the concept". 
On a conceptual level , several authors (Zott et al. , 2011; Morris et al. , 2005) have 
highlighted the absence of BM' s definitional clarity as a source of challenge. This 
seems to obstruct further clarifying the nature and building components of BM. 
Definitional inconsistency may also create terminology confusion to the extent that 
notions like "business model , strategy, business concept, revenue model, and 
economie model are often used interchangeably" (Morris et al. , 2005, p. 726). Zott et 
al. (20 11 , p. 1 023) claim that the confusion due to lack of definitional clarity can also 
promote dispersion of perspectives and prevent cumulative progress on BMs. 
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Therefore, conceptual fuzziness has provided authors (e.g. Zott et al. , 2011 ; Monis et 
al. , 2005) with the motivation to conduct literature reviews to propose more 
comprehensive and unanimous definitions and develop frameworks to further study 
the BM concept as a unit of analysis. Among the prominent ones are Zott et al. 
(2011), Morris et al. (2005)'s, Teece (2010)'s, Chesbrough & Rosenbloom (2002)'s; 
to name a few. Table 2.2 presents a tabular review of most common definitions of 
BM concept complied by the author. 
Monis et al. (2005 , p. 726) build upon the assumption that BM can be used as a 
"unifying unit of analysis" which in tum plays a facilitating role in entrepreneurship 
theory development. The authors conduct a literature review analysis to synthesize 
the cunent understanding of what BM is and what its components are. Based on their 
principal emphasis, Monis et al. (2005, pp. 726-727) classify the definitions into 
three levels: economie, operational and strategie. The frrst level concems a firm 's 
economie mode! so the logic of profit generation takes precedent. At this leve!, issues 
such as revenue sources, pricing methodologies, cost structures, margins and 
expected volumes are among the most relevant decision variables a firm is faced 
with. The second level refers to ' architectural configuration' where issues like 
internai processes and design of infrastructure become to forefront of value creation 
processes. Therefore, operational decisions regarding production/service methods, 
resource mobility, logistics and knowledge management play pivotai role. The third 
and the last is the strategie leve!. This leve! encompasses overall direction of the firm 
regarding "market positioning, interaction across organizational boundaries, and 
growth opportunities". 
The mam goal of emphasizing strategie aspect of BM is to gam competitive 
advantage and sustainability. Thus, decision making stresses variables such as 
"stakeholder" identification, value creation, differentiation, vision, values, and 
61 
networks and alliances. Considering the three categories of BM and their points of 
emphasis, Morris et al. (2005 , p. 727) introduce an integrative definition as follows: 
"A business mode/ is a concise representation of how an interrelated set of 
decision variables in the areas of venture strategy, architecture, and 
economies are addressed to create sustainable competitive advantage in 
defined markets." 
Furthetmore, Morris et al. (2005) develop a six-component standard framework for 
characterizing a BM irrespective of venture type. Such framework includes three 
specifie levels of decision making: foundation , proprietary and rules levels . The first 
involves generic decision making regarding what the business is ali about; the second 
concems development of unique combinations among decision variables which give 
the venture its marketplace advantage; and the third includes guiding principles 
which govem execution of decisions made at the prior two levels to make sure model 
effectiveness and usefulness (See Table 2.3). 
Morris et al. (2005, p.734)'s study, as claimed, has severa! implications. First, the 
proposed framework (Table 2.3) offers the possibility to "design, describe, 
categorize, critique, and analyze a business model for any type of company" . Next, it 
allows researchers and practitioners to compare different BMs based on the levels and 
components. Third, it facilitates further empirical studies in the field of BM in the 
areas such as "the creation of general model taxonomies and investigations of 
relationships among the foundation level variables to modeling relationships between 
the model and a host of endogenous and exogenous variables". In addition, this 
framework can be used to systematically assess BM validity proposed by 
entrepreneurs. 
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In another literature review-based study, Zott et al. (20 11) show th at the concept of 
BM bas been used to explain three main phenomena: e-business and the use of 
information technology in organizations; strategie concepts like value creation, 
competitive advantage and firrn performance; and innovation and technology 
management. 
Author(s) 
Baden-Fuller 
and Haetliger 
As para, 
Lam berg, 
Laukia, and 
Tikkanen 
Bucherer, 
Eisert and 
Gassmann 
Demi! and 
Lecocq 
Teece 
Teece 
Seelos and 
Ma ir 
Morris, 
Schindehutt, 
and Allen 
Year 
2013 
2013 
2012 
2010 
2010 
2007 
2007 
2005 
Table 2.2. Business Mode! Definitions 
Definition 
"A system that solves the problem of identifying who is (or are) the 
customer(s), engaging with their needs, delivering satisfaction, and 
monetizing the value." (p. 41 9) 
" the corporate business mode) resides primarily in the minds of the 
corporation 's top managers or top management team (TMT) members 
- essentially, it is the corporate top managers' perceived logic of how 
value is created by the corporation, especial/y regarding the value-
creating links between the corporation 's portfolio of businesses." (p. 
460) 
"The business mode) abstracts the complexity of a company by 
reducing it to its core elements and their interrelations and thus 
specifies the core business logic of the firm. A business mode! is not 
static but must be managed and deve loped over time." (p. 1 84) 
"The business mode) concept generally refers to the articulation 
between different areas of a ftrm ' s activity designed to produce a 
proposition of value to customers ." (p. 227) 
"The essence of a business mode! is in defining the manner by which 
the enterprise delivers value to customers, entices customers to pay for 
value, and converts those payments to profit" (p. 172). "A business 
mode! articulates the logic and provides data and other evidence that 
demonstrates how a business creates and delivers value to customers. 
It also outlines the architecture of revenues, costs, and profits 
associated with the business enterprise delivering that value." (p. 173) 
The business mode) retlects " the management hypothesis about what 
customers want and how an enterprise can best meet those needs, and 
get paid for doing so." (p. l329) 
Business mode) is conceptualized as a "set of capabilities that is 
configured to enable value creation consistent with either economie or 
social strategie objectives." (p . 53) 
"A business mode! is a concise representation of how an interrelated 
set of decision variables in the areas of venture strategy, architecture, 
and economies are addressed to create sustainable competitive 
advantage in defined markets ." (p. 727) 
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Morris, 
Sch i nd eh utt, 
and Allen 
Osterwalder 
and Pigneur 
Chesbrough 
and 
Rosenbloom 
Amit and 
Zott 
Afuah and 
Tu cci 
Stewart and 
Zhao 
Tapscott 
Mayo and 
Brown 
Timmers 
2005 
2002 
2002 
2001 
2001 
2000 
2000 
1999 
1998 
"The business mode! has been referred to as architecture, design, 
pattern, plan, method, assumption, and statement." (p. 726) 
"a description of the va lue a company offers to one or severa! 
segments of customers and the architecture of the ftrm and its network 
of pa1tners for creating, marketing and delivering this va lue and 
relationship capital , in order to generate profitable and sustainable 
revenue streams." (p. 77) 
"ln the most basic sense, a business mode! is the method of doing 
business by which a company can sustain itself- that is, generate 
revenue. The business mode! spell s out how a company makes money 
by specifying where it is positioned in the value chain ." (p. 533) "The 
heuristic logic that connects technical potential with the realization of 
economie value." (p. 529) 
"A business mode! depicts the content, structure, and governance of 
transactions designed so as to create value through the exploitation of 
business opportunities." (p. 511 ) 
A business mode! can be viewed as a "system that is made up of 
components, linkages between components, and dynamics ." (p. 4) 
"The method by which a firm builds and uses its resources to offer its 
customers better value and to make money in doing so ." (p. 3) 
"A statement of how a firm will make money and sustain its profit 
stream over time." 
"The totality of how a company selects its customers, defines and 
differentiates its offerings, defines the tasks it wi ll perform itself and 
those it wi ll outsource, configures its resources, goes to market, 
creates utility for customers and captures profits ." (p. 1 0) 
"The design of key interdependent systems that create and sustain a 
competitive business ." 
"An architecture of the product, service and information tlows, 
including a description of the various business ac tors and the ir roles ; a 
description of the potential benefits for the various business actors; a 
description ofthe sources of revenues." (p. 2) 
Source: Compi led by the Author 
Analysis of the first stream of the literature reveals that "the business model is not a 
value proposition, a revenue model, or a network of relationships by itself; it is ali of 
the se elements together" (Zott et al. , 2011, p. 1 028). Authors also fi nd that none of 
the research in this category analyses the relationship between any components of 
BM and other constructs. The examination of the second category .shows interesting 
results too. These include notes on what BM is not. 
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Components 
Component 1 
0./Jering-re/ated 
f actors 
Table 2.3. The Six Main Components of a Business Model 
Questions 
How do we create value? 
Factors 
offering: primarily products/primarily 
services/heavy mix 
offering: standardized/some customization/high 
customization 
offering: broad tine/medium breadth/narrow line 
offering: deep !ines/medium depth/shallow !ines 
offering: access to product/ product itself/ product 
bu nd led with other firm ' s product 
offering: internai manufacturing or service delivery/ 
outsourcing/ licensing/ reselling/ value added 
reselling 
Component 2 
Mar/œt-related 
fa ctors 
Component 3 
Interna/ 
capability-re/ated 
f actors 
Component 4 
Competitive 
s/rategy-related 
factors 
Component 5 
Economic-related 
factors 
Who do we create value 
for? 
What is our source of 
competence? 
How do we competitively 
position ourselves? 
How do we make money? 
offering: direct distribution/indirect distribution (if 
indirect: single or multichannel) 
type of organization : b-to-b/b-to-c/ both 
local/regional/national/international 
where customer is in value chain : upstream 
supplier/ downstream supplier/ government/ 
institutional/ wholesaler/ retailer/ service provider/ 
final consumer 
broad or general market/multiple segment/niche 
market 
transactional/relational 
production/operating systems 
se li ing/marketing 
information management/rn ining/packaging 
technology/R&D/creative or innovative 
capability/intellectual 
financial transactions/arbitrage 
supply chain management 
networking/resource leveraging 
image of operational excellence/ consistency/ 
dependability/ speed 
product or service quality/ selection/ features/ 
availability 
innovation leadership 
low cost/efficiency 
intimate customer relationship/experience 
pricing and revenue sources : fixed/ mixed/ flexible 
operating leverage: highlmediurnllow 
volumes: high/medium/low 
margins: high/medium/ low 
Component 6 subsistence mode! 
Persona// What are our ti me, scope income mode! 
investor-re/ated and size ambitions? growth mode) 
factors speculative mode) 
Source: Adopted from Morris, Schindehutte, and Allen (2005 , p.730) 
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For example, "the business mode! does not involve a linear mechanism for value 
creation from su pp liers to the firm to its customers" (Ibid ., p.1 031 ). This shed light on 
complexity associated with ' value creation' process as an "interconnected set of 
exchange relationships and activities among multiple players" (Zott et al. , 2011 , pp. 
1031-1 032). In addition, BM is not the same concept as product market strategy or 
corporate strategy. The concept cannot be reduced only to issues that concem the 
internai organization of firms; it typically span firm boundaries. 
Figure 2.4. The Six Main Components of a Business Mode! 
1-How value is 
created? 
(Process) 
6-Ti me, scope and size 
questions 
5-Monetization process and 
value appropriation 
Business Model 
2-For whom value is 
created? 
(Target Market) 
3-What is our source 
of competence? 
(Internai Capabilities) 
4-Competitive positioning 
and competitive strategy 
Source: Content Adopted from Morris, Schindehutte, and Allen (2005, p.730), Figure representation 
form is by author. 
Y et, BM is a source of competitive edge. Finally, investigation of the third category 
of research on BM leads to insightful comments conceming the interplay between 
BM, innovation and technology management. Zott et al. (20 11) conclude that 
technological innovation is important for firms, but it might not suffice to guarantee 
success (e.g. , Doganova & Eyquem-Renault, 2009) because technology alone has no 
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inherent value (Chesbrough, 2007a, 2007b). Therefore, to fully realize the 
commercial potential oftechnology, a firm needs to have a unique BM which enables 
it to embed the technology in products and services (Zott et al. , 2011). 
In addition to providing a classification of the literature on BM research, Zott et al. 
(2011)'s analysis has led to emergence of four common themes despite the disparity 
of researchers ' approaches to BM concept. These common themes are: 1) BM as a 
new unit of analysis; 2) a holistic perspective on how firms do business; 3) an 
emphasis on activities; and 4) an acknowledgement of the importance of value 
creation. 
The first theme shows that BM is either implicitly or explicitly considered "as a new 
unit of analysis .. . which spans or bridges traditional units of analysis, such as the 
firm or the network" (Zott et al. , 2011 , p. 1 036). The second theme highlights how 
scholars are shifting towards conceptualizing BM through adoption of "a holistic and 
systemic (as opposed to particularistic and functional) perspective, not just on what 
businesses do ... but also on how they do it.. ." (Zott et al. , 2011 , pp. 1036-1037). 
Taking a holistic view, as it involves both the content as weil as process of 
conducting business imposes the challenge of defining and operationalizing the BM 
construct. Moving beyond BM as representing a system-leve! concept, the third 
theme views BM as a "firm-specific, yet boundary-spanning, activity system" (Zott et 
al. , 2011 , p.l 03 7). The litera ture on BM seems to support "an activity system 
perspective" where BM can be defined as a "system that is made up of components, 
linkages between components, and dynamics" (Afuah & Tucci, 2001 , p. 4). Lastly, 
the fourth theme highlights the shift of emphasis in the literature from value 
appropriation or value capture to 'value creation '; while the latter is emphasized 
without the former being ignored (Zott et al. , 2011 , p.l 03 7). This trend has even 
brought to the attention of those BM researchers whose primary focus has been on 
value appropriation by focal firm; mainly because they have realized that "the value 
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is created through the focal firm in concert with its exchange partners" (Zott et al. , 
2011 , p.1037). Figure 2.5 demonstrates the four themes as discussed above. 
Teece (20 1 0) maintains that the conventional balance between customer and supplier 
is disturbed due to developments made in the global economy. ICTs and open global 
trading regimes, among others have put consumers in a more powerful position as 
they have more choices and various needs; "businesses therefore need to be more 
customer-centric" (Teece, 2010, p. 172). His perspective on BMs, indubitably, 
revolves with more weight around customers' role in BM design. BM represents the 
"logic" and "evidence" on how a business creates and delivers value to customers. 
Teece's work also outlines "the architecture of revenues, costs, and profits associated 
with the business enterprise delivering that value" (Teece, 2010, p. 173). Put simply, 
a good BM is one that can "provide considerable value to the customer and collect 
(for the developer or implementor of the business model) a viable portion of this in 
revenues" (Teece, 2010, p. 179). 
Teece (2010, p. 174) identify the core elements of a BM design as follows: 1) 
Selecting the technology to be embedded in the product or service; 2) Determining 
the benefits that customers can enjoy from consuming the product or service; 3) 
ldentifying market segments; 4) Confirming available revenue streams; 5) Designing 
mechanisms to capture value. Furthermore, although BM is more generic than 
business strategy, as put by Teece (20 1 0), for a BM to be competitively sustainable it 
must survive the filters which strategy analysis imposes. This will help the BM to 
become hard-to-imitate. 
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---------------- ------- - ---------- - -
Figure 2.5. The Four Major Themes Concerning BM Studies 
Viewed as 
finn-specifie, 
yet boundary-
spanning, 
activity 
system 
As a Unit 
of Analysis 
4 Common 
Them es 
----------More 
Emphasis 
on Value 
Creation 
Examined 
through 
Adoption of 
Holystic and 
Systemic 
View 
Source: Contents are based on Zott et al. (20 1 1 ). They are represented schematically by author. 
Lastly, Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) explore the role of BM in capturing 
value from early stage technology. They view an effective BM as one that "creates a 
heuristic logic that connects technical potential with realization of economie value" 
(Ibid., p. 529). Therefore, the objective of a BM is to unlock the "latent value" from a 
piece of technology. Despite Jack of BM conceptual clarity in the literature, the 
authors attempt to operationalize BM as a construct by delineating its six functions 
(Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002, pp. 533-534): 
• "articulate the value proposition, i.e. the value created for users by the 
offering based on the technology; 
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• identify a market segment, i.e. the users to whom the teclmology is useful 
and for what purpose, and specify the revenue generation mechanism(s) 
for the finn; 
• define the structure of the value chain within the firm required to create 
and distribute the offering, and determine the complementary assets 
needed to support the firm 's position in this chain; 
• estimate the cast structure and profit potential of producing the offering, 
given the value proposition and value chain structure chosen; 
• describe the position of the finn within the value network linking suppliers 
and customers, including identification of potential complementors and 
competitors; 
• formulate the competitive strategy by which the innovating finn will gain 
and hold advantage over rivais". 
Figure 2.6 shows how the BM connects a technological possibility with an economie 
reality. 
Figure 2.6. The BM Mediates between the Technical and Economie Domains 
Technical 
Inputs: 
e.g. , 
feasibility, 
performance 
Measured in technical domain 
Business Model : 
• Market 
• Value proposition 
• Value chain 
• Cost and profit 
• Value network 
• Competitive 
strategy 
Source: Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002, p. 536) 
Economie 
Outputs : 
e.g., value, 
priee, profit 
Measured in economie domain 
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2.5.5 Conventional BM concept poorly suited to explain distributed value creation 
The review of the BM' s literature makes the case for claiming that it is not a well-
equipped concept to deal with the openness, open strategy, and more importantly, 
open source software phenomenon. BM, as it seems, is still very corporate-centric, 
focused on firm-level sustainable competitive advantage, customer segment and 
revenue focused, and the internai structure of the firm. Although the bulk of the 
literature tends to position the concept in the thinking of conventional strategie 
management, i.e. , Porter' s five forces (1980a), recently scholars have acknowledged 
that BM expands firm boundaries and that it is becoming more focused on value 
creation processes. Still, BM does not seem to have become attuned to 01 or Ul 
concepts where value creation and capture processes are not readily situated within 
organizational boundaries. lt certainly is poorly suited to explain the core and nuances 
ofOSSTCs. 
2.5.6 Does BM literature embrace 01? 
Why is the discussion of BM so central to researching 01 field? Innovation means 
ideation accompanied by commercialization; according to Chesbrough (201 0, p. 354), 
"companies commercialize new ideas and technologies through their business 
models". Essentially, a BM functions in two pivotai ways: it creates value and it 
captures (a portion of) that value (Zott et al., 2011; Chesbrough 2007a; Chesbrough, 
2007b; Brandenburger & Stuart, 1996). In fact, not only BM is an indispensable part 
of innovation agenda of a company, but also it plays a critical role in making the 
whole innovation process successful or disastrous so much so that technology by 
itself has no single objective value. The economie value of a technology, according to 
Chesbrough (20 1 0), remains latent until it is commercialized in sorne way via a BM. 
As a result, "a mediocre technology pursued within a great business model may be 
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more valuable that [sic] a great technology exploited via a mediocre business mode!" 
Chesbrough (201 0, p . 354). For this reason we need to understand the nature of Open 
Business Mode! (OBM) in relation to 01 field . In fact, "open business models enable 
an organization to be more effective in creating as well as capturing value" 
(Chesbrough, 2007b, p. 22). OBMs help create value by extending a firm's am1 to 
capture extemal sources of ideas and they allow greater value capture "by utilizing a 
firm's key asset, resource or position not only in that organization's own operations 
but also in other companies' businesses" (Chesbrough, 2007b, p. 22). 
Although severa! scholars have advanced our understanding of 01 field of research by 
their scholarly attempts, there still remains rather unclear as how one makes a 
distinction between the concept of 01 and OBM. To sorne, drawing a clear-cut 
distinction is quite confusing, therefore they suggest viewing both (01 and OBM) as 
one (e.g., Holm et al. , 2013 ; Wang & Zhou, 2012; Davey, Brennan, Meenan, & 
McAdam, 2010, 2011; Chanal & Caron-Fasan, 2010; Gassmann, et al. , 2010; 
Chesbrough, 2006a). For example, based on Chesbrough (2006a), the OIP requires 
adoption of OB Ms which in turn enable firms to be more effective in creating as weil 
as capturing value (Chesbrough, 2006a, 2007b ). 
Others (Alexy & George, 2013 ; Wang et al. , 2009; Chesbrough & Schwartz, 2007), 
on the other hand, have made distinctions (however marginal) in the sense that OBM 
is a BM based on 01 princip/es or that it entails adjusting a firm ' s BM to OIP 
(Weiblen et al. , 2013). In what follows, 1 wish to draw on the relevant literature and 
provide different viewpoints on the relationship between 01 concept and OBM. 
Among the most recent and very few focused studies conducted on OBMs, 1 can 
draw on Weiblen et al. (2013)' study that identifies two views on OBM. One is the 
open innovation view of OBM and the other is business mode! view of OBM. 
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The former follows the doctrine put forth by Chesbrough (2006a, p. 1 07) which 
hinges on the debate that "companies must develop open business models if they are 
to make the most of the opportunities offered by open innovation". This is further 
clarified by the concept of ' opening up ' the BM "by actively searching for and 
exploiting outside ideas and by allowing unused internai technologies to flow to the 
outside, where other firms can unlock their latent economie potential" (Chesbrough, 
2007b, p. 22). Following this perspective, according to Weiblen et al. (20 13, p. 7), 
"an open business model is always accompanied by the open innovation paradigm 
successfully implemented in a firm ' s R&D". This is also called the R&D-centric 
perception of the OBM where it is built around openness in the R&D activities of a 
firm (Weiblen et al. , 2013). The latter view ofOBM, with which 1 agree more, takes a 
more liberal standpoint in that it sees ali activities of a firm "as potential candidates 
for collaboration and thus openness" (Weiblen et al. , 2013 , p. 11). This means that 
firms can apply openness to ali value creation and value capturing activities in their 
value chains. Therefore, as these views suggest, the concepts of 01, BM and OBM 
are not the same though they have overlapping constituents. 
The two vtews have four elements in common which brings us doser to 
operationalizing the concept of OBM and therefore being able to draw a rather clear-
cut distinction between OI and OBM. These four elements are: 1) concept of 
ecosystem; 2) existence of value or partner networks; 3) platforms; and 4) alliances 
(Weiblen et al. , 2013). 
In fact, OBM explicitly considers the ecosystem as a new source of value creation 
and capture by developing symbiotic relationships (Romero & Molina, 2011) and 
emphasizing inter-organizational activities (Chu & Chen, 2011). Further, creating a 
value network is seen as an inseparable part of an OBM (Davey et al. , 2011). In 
addition, a firm ' s technology assets form a platform which can be opened up to 
smaller partners by the platform owner to enable them to create additional value and 
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therefore influencing the industry (see Sandulli & Chesbrough, 2009b; Purdy et al. , 
2012; Luo & Chang, 2011). Finally, alliances- either perceived as inter-
organizationallegal partnership like joint ventures (Wang & Zhou, 2012) or received 
as the logic of managing partnerships (Enkel et al. , 2009)- are an indispensable part 
ofOBM. In short: 
"An open business model is seen as an ecosystem-aware way of value creation 
and capturing. Focal fim1s collaborate with the ecosystem by building up value-
or partner networks, platforms, or alliances and innovate their business model to 
make use of the emerging opportunities." (Weiblen et al. , 2013 , p. 16) 
Based on Weiblen et al. (2013)'s four assertions, we can better understand the 
differences between 01 and OBM. First, an OBM includes extemal resources in at 
least one of its value creation and capturing activities. Second, in an OBM, openness 
in terms of collaboration should be so central to the firm's logic of value creation and 
capturing that it could not be explained without it. Third, 01 only constitutes an OBM 
if it contributes to the firm ' s sustained value creation and capturing. Fourth, 01 only 
constitutes an OBM if it leads to collaboration in the fmn 's value creation and 
capturing activities. Figure 2. 7 depicts the relationships discussed above. 
Although Figure 2.7 represents the most recent and perhaps interesting analysis of the 
relationships between 01 and OBM, one cannot fully rely on this model as it is not 
yet established in form of a journal article. Further, as cited earlier, many authors 
approximate very closely the notion of OI with OBMs. The study conducted by 
Weiblen et al. (2013) is a pioneering attempt to bring sorne conceptual clarity to the 
interwoven concepts of OI-based BM and OBM, and this is an ongoing line of 
research in the years ahead of us. According to Dahlander and Gann (20 1 0), not any 
OI move constitutes an OBM; furthermore, value capturing is a major problem in this 
class of Ols (Dahlander & Gann, 201 0). This is evident from the example put forward 
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by Alexy and George (2013) which regards Netscape ' releasing the source code of its 
Navigator web browser. This has been viewed as a single-shot strategie move vis-à-
vis Microsoft ' dominance and it hardly forms a basis for a sustainable new BM. 
Figure 2. 7. Conceptual Fran1ework of Separation and Overlap between 
OI, BM, and OBM Concepts 
01 logic, not 
influencing 
sustained value 
creation & capture 
logic (e.g. small 
open R&D 
initiative, BMW 
iDrive 
01 based business models (e .g. selling IP) 
Business 
Model 
01-based Open business models (e.g. opening 
technology base for complementors as 
comerstone ofbusiness mode! 
Open based business models not affecting 
R&D (e.g. marketing co-operation) 
Source: Weiblen et al. (2013, p. 24) 
Thus, we may accept OBM as a standalone phenomenon having certain degree of 
overlap with OIP. If so, it is not possible to discuss one without including the other. 
This connection leads to sorne questions such as: what are the consequences of 
opening the BM and what are the challenges associated with having an OBM as part 
of the firm 's strategy. 
As these issues have been a point of concem over the past decade, different scholars 
have touched upon different challenges as a sub-category to OBM discussion. For 
example, Kakaletris et al (2004) mention technical challenges while Smith et al. 
(20 1 0) highlight leadership ones. Other researchers view the issue of incentivation 
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(Chanal & Caron-Fasan, 201 0) while sorne spotlight the matter of absorptive capacity 
(Sandulli & Chesbrough, 2009b ). Laursen and Salter (2006a) caution th at although 
the lack of openness to the externat environment may reflect an organizational 
myopia one should consider that the degree of openness needs to be evaluated against 
the costs of it. Among other challenges is, how a firrn should deal with the increased 
costs due to coordination and integration and the risk of knowledge leaks? (see West 
& Bogers, 2014; Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Faems et al. , 2010). Still , although sorne 
scholars have directed their attention to challenges involved with OBM, Dahlander 
and Gann (20 1 0) maintain that most of the existing research (in the field of 01 and 
OBM) tends to focus on the potential benefits of openness rather than addressing the 
disadvantages. This has led to a 'pro-bias ' in the literature. 
One example further depicts how OBM is studied and linked to 01. Holm et al. 
(2013 , p. 324) reiterate how literature on OI has portrayed OBM as a "contemporary 
and extremely useful tool" to create and capture value in collaboration with externat 
partners. The authors conduct an empirical study on the impact of OBM in the 
traditional newspaper industry. This study captures the interrelations between 
technological discontinuity and BM adjustment in line with OIP. In fact, when the 
traditional BM of a matured newspaper industry is under attack mainly due to the 
internet as a content delivery channel (a form of technological discontinuity), the 
industry players open their BMs (i.e., designing OBM) to create value by including 
external ideas and capture value by utilizing complementary key assets of partner 
organizations. Therefore, disassembling the traditional BM (focused on a single 
delivery channel) and opening up (acquisition of content from various suppliers, 
crowdsourcing, outsourcing IT development, etc.) impose the challenge of critical 
dependency on third-party assets. In such OBM, the notion of inward-outward 
openness which captures: how the firrn acquires third party strategie assets to create 
value; and how the firrn shares its assets with partners to capture value, is based on 
OI concept (Chesbrough, 2006b). However, the scope of openness (broad vs. deep) is 
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one which is strongly related to the concept of boundary-spanning activities (Leif er & 
Delbecq, 1978). This study shows how in practice, in such an R&D unrelated 
industry, OBM can draw on the principles of 01 while not becoming completely 
submerged by it. In conclusion, the authors explicitly recommend that "a more 
nuanced view and balanced understanding of the tem1 openness as regards business 
mode! is needed" (Holm et al. , 2013, p. 324). 
To summanze our discussion on OBM, we arnve at the following concluding 
remarks. First, for BM to fit into OIP, it must adopt an open strategy and step outside 
the organizational boundaries. Put simply, BM needs to transform into OBM in arder 
to become relevant to discussions on open and distributed innovation (in this case 
OSS). The discussions on open BM, therefore, are more useful in the context of 
OSSTCs as they have begun to tap into ecosystem way of value creation, partner 
networks, platforms, and alliances. Ali these concepts, however, are subject to 
detailed investigation in arder to reflect the particularities of OSS technologies and 
their development processes. For instance, we need to understand whether or under 
what conditions OBM adopted by OSS firms can lead to positive network 
extemalities and continuous value creation. 
2.5.7 Does OSS business models inform us about OBM concept? 
Firms can more effectively create and capture value if they adopt OBMs 
(Chesbrough, 2007b). OBMs are justified on severa! grounds: inefficiencies of 
innovation markets, rising costs of R&D, shortening product lifecycles, and their 
potential to enable firms to conduct open experiments (see, e.g. , Chesbrough, 2007b). 
For example, somewhere between 75% and 95% of patented technologies are on the 
shelf left unused (Chesbrough, 2007b, p.23). This shows how markets are inefficient 
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in automatically assessing the true potential value of inventions, not to mention the 
high costs associated with transactions in the innovation markets. Furthermore, the 
costs of technology development (i.e. R&D) have been increasing beyond the reach 
of many corporations. This coupled with shortening life cycles of new products have 
given rise to the situation where "companies are finding it increasingly difficult to 
justify investments in innovation" (Chesbrough, 2007b, p. 24). 
In response to these difficulties faced by the firm-level innovation process, OBM 
offers a pragmatic solution. Firms adopting OBMs can leverage extemal R&D 
resources to save time and money in their innovation process while still increasing 
their revenues by outsourcing their unrealized technological innovation (Chesbrough, 
2007b). 
In addition, OBM offers firms the possibility to more effectively benefit from OIP. In 
the aforementioned discussion on BM concept (see section 2.5.4), the research 
reveals the complexity of the value creation process through highlighting the 
interconnectedness of exchange relationships and activities among a federation of 
players in order to fully realize the commercial potential of technologies. An 
important and critiq.l part of value creation within a BM is to experiment the results 
(products and services) without wasting many resources, endangering customer 
loyalty, firm reputation and branding of the products, to name a few. Part of this 
challenge is captured by Chesbrough (2007b, p. 24)'s recommendation of ' open 
experiments ' as it refers to a firm's need to "develop the ability to experiment with 
their business models". This further involves firms to create processes for conducting 
experiments and for assessing their results in order to avoid risking any damage to 
their consumer brand (Chesbrough, 2007b). However, how to create real value for the 
end users precedes the branding issue. That is the reason so much focus is placed on 
the role of customers in BM discussions, and OBM is no exception. 
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In line with the open process of innovation (Chesbrough, 2006a) as weil as creating 
and capturing value through OBMs, many scholars have attempted to study OSS 
firms so as to better understand how OBM works. 
OSS-classified as a process innovation- is an interesting case; because, it is a 
process that relies on unlimited access to source code as opposed to the conventional 
closed and property-based approach of the commercial world (Bonaccorsi & Rossi , 
2003). Similarly, Dahlander and Magnusson (2005 , p. 481) maintain that "OSS 
challenges substantial parts of the conventional wisdom regarding the role of firms, 
intellectual property rights, and organizational forms". Therefore, this unconventional 
attribute of OSS has put the phenomenon under research spotlight. Furthermore, as 
user communities are an indispensable part of OSS development, the inter-
relationship between the two, too, has been in the center of attention (e.g. , von 
Hippel, 2005); yet, much less attention has been given to the role of the firms in the 
community and how they can profit from their participation (van de Vrande et al. , 
2010). 
Proprietary software firms are distinct from OSS firms in that their value creation 
process heavily relies on proprietary software codes developed by the firm's hired 
software developers/employees. That is why the mainstream software firm is 
categorized as one which employs a closed BM. On the other hand, OSS firms ' BMs 
have a unique feature . They include a role for a 'community of software developers '. 
This striking notion has been earlier touched upon by several scholars: Benkler 
(2002); Hertel et al. (2003); O'Mahony (2003); von Krogh et al. (2003); Dahlander 
and Magnusson (2005), etc. 
However, to fully understand open source software business models (OSSBM), it is 
helpful to find out wh y they gained momentum. Perr et al. (20 1 0) classifies the 
reasons into two: 1) market pull ; and 2) technology push. Market pull reflects the 
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demand side of the OSSBM. For example, the need for reduced software 
development costs (Haefliger et al., 2008), or enhanced product margins as weil as 
the need for technical superiority (von Krogh, 2003). Technology push, on the other 
hand, captures notions such as customer acquisition, disrupting markets, and 
achieving socio-economic development goals (Perr et al., 201 0). 
Having briefly touched upon 'why' OSSBM has gained popularity, we need to know 
'how' such model works. In this regard, Perr et al. (2010) address the BM paradox 
which exists between value creation and capture within OSS fmns. Their research 
question concems 'how can OSS jirms capture the economie value that they create if 
the building blacks of the ir products can be used by competitors? 
Perr et al. (20 1 0) specify three BM factors that appear most responsible for success in 
value capture. These are: 1) IP ownership and the li cense choice; 2) community 
management; and 3) the ability to craft a BM that is appropriate for the targeted 
markets and product categories. Based on these three factors and the way OSS firms 
create value, Perr et al. (20 1 0) further identify seven types of BMs. These are: 1) 
professional services and consulting; 2) support; 3) subscription; 4) dual license; 5) 
hybrid with proprietary extensions; 6) deviee; and 7) community source. I briefly 
elaborate on the three factors and touch upon the surface of the BM typology. 
License choice and IP ownership strategies are important concepts as they shed light 
on the misconception of OSS vs. free software 15 as weil as different types of OSS 
15Free software licensed under the terms of the GPL is OSS; however, not ali OSS is free software. The term ' free ' 
refers not to the priee of the software, but to the four freedoms to use, copy, modify, and redistribute the software 
(free or for a fee). Therefore, ali OSS can be used for commercial purpose; the Open Source Definition guarantees 
this . You can even sell OSS. However, note that the word 'commercial ' is not the same as ' proprietary' . lf you 
receive software under an Open Source license, you can always use that software for commercial purposes, but 
that doesn't always mean you can place further restrictions on people who receive the software from you . ln 
particular, so-called copyleft-style Open Source licenses require that when you distribute the software, you do so 
under the same license you received it under. (Based on Open Source Initiative website : 
http :// opensource. org/faq#commercial) 
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licensing. They also have implications in understanding how OSSBM generates value 
(e.g. revenue streams). 
Perhaps the two most common licensing types of OSS are ONU General Public 
License (ONU GPL or GPL) 16 and Lesser General Public License (LGPL) 17 . 
Therefore, the software licensed under the GLP terms and conditions will confer to 
the four core freedoms and includes a ' give-back' principle, i.e. if a firm redistributes 
the software, the source code and accompanying modifications made to it must also 
be released and revealed in transactions. 
On the other hand, LGPL licensing allows software developers not only to 
incorporate open source libraries into their development process but also it allows for 
the final software product to be licensed under proprietary terms. Y et there is another 
licensing mode: i.e., Berkeley Software Development-BSD, which permits the 
appropriation of software modifications (Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2003). Further, Perret 
al. (20 1 0) note that OSS firms can opt for dual licensing for commercial versions of 
their software and this allows them to capture value. 
Probing further the role of comrnunity in relation to OSSBM, one can see the 
highlighted role of v endors as opposed to the widespread misconception that OSS is a 
phenomenon totally relying on their comrnunities. In fact, based on findings of Perr et 
al. (201 0, p. 439), "a wide array of comrnunity models exists and [it] increasingly 
16The is the most widely used free software li cense, which guarantees end users (individuals, organizations, 
compani es) the freedoms to use, study, share (copy), and modify the software. Software that ensures that these 
rights are retained is called free software. The license was originally wri tten by Richard Stallman of the Free 
Software Foundati on (FSF) for the GN U project. http ://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_General_Public_License 
17The GNU Lesser General Public License or LGPL (formerly the GNU Library General Public License) is a free 
software li cense publi shed by the Free Software Foundation (FSF). The LGPL all ows developers and compan ies 
to use and integrale LGPL software into their own (even proprietary) software without being required (by the 
terms of a strong copyleft) to release the source code of the ir own software-parts . Merely the LGPL software-parts 
need to be modifiabl e by end-users (via source code ava il ability ): therefore, in the case of proprietary software, 
the LGPL-parts are usually used in the form of a shared library (e.g. DLL), so that there is a clear separation 
between the proprietary parts and open source LGPL parts. 
http://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU _ Lesser _ General_publi c _ Li cense 
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includes vendors who provide much of the core development (if not testing and 
documentation) staff for open source projects". Therefore, it is needless to say that 
these vendors are in a position to exert their control over the software code, which 
later allows them to pursue a variety of BMs. Lastly, Perr et al. (2010) make 
distinction between horizontal and vertical markets and emphasize that newer vertical 
market offerings often require the subject matter expertise and engineering resources 
that only the vendor can provide. 
Obviously, these three factors have a significant bearing on OSSBM value creation 
and capture sides. For example, in instances where there is Jack of IP ownership and 
copy right assignrnent, a firm can devise an OSSBM based on ' support' (i.e., an 
OSSBM type) generating revenues derived from sale of customer support contracts. 
However, when a target marketplace is a vertical one and there is an option of 
crafting a product which has a licensed enterprise version, a firm can proliferate open 
source application and monetize through sale of proprietary versions or product line 
extensions (hybrid mode!). 
Dahlander and Magnusson (2005) are also intrigued by the fact that the firm that 
contributes to and benefits from OSS communities does not solely control the 
knowledge produced to create the software which holds a central position in the 
firm 's product development (value creation). Therefore, the authors are interested in 
finding more about how OSS firm-community relationships are managed and what 
managerial challenges OSS firms encounter. 
Employing case-study approach, Dahlander and Magnusson (2005) propose a 
typology of three different approaches used by firms to manage their relationships. 
These are: 1) symbiotic; 2) commensalistic; and 3) parasitic. These three approaches 
are not clear-cut categories but rather "steps on a continuum regarding the benefits for 
the communities deliberately searched by the OSS firms" (Dahlander & Magnusson, 
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2005 , p. 487). The authors further describe the three approaches as follows. The 
parasitic approach entails the situation where a firm only focuses on its own benefits, 
without taking into account that its actions might harm the community. The symbiotic 
approach, on the other hand, refers to a situation where a firm co-develops hand in 
hand with the community. The last approach which is an intermediate way to inter-
relate to the comrnunity is to benefit from the co-existence with another entity while 
leaving it without harm. 
In addition to the three approaches, Dahlander and Magnusson (2005) highlight seven 
managerial challenges such as: 1) respecting the norms and values of the OSS 
communities; 2) using licenses in a fruitful manner; 3) attracting developers and 
users; 4) handling the resource consurnption related to comrnunity development; 5) 
aligning different interests about the nature of work; 6) resolving ambiguity about 
control and ownership; and 7) getting acceptance for using the comrnunity-developed 
software in commercial applications and avoiding direct conflicts. 
Based on the feedback received from interviewed firms, Dahlander and Magnusson 
(2005 , p. 491) apt! y conclude that the symbiotic approach that entails the acceptance 
of dual roles provides a better chance for the firm to influence the comrnunities; yet 
the central issue becomes that of "how to balance a distributed knowledge system 
incorporating both the firm and its comrnunity, also acknowledging that the modes of 
control available differ widely within this system". This returns us back to the value 
capture side of OBM. In this regard, the authors briefly touch upon using "subtle 
me ans of control " to steer the value capture. These controlling mechanisms include: 
1) devoting personnel to work in or with comrnunities; 2) creating and maintaining 
reputation; 3) fringe benefits; 4) the use of ' interaction tools ' ; and 5) ' selling' 
development tasks. Y et, these subtle means of control practiced by four firms remain 
to be tested and tried by larger number of firms over time to become established as 
industry standards so as to be later widely adopted by firms interested in adopting 
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OB Ms. Also, the relative importance of these mechanisms remains a mystery to tho se 
policy makers who need convincing numbers to make a shift in policy directions. 
This is especially the case as the debate over patenting algorithms and business 
methods related to software (mainly in European context) has remained an unsettled 
one (see also Levin et al. , 1987). 
As OS communities gain more momenturn with respect to OSSBMs, in another study 
Dahlander and Magnusson (2008) try to understand how firms make use of these 
communities and how such use is associated with their business models. Authors 
conduct a qualitative study based on four in-depth interviews with OSS firms and 
inductively derive three themes: accessing, aligning, and assimilating. Accessing 
involves firms approach to get access to the community resources to expand their 
resource-base. Aligning reflects how a firm aligns its own strategies with those of 
community. Assimilating regards how firms assimilate with communities to integrate 
and share results. Each of these themes reflects an overarching strategy which 
involves minor tactics for implementation. For example, accessing can be done 
through a tactic called establishing new communities, which aims at attracting 
outsiders to work in the firm' s area. Aligning requires the firm to opt for adopting 
licensing practices to clarify ownership of product developed collaboratively by the 
firm and its community. Finally, assimilating draws on a tactic called devoting 
resources to evaluate and select source code from communities. 
Although Dahlander and Magnusson (2008) provide a rather thorough understanding 
on how OSS firms use OSSBM and manage their affairs to make use of communities, 
their work is very practice oriented and Jack sound theoretical perspective underlying 
those themes. For example, each theme and its associate tactics draws on different or 
a mix of firm-specific capabilities ( e.g. absorptive capability with regards to 
assimilating theme) which remain foggy and unattended in the course oftheir study. 
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Perhaps among other interesting academie insights which shed light on user 
communities18, 1 can note the work conducted by Dahlander and Frederiksen (2012) 
which highlights the relational view of innovation in user communities (here, user 
community for computer controlled musical instruments). In fact, there are certain 
truths about user conununities which make them interesting in the discussion of value 
creation and value capture with regards to OSSBM. 
For example, the vast majority of contributions within user communities are made by 
a few (Lakhani & von Hippel 2003) where communities portray a core-periphery 
structure with a cohesive subgroup of core actors and a set of peripheral actors who 
are loosely connected to the core ( e.g. Borgatti & Everett 1999). Therefore, a 
member' s position can change from being of pivotai to not so important in terms of 
its influence within a community. This has led scholars (Dahlander & Frederiksen, 
2012) to view core-periphery structures in terms of a continuum and claim that a 
member' s relative position within a core-periphery structure can have a significant 
bearing on innovations. 
Extending this line of reasoning to OSSBM and OSS firms would suggest that the 
kind of position an OSS firm holds within certain communities ( often more than one) 
can impact the direction of innovations within tho se communities and align them with 
the firm 's innovation strategy. Therefore, as long as value creation and capture are 
involved, the discussion of OBM encompasses user communities as weil. 
In conclusion, although the study of the OSSBMs brings us closer to an 
understanding of OBM, we still do not know enough about neither OBM nor OSSBM 
concepts. This is more particularly so as OSS is a very specifie case of OBM. OSS 
industry is a complex one. lt comprises OS technologies, community of developers, 
180SS communities are in fact user communities to a large extent, however, if absolutely viewing them 
as such signifies an extreme view. 
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OS foundations, OS service providers, and ali organizations that integrate OSS tools 
(e.g. , FFmpeg, GStreamer, Linux kernel) and libraries into their value chain activities. 
For these reasons, a study of OSSTCs is a valid effort that can better inform us about 
value creation processes within OSS industry and expand our knowledge of OBM. 
Moreover, 'OSS development process' can be conceptualized in different ways. lt is a 
software development methodology (purely technical perspective). lt is a strategie 
plan to obtain unique resources, to reduce cost and time of development to offer more 
competitive biddings, to build internai technical capabilities and boost in-bouse R&D, 
to build branding and attract customers, etc. (strategy and innovation perspective). It 
is an indispensable part of an OBM adopted by different organizations to create value 
through boundary spanning enabled by institutional openness (OBM enabler). lt is 
also part of an OBM to capture a portion of the created value in different forms: 
monetary (e.g. , revenues) and non- monetary (e.g. , learning, enhancing internai R&D 
capacity) through formai or informai mechanisms (BM perspective). Therefore, 
knowing about only OSS service providers' BMs is not enough to explain ali aspects 
of OSSBM or OBM as a larger context. We also need to study other elements of the 
ecosystem in relation to value creation and value appropriation processes of 
OSSBMs. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the literature has shown a shifting emphasis on ' value 
creation' (without ignoring the value capture) and highlighted the key role of 
'customer-focused value creation' within strategy-related discussion of BM. Both 
concepts of value creation and value capture are at the core of strategie management 
sin ce su peri or value creation and the ability to capture value in the form of profits are 
prerequisites for building competitive advantage (Priem, 2007; Enders et al. , 2008; 
Enders et al. , 2009). However, the concept of value creation deserves special 
attention particularly because the process of value creation is often confused with the 
process of value capture (Morgan & Finnegan, 2014, p. 3). In addition, it is argued 
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that both value creation and capture should be viewed as distinct processes, since the 
source that creates value may or may not be able to capture that value in the long-
term (Lepak et al. , 2007). Y et, strategy management research has paid less attention 
to value creation than to value appropriation/capture (Nickerson et al. , 2007). As a 
result, the task of examining how firms create and capture value with OSS is made 
more difficult. The situation is further exacerbated when little attention has been paid 
to the role of customers within OSS-related BMs. On the contrary, more focus has 
been on the relationship between firms and communities or interactions within 
communities thereby overshadowing the role of customers in joint value creation. 
Thus, a study of OSS needs to focus on the types, roles, and capabilities of clients in 
order to provide a more complete picture of innovation process and respect the 
holistic nature of OBM design. For example, questions like "how can OSS clients 
contribute to sustainable value creation process?" or "what roles can customers play 
in the R&D process of OSS products to reduce costs of development, time to market, 
and increase effectiveness of solutions?" have remained elusive in the 01 as well as 
OSS literatures. 
2.6 To what extent 01 is a valid theory to investigate the case of OSS 
1 include this section mainly because there are sorne doubts about the explanatory 
power and robustness of OIP among academies and practitioners alike. The key 
question to ask can be, 'is 01 a fully-fledged theory? ' The answer to this question is 
negative and in what follows, 1 explain the reasons. In fact, since 01 concept has been 
proposed by Henry Chesbrough in 2003, it has been enjoying an upward trend in 
popularity. However, OI concept is not a bed of roses! On the contrary, it has been 
criticized on three major fronts: a) dearth of solid theoretical underpinning; b) 
research shortcomings, many ~charted research domains, and dearth of extemal 
validity; and c) being built upon fuzzy pillars so much so that it has been labelled for 
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being "old wine in new botties" (Trott & Hartmann, 2009). Thus, we cannot depend 
blindly follow 01 teachings while studying OSSTC and OSS phenomenon in general. 
To err on the safe side, we may treat OSS as an independent unit of analysis. 
However, we should benefit from the earlier research on the relationship between 
OSS and 01, and try to contribute to the interface where we can. 
A) Lack of solid theoretical underpinning 
01 is viewed as a field which Jacks solid theoretical underpinning (e.g. , 
Lichtenthaler, 2011; van de Vrande et al. , 2009) - an issue which is still valid 
(Vanhaverbeke & Cloodt, 2014). For instance, 01 neither complies with severa! 
criteria that typically characterize management fashions (Abrahamson, 1996; Kieser, 
1997) nor it qualifies as a new theory based on essential guidelines (Sutton & Staw, 
1995; Zahra & Newey, 2009; as cited in Lichtenthaler, 2011, p. 79). Th us, 01 is yet to 
be considered "a coherent new theory" (Lichtenthaler, 2011 , p. 79). 01 is main! y 
perceived as aframework characterizing sorne approaches to innovation management 
(Lichtenthaler, 2011 , p. 80). Others (Vanhaverbeke & Cloodt, 2014) have also 
recognized this matter, and therefore emphasized the need for integrating 
management and economies theories into 01 discussions in order to forward the field 
into a more theoretically mature state with the aspiration of transforrning 01 
framework into a fully-fledged theory of [contemporary] innovation. 
B) The extant research gaps and Jack of extemal validity 
01 research offers severa! white research spaces (i .e. , "uncharted research domains") 
so mu ch so that it still needs to be studied in a wide variety of settings (van de V rande 
et al. , 2010, p. 229). West and Gallagher (2006) emphasize the need to extend 01 
research to different levels of analysis. OECD (2008) highlights the role of 01-related 
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public policy implications. Still others underline the necessity to direct OI's focus on 
SMEs and SMEs in lmv-tech industries (van de Vran de et al. , 2010, 2009). This is 
mainly because most research on OI has been focused on high-tech multinationals 
(van de Vrande et al. , 2009; Chesbrough, 2003a); while research has shown us that 
"!essons learned from open innovation in large firms are not readily transfeiTable to 
the context ofSMEs .. . " (van de Vrande et al. , 2010, p. 227). 
Moreover, 01 suffers from severa! other research paucities. For example, we still 
need to obtain a clearer understanding of "OI ' s characteristics" as well as "practices 
and tools" for managing its processes (Lichtenthaler, 2011 ). Others (Lichtenthaler, 
2011; van de Vrande et al. , 2009; Gassmann & Enkel, 2004) emphasize the 
dominance of (or exaggerated role of) qualitative research approaches compared to 
quantitative methodologies in exploring the phenomenon. This methodological 
imbalance has severa! repercussions with the most important being the issue of 
external validity of 01-focused studies. Thus far, only few studies have explored 
openness using large-scale datasets (e.g. , Laursen & Salter, 2006a). Therefore, 
exploring other empirical settings is important for achieving external validity 
(Chesbrough & Crowther, 2006); i.e. increasing generalizability of the results. This 
will also satisfy policy makers ' need for statistics to makes sure about Ol ' s relevance 
to larger business populations. 
C) OI's fuzzy pillars: Reviewing the past criticism on 01 
01 concept - which has been celebrated for a little more than a decade by its 
proponents within academia (e.g. , Gassmann, 2006; Henkel , 2006; West & Gallagher, 
2006; Dittrich & Duysters, 2007; van de Vrande et al. , 2009; Enkel et al. , 2009; 
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Gassmann et al. , 201 0) and industry ( e.g., Philips; Pro ct er & Gambie Co; Dodgson et 
al. , 2006)- now seems to enjoy an upward trend in popularity 19. 
Earlier in this chapter, 1 have attempted to review the 01 concept mainly based on the 
major research works conducted on and around the tapie. Mostly, 1 have cited 
scientific research efforts that have attempted to further clarify 01 concept and 
solidify its theoretical pillars based on the implicit assomption that: it is a novel 
conceptualization of modern innovation paradigm; in other words, the way forward in 
the years to come. However, not all academies in the field of R&D and innovation 
management, or even practitioners for that matter, share the same positive and 
encouraging sentiment towards 01. On the contrary, despite dearth of criticism 
officially published in academie journals, there are three academie papers that have 
expressed criticism (albeit to different degrees) over the concept; and they are 
noteworthy to mention. These are: a) Trott and Hartmann (2009)'s; b) Mowery 
(2009)'s; and c) Groen and Linton (2010) ' s study. 
First, Trott and Hartmann (2009, p. 715) claim that Henry Chesbrough has created "a 
false dichotomy by arguing that open innovation is the only alternative to a closed 
innovation madel". Thus, the authors believe that the works of Chesbrough (2003a, 
2003c) in which he presents the six principles of closed innovation build the case for 
"a straw man argument, which misrepresents the true position of innovation 
management today" (Trott & Hartmann, 2009, p. 716). Consequently, the critical 
authors draw on long standing literature in the field of R&D and innovation 
management to show that the core concept of 01 represents "little more than the 
repackaging and representation of concepts and findings over the past forty years 
within the literature on innovation management"(lbid. , p. 715). For example, they 
cite Rothwell and Zegveld (1985)'s "Reindustrialization and Technology" in arder to 
19 For a review of the concept, please read Chesbrough and Bogers (20 14). ln the ir work, the authors 
have provided an updated review of the concept ofOI and its current popularity. 
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demonstrate that weil over twenty years ago, others have emphasized "the need for 
extemal linkages within innovation process" (Trott & Hartmann, 2009, p. 716). In 
short, Trott and Hartmann (2009) believe that Chesbrough has not given the past 
literature its due while introducing the concept of OI. 
Second, Mowery (2009)'s paper also provides traces of criticism conceming OI 
concept, albeit to a more limited extent. His paper reviews the development of 
industrial R&D in the United States during the postwar period (i.e. , since 1945). The 
author believes that the structure of industrial R&D has been changing considerably 
sin ce 1985. Mowery (2009, p. 1) claims that the change has not been towards 
"creating an entirely novel system" yet "this restructuring has revived important 
elements of the industrial research ' system' of the United States in the late 191h and 
early 201h centuries". His analysis aptly shows that "many of the elements of the 
'Open Innovation ' approach to R&D management (Chesbrough 2003a, 2006b) are 
visible in this earlier period" (p. 1 ). 
"Indeed, the 1945-1985 period in the historical development of industrial R&D 
in the United States, which was characterized by large central corporate 
research facilities that sought to span the continuum from fundamental research 
to development, ultimately may prove to be a departure from a structure that 
for much of its existence included both inter-institutionallinkages and a market 
for intellectual property to support industrial innovation". 
Thus, early 1970s marks the beginning of the structural change in the pattern of US 
industrial R&D where "large corporations reduced or eliminated their central R&D 
laboratories, increasing their reliance on external sources of R&D and knowledge , 
such as universities, interfirm alliances, licencing transactions, and acquisitions of 
other firms" (Mowery, 2009, p. 13; Emphasis added). 
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Further, Mowery (2009) places an emphasis on the key role of 'public policy' (more 
particularly, the antitrust policy) as a major influence on the evolution of the US 
industrial R&D system during the past 125 years. He emphasizes the role of public 
R&D spending as another aspect of major influence of public policy in the post-1945 
period. 
In short, Mowery (2009)' s research shows the emergence of what la ter has been 
termed "open innovation" in the US industrial R&D by highlighting 1985 as the 
turning point in the US industrial R&D pattern and influence of public policy. 
Third, Groen and Linton (201 0) criticize the 01 concept from a terminology 
perspective. They claim that 01 corresponds to the definition of supply chain 
management20 resting upon the core argument that "supply chain management 
focuses on the creation of value by reaching beyond the traditional borders of a firm 
including suppliers, customers and other stakeholders" (Groen & Linton, 2010, p. 
554). Therefore, arguing so, using 01 in the realm of technology innovation 
management and supply chain management in other fields, the authors pose the 
question: "are we creating false barriers that inhibit communication between different 
groups of academie?" (Ibid., p. 554). 
The above mentioned three critics have been very briefly attended to within the latest 
work of Chesbrough and Bogers (2014, pp. 22-24). To respond to Trott and 
Hartmann' s (2009) paper, Chesbrough and Bogers (2014) build their argument over 
the "erosion factors"21 introduced by Chesbrough (2003a). In their defense, 
Chesbrough and Bogers (2014, p. 22) claim that "Chesbrough (2003a) identified 
20 Supply Chain Management defined as "key business processes from end user through orig inal 
suppliers that provides products, services, and information that add value for customers and other 
stakeholders" (Lambert & Cooper, 2000). 
21 Erosion factors : increased mobility of workers, more capable universities, declining U.S. hegemony, 
and growing access of startup firms to venture capital (re-stated in Chesbrough & Bogers, 2014, p. 22; 
Chesbrough, 2003a) 
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erosion factors that influence the conditions under which innovation takes place have 
changed, giving rise to a new paradigm in which firms need to be and benefit more 
from bein.g open for i1111ovation. This does not imply that individual elements of open 
i1movation were absent in the earlier paradigm, but rather that they now combine to 
form a new paradigm to manage iimovation". Furthem1ore, the authors mention that 
in their version of the book (2003a), Chesbrough did cite prior literature and gave 
credit to pioneering authors. 
Further, Chesbrough and Bogers (2014, p. 23) perceive Mowery ' s (2009) work as 
"regrettably" incomplete, "with little notice taken of any of the evidence or the 
analysis offered in the Chesbrough (2003a)". Chesbrough and Bogers (2014, p. 23) 
claim that Mowery's (2009)'s research is in sharp contrast with Trott and Hartma1111' s 
(2009), in that the former emphasizes change in the "industrial i1111ovation" while the 
latter claims "little has changed". Then, again, the authors tum the spotlight on 
"erosion factors" and claim that the work of Mowery provides yet "further evidence 
for sorne of the erosion factors noted by Chesbrough (2003a)." Thereby, turning the 
criticism into more credit for OI, authors claim that the erosion factors accentuate the 
need for OI. Chesbrough and Bogers (2014, pp. 23 -24) state that: 
"Mowery ' s cntJque also overstates his argument. There is indeed sorne 
continuity between the i1111ovation systems of a century ago and the systems of 
today. The large-scale industrial research laboratories that arose during the last 
century have receded. But to state that we have retumed to innovation 
conditions of a century ago overlooks a great deal that is new. The roles of 
startup firms, of venture capital, the growth of federally funded university 
research .. _.all of these differ substantially from the period of the second 
industrial revolution .. . " 
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Furthermore, Chesbrough and Bogers (2014) claim that their work is based on 
primary qualitative data while Mowery ' s (2009) research is based on secondary data 
analysis. 
Finally, Groen and Lin ton' (20 1 0) critique has been attended by Chesbrough and 
Bogers ' s (2014) as well as Badawy' s (2011) responses. Chesbrough and Bogers 
(2014, p. 24) claim that 01 is different from supply chain management because first it 
specifically deals with "the creation of new products, services and processes" ; and 
second, 01 "covers a much broader range of possible stakeholders, which provides 
value in using the term open innovation as distinct from supply chain management". 
Similarly, Badawy (20 11 , p. 66) perceives 01 as "a business madel and a paradigm" 
while he defines supply chain management as "essentially a tool or component of a 
system for achieving efficiency in the supply chain". Therefore, to Badawy, 01 and 
supply chain management are two "remarkably different" issues concerning their 
'focus ' and 'rationale '. As far as issue of ' focus ' is considered, Badawy (2011 , p. 66) 
notes that: 
"The focus in open innovation is on searching for new ideas, products, or 
services as a basis for collaboration and partnerships among organizations, 
companies, entrepreneurs, and other. However, the focus in supply chain 
management is primarily on cast-cutting and efficiency through establishing a 
network of interconnected system spanning all movement and storage of raw 
materials, work-process inventory, and finished goods from point of origin to 
point of consumption (supply chain)." 
The rationale behind the two concepts is also different. As far as issue of ' rationale ' is 
considered Badawy (20 11 , p. 66) notes that: 
"The rationale behind the supply chain management as a strategie set of tools 
relates essentially to the coordination of the traditional business functions . On 
the other hand, the open innovation paradigm embraces the non-traditional 
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activities relating to creativity, invention, innovativeness, and product/ service 
differentiation from the cunently existing and accepted mold. As such, 
" newness" is the name ofthe game." 
In view of the above, it seems obvious that although OI has received very few 
published critiques, OI founders have not been successful in regards to providing 
plausible responses as why 01 should be considered a new paradigm for R&D and 
innovation management. Nor have they embedded their counter-arguments in 
theoretically strong molds (see Chesbrough & Bogers, 2014). Their major focus point 
in their counter-arguments mainly revolves around the erosion factors that are 
believed to have given ri se to the emergence of the concept. Th us, we need to review 
their relevance to be able to appreciate their explanatory power. 
D) Reviewing Chesbrough's "erosion factors" 
There are two major tenets underpinning OI framework: 1) Six contrasting principles 
of closed and open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003a, 2003c); and 2) Erosion factors 
(Chesbrough, 2003a, 2003c). Previously, Trott and Hartmann (2009), relying on a 
literature review, showed that in principle closed innovation never exist. They 
criticized or by building arguments that could refute the six principles of 01 
paradigm. However, Chesbrough and Bogers (2014) focused on erosion factors and 
their significant influence on shifting the closed innovation paradigm towards an 
open one in order to respond to major parts of Trott and Hartmann' s (2009) 
arguments. So, what are these factors in Chesbrough' s language? 
"Toward the end ofthe 20th century, though, a number of factors combined to 
erode the underpinnings of closed innovation in the United States. Perhaps 
chief among these factors was the dramatic rise in the nurnber and mobility of 
knowledge workers, making it increasingly difficult for companies to control 
their proprietary ideas and expertise. Another important factor was the 
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growing avai lability of private venture capital, which has helped to finance 
new finns and their efforts to commercialize ideas that have spilled outside 
the silos of corporate research labs. Such factors have wreaked havoc with the 
virtuous cycle that sustained closed innovation . . . " (Chesbrough, 2003c; p. 
36). 
First, Chesbrough' s (2003c) argument conceming erosion factors seems to be limited 
to the geography of the United States at best, as stated by himself. In addition, based 
on classification made by ' 2015 Index of Economie Freedom' 22 which divides 186 
countries into six categories (free, mostly free, moderately free, mostly unfree, 
repressed, and not ranked), only five countries are listed under free market economy 
category; and only 30 are classified as mostly free . The USA and Canada, as 
representative of North America, are two countries listed as mostly free conceming 
their economies. 
Furthermore, countries which rank high on 'Knowledge Economy Index ' (four 
pillars: Economie Incentive and Institutional Regime-EIR, Education, Innovation, 
and Information and Communications Technologies-ICT) form only a limited 
number of countries and not ali are homogenous on each of the dimensions. For 
example, even USA, which is considered among knowledge economies in the world, 
does not rank among the top 10 on education, EIR, and ICT dimensions23. Therefore, 
highlights · of the US economy such as government sound public poli ci es ( e.g. , 
antitrust, Bayh-Dole IP policy for university ownership, etc.), and high mobility of 
knowledge workers as eroding factors need to be taken with a pinch of salt within the 
US context, let alone to other countries. 
22 Please refer to online source: 2015 Index of Economie Freedom; available at 
http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking. 
23 please see the report: "knowledge economy index (kei) 2012 rankings" published on the world 
bank 's website available at 
http: //web. worldbank.org/wbsite/extemal/wbi/wbiprograms/kfdlp/extunikam/O, contentmdk:20584250 
- pagepk:64168427- pipk:64168435- thesitepk: 1414721 ,OO.html ?. 
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Second, Gompers and Lerner (200 1, p. 164) argue that "many policymakers have a 
perception that venture capital organizations have had much to do with the rising 
leadership of U.S. firms in high-technology industries ... But demonstrating a causal 
relationship between the presence of venture capital investment and innovation or job 
growth is a challenging empirical problem." They claim that both venture capital 
funding and patenting could be positively related to a third unobserved variable such 
as "arriva! of technological opportunities". Others have tried to establish causality 
between venture capital funding and innovation; but they have not arrived at 
confirming evidence. 
For example, Hellmann and Puri (200), paying only modest attention to causality 
concern, found that venture capital may be particularly important for innovative 
firms. Gompers and Lerner (200 1) interpret this finding in light of the possibility that 
more innovative firms select venture capital for financing, rather than venture capital 
causing firms to be more innovative. In another study, Kortum and Lerner (1999; see 
also 2000) tried to search for patterns on aggregate industry leve! as opposed to only 
firm leve!. Having cared for causality concerns, their results showed that venture 
funding did not have a strong positive impact on innovation. Therefore, the issue 
remains open concerning the role of venture capital in an economy's overall process 
of innovation (Gompers & Lerner, 2001). Thus, even if a closed innovation mode! 
ever existed, the role of venture capital in transforming the landscape of innovation 
remains questionable. However, one cannot deny the fast paced growth in the venture 
capital industry in the United States ( e.g. , Gompers, 1996; as cited in Gompers & 
Lerner, 2001 ) and its importance for proving financial support to entrepreneurial 
firn1s (e.g., Gompers & Lerner, 2001). 
Third, there has been an increase in the nurnber and mobility of knowledge workers 
in the global village of today. However, this does not mean high-tech organizations 
have !ost control over their strategie intangible assets. It is in fact still a debatable 
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1ssue within the field of research on social capital. Perhaps, the better way of 
forrnulating the issue is to look at intangible assets from a social capital perspective in 
which sense there is a debate over the locus of ownership of interorganizational 
relationships. Therefore, the key work here is ' relationship' and not necessarily 
mobility of knowledge workers in real space-geography issue. Most recently, based 
on the assumption that interorganizational relationships rely on their individuals, 
Sorenson and Rogan (2014) attempted to settle the argument, "who owns such 
relationship (employee or employer) and who can benefit from that". The authors 
found three factors increasing the odds associated with individual ownership. These 
are: a) the extent to which the resources valued by alters belong to the individual 
(rather than the organization); b) the degree to which alters feel greater indebtedness 
to the individual than to the organization; and c) the extent to which relationships 
involve emotional attachment. I mention this example to highlight the details 
involved with locus of ownership and that it cannat be simplified to a mere statement 
that because individuals can move around more often, therefore, the innovation 
regime has simply changed. 
2. 7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have reviewed and analyzed the relevant literatures on OI, open 
strategy, BM, OBM, and OSSBM. Based on the review, we can consider 'openness' 
as an essential condition to adopt OIP, but it is not sufficient to remain successful and 
relevant to the competitive arena. In fact, firms need to change their BMs and adopt 
OBM to benefit from OIP. Furthermore, -oi has not matured into a fully-fledged 
theory, mainly viewed as a framework in progress. Prior research also shows that OI, 
BM, and OBM concepts have been studied dominantly from a firrn-centric 
perspective to the extent that user communities, eco systems, and network of partners 
have received less attention. If we factor in the paucity of research on interactive and 
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reciprocal nature of coup led OI processes as weil as Jack of focus on ' value creation 
processes' within OBM context, the study of OSSTCs and OSS development process 
become a valid investigation that can add significant value to current understanding 
of the se fields. 
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CHAPTER III 
PERSPECTIVES ON OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of this research is to better understand the nature of OSS technological 
collaborations (OSSTC) and OSS collaborative R&D and innovation process (RDIP) 
at heart of which lies co-value creation processes. Ultimately, 1 intend to develop a 
theory that explains and relates key participants' motivations, roles, and 
interrelationships to success and sustainability of OSSTC- while accounting for 
inherent particularities of OSS technology. In this Chapter, 1 first distinguish between 
' free/libre' software and OSS and further shed light on the most recent 
characterization of OSS which captures its metamorphosis into a 'strategie and 
commercial' software product. Then, 1 present a brief argument conceming the 
significance of OSS and its development process as an appropriate case for 
researching ' collaborative' technology development process. Next, 1 discuss the five 
inherent particularities of OSS technology that lead to building a special case to study 
OSS RDIP as an open and distributed innovation process. 1, then, revisit the existing 
theoretical perspectives on OSS development; these include: motivations to engage in 
invention and development process; measures of OSS success; as well as govemance, 
organization and innovation process of OSS. 1 close this chapter by presenting a 
conclusion. 
3.2 The origin ofOSS: The free/libre software movement and beyond 
The origin of the ' free software movement' dates back to about 198411985 in which 
period of tirrie Richard Stallman, a researcher in the field of computer science at the 
MIT's Artificial Intelligent Laboratory in Boston, resigned from MIT and founded 
the Free Software Foundation (FSF) in 1985 . The FSF is believed to have been 
shaped as a fight against the monopoly power of the software giants like Microsoft. 
For example, AT &T's decision to tum the UNIX operating system into a commercial 
proprietary program was amongst the triggers that induced Stallman to react and 
embark on inventing GNU (Gnu is Not UNIX) operating system in 1983. About a 
decade later, in 1992, Linus Torvald ' s Linux kemel filled the missing component of 
GNU and made it fully operational.24 
FSF is a non-profit organization with a worldwide mission to promote computer user 
freedom and to defend the rights of all free software users (see, FSF). In one of the 
recent speeches of Stallman (TEDx talk at "FREEDOM (@ digital age") in April 
2014), the man, repeatedly, explains the fundamentals ofthe free software movement. 
He perceives free software as "the frrst battle in the liberation of cyberspace". As 
computers and computing lie at the core of hurnan daily activities, the situation begs 
the question: "Who controls your computer?" "Is it you? Or, is it sorne big company 
that' s really controlling it?" (Stallman' s speech, 2014)25 . Free software phenomenon 
is therefore grounded in social, philosophical and political debates. "Free software" is 
defined as: 
24 For further information and reference please see: a) FSF' s website: https: //www.fsf.org/; b) von 
Hippel and von Krogh (2003); c) Bonaccorsi & Rossi , (2006); d) Richard Stallman ' s Speech in April 
2014 in the event: TEDxGeneva2014 : Freedom (@ digital age). Information is available in the video 
which can be retrieved from http://www.tedxgeneva.net/tedx-geneva-20 14-freedom-digital-age/. 
25 Richard Stallman 's speech in April 2014 in the event: TEDxGeneva2014: Freedom (@ digital age). 
Information is available in the video, which can be retrieved from http://www.tedxgeneva.net/tedx-
geneva-20 14-freedom-digital-age/. 
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" ... software that respects us ers ' freedom and community. Roughly, it means 
that the users have the freedom torun, copy, distribute, study, change and 
improve the software. Thus, "free software" is a matter of liberty, not priee. 
To understand the concept, you should think of "free" as in "free speech," not 
as in "free beer". We sometimes call it "libre software" to show we do not 
mean it is gratis."26 
Further, free software denotes that its users can have "four essential freedoms"; these 
are: 
1. The freedom to run the program as you wish, for any purpose (freedom 0). 
Il. The freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to your needs 
(freedom 1 ). Access to the source code is a precondition for this. 
III. The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor (freedom 2). 
IV. The freedom to improve the pro gram, and release y our improvements to the 
public, so that the whole cornmunity benefits (freedom 3). Access to the 
source code is a precondition for this.27 
Although the free software doctrine has its own proponents and forms the bedrock of 
Open Source (OS) movement, it did not evolve into mainstream irnmediately and 
industry was especially suspicions of it. As cited in von Hippel and von Krogh (2003, 
p. 201 0), "in 1998, Bruce Perens and Eric Raymond agreed that a significant part of 
the problem resided in Stallman's term "free" software, which might understandably 
have an ominous ring to the ears of business people". This gave birth to the OS 
movement to be founded by prominent hackers (Perens, 1998, as cited in von Hippie 
& von Krogh, 2003, p. 210). Although core licensing practices which have been 
upheld by the free software movement are incorporated into OSS (see, von Hippel & 
von Krogh, 2003), to Stallman they are not the same. According to FSF: 
26Definition is based on GNU Operating System ' s website founded by Richard Stallman: 
http://www.gnu.org/ 
27 These four essential freedoms are based on GNU Operating System ' s website founded by Richard 
Stallman: http: //www.gnu.org/ 
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"The fundamental difference between the two movements is in their values, 
their ways of looking at the world. For the Open Source movement, the issue 
of whether software should be open source is a practical question [ emphasis 
added] , not an ethical one. As one person put it, "Open source is a 
development methodology [ emphasis added] ; free software is a social 
movernent." For the Open Source movement, non-free software is a 
suboptimal solution. For the Free Software movernent, non-free software is a 
social problern and free software is the solution."28 
The term 'open source' · (OS) was coined on February 3rd 1998 in Palo Alto, 
California to highlight the "pragmatic" and "business-case ground" associated with 
the OS phenornenon. The business sense that originally motivated Netscape to release 
their code illustrated a valuable way to engage with potential software users and 
developers, and convince them to create and improve source code by participating in 
an engaged cornrnunity. The newly coined terrn, gave the phenomenon an identity 
that liberated it from philosophical and political tints associated with its predecessor: 
free software29. Similarly, Fitzgerald (2006, p. 590) mentioned that the term free 
software could lead to "the cornrnon misperception" that contributors (individual and 
organizations) could not make money with free software. Today, OS refers to open 
source projects, products, or initiatives that embrace and celebrate open exchange, 
collaborative participation, rapid prototyping, transparency, merilocracy, and 
community development.30 As the present research is concerned with ' open source 
software' (OSS), the focus will be lirnited to OS ' software ' as defined by Open 
Source Initiative (OSI): 
"Open source software is software that can be freely used, changed, and 
shared (in modified or unrnodified forrn) by anyone. Open source software is 
28 Quoted from the article: Why "Free Software" is better than "Open Source" which can be retrieved 
online from GNU operating system ' s website sponsored by Free Software Foundation at: 
https:/ /www .gn u.org/ph i losophy/free-software-for- freedom . htrn 1 
29 See the Open Source Lnitiative Website: http://opensource.org/history 
30 The open source perspective is adopted from OpenSource.com: http://opensource.com/ 
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made by many people, and distributed under licenses that comply with the 
Open Source Definition."31 
Other academie scholars (e.g. , O 'Mahony, 2003 ; Lemer & Tirole, 2002) have also 
relied on the OSI for providing a sound definition of OSS, mainly because the OSI, a 
non-for profit organization founded in 1998, is dedicated to promoting OSS and is the 
founding father of its definition. Furthermore, the distribution of OSS must comply 
with certain criteria; nameli2: 
1. Free redistribution: 
The license shall not restrict any party from selling or giving away the software 
as a component of an aggregate software distribution containing programs from 
severa! different sources. The license shall not require a royalty or other fee for 
such sale. 
2. Source code: 
The program must include source code, and must allow distribution in source 
code as well as compiled form. Where sorne form of a product is not distributed 
with source code, there must be a well-publicized means of obtaining the source 
code for no more than a reasonable reproduction cost preferably, downloading 
via the Internet without charge. The source code must be the preferred form in 
which a programmer would modify the program. Deliberately obfuscated 
source code is not allowed. Intermediate forms such as the output of a pre-
processor or translator are not allowed. 
3. Derived works: 
31 The definition ofOSS is based on Open Source Initiative 's Official Website: http://opensource.org/ 
32 The criteria for distribution of OSS is based on Open Source Initiative's Official Website: 
http://opensource.org/ 
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The license must allow modifications and derived works, and must allow them 
to be distributed under the same terms as the li cense of the original software. 
4. Integrity of the author's source code: 
The license may restrict source-code from being distributed in modified form 
only if the license allows the distribution of "patch files" with the source code 
for the purpose of modifying the program at build time. The license must 
explicitly permit distribution of software built from modified source code. The 
license may require derived works to carry a different name or version number 
from the original software. 
5. No discrimination against persons or groups: 
The li cense must not discriminate against any persan or group of persans. 
6. No discrimination against fields of endeavor: 
The license must not restrict anyone from making use of the program in a 
specifie field of endeavor. For example, it may not restrict the program from 
being used in a business, or from being used for genetic research. 
7. Distribution of license: 
The rights attached to the program must apply to ali to whom the program is 
redistributed without the need for execution of an additional license by those 
parties. 
8. License must not be specifie to a product: 
The rights attached to the program must not depend on the program's being part 
of a particular software distribution. If the program is extracted from that 
distribution and used or distributed within the terms of the pro gram' s li cense, 
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ail parties to whom the program is redistributed should have the same rights as 
those that are granted in conjunction with the original software distribution. 
9. License must not restrict other software: 
The license must not place restrictions on other software that is distributed 
along with the licensed software. For example, the license must not insist that 
ail other programs distributed on the same medium must be open-source 
software. 
1 O. License must be technology-neutral: 
No provision of the li cense may be predicated on any individual technology or 
style of interface. 
The definition of OSS and the criteria goveming its creation and distribution ensure 
that OSS development process incorporates notions of: openness, knowledge 
exchange and collaboration, transparency and porous innovation boundaries into the 
innovation process. 
Recent! y, OSS has become the subject of much commercial interest probably because 
it seems more promising in coping with "the core issues of the software crisis, 
namely that of software taking too long to develop, exceeding its budget, and not 
working very weil" (Feller & Fitzgerald, 2000, p. 58). To certain extent, as OSS 
proponents claim, OSS methodology, as a particular way to software development, 
has even the capacity to compete successfully, and perhaps in many cases replace 
traditional commercial development methods (Mockus et al. , 2002). Beyond this, the 
landscape of OSS development (OSSD) and innovation process has undergone a 
transformation which according to sorne scholars (Fitzgerald, 2006, p. 587) have led 
to OSS phenomenon metamorphosing into "a more mainstream and commercially 
viable form" dubbed as "OSS 2.0" . Such metamorphosis has influenced 
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' development process' of OSS as weil as its 'product domains ' through leaving its 
footprint on the four phases of software development process (i.e. , planning, analysis, 
design, and implementation) (Fitzgerald, 2006). Among major changes concerning 
its development process and end-product are the following, as emphasized by 
Fitzgerald (2006). 
OSSD process has become "less bazaar-like" due to more emphasis on "strategie 
planning" associated with the planning phase of development - which was not 
initially the case in early OSSD (Fitzgerald, 2006, p. 594). In fact, as Raymond 
(1999) notes, the planning phase of OSSD has been mainly ignited by "an itch worth 
scratching" where developers are mainly users of the software being developed. OSS 
becomes more commercially demanding and private firms consider how best they can 
gain an edge from OSS- competing with its proprietary counterparts (e.g., Linux 
operating system, Apache web server, Mozilla web browser, MySQL database 
management system, etc.). Now, there is more strategie planning involved in OSSD 
process. This trend has been followed by more complexity being associated with 
software "analysis" and "design" as the OSS as a product "is moving from 
development as back-office, invisible infrastructure to front-office, highly visible 
deployment of IS applications in vertical do mains" (Fitzgerald, 2006, p. 591 ). Thus, 
issues like "rigorous project management" to create professional products; "branding" 
of OSS products to increase trustworthiness leading to achieve market leader status; 
offering a "whole-product concept of a market-driven business approach" to deliver a 
solution to customers in terrns of products and services have become the 
distinguishing features of the new mode of OSS as OSS 2.0 (see, Fitzgerald, 2006). 
Therefore, the focus of this research is on the OSSas the technology (e.g., Odoo, i.e. , 
an open source ERP) that is designed and developed to satisfy a market demand; one 
that deals with commercial clients. This research is different from previous research 
that focuses on understanding how OSS functions ( e.g., von Krogh & von Hippel, 
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2006; Bonaccorsi & Rossi , 2003), or, on how the commercial firms either in form of 
OS service providers or commercial software companies engage in OSS development 
process to gain an edge (West & Gallagher, 2006). The distinction is the integration 
of the ' clients' of commercial entities as stakeholders of this open and distributed 
development and innovation process; and further emphasizing their influential role in 
developing, and sustaining the OSS 2.0, as I call it ' strategie and commercial ' OSS. 
3.3 Significance of OSSas a case for open and collaborative technology development 
OSS refers to a 'development methodology' where geographically dispersed 
programmers collaborate to jointly produce software using virtual collaboration tools 
(West & O'Mahony, 2005). It is perceived as "probably the most well-known case" 
when collective aspect of new software development and innovation is emphasized 
among "geographically dispersed individuals" (Dahlander, Frederiksen, & Rullani, 
2008, p. 115). It also is an "extremely successful exemplar of globally distributed 
development" (Fitzgerald, 2006, p. 594). 
On the one hand, the two key features of OSS technology development process such 
as: 1) collaborative development (using donated labor); and 2) shared rights to use the 
resultant technology, are among the commonalities between open source and open 
innovation strategy (see, e.g., West & Gallagher, 2006). OIP emphasizes 
collaborative or pooled R&D efforts to come up with new products and services (see, 
e.g. , Chesbrough, 2003a, c; 2007b ). Therefore, OSS has been viewed as "a great 
exemplar of open innovation because of the shared rights to use the resulting 
technology as weil as the collaborative development of the technology" (West & 
Gallagher, 2006, p. 322) (see also Morgan & Finnegan, 2010, p. 76; Lundell & van 
der Linden, 2013). More specifically, as OSS is gaining more and more momentum 
and is becoming an indispensable part of software industry, OI has become a more 
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relevant framework to study how private enterprises have ventured into exploiting the 
opportunities offered by OSS sector (West & Gallagher, 2006). 
On the other hand, as OSS development methodology enables participants to: a) find 
optimum solutions to complex programing issues; b) reduce cost and duration of 
software R&D; c) mi ti gate the risk associated with software development and allay 
uncertainty with new software inventions; and d) learn know-how and capabilities 
which cannot be easily codified and leamed otherwise, it shares an uncanny 
resemblance with strategic/technological alliances/collaborations. For example, 
Hagedoorn's (1993) seminal paper provides a large number of studies that shed light 
on motives underlying strategie technology partnering. These motives or underlying 
rationales, to name just a few, include: reducing the technological complexity and 
achieving technological synergies; reducing, minimizing and sharing the uncertainty 
associated with R&D projects; reducing and sharing the costs of R&D; capturing of 
partner' s tacit knowledge of technology; reducing the period between invention and 
market introduction (see Hagedoorn, 1993, p. 373). 
Therefore, although OSS breaks away from "established assumptions about 
innovation" (von Krogh & von Hippel, 2006, p.975), we must be cautious and ask the 
questions: ls OSS really a poster child of 01 concept? Or, is it a next generation of 
technological alliances within OSS industry? More specifically, as 01 is not yet a 
theory, we need to be careful not to use a theoretical container (i.e., 01 concept) 
which cannot encompass the contained! For this reason, 1 tend to position OSS 
technological collaborations (OSSTC) between 01 (best perceived as a BM) and 
technological alliances as understood within the literature of strategie alliances. To 
embark on this journey, first we need to better understand the theoretical perspectives 
on OSS and highlight its blind spots. 
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3.4 The five inherent particularities of OSS technology 
OSS is a special case technology because of having five inherent particularities. First, 
it is modular. Modularity refers to the fact that parts or processes of an innovation 
may be broken down into more essential parts-which can be worked on 
independently. lt is largely a property of the OSS technology. In fact, globally 
dispersed individuals can develop and improve components, further assemble them 
together and later integrate them into the larger system (i .e. , code base; e.g. , the Linux 
kemel) in arder to make them function together. Other innovations in contrast ( e.g., 
biomedicine) may be more di ffi cult to separate into smaller building blacks because 
they are more intricately tied to other components which are difficult to separate. 
Modularity thus facilitates open development strategies. 
Second, OSS technologies embody an evolutionary character. Several factors 
contribute to this attribute. One is the 'constantly evolving network of technologies ' 
to which a wide range of OSS technologies contributes. For instance, Microsoft 
Azure Cloud technology (proprietary owned technology) relies on Docker (OS 
project licensed under Apache License 2.0)33. Another is ' constantly evolving and 
changing needs' of end-users in the market place. As Weber (2004, p. 77) asserts, 
"prediction is actually the enemy in software testing". Third, software technology 
demonstrates the traits of public goods (non-rivalry and non-exclusivity) where there 
is no case of tragedy of comrnons. For instance, if 1 download and use VLC34, a free 
and OS application, 1 will not exclude others to do so, nor will I reduce the 
availability of VLC to others. Having a public good' s quality further leads to 
augmented positive network extemalities. 
33 Docker is an OS project that automates the deployment of applications inside software containers. 
Azure cloud technology promotes Docker in order to enable users to choose the tools and solution that 
best suit your needs for Docker container orchestration and scale operations. Source: 
https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/container-service/ 
34 On March 11 , 2017, at 11:40 and sorne seconds am, the download counter shows a rate of 158,600, 
212, where the rate of downloads is a fraction of a second. 
See, http: //www.videolan.org/vlc/index.html 
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Fourth, network externalities occur when individuals usmg the same or shared 
standard or technology within a space, derive benefits such as compatibility and 
economies of scope or scale. These benefits are scale dependent~ meaning that the 
greater number of users, the larger the benefits, particularly when it cornes to the 
benefits of standardization that come in lower interaction costs and incrementai 
development. Network extemalities are an important kind of benefit that occur in case 
of non-rivalrous technologies, that is, the case where copies of an innovation do not 
reduce benefits the same way they would in the case of rivalrous goods, (e.g., 
patented innovations) where (Ricardian) rents accrue to rarity. In the case where 
network extemalities are important, unbridled copying is desirable. In contrast, where 
network extemalities (or the number of users on a shared platform) are not important, 
technologies will tend to be protected by patents or other entry barriers (such as trade 
or technology secrets), where the main benefit to the innovator will be a license fee. 
This quality of OSS technology platforms is relevant to our discussion because if an 
OSS project (or a project's technology) creates ' positive network extemalities', then 
there will be more incentives for its developers to increase its ubiquity (i.e., turning it 
into the dominant industry standard). 
Fifth and last, OSS technology is more process oriented than product oriented. The 
implication of this attribute is twofold. First, openness is central to OSS collaborative 
RDIP as it enables inclusion of more able developers in its development process. 
Second, if openness and the open collaborative process not managed properly and the 
synthesis and synergy of idiosyncratic assets are not duly accomplished then the 
project outcome is of no value to marketplace. 
These five qualities-or as I cali them inherent particularities of OSS technology-
build the case for researchers of open and distributed innovation process to view OSS 
as a unique phenomenon that needs a theory development effort having two major 
foci. First, we need to take into consideration the inherent particularities of the OSS 
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technology; and , how they may unfold in its collaborative RDIP. Second, we have to 
be observant and vigilant not to follow previously developed paradigm religiously 
without considering their explanatory power concerning this particular technology. 
3.5 Theoretical perspectives on OSS development process as a technological 
innovation 
"Breaking with many established assumptions about how innovation ought to 
work, open source software projects offer eye-opening examples of novel 
innovation practices for students and practitioners in many fields." 
(von Krogh & von Hippel , 2006, p.975) 
OSS is a software product that is created collectively and made available online gratis 
for potential users. The creation and innovation process are open to all potential 
capable con tri butors and any software developer ( either an individual or a firm) who 
can voluntarily collaborate with others to develop the software for fun, to satisfy their 
persona! or organizational needs, to gain experience, or to demonstrate their 
capabilities to attract potential employers. The OSS projects are posted and 
maintained through internet-based communities of software developers and anyone 
who is interested and has the expertise can easily start a new OSS project. As OSS 
development process involves a mix of social, economie, and innovation related 
factors it has increasingly become under research spotlight being perceived as an 
exotic test ground for investigating open and distributed innovation and/or "peer 
production" (e.g., see Feller et al. , 2008 ; Benkler, 2006, 2002). 
Thus far, OSS has spurred academie research in a few key areas. Severa) authors have 
focused their attention on the "motivations" which induce behavior in users and 
developers and cause their contributions to OSS projects (e.g. , Lakhani & Wolf, 
2005 ; Lerner & Tirole, 2002). Others (e.g., Schaarschmidt et al. , 2015 ; O' Mahony & 
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Ferraro, 2007; Shah, 2006; Kogut & Metiu, 2001) have been intrigued by 
"governance" issues within OSS communities. Sorne other researchers (e.g. , West & 
O'Mahony, 2005; Scacchi 2002) have found the "organization" of OSS projects and 
communities of importance and devoted their efforts to explore the topic. Y et a few 
researchers (e.g. , von Hippel , 2005 ; von Krogh et al. , 2005; Feller & Fitzgerald, 
2000) have made an effort to explore and unbox the unorthodox " innovation process" 
of OSS development. 
In what follows, 1 will mention three core issues conceming OSS R&D and 
innovation process (RDIP) that have given rise to the prorninence to OSS 
phenomenon and spurred scholars to approach the subject from different theoretical 
perspectives. These three core issues are: 1) Motivation to engage in OSS 
development process; 2) measures of OSS success; and 3) govemance, organization, 
and innovation process of OSS development. Each section reviews the related 
literature with the aim of developing the discussion to highlight relevant problem 
areas. 
3.5.1 Theories about why developers engage in OSS development process 
Rapid diffusion of OSS, significant investments made by corporations rn OSS 
projects, and the new organization structure ( collaborative software development) are 
among the three important factors that have given rise to the prorninence of OSS 
phenomenon (Lemer & Tirole, 2002). Yet, none of these factors explains why 
individuals and firms contribute ta OSS Development. Therefore, 'Motivation' to 
contribute to OSS development process as a technological innovation has been 
always a core issue while researching OSS (see, e.g., Roberts et al. , 2006; Shah, 
2006; von Krogh & von Hippel, 2003 ; Lemer & Tirole, 2002). 
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The very basic question with regards to motivation to invest time, resources and 
efforts has been originally framed by Glass (1999, p. 1 04) : "!don 't know who these 
crazy people are who want to write, read and even revise all that code without being 
paid anything for il at ail". Similarly, Lerner and Tirole (2002, p. 198) are intrigued 
by " Why should thousands of top-notch programmers contribute freely to the 
provision of a public goocl?" In view of this line of query, severa} authors have 
attempted to approach OSS projects and their developers to provide answers and 
explanations in form of plausible theories (see, e.g., Bitzer et al. , 2007; Bonaccorsi & 
Rossi, 2006; Shah, 2006; Roberts et al. , 2006; Lerner et al. , 2006; von Hippel & von 
Krogh, 2003 ; Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2003 ; Hertel et al. , 2003 ; Lerner & Tirole, 2002). 
Bitzer et al. , (2004; as cited in Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2006) assert that firms contribute 
to OSS projects to profit while individuals' participation seems to be encouraged by 
a mix of intrinsic and extrinsic motives. Bonaccorsi & Rossi (2006) further stress the 
important role of social and ideological motives. 
There are three broad classes of incentives: economie, social and technological. In 
addition, there is distinction between micro and macro levels of motivation where 
individuals refers to the former and organizations to the latter (See pioneering work 
by Feller & Fitzgerald, 2000). 
Lerner and Tirole (2002) focus on programmers ' contribution to code development. 
They mention that a programmer is mainly motivated to participate if she receives a 
net benefit out of her activity; meaning that she engages in a "cost-benefit analysis". 
The costs can be the monetary or opportunity cost; and the benefits can include 
learning or improved performance, enjoying doing something fun, or delayed career-
related incentives. 
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For example, as mentioned by Lerner and Tirole (2002, p. 213), "A ' cool ' OS project 
may be more fun than a routine task". The career related incentives can concern: 
"future job offers", "shares in commercial open source-based companies" or "future 
access to the venture capital market". Further, Lerner and Tirole (2002) highlight 
"ego gratification incentive" as a motivation which is rooted in a programmer' s desire 
for peer recognition. Ali in ali , these incentives can be explained by the "signaling 
incentive" (for further information see, Holmstrom, 1999); an economie theory that 
suggests: a) "the more visible the performance to the relevant audience (peers, labor 
market, venture capital community)"; b) "the higher the impact of effort on 
performance"; and c) "the more informative the performance about talent" (Lerner & 
Tirole, 2002, p. 214). 
As far as commercial firms are considered, the literature shows that the private sector 
is reluctant in mimicking the "visibility performance reached in the open source 
world" (Le mer & Tiro le, 2002, p. 223) mainly out of fear of losing the ir employees to 
competitors (Lerner & Tirole, 2002) or losing their trade secrets (Ronde, 1999). 
Therefore, habits of OS world such as "promotion of widespread code sharing" 
become limited to confinement of a single corporation at best which still is fraught 
with the hurdles imposed by "existing organizational forms" (Lerner & Tirole, 2002). 
However, irrespective of challenges of adopting OS way of software development, 
commercial firms35 have developed strategies to benefit from OSS development 
methodology. Lerner and Tirole (2002) mention three main strategies used by 
commercial firms to enjoy OSS commons. These are: 1) Living symbiotically off an 
OS project; 2) Code release; and 3) Intermediaries. 
35 The literature uses the term commercial firms or corporations to refer to private software firms 
which produce proprietary software products , e.g. , Microsoft, IBM, Oracle, etc. 
115 
The first strategy refers to firms ' commercially providing complementary services 
and products that are not supplied efficiently by the OS community (Lemer & Tirole, 
2002). These firms are mainly known as OS or OSS firms. Perhaps the most well-
known one is Red Hat Inc. which is perceived as the world ' s OS leader. As their 
primary motivation is to gain profit by providing complementary services, these firms 
allocate their human capital (programmers) to contribute to OSS projects they are 
involved with (Lemer & Tirole, 2002). In addition, considering the fact that these 
firms cannot appropriate ali the benefits of their investments in OSS projects, "free-
rider problem" is associated with their efforts to connect with communities (Lemer & 
Tirole, 2002). The second strategy, which is a more proactive in nature, involves 
releasing the source code of existing proprietary software in an attempt to create an 
OS project which can attract voluntary contributors (Lemer & Tirole, 2002). This 
strategy also involves putting in place a proper governance structure (Lerner & 
Tirole, 2002). Under different conditions, firms may be motivated to opt for this 
strategy. For example, firm may gain profits due to sales of proprietary 
'complementary' segment which can offset any profits that would have been made in 
the primary segment, had it not been converted to open source (Lerner & Tirole, 
2002). Lastly, "Intermediaries" refers to "the creation of organizations such as 
Collab.Net [sic] as efforts to certify corporate open source development programs, 
just as investment banks and venture capitalists play a certification role for new 
firms" (Lemer & Tirole, 2002, p. 228). CollabNet - which functions as an enterprise 
funded by VC in 1999 - organizes OS projects for private firms ( e.g. , Philips, Intel, 
HP, etc.) that intend to develop part of their software through OS methodology. For 
example, one of the first products of CollabNet was "SourceXchange", a software 
development marketplace, where developers could bid for contracts to develop OSS 
applications posted by corporations (Wikipedia, 2014i6. 
36 For further information on CollabNet please refer to the Wikipidia page at: 
http: / /en . wikipedia.org/wiki/Co llabN et#cite _note-3 
- - --- -- - - ----- - - ---- - ----- - - --
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Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2006) emphasize the incentives of firms adopting OS business 
models. They describe economie motivations of individuals as the classical "cost-
benefit framework" of economie theory where the cost of participation in an OS 
project is very marginal for an individual participant. Similarly, Lakhani and von 
Hippel (2003 , p. 939)' s analysis of execution of "mundane but necessary" tasks in the 
field support of Apache web server software reveal that "the actual answering of 
questions .. . took up only 2% of an infom1ation provider' s time on site, with 
providers reporting that they invested only 1- 5 min per question answered." 
However, this marginal time (represents marginal cost for contributing) spent on 
answering questions (a form of contribution to OSS community) was also because the 
information providers only shared information they already knew "off the shelf'. 
They seldom did new problem solving or searching in order to provide additional 
information to a help-seeker (Lakhani & von Hippel , p. 939). As far as the benefit 
accrued to participants is concerned, Lakhani and von Hippel (2003 , p. 923) find that 
"98% of the effort expended by information providers in fact returns direct learning 
benefits to those providers" . 
Social motivations, on the other band, are concerned with individuals' motivation to 
gain social status, peer recognition, and reputation (see, Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2006; 
Zeitlyn, 2003 ; Raymond, 1999). Raymond ( 1999), for example, views OS 
development from a "gift culture" perspective. Zeitlyn (2003 , p. 1287) notes that "a 
gift includes an obligation to make a return presentation. This compulsion to retum a 
gift bas special force in a small social world. The public world of the net, especially 
that of the software engineer, is a very small world no matter where they are 
physically based". In fact, gift cultures are based on "gift economies", in which social 
relations are not regulated by the possession or exchange of money or commodities; 
but they are known by the creation and maintenance of social relationships based on 
the economy of gift exchange (Bergquist & Ljungberg, 2001 , p. 308). The same goes 
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true with OSS programmers where successful gift giving can lead to gammg 
reputation and social status. Bergquist and Ljungberg (2001) analysis of gift giving 
practices within OS community reveals three main purposes of such behavior: 1) 
creates openness; 2) shapes relationships among community members by awarding 
the givers a higher status among their peers; and 3) circulating the new ideas. 
Technological motivations are enabled by the very nature of OSS which involves 
open access to the source code and transparent development process. In fact, OSSD 
process provides an excellent opportunity to those individuals who wish to dive into 
the source code, study it, learn from it, and use it to resolve new issues (Bonaccorsi & 
Rossi, 2006). More importantly, the interaction and the iterative peer-review process 
in code development and refinement lead to leaming opportunities which are not 
available to free-riders (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). The mentoring that is being 
offered to those volunteers who go deep into iterative peer-reviewed coding is among 
the benefits which are particularly exclusive to those intensely involved. Such 
involvement in open coding builds necessary software development competencies 
that cannot be obtained through working on proprietary software projects in contrived 
environments. Furthermore, other scholars view open code writing as motivated by 
tapping an unmet market need (e.g. , Feller & Fitzgerald, 2000) or "an itch worth 
scratching" (Raymond, 1999). The story of the development of Perl language by a 
systems administrator to satisfy an unmet need is an attestation to technological 
motivations. 
OSS firms ' motivations to take part in OSSD are also classified into the three 
categories by Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2006). The main economie motivation for OS 
firms to engage in OS movement is to escape the financial burden of paying license 
fees to proprietary software developers like Microsoft or Oracle (Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 
2006). Therefore, OSS firms develop different business models (see Perret al. , 2010 
for a typology of these business models) which are centered mainly on offering 
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complementary OSS-related services. Also, as discussed in the previous chapter (see 
section 2.5.7 Does OSS business models inform us about OBM concept?) OSS firms 
develop different types of relationships with community of OSS developers in order 
to benefit from the collaboratively developed technology to different degrees (see for 
details: Dahlander & Magnusson, 2008; Dahlander & Magnusson, 2005). 
Mainstream software firms like IBM also benefit economically from OSS 
communities by releasing their proprietary source code into the OS domain through: 
exploiting the contributions of individual developers, benefiting from the resultant 
R&D spillovers, and selling OSS-based products (Bonaccorsi & Rossi , 2006). Lastly, 
software firms use their engagement with OSS communities as medium to attract 
talented developers for hiring purposes (Wichmann, 2002; as cited in Bonaccorsi & 
Rossi, 2006). 
Firms alsù have social motivations for their involvement in OSS movement and 
building a relationship with OSS communities (see Bonaccorsi & Rossi , 2006; 
Dahlander & Magnusson, 2005). As a case in point, those firms that use OS code but 
do not conform to the non-written rules of OS community face considerable 
competitive disadvantages (Osterloh et al. , 2002; as cited in Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 
2006). Behaviors such as tuming open code into proprietary pieces are in contrast 
with the social norms governing the OSS community projects and are therefore 
viewed as betrayal over the trust of the individual developers (Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 
2006, p. 49). Similarly, as Dahlander and Magnusson (2005 , p. 487-488)'s typology 
of firm-community relationships shows, firms that resort to a "parasitic approach"37 
towards community of OSS are "perceived as a negative influence by the community, 
either in terms of its violation of basic norms, values and principles, or that it is 
simply perceived as a free rider". Therefore, part of social motivations for firms 
includes collaboration with and contribution to OSS projects to maintain either a 
37 The parasitic approach implies that the firm only focuses on its own benefits, without taking into 
account that its actions might harm the community (Dahlander & Magnusson , 2005 , p. 487). 
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"symbiotic" or "commensalistic" relationship with OSS communities. The symbiotic 
approach leads to a situation where the firm co-develops hand in hand with the 
community; and the commensalistic approach captures an intermediate way to inter-
relate to the community and eventually to benefit from the co-existence with another 
entity while leaving it without harm (Dahlander & Magnusson, 2005). 
Lastly, technologically, firms are motivated to engage in a relationship with OSS 
communities because they can receive feedback and contributions from the OSS 
communities; and these teclmical benefits in turn lowers their R&D costs and 
improves the quality of the software they produce (Bonaccorsi & Rossi , 2006) . 
Shah (2006) ' s study also provides an interesting perspective on motivations of 
individual participants concerning their engagement in OSS projects. She makes 
distinctions between open and gated communities; as well as creation of code vs. 
contribution to code development. Shah (2006, p . 1004) divides individual 
participants into two categories: need-driven participants and hobbyist participants. 
Need-driven participants are motivated by their needs (e.g., "the need for software-
related changes"). An individual has a need and therefore cannot wait for others to get 
the job done and solve the pressing problem. However, having created the code, 
participants make contributions to code development due to sorne other reasons such 
as "reciprocity, future improvements, source code commits, and career concerns" 
(Shah, 2006, p. 1 005). Hobbyists ' participation, on the other hand, crea tes codes as 
they seek fun and enjoyment in the process of coding (Shah, 2006). Need-driven 
participants and hobbyists are complementary to each other therefore forging a 
symbiotic relationship. The useful challenges hobbyists are looking for can be indeed 
the needs of need-driven participants that are left unattended in the community. 
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Roberts et al. (2006) develop a theoretical mode! that explains the relationship 
between motivations (intrinsic and extrinsic ), participation and performance of OSS 
developers . Authors fmiher test their proposed mode! through a data set gathered 
from longitudinal research on software developers from the Apache projects. They 
discover th at the developers ' motivations are not independent but rather they are 
related in complex ways. They shed light on the interplay between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations. For exan1ple, they do not find evidence to support diminishing 
intrinsic motivation (use-value) while extrinsic motivations (paid contribution) are 
introduced. Further, they find that motivations types influence participation of 
individuals differently. Lastly, the contribution levels of individuals have a positive 
bearing on their performance rankings in the context of the projects they contribute to 
them. Table 3.1 provides a summary of motivations mentioned in this section. As 
Table 3.1 shows, past research has main! y focused on identifying and discussing 
motivations of individuals and software firms. The gap, thus, remains to explore the 
OSS RDIP in order to find out whether there are other sorts of contributors to OSS 
development process. If so, what could be their motivations? 
121 
Table 3 .1. M
ajor M
otivations U
nderlying Contributions to O
SS Projects 
L
evelof 
M
otivation 
M
otivation C
lass 
U
nderpinning theory 
R
eference 
A
nalysis 
Lakhani and v
o
n
 H
ippel 
D
irect learning benefits 
Technological 
(2003); Lakhani and W
olf 
(2005); H
ertel et al. (2003) 
G
hosh ( 1998); Lerner and 
Tiro le (2002); C
on
stant et 
Fun
,
 Enjoy
,
 doing a co
ol task; hobby 
Persona! a
nd so
cial (intrinsic) 
al. ( 1996); Torvald
s a
nd 
D
iam
ond (200 1 ); H
ertel et 
al. (2003); Shah (2006) 
D
irect utility o
r o
w
n
 u
se (increasing o
w
n
 
Technological (intrinsic and 
Lerner and Tirole (2002) 
technical perform
ance at w
o
rkplace) 
e
xtrinsic) 
~
 ::l 
Signaling incentive 
Lerner and Tirole (2002); 
:g 
G
aining future c
a
re
e
r benefits 
Econom
ie ( e
xtrinsic) 
>
 
(Holmstrom
,
 1999) 
H
ertel et al. (2003) 
-o
 
t: 
-
The ego gratification incentive (desire for peer 
Signaling incentive 
Lerner and Tirole (2002); 
re
c
ognition); reputation 
Persona! a
nd so
cial (intrinsic) 
(Holmstrom
,
 1999) 
Lakhani and W
olf(2005) 
C
om
petition w
ith other developers (either 
B
ezroukov ( 1999a; a
s cited 
w
ithin O
SS projects o
r betw
een O
SS projects 
Persona! and so
cial (intrin
sic) 
in H
ertel et al.
,
 2003
,
 p. 
a
nd c
o
m
m
e
rcial softw
are ~rojects) 
1162); H
ertel et al. (2003) 
Extended K
landerm
an
s 
B
eing identified w
ith c
o
m
m
u
nity (sense of 
M
ode! ofvoluntary a
ction in 
belonging) 
Persona! a
nd so
cial (intrinsic) 
so
cial m
o
v
e
m
e
nts 
H
erie! et al. (2003) 
(Kiandermans
,
 1997; Sim
on 
et al.
,
 1998)
.
 
122 
E ..... 
ti:: 
C
/) 
C
/) 
0 ....
.
 
0 
-
-
'"0 
t:: 
~
 
ê ti:: ~ ~ ~ 0 C/) ~ () ..... Q) E E 0 u 
N
orm
-oriented m
otives related to re
a
ctions 
of relevant others (family
,
 friends, c
olleagues) 
"c
o
m
m
e
rcially providing 
c
o
m
plem
entary se
rvices [as installation
,
 
integration
,
 m
aintenance
,
 and support] and 
products that are n
ot supplied efficiently by the 
open so
u
rc
e
 c
o
m
m
u
nity
"
 
B
uild public relations w
ith program
m
ers and 
c
u
stom
ers 
R
espect the psychological im
plicit c
o
ntract 
betw
een O
SS firm
 and program
m
ers 
C
om
pany program
m
ers learn from
 their 
participation and benefit the c
o
m
pany 
A
ccess to u
nique c
o
m
m
u
nity-based re
so
u
rc
e
s 
G
ain indirect re
v
e
n
u
e
s through selling open 
so
u
rc
e
 related products 
For hiring purposes 
Source: Com
piled by the author 
Persona( a
nd so
cial (intrinsic) 
Econom
ie (appropriate benefits 
through spillover effects) 
Econom
ie (appropriate benefits 
through spillover effects) 
Social 
-
Econom
ie (Lowering c
o
sts 
ofR
&
D); 
-
Technological (appropriate 
benefits through spillover 
effects
,
 learning
,
 w
hich 
im
prove softw
are quality) 
Econom
ie and technological 
Econom
ie 
Econom
ie 
Extended K
landerm
ans 
M
odel ofvoluntary action in 
so
cial m
o
v
e
m
e
nts 
(Kiandermans
,
 1997) 
Spillover effect; c
o
st-benefit 
an
alysis
,
 low
ering production 
c
o
sts by n
ot paying royalties 
Spillover effect 
C
onform
ity to so
cialnorm
s 
induces c
o
operative behavior 
Production c
o
st-benefit 
an
alysis; Spillover effect 
R
esource-based view
 
C
ost-benefit a
n
alysis
,
 
low
ering production c
o
sts by 
n
ot paying royalties 
R
esource-based view
 
H
ertel et al. (2003) 
Lerner and Tirole (2002
,
 p. 
224 ); Lerner et al. (2006); 
W
icbm
ann (2002); 
B
onacorssi et al. (2006) 
Lerner and Tirole (2002; 
2005); Lerner et al. (2006) 
O
sterloh et al. (2002; as 
cited in B
onaccorsi &
 
R
ossi
,
 2006) 
Lerner and Tirole (2002); 
Lerner et al. (2006) 
D
ahlander and W
all in 
(2006) 
W
ichm
ann (2002) 123 
3.5 .2 The commercialization challenge of OSS 
The landscape of OSS development bas undergone a transformation, such that it bas 
turned into "a more mainstream and comrnercially viable form" (Fitzgerald, 2006, p. 
587). Such metamorphosis has affected all phases of development process including 
planning, analysis, design, and implementation, to the extent that it has turned into a 
strategie product (Fitzgerald, 2006). Therefore, issues like "rigorous project 
management", "branding" of OSS products, offering a "whole-product concept of a 
market-driven business approach" have become integrated into the OSS phenomenon 
of today' s market place (see, Fitzgerald, 2006). All these factors collectively contribute 
to development of professional OS products and services, increasing trustworthiness of 
the technologies, gaining leadership positions in target markets, and delivering 
solutions that actually address customers' needs. 
Others (Feller et al. , 2008, p. 476), on the other hand, have been rather agnostic about 
effectiveness of OSS in addressing real market needs. They emphasize, "the 
community-based peer production of software often falls short of creating customized 
software products in the sense that individual and corporate consumers understand". 
Woods and Guliani (2005) underline this shortcoming, describing it as the need to 
"productize" OS service in order to bridge the gap between private enterprises and 
individual end users. 
A review of the past research on the comrnercialization process of OSS also shows that 
authors have mainly focused on how very large (software) corporations such as IBM, 
Google, Sun38, or OSS firms that invest in communities of OSS developers, 
collaboratively create value, and address the challenges of appropriation (e.g. , West & 
Gallagher, 2006; Dahlander & Magnusson, 2008). A good part of this literature has also 
focused on different types of business models and their role in making the relationship 
between OSS firms and communities work in a profitable manner ( e.g. , Dahlander & 
Magnus son, 2005; Dahlander, 2005; Perr et al. , 201 0). 
38 On January 27, 2010, Sun Microsystems, !ne. was acquired by Oracle Corporation. (Source: 
https:/ /en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Sun _ Microsystems) 
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However, as noted by Feller et al. (2008) and Fitzgerald (2006) the process of 
commercializing and productizing OSS oftentimes extend beyond the capabilities of 
many OSS firms ; thereby creating the need for "cooperative business networks". 
It is true that "commercial open source" is software that a for-profit entity develops and 
contrais its development direction. Naturally, the firm behind the commercial OSS has 
certain degree of power to determine what gets accepted and integrated into the 
software source code and what will be seriously discussed for the next implementation 
such as the case of MySQL and its MySQL database39 (Riehle, 2007). However, 
services to be provided on strategie and commercial OSS products are not limited to the 
founders of OSS project. For example, many OSS firms provide services on Odoo40, 
and they are also involved in the innovation process through developing new features 
(modules), collaborating together in development process and maintaining the features 
over time. In fact, OSS industry is not a saturated marketplace; there is always a need 
for new capable firms to enter the competition. 
These conflicting views on OSS as a commercially viable and competitive product 
coupled with the need to create cooperative business networks to address 
commercialization challenge make a case to further investigate the OSS R&D and 
innovation process (RDIP) in arder to discover factors that affect effective 
commercialization and further sustainability of OSS products and services. For 
instance, knowing about the consequences of not engaging in collaborative RDIP can 
better inform us of wh at can actually con tri bute to successful OSS commercialization. 
3.5 .3 Understanding measures of ' success' in context of OSS 
' Success ' of OSS project is a multi-faceted and fuzzy concept which depends on many 
factors and can be viewed through different perspectives. In fact, understanding the 
39 Available at www.mysql.com 
4° Formerly known as OpenERP- a very successful OS enterprise resource planning software 
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predictors of OSS success is one of the key areas of interest ( e.g. , Subramaniam et al. , 
2009). 
One of the stattling facts about OSS phenomenon is that today thousands of OSS 
projects exist, filling a wide range of individuals ' and organizations' need gaps. Table 
3.2, below, demonstrates the basic statistics concerning three major websites that 
provide an online platform for OSS projects and the interactions atnong their 
contributors and users. 
Table 3.2. Basic Statistics on Major Online Community Platforms 
Number of 
projects or Lines of Registered No. of Downloads Last update Host repositories codes in 
contributors per day on statistics being total us ers 
supported 
Sourceforge 430,000 N.A. 3.7 rn N.A. 4,800,000 February 
.net 10, 2015 
Black Duck 
Open Hub 668,055 31 ,042,267 N.A. 3,695,026 N.A. February (forrnerly ,464 10,2015 
Oh loh.net) 
GitHub 20.1 rn N.A. 3.4 rn 8.6 rn N.A. February 
repositories 10, 2015 
Source: Cornpiled by the author based on available data online 
Note 1: Nurnbers are constantly changing and they should be taken as approximations 
Note 2 : N.A.: Not Available 
Among most successful OSS projects are ONU/Linux (computer operating system), 
Mozilla web browser, Apache (server software), PHP and Perl (programming 
language); OpenStack (cloud software), Joomla! And WordPress (web content 
management), SugarCRM ( customer relationship management), and MySQL database, 
to name a few. 
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However, irrespective of highly successful projects, "the number of failed or dormant 
OSS projects is also notable" (Lee et al. , 2009, p. 426). Based on statistics provided by 
the one of the most popular OS portais (SourceForge: (http: //sourceforge.net/), most 
OSS projects have failed: 58% of the projects do not move beyond the alpha 
developmental stage, 22% of them remain in the planning phase, 17% remain in the 
pre-alpha phase, and sorne become inactive (Lee et al. , 2009, p. 426) . Similarly, a 
World Bank study has reported the failure rate of more than 50% for OSS projects (as 
cited in Lee et al. , 2009, p. 426) . Most recently, based on online news by Dormie 
Berkholz, a senior analyst at RedMonk, it is reported that "the vast majority . of 
repositories (>98%) are modified only in the year they are created, and they' re never 
touched again" (Berkholz, 2014). This suggests that more than 98% of all projects on 
GitHub do not see any development beyond the first year they have been written (see, 
Asay, 2014). 
Unconventional to the perceived wisdom, sorne practitioners celebrate OSS success by 
mentioning the magnitude and activity level of these major online community 
platforms as an attestation to the success and growth of OSS as a technological 
innovation. They believe, "open source failure is its greatest success" (Asay, 2014). 
They view OS as all about ' experimentation' and ' iteration', which is why a 98% 
failure rate may be weil the best sign of its success (see, Asay, 2014). Instead of 
focusing on the failure rate, which has remained so dramatic in the past decades, they 
shift the focus on the "volume and breath" of the OS projects, which indeed has 
skyrocketed. In the article: "Open source failure is its greatest success" by Matt Asay 
(2014), he mentions that "every year (plus a month or so), both the total number of 
projects and !ines of code double". This growth in the "overail number of projects" and 
"magnitude of lines of codes" is viewed as sign of "tremendous success", simply 
because they shed light on the ' evolution' and ' evolutionary nature ' of OS projects 
where failure is seen as the "norm" . Thus, by "redefining success" (taking a holistic 
view of OS phenomenon) "failure" becomes the greatest "beauty" of OS world. This 
approach to success, which emphasizes "spirit of iteration" and "experimentation", 
resonates weil with the Linus ' s Law as put forward by Raymond (1999): "given enough 
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eyeballs, ali bugs are shallow". This means that "given a large enough beta-tester and 
co-developer base, almost every problem will be characterized quickly and the fix will 
be obvious to someone" (Raymond, 1999). 
On a broad note, this perspective on success, emphasizing experimentation, sits weil 
with notion of "open experiments" in value creation process of open business models 
(Chesbrough, 2007b ). Therefore, tho se projects that cannot create enough or useful 
value for users shall not sustain long-term. Severa! scholars (von Krogh & von Hippel, 
2006, p. 975) have called for need to properly understand how OSS functions so that 
we can examine the well-known negative side effects on freedom to innovate. 
However, divergingly yet creatively, others have taken a 'different approach' towards 
"success" of OSS projects. Having perceived OSS as a form of system development, IS 
researchers (e.g., Sen et al. , 2012; Subramaniam et al. , 2009; Lee et al. , 2009; Crowston 
et al. , 2006) have approached operationalization of the concept by building upon 
"success measures" identified in the IS literature (e.g., DeLone & McLean, 2003, 2002, 
1992; Rai et al. 2002; Seddon et al. 1999; Seddon 1997). 
Measuring the success of OSS projects is important for two reasons (Crowston et al. , 
2006, p. 123). First, to have a better understanding of determinants of success can help 
project leaders in assessing their projects. For example, in projects that involve third 
party sponsors, the investors are keen on knowing about the return on their investment 
(ROI). Second, to leam from OSS development process, particularly from "teams that 
are working weil we need to have a definition of 'working weil"' (Crowston et al. , 
2006, p. 123). This second factor is based on the premise that OSS development is "an 
increasingly visible and copied mode of systems development" (Ibid. , p. 123). Further, 
many users including individuals and corporations are dependent on OSS products such 
as Linux (Crowston et al. , 2006). Yet, we still know little about "how people in these 
communities coordinate software development across different settings" or "what 
software processes, work practices, and organizational contexts are necessary to their 
success" (Scacchi, 2002). More importantly, literature (Ghosh, 2002; as cited in 
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Crowston et al. , 2006) has emphasized the need to learn from OS modes of 
organization and production with the aim of possibly applying the insights to other 
areas as weil asto better concert the efforts of OS projects. 
Irrespective of importance of why project success should be studied, IS researchers 
have identified ' success factors ' differently and measured their impacts through 
different methodologies. 
Measures of success are different and varied. In crudest form, as OSS projects depend 
on input added by volunteers, the ability of a project to attract the interest of developers 
as well as contributions from them is a key success measure (Stewart et al. , 2006). Such 
interest can be m~asured through the traffic on the OSS projects website and the 
number of downloads of the software code (Crowston et al. , 2003). Stewart et al. 
(2006) also identify interest over time (i.e., change in the number of subscribers) and 
amount of development activity (i.e. the nurnber of files released) as measures of OSS 
project success. 
Severa! scholars (Crowston et al. , 2006; Stewart & Gosain, 2006) have proposed 
measures such as project activity levels, release of new features, development 
team/comrnunity size (i.e. , the nurnber of active contributors to the project), and the 
time taken to fix software bugs. Subramaniam et al. (2009) use developer interest, user 
interest, and project activity as measures of project success and investigate the 
interaction effects among them. 
Other researchers have emphasized the role of developers and their voluntary 
contributions concerning creating, debugging, and maintaining the OSS project as 
critical to OSS success. Therefore, they have viewed developer participation as critical 
to project success and have focused on their motivations, incentives and interests (e.g. , 
Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2003 ; Lerner & Tirole, 2002). 
129 
More recently, Sen et al. (2012) measure OSS success through the ' number of 
subscribers ' and ' developers ' working on an OSS project. Sen et al. (2012, p. 365) 
emphasize "subscriber base" as a key measure for success, which bas been ignored by 
previous studies (e.g. , Subramaniam et al. , 2009). They define subscriber base as "the 
number of individuals who chose to receive regular information (e.g. , project progress, 
new release information, any major changes to the project team etc.) on the project" 
(Sen et al. 2012, p. 365). 
This determinant of success is important for severa) reasons. First, growth in number of 
subscribers shows the increasing interest in the project from committed and potential 
users, competitors, and other stakeholders (Sen et al. , 20 12). Second, subscribers have 
chosen to be part of the project development and therefore they are received as people 
with "a deeper interest in the OSS project" (Ibid. , p. 365). Consequently, information 
about such a large group of loyal users can be useful to project management team. 
Lastly, Sen et al. (2012, p. 365) mention that subscribers can provide "clearer and better 
directions with respect to project development for long-term success" . They are also 
perceived as "committed users" who are also more likely to support the project 
financially if needed because of the ir higher interest (Sen et al. , 20 12). 
The review of the literature on measures of success of OSS projects shows the multi-
dimensional nature of OSS success. As OSS projects are targeted at different types of 
audiences or users (Sen et al. , 2012, p. 366), different types of success measures may 
become more or Jess important in the role they play. OSS is not just about developing 
or modifying software; increasingly more non-developer users are relying on OSS for 
personal and business needs (Lerner & Tirole, 2005). For example, clients of OSS firms 
are amongst the most important users as weil as audiences of OSS projects so much so 
that without them, the whole sector of OS or OSS firms falls apart. They are the ones 
that sponsor commercial features of OSS projects and keep the core development tean1 
on payrolls. Especially, as we discussed earlier, OSS bas been transforming into a 
commercially viable option (Fitzgerald, 2006) which competes on certain fronts with 
proprietary software products. Y et we do not have enough information about the 
130 
development processes for conunercial OSS products (Aksoy-Yurdagul , 20 15). Equally 
important is the role of clients in successfully developing strategie OSS which is built 
upon collective effort but it responds to different target groups ' technological needs. 
Therefore, the clients can be considered as active participants who can influence the 
success of OSS projects for a number of reasons. 
First, like subscribers to OSS projects as developers or users, clients are enterprises that 
are considered as users and beneficiaries of OSS. The efficiency and effectiveness of 
their information systems (ISs) rely, to different degrees, on OSS tools, applications, 
and support services which are provided by communities of OSS and private OSS 
firms. Clients' innovation performance and manufacturing success are also depending, 
to varying degrees, on their supporting ISs which include open source applications. 
Therefore, they have ' incentive ' to be part of the development team and consequently 
be influential in the success of OSS project. The influential role of interest shown by 
users of OSS has been perceived as an important indicator of project success (Stewart 
et al. , 2006), yet it has not been explored in the context of clients of OSS firms . 
Second, OSS success heavily relies on developers: their contributions in creating codes, 
improving them through bug fixes, and maintaining the code base in the long run 
through active participation (these are also measures of success as discussed above) . 
Therefore, clients which have resources such as knowledgeable and experienced IT 
personnel, testing infrastructures, target market knowledge and feedback, etc. can play 
a significant role by their contributions to the OSS development process; and thereby 
influence OSS success. 
On a more detailed note, Grewal et al. (2006) mention that the criteria for success of 
OSS projects should encompass both the technical achievements of a project, as weil as 
indicators of market or commercial success: i.e. , technical and commercial success. 
Su ch classification is in li ne with IS ' litera ture on software success ( e.g., Rai et al. , 
2002) as weil as the literature on R&D success in new product development (NPD) 
dating back to Mansfield and Wagner (1975). 
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As Weber (2004, p. 77) asserts, "Prediction is actually the enemy in software testing". 
Therefore, instead of guessing and predicting how a piece of software functions in 
different situations or what functionalities must be added to an open source application, 
we need to consult the end-users and design software from their perspective. Thus far, 
to the best of my knowledge, the role of non-software enterprise firms or clients as 
developers of OSS (projects) and their impact on their success have remained 
unexplored. Weber (2004, p. 216) has also highlighted this gap. He further claims, "the 
role of the 'customer' in the production process, specifically as it plays out within 
business models" is a central conceptual question to be further studied in the context of 
OSS development. In line with this argument and based on the reviewed literature on 
OSS success, we can view enterprise users of OSS as stakeholders of OSS projects. 
Thus, it is safe to argue that their interest can influence the OSS project commercial 
and technical success. Such conceptualization further motivates me to find more about 
the way ('how') non-software enterprise firms engage in OSS technological 
collaborations. 
3.5.4 OSS innovation process 
If there is one thing that surprises those who are not weil acquainted with OSS 
development process, it is the level of heterogeneity involved with regards to types of 
actors and their motivations to participate in its joint development process. This 
diversity and the difficulty associated with managing it put the spotlight on issues of 
project organization and governance within the innovation process. In what follows , 1 
review the most notable works on these issues. 
First, OSS "innovation process" defies the conventional assumptions that underpin and 
promote innovation and necessitate the intellectual property system ( e.g. , von Hippel, 
2005; Dahlander & Magnusson, 2005, Ulh0i, 2004). A few scholars (Ulh0i, 2004; 
Tuomi, 2002) have also viewed OSS projects as creating an institutional alternative to 
'firm-based' innovation, so much so that Lerner et al. (2006, p. 114) claim that "there 
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are substantial differences between open-source projects and traditional innovative 
efforts in private firms" . 
Historically, based on the doctrine of 'private investment model ', innovation has been 
mainly supported by private investment paradigm where the investor collects private 
retums from his investment (Demsetz, 1967). Based on this view, "copyright and patent 
law provide a sound basis for an economically efficient system of protection ... [focus is 
on software industry]" (Dam, 1995, p.321). Therefore, one ' s innovation cannot be 
integrated into the 'commons' because if this happens the innovator will incur losses 
due to hazard of free-riding which eventually destroys the innovator ' s incentive to 
further innovate (see, Granstrand, 1999; Dam, 1995 ; Demsetz, 1967). Obviously, it also 
negatively affects the sustainability of innovation process long-tem1, as innovation is 
more contingent upon continued investment in the R&D and other innovation-related 
activities. 
However, in face of success stories of OSS projects and its technological 
collaborations, the conventional perception of how innovation process can effectively 
function has changed its course. For example, today, thousands of OSS projects exist 
addressing a wide range of individuals ' and organizations' needs (as shown in Table 
3.2) 
In v1ew of success and growth of OSS projects ( e.g., ONU/Linux, Apache, Perl, 
OpenStack, etc.), severa! scholars (von Krogh & von Hippel , 2006, p. 975) cali for the 
need to take a fresh perspective ("fresh eyes") to properly understand how OSS 
functions in order to examine the negative si de effects of freedom to innovate and adopt 
(e.g., Helier & Eisenberg, 1998)41 • 
Additionally, OSS is a "public good" or "commons". It demonstrates attributes of non-
exclusivity and non-rivalry. An individual or a finn can download, use, and share OSS 
tools and solutions without excluding others from benefiting from the innovation; and 
41 
" fresh eyes" refers to the private-collective innovation mode! proposed by von Hippel & von Krogh 
(2003). 
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where one individual or firm uses an OSS product, they do not reduce its availability 
and use to others (see, e.g. , von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003; O'Mahony, 2003). 
However, OSS also differs from a pure public good as it involves a copyright-based 
license to keep private intellectual property claims out of the way of both software 
innovators and software adopters while at the same time preserving a commons of 
software code that everyone can access (O 'Mahony, 2003). Furthermore, OSS projects 
resort to use of "legal and normative tactics to protect their source code from 
proprietary appropriation and to protect their collective identity and reputation" 
(O 'Mahony, 2003, p. 1194). 
Therefore, having qualities of both public and private goods as well as being produced 
under private-collective innovation model highlight OSS as a unique phenomenon to 
further investigate the concept of openness, and open and distributed innovation within 
software industry. 
Earlier attempts by scholars have provided us with ' conceptual frameworks ' for 
understanding the unique character of and the specifie requirements for OSS innovation 
process (Scacchi, 2002; Feller & Fitzgerald, 2000). 
For instance, Scacchi (2002) describes, examines and compares the OSS development 
processes within four communities and identify eight kinds of software "informalisms" 
which play a pivotai role in the elicitation, analysis, specification, validation and 
management of requirements for developing OSS systems. Mockus et al. (2002) 
examine data from two major OS projects (the Apache web server and the Mozilla 
browser) in order to further clarify OSS development and maintenance as claimed to be 
competing with traditional commercial software development method. Mockus et al. 
(2002) quantify severa! issues such as aspects of developer participation, core team 
size, code ownership, productivity, defect density, and problem resolution intervals for 
these two OSS projects in order to develop severa! hypotheses by comparing the 
Apache project with severa! commercial projects. Von Krogh et al. (2003) looks into 
the OSS innovation process by focusing on the creation of the project named "Freenet" 
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adopting an inductive theory building approach. They explore the "strategies and 
processes" by which new people join the existing community of software developers, 
and how they initially contribute code. Based on their analysis of data, the authors 
generate four constructs: "joining script", "specialization", "contribution barriers", and 
"feature gifts", and propose relationships among them. Their research sheds light on the 
evolutionary nature of OSS development process that shows how individuals join the 
projects and follow a social "joining script", contribute to development process and 
undergo a transition from ajoiner to a newcomer and eventually a committer. 
David and Rullani (2008) adopt a "systems analysis perspective" to analyze the critical 
properties of OSS mode of innovation. They rely their theoretical perspective on 
March' s (1991) framework of innovation within a firm. However, they're-scale' it so as 
to make it fit the characteristics of innovation system of distributed organization of 
interacting agents in a virtual collaboration environment (as suggested by OSS 
innovation system). David and Rullani (2008) view "exploration" and "exploitation" 
phases (March, 1991) as suitable to be applied to the innovation system of OSS. 
According to David and Rullani (2008, p. 647) the "innovation system of virtual 
collaboration environment" mirrors the two processes. Meaning that, exploration 
captures the interactions among agents searching information and knowledge resources 
to apply in designing new software products; while exploitation involves the 
mobilization of individuals' capabilities for application of those information and 
knowledge resources in the software development projects that become established on 
the platform. Their observation shows that OSS innovation process, as studied through 
SourceForge platform, tends to be highly "dissipative"; i.e. , a very large proportion of 
the registered developers fail to become even minimally active on the platform. While 
this could hamper sustainability of the innovation system, a sm aller number of the core 
developers- who persist in creating novelty and the structure of the ir interactions- may 
be enough to sustain both the exploration and exploitation phases of the platform's 
global dynamics. 
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While the research on OSS development process clarifies certain realities associated 
with its innovation process, the issues of commercialization and sustainability of OSS 
innovation remain elusive. 
There are two types of OSS : community and commercial OSS. The former refers to the 
software that a community develops, rather than a single corporate entity owning the 
software. Therefore, individual developers, hobbyists and the committers and not 
necessarily a specifie firm (here software fim1 or OSS firm) make decisions about the 
software and its direction (e.g., the Apache Web server; Liferay Portal Community 
Edition42) . The latter is software that a for-profit entity owns and develops; therefore, 
the firm or group of firms sponsoring the software development and innovation process 
hold the copyright and detetmine what is accepted into the software code base and what 
to implement next (e.g. , MySQL and its MySQL database; Liferay Portal Enterprise 
Edition License43). However, this does not mean that the commercial OSS does not 
follow the OSS development methodology and its characteristics. There is transparency 
concerning the social and the technical aspects, but the commercial sponsors have 
significant decision-making power. 
Irrespective of their differences, every OSS project enjoys from and prosper through 
having more developers joining and contributing to the project. This will help projects 
evolve into a more user friendly and useful version. They can also diffuse through 
positive network extemality effects (See, e.g., Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2003). For example, 
in the client market Microsoft has succeeded in gaining the dominant position with its 
MS Dos and Windows products, a huge market in which OSS products like 
Libreüffice, Apache Openüffice could not largely diffuse. 
42 Liferay Portal CE, (LGPL, version 2.1) is the OS version of Liferay's enterprise web platform for 
building business solutions that deliver immediate results and long-term value. Source: 
https://web.liferay.com/community/liferay-projects/liferay-portal!overview. 
43 In addition to Portal Community Edition ("Portal CE"), Liferay packages and makes available a 
supported Portal EE, intended for enterprise-grade users and implementations, which is subject to the 
Liferay End User License Agreement and made available to Liferay Enterprise Subscription customers at 
no extra charge. Source: https: //www.liferay.com/downloads/ee-license. 
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In commercial OSS innovation process, the inclusion of end-users early on in the 
innovation process and development phase and later in maintenance and further 
evolution of the project can influence the innovation process positively. They can bring 
along their own software expertise, real market needs, and tacit knowledge. These can 
lead to developing software that is more useful and user friendly . In fact , the "potential 
for economically important software novelty may reside not in the technical 
modifications of the code per se", it lies in how these modifications can actually 
"enable the project to explore and possibly fill a new and growing market niche" 
(David & Rullani, 2008, p. 657). 
This view of innovation is consistent with Schumpeter' s thesis that innovation does not 
necessarily mean introduction of technical novelties, but reapplying the existing 
product designs and production methods in new market context (Schumpeter, 1934). 
lnvolving ali enterprise users in the innovation process provides this opportunity for the 
OSS firms as weil as other community developers to enjoy what traditionally is called 
external knowledge as a source of diversity. The OSS ecosystem can exploit these 
sources of diversity in order to escape the trap of local search and induce wider 
exploration even when the underlying technology is similar (David & Rullani, 2008, p. 
657). lt can also lead to exploiting existing technology in new contexts. 
In summary, the unique qualities of OSS - resembling both public and private goods, 
following a private-collective innovation model- provide both opportunities and 
challenges for its innovation process success and long-term viability. As a non-rival, 
non-exclusive public good (e.g., community-based projects such as FFmpeg), it can be 
easily used, exploited, integrated into downstream products and industries and therefore 
diffused rapidly. This can create network effect and attract more collaborators. 
However, since it is not purely a private good, managed and controlled by private 
investors -who collect ali returns on their investment- it suffers from abundance of 
marketing insights and end-user perspectives, thereby effective commercialization. The 
challenge with OSS innovation process, therefore remains as how to balance these 
qualities of OSS so as to sustain its innovation process. 
137 
3.5.5 Govemance of OSS projects 
OSS development process represents a collective R&D and innovation process (RDIP) 
reflecting a (social) network phenomenon. The process of teclmology development 
includes a network of individuals and firms. For example, in order to better understand 
the workings of OSS environments, Grewal et al. (2006) have studied the effects of 
network embeddedness (or the nature of the relationship among projects and 
developers) on the success of OSS projects. Von Krogh et al. (2003) focus their 
attention on creation of 'Freenet' (a project aimed at developing a decentralized and 
anonymous peer-to-peer electronic file sharing network) to find out about the strategies 
and processes by which new people join the existing community of software 
developers, and how they initially contribute code. 
Research on networks has stated, "Quite literally, networks are reshaping the global 
business architecture" (Parkhe et al. , 2006, p. 560). Parkhe et al. (2006) view 
networking and networks as important and relevant to management theory and practice 
due to the 'pervasiveness ' and functionality of this phenomenon. In other words, a wide 
range of "social, digital/electronic, and organizational networks", such the case of OSS 
development in the community-based mode] of the OS movement, has defied the 
conventional constraints of physical geography that puts limits on our communication 
and collaboration modes and volumes. Therefore, traditional organizational structures 
are being challenged (and perhaps re-defined) by the networking phenomenon, partly 
fueled by international competition and advancements in ICT sector. 
In sorne countries (e.g., Japan and South Korea), networks (e.g., intra-firm and inter-
firm networks) are of paramount importance so mu ch so that they have become an 
integral part of the overall economie structure (Gerlach, 1992). Similarly, in sorne 
industries (e.g., OSS industry within ICT sector), the networks between OSS firms and 
communities is an integral part of new product development and R&D process. 
However, "there is still a considerable discrepancy between the acclamation and 
attention networks receive and the knowledge we have about the overall functioning of 
networks" (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 229). 
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Although there are "serendipitous" networks, "goal-directed" networks (Kilduff & Tsai , 
2003) are formed by organizations in order to solve problems (e.g. , Imperial , 2005 ; 
Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). Goal-directed networks are, therefore, set up with a 
specifie purpose, either by those who participate in the network or through mandate and 
evolve largely through conscious efforts to build coordination (Provan & Kenis, 2008). 
As the pursuit of a clear goal derives formation of a goal -oriented network, to 
understand why networks produce the desired outcome, it is critical to understand how 
a network functions. Therefore, network functioning as "the process by which certain 
network conditions lead to network outcomes" (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 229) 
becomes a core concept in our investigation. Equally important is the concept of 
"network effectiveness" which emphasizes why we need networks in the first place. 
Network effectiveness means, "the attainment of positive network level outcomes that 
could not normally be achieved by individual organizational participants acting 
independently" (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 230). Network effectiveness also mirrors the 
concept of synergy, as a collective outcome is greater than the sum of individual efforts 
of a group of people (see also O'Toole, 1997). 
Since networks of OSS development are not legal entities like joint ventures and 
equity-based alliances, the legal imperative for govemance in the sense that it applies to 
organizational setting does not exists. Nevertheless, that does not mean OSS networks 
do not need govemance to obtain their collective goals. For example, Kogut and 
Metiu ' s (2001) research shows that govemance structures of OSS communities play an 
important role in minimizing the hazard of project forking. 
As claimed by Pro van and Kenis (2008, p. 231 ), in the context of goal-directed 
organizational networks, "sorne form of govemance is necessary to ensure that 
participants engage in collective and mutually supportive action, that conflict is 
addressed, and that network resources are acquired and utilized efficiently and 
effectively". So is true with OSS networks, as they are goal-directed yet not strictly 
legal entities, Jack formai contracts, and organizational hierarchies. In fact, 
'govemance ', the topic that has long been studied by organizational scholars (see, e.g., 
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Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Mizruchi, 1983), is believed to have a significant influence on 
network effectiveness (Provan & Kenis, 2008). This means that if OSS networks are 
not govemed properly, the positive network level outcomes, which are the reasons 
networks are formed , will not be obtained. Thereby, the collective effort is doomed to 
fail. 
The situation of OSS projects is also peculiar because the OSS innovation process is 
open to public - perceived by sorne authors as an outcome of adopting an OI model 
(Aksoy-Yurdagul, 20 15). Furthermore, the OSS technology itself is one with unlimited 
downstream utilities. Therefore, the level of heterogeneity observed conceming 
participant types and their incentives is quite higher as compared to, for example, kite 
surfing conmmnities that only attract those who are into kites and the product being 
collectively developed has limited utility. Therefore, severa! authors have studied 
govemance issues concerning OSS projects (see, e.g., von Hippel & von Krogh, 2006). 
Kogut and Metiu (2001) endorse the efficiency of OSS development methodology, but 
highlight the hazard of project forking (i.e., the potential for fragmenting the design 
into competing versions) as seen in the case of UNIX and Java. The authors claim that 
"governance structures offer sorne potential for preventing ' forking" ' (Kogut & Metiu, 
2001 , p. 257). 
O'Mahony (2003) raises the issue of why OS and free software project contributors 
give their work away into public domain in face of the lack of the intellectual property 
rights. O' Mahony (2003) emphasizes the role of severa! ' legal and normative tactics ' 
used by projects in protecting the community developed software from proprietary 
appropriation and in securing their collective identity and reputation. These tactics shed 
light on how communities govem their work and they are seven. First, adopting 
software licenses with distribution terms that restrict proprietary appropriation; second, 
encouraging compliance with licensing terms through normative and legal sanctions; 
third, incorporating to hold assets and protect individual contributors from liability; 
fourth, transferring individual property rights to collectively managed non-profit 
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corporations; fifth, trademarking the brands and logos designed to represent their work; 
sixth, assigning trademarks to a foundation; and seventh, actively protecting the 
project's brand (O 'Mahony, 2003 , p. 1183). 
Frank and Jungwirth (2003) distinguish between approaches of ' rent-seekers ' and 
'donators '. They highlight the two groups of volunteers . The former approach 
emphasizes the fact that although no wages are paid to OSS contributors, other payoffs 
may turn their effort into a profitable investment; whi le the latter approach concerns the 
many contributors to OSS projects who do not expect to ever receive any individual 
rewards. They argue that the basic institutional innovation in OS has been the "crafting 
of a governance structure" which enables rent-seeking without crowding out donations 
(Frank & Jungwirth, 2003 , p. 401). The authors show how "distinct institutional 
mechanisms" (such as Copyleft and or ONU General Public License) are used by OSS 
govemance structure to reconcile the interests of rent-seekers and donators. 
These discussions lead us to appreciate the significant role of governance in the context 
of OSS development process as a form of a goal-directed network. Therefore, the 
network ofOSS participants, to be effective, needs to be ' govemed ' through formai and 
informa! coordination mechanisms. Coordination, here, refers to managing a system of 
exchanges (Levine & White, 1961) which is central to goveming and aligning the 
heterogeneity associated with types of participants and their incentives for participation 
besides the overall goal of the network. Thus, it is safe to argue that the inclusion of 
non-software enterprise users into the OSS technological collaborations may introduce 
new challenges to the govemance of the projects and therefore the whole network 
effectiveness. Consequently, leadership of OSSTC may take a different shape by 
demonstrating certain OSS-specific capabilities and/or characteristics in order to avoid 
breakdown ofthe collaborations and technological systems. 
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3.5 .5 Organization of OSS projects 
In addition to the significant role of governance in turning OSS projects and networks 
into a an effective and successful collective effort, one should be wary of the 
"organization" of OSS innovation process which has been the subject of research 
during the past decade (e.g., West & O' Mahony, 2005; Dempsey et al. , 2002; Scacchi, 
2002; Gall ivan, 2001 ). 
At the heart of the issue of organization of OSS projects is the "pronounced difference 
in ' roles ' taken by contributors" (von Krogh & von Hippel, 2006, p. 979). Nonneke and 
Preece (2000) highlight the issue of "lurkers" (those who play a passive role) within 
online communities. Lurkers can account for as high as 90% of online groups despite 
their role being unclear. Nonneke and Preece (2000, p. 79) reveal that lurking is not 
necessarily a negative phenomenon as it involves a silent participation different from 
being a free rider. In fact, "a case can be made for lurking being normal and public 
posting being abnormal. After ali , if everyone were posting, who would be reading". 
They also show that the actual number of lurkers is much less than what had been 
reported, widely ranging from zero to 99%. 
West and O'Mahoney (2005) distinguish between two types of OS projects: 
community-founded projects vs. private organization sponsored projects. The former is 
traditional madel of OSS development that is initiated by one or more individuals 
independent of their employment context44 • The latter is an alternative OS project 
model which is called a sponsored or spinout model (West & Gallagher, 2006). 
Sponsored madel concerns the situation where a sponsor of an internally developed 
software project releases its code to the public under an OSS license, inviting the 
external community to join the project. The authors compare the two models in order to 
find out how sponsored OS projects can best utilize their resources while still 
managing to grow a diverse external community of contributors. The authors 
conjecture that firms that operate with a completely open development process, laissez-
44 Examples include Linus Torvalds ' starting the Linux operating system; Miguel D' lcaza' s initiating the 
GNOME desktop environment project; and the eight developers who adapted the NCSA web server to 
become Apache. 
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faire governance or abdicate community leadership may unintentionally waste 
resources, hurt their ability to appropriate returns or advance their competition. Further, 
West and O'Mahoney (2005) show that creating a spinout OS project shares many of 
the same issues as a community managed one, such as building a collaboration 
infrastructure, designing govemance mechanisms and making key decisions about 
licensing and other external relationships. 
In a follow-up study, West and O' Mahoney (2008) try to investigate how sponsors 
design OSS communities in the hopes of attracting external participation, and how this 
differ from the design of autonomous-based communities? Through unboxing the 
'design decisions ' that sponsors have made when creating a community, authors 
identify three dimensions that affected participation: 1) the organization of production; 
2) governance; and 3) intellectual property. In doing so, West and O'Mahoney (2008) 
show that the participation architecture of a technical community is detern1ined not 
only by its technical architecture, but also by community design decisions made by the 
community ' s leaders. The aspects of community design that are identified are also 
critical to attracting and enabling participants. The reason is that they shape the 
landscape of opportunities extended. Their study, as weil as others mentioned above, 
reveals a 'conflict' or 'tension' that is created when a firm sponsors an OS community 
project, as there are conflicting goals. On the one hand, firms favor holding control over 
technologies fundamental to their business success. On the other hand, providing the 
opportunity structure for others to participate has been a prerequisite for gaining the 
benefits from developing an external community. Therefore, while designing 
participation architecture, firms need to take a middle-road position and mediate 
between surrendering control and offering opportunities for outside participation that 
could lead to community contributions and growth. 
Discussions on organization of OSS projects and OSS development process emphasize 
how firms and communities are concerned with extemal participation and sustaining 
their contributions. Therefore, organization of people is tightly interwoven with success 
and viability of the whole OSS RDIP. The problem is further exacerbated when we 
consider augmenting the heterogeneity leve! of participants by inclusion of or reserving 
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a role for non-software enterprises from different downstream industries. The 
implications of including other participants as technological collaborators may further 
impose ' unexpected organization challenges' which have not so far identified and 
addressed in the extant literature. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the notable works on the main research areas of OSS; 
namely, motivations of firms and individuals; concept of success in the context of OSS; 
as weil as govemance, organization and innovation process of OSS collaborative RDIP. 
I have also discussed the five inherent particularities of OSS technology which 
collectively build the case for developing a theory that takes into account these 
attributes. Indeed, we need to be cautious how these attributes unfold in OSS 
collaborative RDIP and further influence the nature of collaborations, organization of 
innovation, and govemance of projects. This chapter pictures OSS mainly as a public 
good (non-rival and non-exclusive) which does not suffer from the tragedy of 
comrnons. Nonetheless, having sorne qualities of private goods (ownership and control 
offered by certain licenses, copyrights, and subscription fees) in case of commercial 
and enterprise version of OSS can disturb the balance between collective value creation 
and private value capture. 
Although openness of the source code is a shared quality between free software and 
OSS, the same attribute distinguishes OSS sharply from proprietary software. The past 
research clearly shows challenges and differences associated with govemance and 
organization of commercial and strategie version of OSS. Particularly, as OSS, in 
general, is continuously faced with comrnercialization and productization challenge, we 
need to further study its development process to make sure ali significant stakeholders 
are included in its RDIP. Such integrative or holistic approach to including a broader 
range of participants such as non-software enterprise users (rarely studied in the extant 
lite rature) from downstream industries ensures having a software creation process that 
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responds to real and immediate market needs. However, this also means that we are 
adding to challenges of OSS organization and govemance. Augmented heterogeneity 
leve! in the software production leve! can translate into more diversity in motivations to 
engage, various expectations of capture value, more friction and conflicts, and a more 
uncertain project success. These issUes, therefore, call for a more inductive research 
approach in this field to gain a fresh perspective and provide a finer grained 
understanding of the se issues. 
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CHAPTERIV 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodological approach adopted to realize this research 
project. It includes five sections. This introductory note encompasses how this chapter 
is organized. Section 4.2 explicates the two main methodological approaches 
(quantitative and qualitative) and ex plains the rationale behind choosing the qualitative 
methodology to conduct this research. Further, it explains how three variations of 
qualitative methodology (case study research, participant-observation, and grounded 
theory approach) fit well together in the course of the present research. Next, section 
4.3 presents the essence of research design by highlighting case and unit of analysis, 
sampling methods, data collection as well as methods of data analysis . Later, section 
4.4 discusses issues like validity, reliability, research ethics and generalizability which 
are related to evaluating qualitative research. Finally, section 4.5 closes this chapter by 
highlighting its methodological contribution. 
4.2 Methodological approach 
Research methodology is a strategy to make an enqmry and it implies underlying 
philosophical assumptions, research design, and data collection (Myers, 2013). 
Methodology of re se arch includes the "general strate gy" of research (Vogt, 2007, p. 5). 
lt also emphasizes on choosing the right method by comparing advantages and 
disadvantages of different methods (Vogt, 2007). Research method, on the other hand, 
is more specifie (i.e., it concems "how" the research is conducted) ; and, it refers to the 
"means of accomplishing the ends of using knowledge to answer questions, solve 
problems, and create knowledge" (Vogt, 2007, p. 5). 
Research methodology is typically classified into two major categories: quantitative 
and qualitative. However, during the past decade, the interest in conducting 'mixed 
methods research ' or ' mixed methodology' has been increasing (Bryman, 2006, p. 97) 
so much so that Bryman (2006) hold that "we end up with three distinct approaches to 
research: quantitative; qualitative; and w~at is variously called multi -methods 
(Brannen, 1992), multi-strategy (Bryman, 2004), mixed methods (Creswell, 2003 ; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003), or mixed methodology (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998) 
research" . Further, Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner (2007, p. 113) position the 
mixed methodology somewhere "between the extremes Plata (quantitative research) 
and the Sophists (qualitative research), with mixed research attempting to respect fully 
the wisdom of bath of these viewpoints while also seeking a workable middle solution 
for many (research) problems of interest". In this section, I do not deploy mixed 
methodology approach, as it does not respond to the needs of this study. I shall 
therefore limit the discussion to the classical qualitative vs. quantitative approaches. 
While quantitative research methods originate m the world of natural sciences to 
investigate natural phenomena, qualitative research methods have long belonged to the 
realm of social sciences to enable the social scientists to study and understand socio-
cultural phenomena. Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 17) define qualitative research as: 
"any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical 
procedures or other means of quantification. It can refer to research about 
person' s lives, stories, behavior [emphasis added] , but also about organizational 
functioning, social movements, or interactional relationships [ emphasis added]. 
Sorne data may be quantified as with census data but the analysis itself is a 
qualitative one". 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 18), qualitative research is one that involves 
"nonmathematical analytic procedure that results in findings derived from data 
gathered by a variety of means. These include observations and interviews, . . . " . 
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In further characterizing the qualitative research methodology, Yin (2011 , p. 7-8) 
introduces five important ' features ' of qualitative research. First, it involves studying 
the meaning of people' s lives, under real-world conditions; 2) it represents the views 
and perspectives of the people; 3) it covers the contextual conditions within which 
people live; 4) it contributes insights into existing or emerging concepts that may help 
to explain human social behavior; and finally 5) it strives to use multiple sources of 
evidence rather than relying on a single source alone. 
Tracy (2013 , p. 2) introduces the three ' core concepts' of qualitative approach as: 1) 
Self-rejlexivity; 2) context; and 3) thick description. The first concept refers to "the 
careful consideration of the ways in which researchers' past experiences, points of 
view, and roles impact these same researchers ' interactions with, and interpretations 
of, the research scene". This core element highlights the role of the researcher' s 
"baggage" or as sorne caU it "wisdom" in the research process; as she or he brings her 
or his own worldviews into the research. Therefore, "rather than deny our way of 
seeing and being in the world, qualitative researchers acknowledge, and even celebrate 
it' ' (Tracy, 2013 , p. 3). Tracy (2013 , p. 3) continues by characterizing ' context' as the 
immersing process of qualitative researcher in the research scene where he or she tries 
to make sense of it. Finally, she views ' thick description '- which is related to the 
context- based on the premise that "meaning cannot be divorced from this thick 
contextual description" (Tracy, 2013 , p. 3). For example, a person' s winking could 
mean a number of things ranging from flirting to an uncontrollable facial twitch 
(Geertz, 1973; as cited in Tracy, 2013 , p. 3). Thus, understanding relationships, 
groups, and organizations are among main foci of qualitative research. Indeed, 
qualitative research is capable of providing important insight into interpersonal 
relationships through interviews and participant observation (Tracy, 2013). 
Tracy (2013 , p. 25-28) further highlights four 'main characteristics ' of qualitative 
research: 1) Gestalt; 2) Bricolage; 3) the funnel metaphor; and 4) sensitizing concepts . 
148 
First, the ' gestalt' concept "captures people' s tendency to piece together various parts 
into an integrated system or culture. The meaning of these systems cornes through 
their interdependence and integration: the perceived whole is more than a sum of its 
parts" (Tracy, 2013 , p. 26) . Therefore, the holistic approach of qualitative researcher 
makes the phenomenon an understandable one. Second, within qualitative approach, 
the researcher is painted as "bricoleur"; meaning that qualitative researchers "are like 
quilters, borrowing and interweaving viewpoints and multiple perspectives . .. . in order 
to construct a meaningful, aesthetically pleasing, and useful research synthesis" (Ibid. , 
p. 26). This activity is captured through the concept of "bricolage"; i.e. , "a pieced 
together set of representations that is fitted to the specifies of a complex situations" 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2005 , p. 4). Third, the funnel metaphor refers to the nature of 
qualitative research that it usually starts with a broad and wide-open question such as 
"what is going on here?'' and then it narrows down in focus, as the researchers gather 
more data and "slowly but surely circle through the funnel" (Ibid. , p. 27). Therefore, it 
is important for qualitative researchers to be comfortable with a certain amount of lack 
of control and having sorne tolerance for ambiguity. Fourth and last, ' sensitizing 
concepts ' refers to "theories or interpretive deviees that serve as jumping-off points or 
lenses for qualitative study" (Charmaz, 2003; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; as cited in 
Tracy, 2013, p. 28). Therefore, researchers' past experiences and literature review 
efforts, can equip them with sorne "background ideas" which "offer frameworks 
through which researchers see, organize, and experience the research problem" (Ibid., 
p. 28). 
Furthermore, there are different types of qualitative research, "although no formai 
typology or inventory exists" (Yin, 20 Il , p. 17). The author pro vides ten variations of 
commonly accepted forms of qualitative research. He further suggests that these 
variations "do not group into any orderly categories" (Ibid., p. 16). Therefore, as there 
is an overlap between variations one can conduct a case study research based on 
participant-observation (Yin, 2011). 
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These ten types or variations of qualitative research are: 1) Action research; 2) case 
study; 3) ethnography; 4) ethnomethodology; 5) feminist research; 6) grounded the01y; 
7) !ife his tory; 8) narrative inquiry; 9) participant-observer study; and finally 1 0) 
phenomenological study (Yin, 2011 , p. 17). Yin (20 11 , p. 16) further emphasizes that 
"you need to be sensitive to these variations, but you do not need to choose among 
them if you do not wish to". However, irrespective of their differences, virtually ail 
qualitative research appears to follow, if not ail , of the five features of qualitative 
research described earlier (Yin, 2011) in this section. Another way to better understand 
qualitative and quantitative research methodologies is by way of comparison. There are 
key differences between the two methodologies. 
One major distinction between the two methodologies concems their methods of data 
collection, data type, analysis and their presentation. Tracy (20 13, p. 28) mentions that 
qualitative method is an "urnbrella term" that includes interviews, participant 
observation, and document analysis. Howard and Prividera (2008) include open-ended 
qualitative surveys. Tracy (20 13, p. 24) provides an acute observation concerning the 
two. She mentions, "quantitative research transforms data ... into numbers." In fact, 
quantitative methodologies resort to "measurement and statistics to develop 
mathematical models and predictions" (Ibid. , p. 24) . She further goes on and explicates 
her point by highlighting three key differences. For example, she mentions that 
quantitative researchers may aggregate data collected through a survey method to 
measure how often respondents engage in a certain activity. Therefore, "quantitative 
research is usually driven by questions of scale of the type ' how much?' and ' how 
often" ' (Ibid. , p. 24). Such methodology lacks in thick descriptions of the scene, a 
quality that characterizes the qualitative research. Similarly, based on Denzin and 
Lincoln (2000, p. 3), "while quantitative research presents statistical results represented 
by numerical or statistical data, qualitative research presents data as descriptive 
narration with words and attempts to understand phenomena in "natural settings". This 
means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to 
make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to 
them." Next, she raises the role each methodology assigns to researcher establishes a 
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key distinction between the two methodologies. ln quantitative research the "research 
instrument and the researcher controlling the instrument are two separate and distinctly 
different entities" (Ibid., p. 24); while in qualitative research "the researcher is the 
instrument" (Ibid., p. 25). Finally, the "representation of the methodology, findings, and 
discussions" of both methodologies is different. In articles following a quantitative 
methodology, there is tendency to separate the description of research instrument from 
a report on findings ; while in qualitative reports "the description of the research 
methods often flows into the stories, observations, and interactions collected" (Ibid., p. 
25). 
Other scholars have highlighted different points of distinction. For example, Stake 
(1995, p. 37) highlights the "purpose of research" as a point of departure in that 
researcher' s intention to exp lain and understand a phenomenon forms the main goal of 
qualitative research; while quantitative research is mainly used to establish 
relationships between measured variables. Similarly, Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 19) 
clearly mention that one employs qualitative research "to uncover and understand what 
lies behind any phenomenon about which little is yet known. Such methodology can be 
used to gain novel and fresh slants on things about which quite a bit is already known. 
Also qualitative methods can give the [sic] intricate details of phenomena that are 
difficult to convey with quantitative methods". 
Lastly, the nature of qualitative research tends to be inductive while quantitative 
research tends to be deductive (see Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Inductive reasoning is a 
"bottom-up or little-to-big" approach while deductive reasoning refers to a "top-down 
or big-to-little" approach (Tracy, 2013, p. 21). According to Tracy (2013 , p. 21), in 
qualitative methods we often speak of "ernie understandings of the scene"; i.e., 
"behavior is described from the actor' s point of view and is context-specific" . Ernie or 
inductive, therefore, refers to "meanings that emerge from the field" . On the other band, 
in deductive reasoning we speak of "etic understandings, in which researchers describe 
behavior in terms of extemal criteria that are already derived and not specifie to a given 
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culture .. ... a deductive and Etic research begins with External Theories (presuppositions 
or criteria) to determine and frame meanings" (Ibid. , p. 21 ). 
Overall , qualitative approach to research is a scientific methodology which is most 
suitable when the researcher aims to gain (fresh) understanding and explain an intricate 
phenomenon which is context dependent. lts data collection methods and data quality 
allow the researcher to inquire about different perspectives and angles of the same 
phenomenon and present different meanings as they co-exist in the same context. lts 
"analytic or interpretive procedures" can be used to develop theories inductively 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 20) and provide thick descriptions to justify the objectivity 
of the end results of the research. 
4.2.1 Rationale for selecting the qualitative methodology and its three variations 
The overarching goal of this research is to develop a theory that explains the nature of 
the OSS technological collaborations of the shared R&D and innovation process within 
OSS context. In order to better understand the conceptual nuances and be able to make a 
contribution to the existing literature, I need to build a theory ground-up from the 
industry-based observations. Such theory building process feeds on individuals' as weil 
as commercial firms ' perceived incentives and motivations to participate in the OSS 
technological collaborations, their roles and nature of interactions and relationships, 
among other factors. Literature has placed an emphasis on adopting an inductive 
approach to theory building in the realm of sciences, including management and 
psychology (see, Locke, 2007). In fact, this approach to theory development has proven 
to be an effective and successful one. For example, ' goal setting theory' has been 
ranked number one in importance out of seventy-three management theories by 
organizational behavior professors (Miner, 2003; as cited in Locke, 2007, p. 877). 
Since the goal of the present research is theory development, and not theory testing, 1 
have adopted qualitative research methodology governed by inductive approach to 
reasoning as the dominant methodological approach. 
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Within the domain of qualitative approach, 1 then intend to adopt and integrate three 
approaches: 1) Case study (Yin, 2009); 2) Grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1990); and 3) Participant-observer study (Becker, 1958; DeWalt & 
DeWalt, 2002).45 
4.2.2 Case study 
Case study is one of severa) ways to conduct research in the field of social science. It 
"is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident" (Yin, 2009, p. 18). Furthermore, Yin (2009) highlights 
the usual inseparability of phenomenon and context in real life situations. Case study 
"copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of 
evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result 
benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection 
and analysis" (Ibid. , p. 18). Therefore, it represents an "all-encompassing method-
covering the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specifie approaches to data 
analysis" (Ibid. , p. 18). 
Yin (2009, p. 8) argues that there are three necessary conditions underlying a method 
selection: a) research question type (Hedrick, Bickman, & Rog, 1993; as cited in Yin, 
2009, p. 9); b) "the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioral events"; 
and c) "the degree offocus on contemporary as opposed to historical events." 
Yin (2009, p. 8-10) provides a basic category of questions (i.e., 'who ', 'what' , 'where' , 
'how' , and 'why' ) and further explains how a researcher can match the type of 
questions with different methods of investigation (i.e. , experiment, survey, archivai 
analysis, history, and case study). Based on his arguments, for the research questions 
posed in the present study, case study is the most appropriate method of investigation. 
45 Please re fer to Yin (20 Il , p. 17) to gain a detailed understanding on variations of qualitative research. 
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For example, the questions which start with "how" and "why" in this study are 
explanatory in nature. These questions, normally, "deal with operational links needing 
to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence" (Ibid., p. 9). Even the 
questions that start with "what" in this study are not designed as variations of "how 
many" or "how much" lines of inquiry; they indeed are exploratory in nature and they 
are designed with the goal of developing pertinent propositions and hypotheses . Thus, 
based on the types and nature of questions, selecting the case study method is an 
appropriate choice. 
Furthermore, as Yin (2009, p. 11) puts it, "the case study is preferred in examining 
contemporary events, but when the relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated". In this 
research, I deal with living OSS developers and investigate the process of OSSD as it is 
happening. Therefore, my focus is on contemporary events and not those considered as 
"dead past". In addition, as a researcher, I cannot manipulate the participants ' 
behaviors. Thus, these two conditions lead me to choose case study as the dominant 
research approach. Equally important, case study method is a strong method as it deals 
with variety of evidence so much so that it relies on two important sources of evidence 
that are direct observation of the events being studies as weil as interviews with the 
people involved in those events (Yin, 2009). These sources of evidence also pave the 
way to integrate the 'participant observation ' method with classical case study 
approach. 
4.2.3 Participant observation 
Participant observation is a method through which researchers generate understanding 
and knowledge by watching, interacting, asking questions, collecting documents, 
making audio or video recording, and reflecting after the fact (Lofland & Lofland, 
1995). It denotes a participatory approach to research in which method "a researcher 
takes part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions, and events of a group of people as 
one of the means of learning the explicit and tacit aspects of their life routines and their 
culture" (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002, p. 1). 
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Pmiicipant observation is also known as "jieldwork" (see, Tracy, 2013, p. 65; DeWalt 
& DeWalt, 2002, p. 1). According to Delamont (2004, p. 218) fieldwork refers to "the 
data collection phase, when the investigators leave their desks and go out ' into the 
field.' The field is metaphorical: it is not a real field, but a setting or a population". 
Later, Tracy (2013, p. 65) adds the term "fieldplay" based on ber experience. The term 
implies: "adventure, curiosity, and playfulness" as parts of the participant observation. 
ln fact, ''jieldplayers are filled with good humor, improvise, and do not take themselves 
too seriously" (Tracy, 2013, p. 65). 
Agar (1996) uses the term participant observation "as a cover term for ail of the 
observation and formai and informai interviewing in which anthropologists engage" (as 
cited in DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002, p. 2). Participant observation is "the starting point in 
ethnographie research" (Schensul et al., 1999, p. 91) in which sense it is considered as 
the foundation for ethnographie research (Schensul et al., 1999). 
DeWalt & DeWalt (2002, p. 4) highlight seven key elements of participant observation 
(as used by anthropologists) as follows: 1) living in the context for an extended period 
of time; 2) learning and using local language and dialect; 3) actively participating in a 
wide range of daily, routine, and extraordinary activities with people who are full 
participants in that context; 4) using everyday conversation as an interview technique; 
5) informally observing during leisure activities (hanging out); 6) recording 
observations in field notes (usually organized chronologically); and 7) using both tacit 
and explicit information in analysis and writing. 
Participant observation is viewed as an 'advantageous ' method of inquiry in conducting 
research for three main reasons.46 Firstly, "it enhances the quality of the data obtained 
46 However, thi s is subj ect to debate mainly due to sorne historica l 'mistakes' that have taken place in the 
field of anthropology. For instance, the methodology (i.e., participant observer) and findings of the 
highly celebrated work of the renowned American anthropologist: Margaret Mead known as "Coming of 
Age in Samoa"- a book based upon the study of primarily adolescent g irls on the island of Ta'u in the 
Samoan Islands - was later severely criticized by Derek Freeman. Freeman' s critique is based on his 
claim that Mead's informants have lied to her and therefore her observations are based on incorrect data. 
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during fieldwork"; secondly, "it enhances the quality of the interpretation of data, 
whether those data collected through participant observation or by other methods" 
(DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002, p. 8). Thus, participant observation is botha data collection 
and an analytical tool. Thirdly, it encourages the researcher to fom1Ulate new research 
questions and hypotheses which are grounded in the on-the-scene observations (DeWalt 
& DeWalt, 2002, p. 8). 
Participant observation is a qualitative method which is also tightly interwoven with 
case study research and interpretive research paradigm within information systems' 
research (see, Klein & Myers, 1999). With the advent of interpretive research as a 
significant strand in the field of information systems' research (see, Walsham, 1995b); 
scholars (Klein & Myers, 1999, p. 67) believe that it can aide IS researchers to better 
"understand human thought and action in social and organizational contexts" as such 
paradigm "has the potential to produce deep insights into information systems 
phenomena". However, case study can be ~onducted under different philosophical 
paradigm; it can be positivist (Yin, 1994), interpretive (Walsham, 1993), or critical 
(Klein & Myers, 1999). Therefore, to further clarify the scope of case study within 
interpretative research and more specifically "interpretive field studies" (Walsham, 
1993 ), Klein and My ers (1999, p. 71-79) propose seven princip/es, based on practice of 
anthropological research as weil as underlying philosophy of phenomenology and 
hermeneutics, to evaluate interpretive field research. 
First, "the fundamental principal of the hermeneutic circle" suggests, "ali human 
understanding is achieved by iterating between considering the interdependent meaning 
of parts and the whole that they form" (Ibid., p. 72). Second, the principle of 
contextualization "requires critical reflection of the social and historical background of 
Source: based on: Wikipedia. Coming of Age in Samoa. Retrieved from 
https://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Coming_ of_Age _ in_ Samoa#Critique _of_ Mead .27s _ methodology _and_ con 
clusions. Note: These anecdotal examples shed light on weaknesses of participant observer' s method, 
albeit they are also based on another participant observer' s view (e.g., Derek Freeman). However, the 
triangulation technique can reduce the margins of error to a great extent. More specifically, because OSS 
developers are not like the youth of Samoan Islands concerning the ir free will andfreedom of choice, and 
since there is a large number of them, dispersed around the globe, we can reduce the possibility of lying 
through using multiple data sources. 
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the research setting, so that the intended audience can see how the current situation 
under investigation emerged" (Ibid. , p. 72). Third, the principle of interaction between 
the researchers and the subjects "requires critical reflection on how the research 
materials (or 'data' ) were socially constructed through the interaction between the 
researchers and participants" (Ibid. , p. 72). Fourth, the principle of abstraction and 
generalization "requires relating the idiographic details revealed by the data 
interpretation through the application of principles one and two to theoretical, general 
concepts that describe the nature of human understanding and social action" (Ibid. , p. 
72). Fifth, the principle of dialogical reasoning "requires sensitivity to possible 
contradictions between the theoretical preconceptions guiding the research design and 
actual findings ('the story which the data tell ' ) with subsequent cycles of revision" 
(Ibid., p. 72). Sixth, the principle of multiple interpretations "requires sensitivity to 
possible differences in interpretation among the participants as are typically expressed 
in multiple narratives or stories of the same sequence of events under study. Similar to 
multiple witness accounts even if all tell it as they saw it'' (Ibid., p. 72). Seventh, the 
princip le of suspicion "requires sensitivity to possible ' bi ases ' and systematic 
"distortions ' in the narratives collected from the participants" (Ibid., p. 72). 
These seven principles clearly show the inter-connection between the three issues: case 
study, participant observation as fieldwork, and interpretivisms as school of thought. 
Case study places emphasis on studying the phenomenon as it lives in a real-life 
context through collecting data through multiple sources of evidence. lt is an initiative 
to get intimate with what a researcher studies. Participant observation allows for this 
intimacy to shape as the researcher becomes engaged in the filed by becoming part of 
the research instrument with heightened interest and awareness. Indubitably, principle 
of ' interaction between the researchers and subjects ' captures so well the existing 
connections, since it maintains that "in social science, the ' data' are not just sitting 
there waiting to be gathered, like rocks on the seashore. Rather, interpretivism suggests 
that facts are produced as part and parcel of the social interaction of researchers with 
participants (Klein & Myers, 1999, p. 74)". After all , as Becker and Geer (1957, p. 28) 
put it: 
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"The most complete form of the sociological datum , after ail , is the form in 
which the participant observer gathers it: An observation of some social event, 
the events which precede and follow it, and explanations of its meaning by 
participants and spectators, before, during, and after its occurrence. Such a 
datum gives us more information about the event under study than data gathered 
by any other sociological method." 
Lastly, Becker and Geer (1957, p. 28-29) distinguish between participant observation 
and interviewing as two methods within the camp of qualitative methodology with 
regards to three main issues: "learning the native language, or the problem of the degree 
to which the interviewer really understands what is said to him; matters interviewees 
are unable or unwilling to talk about; and getting information on matters people see 
through distorting lenses". 
The first issue refers to complexities associated with language of the social group being 
studied. It is assumed that the language is a socio-cultural phenomenon that has its own 
subtleties like words with different nuances of meanings, denotations and connotations. 
These differences rooted in contextual matters form sources of confusion, error in 
dialogue and improper understanding on the side of interviewer and interviewees: "The 
interview provides little opportunity of rectifying errors of this kind where they go 
unrecognized" (Becker & Geer, 1957, p. 29). Therefore, it is believed that participant 
observer can overcome these issues mainly because: 
"participant observation provides a situation in which the meanings of words 
can be learned with great precision through study of their use in context, 
exploration through continuous interviewing of their implications and nuances, 
and the use of them oneself under the scrutiny of capable speakers of the 
language" (Becker & Geer, 1957, p. 29). 
Second, according to Becker and Geer (1957, p. 30), "frequently, people do not tell an 
interviewer ail the things he might want to know"; and this can be due to a variety of 
reasons ranging simply from "resistance" to issues like "unfamiliarity" : i.e ., some 
events may be so unfamiliar or vague to interviewees that they may "find it difficult to 
put into words their vague feelings about what has happened". Such issues can be 
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obviated through participant observation strategy as the participant-observer develops 
his knowledge through observation and interaction with the environrnent and becomes 
able to 'make sense ' of "vague statements as elues to an objective situation" and or 
"can connect his knowledge with these half communications". 
Third, usually individuals develop their own perceptions about a phenomenon so much 
so that there are differences in perception·, and these will naturally affect what they 
report in an interview (Becker & Geer, 1957). The strength of participant observation 
over interview method lies in its ability of the participant-observer "to check 
description against fact and, noting discrepancies, become aware of systematic 
distortions made by the persan under study; such distortions are Jess likely to be 
discovered by interviewing alone" (Becker & Geer, 1957, p. 31). 
Overall, participant observation is a method the deals with the core issue of "errors of 
inference"; i.e., "errors which arise from the necessity of making assumptions about the 
relation of interview statements to actual events which may or may not be true" (Becker 
& Geer, 1957, p. 31). 
Within the context of OSSD, 1 am looking at the relationships among the participants 
(R&D engineers, clients, and community members) in arder to understand how they 
influence the development of strategie OSS. As OSS is a socio-economic technological 
phenomenon, the incentives, and motivations of participants can be influenced by 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary elements and the process of technology development is a 
complex one. Therefore, approaching participants (potential interviewees) without 
building a rapport may result in collecting data that might be merely a demonstration of 
the surface of the issue at hand. Further, as discussed above, due to shortcomings of 
interview method, the quality and accuracy of data will not be at a sufficient leve! to 
lead to high level of reliability and validity of results. Therefore, adopting the 
participant-observer strategy will facilitate my integration into the context and fabric of 
the field and be able to study the OSSD process from an insider's viewpoint. 
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4.2.4 Grounded theory approach 
Grounded theory is originally developed by the sociologists: Barney Glaser and 
Anselm Strauss (1967), and it was later extended by Strauss and Corbin (1990) as weil 
as Charmaz (2006). Grounded theory approach " is a qualitative research method that 
uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively derived grounded 
theory about a phenomenon" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 24, emphasis kept as in the 
original format). The research findings, therefore, constitute a theoretical formulation of 
the reality under investigation, rather than consisting of a set of numbers, or group of 
loosely related themes (Ibid. , p. 24). The main goal of grounded theory approach 
(GIA) is "to build theory that is faithful to and illuminates the area under study" (Ibid. , 
p. 24). Grounded theory building approach leads to creation of a kind of theory that is 
inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents. This means that the 
theory is "discovered, developed, and provisionally verified through systematic data 
collection and analysis of data pertaining to that phenomenon" (Ibid., p. 23). Tracy 
(2013) refers to the systematic inductive analysis of data from ground up in form of a 
bottom-up data analysis. 
Scholars who aim to develop a theory rather than testing an existing one believe that 
forming theoretically informed interpretations is the most powerful way to bring reality 
to light (Blumer, 1969; Diesing, 1971 ; Glaser, 1978). Following the assumption thata 
reality cannot be actually known by man but it is always interpreted, "building theory, 
by its very nature, implies interpreting data, for the data must be conceptualized and the 
concepts related to form a theoretical rendition of reality" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 
22). Such theory is useful not only with regards to explaining the reality we seek to 
understand, but also with regards to providing a framework for action. Furthermore, 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) state that, to theory builders, theories represent the most 
systematic way of building, synthesizing, and integrating scientific knowledge (see p. 
22). 
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In addition, Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 23) touch upon the four central criteria for 
evaluating the applicability of grounded theory; these are: fit , understanding, 
generality, and control (see Glaser & Strauss, 1967, pp. 237-250). 
First, "if the theory is faithful to the everyday reality of the substantive area and 
carefully induced from diverse data, it should fit the substantive area". Next, since such 
theory represents the reality, it should also be comprehensive and make sense both to 
the persons who were studied and to those practicing in that area. In addition, if the 
researcher uses "comprehensive data", and the "interpretations are conceptual and 
broad", then the developed theory tends to be abstract enough to include sufficient 
variation to make it applicable to a variety of contexts related to that particular 
phenomenon. Lastly, the developed theory should provide control with regard to action 
toward the phenomenon. Control is important because the outcome hypotheses, which 
state the nature of relationship among concepts, should be systematically derived from 
actual data that are only related to the phenomenon under investigation. These 
hypotheses will guide further action concerning the phenomenon. Besides, the 
conditions to which the theory applies need to be clearly spelled out. (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990, p.23) 
Within GT A, the researcher follows an ernie or inductive approach to data collection 
and analysis. This means that she or he, instead of approaching the data with imposing 
prior theories on the data to be analyzed, begins the research process with data 
collection stage and engages in open line-by-line analysis so as to create themes and 
link them together in a larger story (Tracy, 2013 , p. 30). Following this approach, the 
researcher does not impose a framework of his own on the study participants, therefore 
the chances to distort their ideas are reduced (see Harris, 1976). Therefore, the research 
process starts from individual cases and from incidents in the data, and these develop 
progressively into more abstract categories and theories (Tracy, 2013 , p. 184). Taking 
such approach to theory development requires the researcher to postpone the literature 
review until after the data are collected; as the theory is data driven and not from 
research questions or existing literature (Tracy, 2013, p. 184). Furthermore, within 
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OTA, data analysis is not delayed until al! data are collected. Rather, data collection 
and analysis take place concurrently; meaning that the researcher studies the data as 
they are col!ected (Charmaz, 2006, p. 80). 
Overall, as the purpose of the present research is to further develop our theoretical 
understanding of the nuances of OSS technological collaborations. To this end, I have 
selected the OTA as a variation of the broader qualitative approach gui ding this piece 
of research. Indeed, "the major difference between this methodology [OTA] and other 
approaches to qualitative research is its merits upon theory development" (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1994, p. 274). Furthermore, the choice of participant observation method fits 
this methodology very weil as it enables the researcher to collect and evaluate data 
based on everyday reality and change direction of data collection more appropriately, 
conveniently and swiftly so as to follow the principle of OTA which is main! y data 
driven as opposed to theory driven. Also, by collecting diverse data from different 
industry participants such as OSS engineers, OSS firms, developers of free and OS 
communities and clients of OSS fmns, 1 can make sure the diversity or 
comprehensiveness of data based on which the theory is being developed. 
Finally, 1 need to address sorne concerns about the adoption of OTA in this research. 
lndeed this dissertation did start with two chapters of literature review nature; while 
principally, according to OTA, data collection stage precedes theory analysis. My 
justifications to rely, partly, on OTA rest in the following argument. First, 1 have 
written Chapter 2, which presents a comprehensive literature review of 01, in order to 
situate the phenomenon of interest through highlighting the weaknesses, strengths and 
theoretical gaps of OIP. This chapter provides the much-needed context for me to more 
clearly define and formulate the research problem about OSSTC. OSSTC is a 
phenomenon in search for a clearer, more detailed and more independent theoretical 
understanding, one that does not necessarily depend on 01 framework. Second, Chapter 
3, which provides the current understanding and perspectives on OSS, informs us of 
conceptual cracks and blind spots that need a finer-grained explanation. For instance, it 
demonstrates that the role· of OSS commercial clients in the shared R&D and 
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innovation process bas not been widely studied in the past (at least to the best of my 
knowledge). lt emphasizes consideration of severa! factors such as the changing 
landscape of OSSD and its ümovation process, the high failure rate of OSS projects, the 
critical role of corporate consumers in providing the whole-product concept of a 
market-driven business approach while developing theories about OSS shared RDIP. 
The literature reviewed in this chapter does not tell us a theoretical story about the 
details of how clients can actually influence OSSD process or how OSSD process 
benefits downstream commercial industries, if commercial users get actively engaged 
in shared RDIP. Thus, I use these literature-based insights to be able to cast a wider net 
and collect more and different data from the OSS industry ecosystem. A metaphor will 
perhaps clarify this issue further. 
lt is my understanding (and I do not claim that it can be ali right and fine) that wh en a 
researcher follows the tradition of GT A to theory development, he resembles a 
jisherman who is about to venture deep into the unpredictable ocean. He is completely 
blind on how the sea will eventually treat him or how many fish, after ail , he will catch. 
Therefore, to reduce his uncertainty, the night before he sails off, he goes to the local 
beach cabin for a chat with sorne fellow fishermen. His evening discussion with a few 
at the cabin the night before sailing off may lead him to choose a wider and thicker net 
to increase his chances of success. However, carrying a wider or thicker net does not 
necessarily mean that he possesses enough knowledge about how the adventure will 
unfold, or how many fish will fall into his prey. Thus, the Chapter 3 is more of an 
evening discussion with other sailors that provides sorne theoretical tips rather than 
deep theoretical discussions on the actual research inquiry. 
Finally yet importantly, based on the inductive results of Chapter 5, I will actually go 
and revisit the existing theories in depth in order to figure out whether the inductive 
theory that I tried to develop will bear novelty vis-à-vis the existing perspectives. By 
way of comparison, 1 carve out the nuances of differences that exist between the 
findings in this research and those of the existing theories. By doing so, 1 can provide a 
finer-grained explanation as the theoretical contribution of this research. GT A, in this 
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sense, helps me to provide a detailed theoretical perspective that did not exist in its 
current shape in the existing literature. 
4.3 Research design 
Yin (2011 , p. 75) holds that "every research study has a design, whether implicit or 
explicit". Research designs function as " logical blueprints" or "plans", different from 
"logistics plans" (Yin, 2011 , p. 75; see also, Yin, 2009, p. 26). This logic encompasses 
the "links among the research questions, the data to be collected, and the strategies for 
analyzing the data" (Yin, 2011 , p. 76). Therefore, the aim of the logical blueprint is to 
ensure that the findings will address the intended research questions (Yin, 2011). 
However, logistics are concemed with the process of research management such as 
scheduling and coordinating research work (Yin, 2011). 
Overall , "colloquially", as expressed by Yin (2009, p. 26), a research design refers to "a 
logical plan for getting from he re ta the re, where he re may be defined as the initial set 
of questions to be answered, and there is sorne set of conclusions (answers) about these 
questions". Put simply, it "guides the researcher in the process of collecting, analyzing, 
and interpreting observations" (Nachrnias & Nachrnias, 1992, pp. 77-78). 
As this research follows a qualitative methodology, 1 focus on perspectives of 
qualitative research design. Qualitative research follows a rather unorthodox design. 
Yin (20 11, p. 77) mentions that "not ail qualitative studies start by having a research 
design"; in fact, "how much design work is done beforehand is a matter of choice" 
(Ibid., p. 76). Even within the camp of qualitative research, sometimes researchers 
favor the option of putting fieldwork first and then designing the research questions 
(see Yin, 2011 , Chapter 4) . 
In the present research, 1 started the research process by conducting five pilot 
interviews (over the phone and Skype®) with industry practitioners such as R&D 
managers of OSS small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) located in Montreal, 
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Waterloo and Ottawa, as weil as policy makers stationed in Quebec City. My main 
objective was to better understand how to approach the OSS industry and OSSD 
process, as weil as to be able to design severa! preliminary research questions. At this 
pilot stage, 1 adopted no elaborate or ostentatious research design. However, having 
completed the pilot phase, 1 then set forth on preparing the actual research proposai and 
decided to craft a rather comprehensive research design in order not to get lost amidst 
conducting the fieldwork ; thereby, 1 revisited the design as the research was 
progressing. Yin (20 11 , p. 77) states that "design process is a recursive one". This is 
mainly because "qualitative research permits and in some ways encourages · multiple 
midstream adjustments throughout the study process ... " . As a case in point, 1 started 
the case study with "unstructured interviews" to be able to pose open-ended questions 
and let the interviewees feel at home and speak their minds freely; but then as the 
research progressed and goals became clearer then 1 also used "structured" questions. 
Structured questions were addressed to certain experts in the field in order to elicit from 
them answers that were more precise. 
4.3 .1 Defining the case and the unit of anal y sis 
Defining the unit of analysis is a fundamental yet a challenging stage in conducting the 
qualitative case study research. lt is "related to the fundamental problem of defining 
what the 'case' is- a problem that has plagued many investigators at the outset of case 
studies (see, e.g. , Ragin & Becker, 1992; as cited in Yin, 2009, p. 29). Like a case, unit 
of analysis can be an individual, an event, or even as broad as a country' s economy 
(Yin, 2009, p. 29-30). As challenging as it may sound, determining the unit of analysis 
in the research is related to research questions and research goals; and its selection 
affects the research design (Yin, 2009). Further, "the units need to be an appropriate 
reflection of the main topic of study" (Yin, 2011 , p. 83). 
Yin (2011, pp. 82-87) discusses the subject of unit of analysis under the term "data 
collection unit" as it represents a "nontechnical reference" which "is usually the unit of 
analysis, [yet] there are complicated situations when it is not". Ali in ali , majority of 
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qualitative studies have more than one level of data collection unit and this involves a 
"broader level" like the case of field setting and a "narrower lev el" like the participants 
in the setting (Yin, 20 Il , p. 82-83). Broader levels include, for example, a geographical 
region, a country, a factory, a pet store; while the narrower levels can refer to policies, 
actions, individuals, project teams, communities and schools, and so on (for more 
examples, see Yin, 20 Il , pp. 84-85). According to Bizzi and Langley (20 12, p. 228), 
while commenting on how to study processes within the context of networks, many 
studies rely on multiple levels and units of analysis which can be both spatial and 
temporal. 
In this research, the broader leve/ of unit of analysis involves the "process of OSS 
development" in ICT sector. This process further involves different groups and 
individuals, projects and communities of software developers, OSS firms, IT 
consultants, and the inter-relationships that exist among them. Therefore, these 
individuals and communities with their inter-relationships embedded in their everyday 
actions form the narrower leve/ of unit of analysis. Since, the overall process of OSS 
development and its participants are part of the OSS ecosystem, therefore, the case 
under investigation is "OSS ecosystem" which includes OSS firms, OSS community of 
software developers, commercial clients and users, as well as policies which influence 
the software development process as well as participants' behaviors. However, it is not 
feasible to conduct an in-depth analysis of all elements within this ecosystem. Thus, 1 
have decided to choose a very fertile , active, involved, and conducive OSS firm with a 
unique business model as the main case setting and branch out into other cases such as 
OSS communities, policy makers, clients of OSS firms, leaders of OSS communities, 
R&D managers of other OSS firms in Canada and abroad (France, Belgium, etc.). The 
pilot studies that 1 conducted has served the case selection process well. 1 have finally 
chosen Savoir-faire Linux (SFL) Inc. as the firm to be embedded in as ' industry 
research intern' in order to study the OSS ecosystem up close, to study SFL in-depth, 
and to capitalize on the relationships between SFL and other entities in the ecosystem. 
The ties of SFL with the other participants of the ecosystem are of paramount 
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imp011ance as they can be my gateway to other cases and expand my case study 
research. Figure 4.1 below illustrates the case and units of analysis schematically. 
Figure 4.1. Type of Case Study Design Including Units of Analysis 
Main context and umbrella case: O~S ecosystem 
' 
' 
: 
' 
' 
' 
OSS communities 
(Community cases) 
Unit of analysis (broader leve!): 
OSS development process 
Units of analysis (narrower leve!): 
Individuals: Community leaders, 
and developers 
' - OSS proj ecls : TikiWiki , 
BigBlueButton, Odoo, Linux, 
LTTng, etc. 
: 
i - Relalionships: lnter-relationships 
: between communities' developers 
and their clients as weil as OSS 
firms. 
' --- -------- --- ----- ------- ---- ------- --------------
Clients of OSS firms 
(Client cases) 
Unit of analysis (broader leve!): 
OSS development process 
Units of analysis (narrower level): 
Individuals: Head of IT depts., IS 
staff, Technology and strategie 
officers 
OSS proj ecls: **confidential** 
Relalionships: lnter-relationships 
between communities of 
developers, SFL and SFL clients 
' 
- -------- -- --- - - - - ------ ---- ---- ----------- -- - -- 1 
' ~ 
Savoir-faire Linux, Inc. 
(Case and main fieldworkl participant 
observation setting) 
Unit of analysis (broader level): 
OSS development process 
' 
' 
' 
' Units of analysis (narrower level) : i . 
- Jndividuals : OSS developers, R&D l 
managers, Business developers, : 
Marketing personnel , etc. 
- OSS projects: Liferay, Ring, etc. 
- Relationships: lnter-relationships 
between SFL developers and their 
clients as weil as communities of 
OSS developers and policy makers 
in Quebec 
' 
' 
' 
' ,. 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' } 
' 
' ' L -------- -- - ------ ----- --- --------- - ----- - - --- --- • 
------- ---------- ------- . -- --- --------- ----------
' 
' 
' Policy makers in Quebec 
(Government Cases) 
Unit of analysis (broader leve!): 
OSS development process 
Units of analysis (narrower leve!): 
lndividuals: Heads of organizations 
that make decisions about OSS 
adoption by government agencies 
within Quebec, and organizations 
that enable or support government 
agencies in their adoption process 
: - Relalionships: Inter-relationships 
between government agencies and 
OSS firms . 
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As Figure 4.1 shows, ali cases are considered as an entity within the OSS ecosystem. 
However, 1 acknowledge that each case has its own individual context. For example, a 
client of OSS firm has its own internai bureaucracies, Jogic, fears and reservations, 
incentives, and capabilities, to mention a few, to either opt for OSS, proprietary or a 
mix of the two solutions in order to satisfy their ISs ' needs. In addition, when a client 
adopts an OSS solution and integrates it into their ISs, the client becomes part of the 
OSS eco system ( explicitly or implicitly) as the underlying OS product carries the 
characteristics of generic OSS. Therefore, in this research the client enterprises, 
communities, and OSS firms are perceived as if they are situated within the context of 
OSS ecosystem. Government bodies however have their own context. 
Since government agencies indirectly influence or are related with OSS communities 
and private enterprise clients, their relationship is shown through dashed !ines; 
however, SFL' s long lasting and effective interactions with government agencies, 
communities and private client enterprises underline the Jogic for using solid !ines. 
4.3.2 Sampling methods 
This study adopts two sampling techniques: a) purposive (or purposeful) sampling 
technique; and b) snowball sampling technique. 
The goal of purposive sampling technique, according to Yin (20 11 , p. 88), is to "yield 
the most relevant and plentiful data"; and according to Kuzel (1992, p. 37), it is "to 
obtain the broadest range of information and perspectives on the subject of study". This 
method is especially useful because the researcher can choose participants that may 
offer contradictory evidence or views that are helpful in evaluating the rival 
explanations (Kuzel, 1992, p. 88). Yin (20 11) further recommends that researchers 
deliberately interview those whom he or she suspects might hold different views related 
to the topic under investigation. However, one should not confuse purposive sampling 
with convenience sampling as the latter involves "selecting data collection units simply 
168 
because of their ready availability" which is not normally a preferred technique (Yin, 
2011 ' p. 88). 
The second technique, snowballing, refers to "selecting new data collection units [e.g. , 
participants] as an offshoot of existing ones" (Yin, 2011 , p. 89). This method, 1s 
acceptable only if it is done purposefully and not out of convenience (Yin, 2011 ). 
4.3.3 Data collection methods: sources of evidence 
This research uses three data collection techniques to gather evidence on OSS 
technological collaborations: interviews, participant observation, and documentation. 
4.3.4 Interview types 
Interviews are an essential source of case study evidence because most case studies are 
about human affairs or behavioral events (Yin, 2009, 108). Yin (2009, pp. 107-108) 
divides case study research interviews mainly into " in-depth" interviews; "focused" 
interviews; and survey like interviews which entail more structured questions. Yin 
(2011, pp. 132-135) classifies interviews into two categories: structured interviews and 
qualitative interviews. Tracy (2013 , pp. 138-141) distinguishes among interview 
structure and type; where she breaks down structure into structured and unstructured 
interviews; and types into six including informant interviews, respondent interviews, 
ethnographie interviews, narrative interviews, life-story or biographie interviews, and 
discursive interviews. 
In this study, I conduct the two main types of interviews which are comrnon in case 
study research; these are " in-depth interviews" and ''focused interviews" (Yin, 2009, p. 
107). 
169 
I use in-depth interviews in order to find out about facts and opinions about OSSD 
process; the nature of relationships within the technological collaborations; and 
whatever topics that interviewees find important and critical from their own 
perspectives. Some interviews extended over a few sessions because they could not be 
completed in a single setting due to severa! reasons. For example, sometimes the scope 
of discussion got too broad and as I did not want to stop interviewees from telling me 
the whole story, we had to continue on different occasions. Other times, they had to 
attend to their daily project matters and come back to me on another occasion. I 
remember one time after about an hour or so of an interview, the interviewee was 
interrupted by a client cali and we had to resume our discussion after a break. In this 
situation, as I was embedded in the company, scheduling another interview session was 
not a difficult task to do, though time consuming. There were occasions where my 
interviewees tumed into "key informants" rather than being a mere respondent. These 
informants were tho se with extensive experience (more than 10 years) in the OSS 
industry and they could provide me with deep insights about the subject matter. Yin 
(2009) views the key informants as often critical to the success of a case study yet he 
cautions the researchers of pitfall of becoming over dependent on these key informants. 
In order to avoid this situation, I followed the recommendation made by Yin (2009) and 
tried to corroborate their opinions through finding other sources of evidence and 
searching for contrary evidence as carefully as possible. 
I also use focused interviews (Merton et al. , 1990) which involves interviews of rather 
shorter periods such as one hour (Yin, 2009). These interviews are performed in a 
"conversational manner" while remaining open-ended (Yin, 2009, p. 1 07). The 
difference is that the researcher can follow certain set of carefully worded questions in 
order to gain a fresh commentary about the topic; they are especially useful for 
corroboriltion purpose (Yin, 2009, p. 1 07). Since 1 was embedded within the 
organization for one year, 1 managed to conduct many of these focused interviews with 
even "walk-in" experts. For example, one day a project manager from Microsoft office 
in Toronto walked into the company to attend a meeting. Upon completion of the 
meeting, I was invited to have lunch with the guest and some other staffers. This was a 
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unique opportunity to conduct a focused interview during the long lunch break and jot 
down the specifie points on my pocket research notebook. The so-called "pop-up" 
interviewee was so nice and cooperative that we continued the interview after lunch in 
the head office and turned the interview into an informai conversation with open-ended 
questions. 
Furthennore, I used both structured and unstructured interviews. Structured interviews, 
according to Yin (2011 , p. 133) are those in which the researcher uses "a formai 
questionnaire that lists every question to be asked". He or she also adopts "the role of 
an interviewer, trying to elicit responses from an interviewee" (Ibid. , p. 1 33). Finally, 
the interviewer makes an effort to adopt "the same consistent behavior and demeanor 
when interviewing every participant" (Ibid. , p. 133). In these interviews, the 
interviewer tends to use more closed-ended questions. On the other hand, unstructured 
interviews- which are referred to as "qualitative interviews" by Yin (2011 , p. 134)-
reflect the nature of qualitative methodology best (Yin, 2011). This is mainly because 
the relationship between interviewer and interviewee is "not strictly scripted" ; although 
the researcher has a "mental framework of study questions"; he or she does not follow 
from a questionnaire bearing complete list of questions (Yin, 2011 , p. 134). Further, the 
researcher does not adopt "any uniform behavior or demeanor for every interview"; 
therefore, the interview follows a "conversational mode" which can "lead to a social 
relationship of sorts, with the quality of the relationship individualized to every 
participant" (Yin, 2011 , p. 134). Lastly, questions used by the interviewer during a 
qualitative interview are of open-ended nature (Yin, 2011 , p. 135). 
In the course of this research, I started with unstructured or qualitative interviews for 
the following reasons. First, I did not want to bring into the interview session my own 
prejudgments and already established worldviews - in this case, for example, about the 
process and methodology of OSS development and the nature of technological 
collaborations. Second, I intended to discover new concepts and build a theory bottom-
up, therefore, I wanted the interviewee to more talk about the sides of the story that 
were unheard, or less often discussed. In order to describe their experiences, I decided 
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to start my conversation with how they started to get to know OSS world and how they 
became engaged. As time went by, 1 then moved towards more details. Finally, 1 used 
qualitative interviews to form a global understanding based on the contextualized 
knowledge so as to identify a clearer path and direction for further interviews. 
Later, as the research advanced, 1 shifted towards adoption of more se mi -structured and 
sometimes structured questions having a set of questions on mind. The main objective 
of asking the structured questions was to obtain different perspectives on the repeated 
themes and be able to corroborate the findings, and highlight the discrepancies and 
contradictory areas. These discrepancies and contradiction served the research weil in 
highlighting newly emerging themes. 
Lastly, ali interviews have been conducted under the "Interview Guide" (or UQAM's 
interview protocol) created for the present research. UQAM's interview protocol 
includes sections such as: Interview and data management methods ( e.g., interview 
objectives and key concepts, interview types, duration and number of interviews, 
interview site, informed consent of participants, anonymity, confidentiality, data 
security management including cryptography and backup filing); interview procedure 
(e.g. , preamble, administration of questionnaire and interviews, closure); sample of 
interview protocol forms (preamble checklist, interview questions, and closure 
checklist); data transcription procedure ( e.g., voice file arrangement, confidentiality 
and data management, transcription site); jlowchart of the whole interview process; 
consentforms in English and French; Non-disclosure agreement; and finally, the essay 
which has been part of the training of research te am on ethics for research with human 
subjects. It took me about three months to prepare, revise, and submit the final version 
of ali these documents to the UQAM's ethics committee. Having evaluated ali the 
documents, UQAM has issued "certificat d ' éthique"47 (i.e. , Ethics Certificate) which 
allows the researcher to embark on the research journey and enter the field. 
47 Certificate issued by the Comité institutionnel d 'éthique de la recherche avec des êtres · humains de 
I' UQAM. 
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4.3.5 Research participants 
In this study, 1 have purposefully chosen Savoir-faire Linux as the main case because 
the company: 
(a) is highly active with regards to contributing codes back to conm1llnity of OSS 
developers (e.g. , the Linux kernel) ; 
(b) is developing and launching OSS projects in-house and builds community of 
developers around them (e.g. , Ring and SFLvault projects); 
(c) is extensively involved in promoting OSSD methodology and adoption of OSS 
solutions through enlightening and enabling enterprise clients ( e.g., information and 
training sessions) and actively participating in public seminars and conferences 
(e.g., Platinum Sponsor de DebConf17; FOSDEM 2017 & 2016, etc.) ; 
( d) is playing an active role with regards to promo ting the adoption of OSS solutions by 
the government agencies of Quebec (i.e. , playing an evangelical role) ; 
( e) has taken meaningful steps to stabilize the position of OSS solutions vis-à-vis 
proprietary software solution within the software industry in Quebec.'8 
Next, to prepare the first list of potential interviewees, 1 have consulted the chief 
technology officer (VP for technologies) and management team of SFL in order to 
choose the participants (i.e. other cases) that are information-rich and highly relevant. 
Later, as 1 developed more familiarity with the overall context and study subject (as an 
embedded researcher within real-life events) coupled with my ongoing experience 
gained through data analysis parallel to data collection, 1 had the chance to approach 
respondents and use the contextual elues in order to get referrals to approach other 
48 See the following links for Savoir-faire Linux, lnc. vs. Régie des Rentes du Québec: 
a) Savoir-faire Linux inc. c. Régie des rentes du Québec, 2010 QCCS 2375 (CanLIJ) 
Source: Savoir-faire Linux inc. c. Régie des rentes du Québec, 2010 QCCS 2375 (CanLJJ). 
CanL/1. Retrieved from 
http://www.canlii .org/fr/qc/qccs/doc/20 10/201 Oqccs2375/20 1 Oqccs2375 .html 
b) Francois2. (2008, March 20). Cour supérieure: Savoir-faire Linux contre la RRQ. Direction 
Informatique. Retrieved from 
http :/ /www. direction informatique. corn/cour-superieure-savoir-faire-1 in ux -contre-1 a -rrq-4/91 91 
c) Jean-François Ferland, J-F . (2010, June 04). Savoir-Faire Linux obtient une victoire contre la 
RRQ. Direction Informatique. Retrieved from 
http :/ /www. direction informatique. corn/savoir-faire-linux -obtient-une-victoire-contre-la -rrq/ 1 0 5 73 
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cases outside SFL. This approach helped me effectively deploy snowballing technique. 
For instance, sorne of the OSS developers who have bad a strong relationship with 
communities of OSS developers referred me to the leaders of these communities to 
conduct in-depth interviews and case studies. Similarly, managers and department 
heads could connect me with enterprise clients that could vary in terms of scope of the ir 
reliance on OSS solutions; their level of involvement with OSS communities; and their 
level of capabilities to engage in shared OSS R&D process. 
Table 4.1 shows the list of firms participated in this study and Table 4.2 shows the list 
of OSS communities approached and studied in this research. Overall , 40 formai 
interviews have been conducted with each interviewee having an average 15 years of 
OSS-related experience. 
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Table 4.2. List of Participating OSS Communities 
Community/ No of Age intervie Position Technology(ies) lnception Origin project name 
WS 
year 
BigBiueButton Web Leader Conferencing 2007 9 Canada (BBB) System 
2 Eclipse 2 Board of Over 250 various 2004 12 Canada F oundation 1 Directors OS projects 
Tiki Wiki Content 
3 CMS Leader Management 2002 14 Canada 
Groupware System (CMS) 
Linux Trace An OS tracing Toolkit next 4 generation Developer framework for 2005 1 ] Canada 
(LTTng) Linux 
5 Tig Leader Text-mode 2006 10 Den mark interface for Git 
Enterprise 
Core Resource 
6 Odoo Developer Planning, a 2002 14 Belgium (OpenERP) and Board complete suite of 
Member management 
applications 
Active OS configuration 7 Puppet developer management 2005 Il USA 
utility 
Active Free and OS 8 Liferay Portal developer enterprise portal 2000 16 USA 
software product 
Note 1: Eclipse Foundation has about 250 OSS projects. 
4.3.6 Participant-observation 
"Direct observation" is pivotai m conducting case studies, as the nature of 
investigation denotes: "case study should take place in the natural setting of the 
' case"' (Yin, 2009, p . 1 09). In this study, 1 use participant-observation method- as a 
special mode of observation (see, Yin, 2009). This method places more emphasis on 
researcher by turning his role from passive into an active mode. lts main strength is 
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that the method enables the researcher to "perceive reality from the viewpoint of 
someone ' inside' the case rather than external to it' ' (Yin, 2009, p. 112). For this 
particular purpose, 1 conducted an industry internship at Savoir-faire Linux, Inc. 's 
headquarters in Montreal for the period of one full year, part-time. This opportunity 
enabled me to live among the OSS developers of the largest OSS firm in Canada and 
interact with them on a daily basis. The method enabled me to observe the behavior 
of software developers up close and access to visual data that could not have been 
otherwise obtained. The following excerpt from my field notes illustrates my thinking 
during the participant observer' s data collection period. 
Carefully, 1 peek at Alex [pseudonym], from time to time, in order to figure 
out why he has several cellphones on his desk. The question bugging me is: 
"What does he do with the three phones?" "Why is he so excited and happy at 
times while playing around with his phones?" "Plugging and unplugging them 
onto his PC ... checking something on them, and then going back to work" ... 
after observing him, unnoticeably, for a few days, 1 approach him on his break 
and pose the questions: "Alex, May 1 ask you a slightly stupid question? [with 
a humorous tone as we have already established a good rapport]" he replies, 
"Y es, sure." 1 go on ... "What do you do with these phones?" He answers, 
"l'rn trying to write sorne new codes to get rid of a stupid bug, 1 am checking 
the code performance on my own phones ... once l'rn happy, 1 will share them 
with the community . .. ", 1 then get more curious and ask: "Are they for your 
own fun or will these code development and sharing benefit your professional 
position at company as well ?"; he replies, "Both, l'rn doing this task for 
myself [own performance and fun] , but eventually l'rn submitting codes under 
SFL [abbreviation for company Savoir-faire Linux, lnc.]'s name, so the 
company will gain reputation as weil. . .it's a win-win situation." 
As the above excerpt shows direct observation is part of participant-observation 
method and leads to accessing empirical evidence that can hardly be otherwise 
obtained. However, participant-observation is not a bed of roses. As Yin (2009, p. 
113) mentions, the researcher can fall into trap of "potential biases", "assume 
positions or advocacy roles", " ... become a supporter of the group or organization 
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being studied", or even, "may not have sufficient time to take notes or to raise 
questions about events from different perspectives." 
In this study, I tried to avoid these issues as much as possible by adopting focused 
interviews with experts extemal to Savoir-faire Linux. Therefore, I could remain 
rather objective concerning the data I collected from inside of the company. 
Fmthermore, as an insider who is trusted and respected, and as a researcher who has 
already signed confidentiality agreements, I could take pictures and record 
conversations quite easily. Therefore, recording events and observations was not an 
issue most of the times. 
More specifically, 1 used my time at the company (as participant-observer) to build 
relationships and trust with individuals through social activities. For example, I 
attended Christmas party, joined their lunch sessions in the kitchen, played football 
with them after work, and hung out with the employees on different occasions, etc. 
These integration activities allowed me to approach the potential participants more 
easily and let them share their minds with me more openly. 
4.3.7 Background of participant-observation site 
Founded by the entrepreneur Cyrille Béraud in 1999, Savoir-faire Linux (SFL), Inc. 
has grown into being among the largest providers of OSS solutions in Canada, and 
the largest and leading firm in the province of Quebec in terms of breath (variety of 
offerings), depth of operations, revenues, number of employees, and R&D 
expenditures. SFL is headquartered in Montreal with branches in other regions of 
Canada (Quebec City and Toronto) as weil as France (Lyon and Paris). 
Growing out of a small local business within Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) sector serving mainly the province of Quebec market (about 90 
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percent), the company has grown into a medium-sized enterprise49. Today, SFL 
serves different regions of Canada like Ontario and British Columbia and is capable 
of providing OSS-based IT solutions to international clients in the USA, France, and 
Africa, to nan1e a few. 
SFL has been expanding in size since its inception in tenns of its number of 'full-
time' employees and ' sales' volumes. According to publicly available statistics 
provided by Industry Canada (July 08, 2014), SFL' s total sales fall between the range 
of $5m and $9,999,999; its export sales are between $500,000 and $999,999; and its 
number ofpaid employees is about 110. Since the beginning of this study in 2013 up 
until the current state, SFL has been growing steadily from having about 85 
employees in 2013/2014 to weil above 150 in 2016/2017. The employees (mainly 
130 software engineers) form an international pool (20 plus nationalities) of highly 
specialized workforce having vast hands-on experience regarding different OSS 
projects and communities (e.g. , the Linux kernel, Ring, Drupal , WordPress, Java, 
PHP, Liferay, Odoo, Redhat, Puppet labs, Android, etc.). 
SFL's core business involves designing ISs, building IT solutions and infrastructure 
which are mainly based on OSS projects nested in OS developer communities. 
Meaning that, the company approaches clients' IT needs by promoting the OSS 
adoption strategies and deployment of OSS-based innovations which are developed 
through communities- the development process is open to those who are willing and 
capable of making contributions and the adoption of developed software is gratis. The 
key expertise of SFL is: 
(a) To identify and evaluate the suitable OS technology solution and tailor it to fit 
the clients' needs and wants; 
49 According to Industry Canada, companies are mainly classified into small, medium-sized and large 
based on the number oftheir paid employees as follows : 1) Small=l-99 employees; 2) medium-sized 
employees= 1 00-499; 3) large= 500 employees and more . Source: lndustry Canada. (20 15). SME 
Research and Statistics. Retrieved from http: //www. ic.gc.ca!eic/site/061.nsf/eng/Home. 
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(b) To make sure the chosen OS technology is nested in a supportive OS 
community undergoing a forward-looking evolutionary path; 
(c) To identify, evaluate, and justify the risks associated with making the most 
plausible choice; 
(d) To support migration towards adopting the chosen OS technology; 
(e) To provide on-going after-migration maintenance supports to ensure smooth 
running of the operations; and 
(f) To train enterprise client's IT department's staffto enable them to continue with 
software technology evolutionary path in connection with conununity of 
developers. 
The key drivers behind SFL' s expertise are three. First, SFL is home to experts who 
have been tightly involved in development of severa! OSS technologies therefore 
they are aware of strengths, technology potentials and vulnerabilities of these OSS 
projects and their dependencies. Second, SFL' s management team makes sure the 
company remains as an integrated part of the community of developers as opposed to 
being just a user of a publically available OSS technology. This involves sharing 
codes and software developments back with the communities and maintain a 
symbiotic relationship. Last, SFL needs to ensure "sustainability" and 
"interoperability" of the OSS innovations that have been already integrated into its 
clients ' IT infrastructure (i.e. , retrospective approach) or that have the potential to 
become integrated into future potential clients' businesses (i.e. , forward-looking 
approach) . 
The first two drivers seem to be, to a large extent, manageable by internai choices 
that SFL' s management team makes with regards to human resource strategies (e.g. , 
hiring engineers/developers with hands-on approach to OSS development), and 
allocation of internai resources to making contributions to OS communities under the 
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guidance of in-house R&D polices and strategies. However, the third driver is subject 
to a broader scope of strategy formulation that involves inter-dependencies and 
collaboration among other actors in OSS ecosystem. Ali together, these three drivers 
seem to influence success and sustainability of the OSSD process; yet their internai 
workings, interc01mectedness and interdependencies are yet to be discovered and 
explained through appropriate theories. 
4.3.8 Documentation 
"Except for studies of preliterate societies, documentary information is likely to be 
relevant to every case study topic", according to Yin (2009, p. 1 01). Documents come 
in various forms such as letters, e-mail correspondences, notes, written reports, 
proposais, news clippings and articles appearing in massmedia, etc. (Ibid. , p. 103). ln 
this study, 1 used extensive use of news articles, industry reports, government portais, 
and videotaped speeches on the subject of OSS phenomenon encompassing its 
history, related controversies, development methodology, innovation process, 
sociological aspects, to name a few. As a participant observer, 1 was able to get to 
know the right people and be directed toward secondary sources of data. Few video 
examples include: 
(a) Free software, free society by Richard Stallman (2014)50 at TEDxGeneva 
(b) Interview with Theo de Raadt, OpenBSD Founder (2013)51 
(c) Freedom ofthought requires free media by Eben Moglen (2012)52 
50Stallman, R. (2014, June 12). Free software, free society [Video file]. Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ag1 AKI1_2GM 
51de Raadt, T. (2013, December 14). On OpenBSD code quality and security aspects [Video file] . 
Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OXS8ljif9b8&index=3&list=FLeXhbPtm6RZ09HQ_Riy3j8Q 
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(d) FLOSS Weekly 146: Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware (2010)53 
4.3.9 Data analysis methods 
In the present research, since my goal is to develop an inductive theory based upon 
observations from OSS industry, I adopt the data analysis approach as recommended 
by Strauss and Corbin (1990). This approach, according to Strauss and Corbin (1990, 
p. 57), aspires to: a) "build rather than only test theory"; b) give the research process 
the rigor necessary to make the theory "good" science"; c) help the analyst to break 
through biases and assumptions brought to, and that can develop during, the research 
process"; d) "provide the grounding, build the density, and develop the sensitivity and 
integration needed to generate a rich, tightly woven, explanatory theory that closely 
approximates the reality it represents." Therefore, the central piece in the analysis is 
"coding"; the process that represents: "operations by which data are broken dawn, 
conceptualized, and put back [ emphasis added] together in new ways. It is the central 
process by which theories are built from data" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 57). 
Coding is the process of data analysis, and there are three major types of it: 1) open 
coding; 2) axial coding; 3) selective coding (Ibid. , p. 58). Authors further highlight 
that the lines between these are artificial, meaning that they do not necessarily happen 
in stages. 
Open coding is defined as "the process of breaking down, examining, comparing, 
conceptualizing, and categorizing data" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 61 ). In short, it 
52Moglen, E. (2012, May 19). (c) Freedom ofthought requires free media [Video file]. Retrieved 
from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKOk4Y4inVY&Iist=FLeXhbPtm6RZ09HQ Riy3j8Q&index=5 
53Laporte, M. (2010, December 31). FLOSS Weekly 146: Tiki Wiki CMS Group; are [Video file]. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q8tjaz6C03 Q&index=2&li st=FLeXhbPtm6RZ09HQ_ Riy3j 8Q 
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refers to "the naming and categorizing of the phenomena through close examination 
of data" (Ibid. , p. 62). Open coding is also the analytic process through which 
"concepts are identified and developed in terms of their properties and dimensions"; 
these concepts are therefore the "building blocks of theory" (Ibid. , p. 74). Table 4.3 
provides an illustration of open coding and categorizing. 
Within open coding process, "making of comparisons" and "asking of questions" are 
among the main procedures to follow (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 62) , and it is the 
reason grounded theory approach (GTA) is also often referred to as "the constant 
comparative method of analysis" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; pp. 101-116). We ask 
questions like "What is this?" or " What do es it represent?" about an incident, a 
phenomenon, or an idea to conceptualize our data. This means that we give them 
names or labels (i .e., the process of "labelling phenomena"), and as we move forward 
in the analysis we can assign similar labels to similar phenomena so that we are able 
to compare and contrast them (see, Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 63). These labels are 
also perceived as "conceptual labels" that lead to forrning "concepts". 
As the number of concepts increases, the researcher must group or "categorize" them. 
Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 65, emphasis added) define categorizing as "the process 
of grouping concepts that seem to pertain to the same phenomena". Each category is 
entitled to receive a "conceptual name" which needs to be higher in its abstraction 
level when compared to the names given to the concepts grouped under the broader 
concept (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 65). 
Categorizing is central to conducting grounded theory-based research, as the authors 
claim GT A deals with more than just coding and labeling, it also involves 
analytically developing categories which is beyond listing of concepts or even just 
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grouping them (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Therefore, the researcher is responsible for 
choosing the categories, as they claim. 
"This is where most names come from-YOU! The name you choose is usually 
the one that seems most logically related to the data it represents, and should 
be graphically related to remind you quickly of its referent" (Strauss & 
Corbin, p. 67). 
A good rule ofthumb that I follow is to look for the logicalfit and relevance between 
and among codes. If a group or string of codes are weil related (referring to or 
talking about the same incident), and they fit one another logically, then it makes 
sense for me to form a category including tho se concepts. In addition, if between the 
logically fit bags of concepts, I discern inter-relationships, then these categories or 
sub-categories are related to one another. Furthermore, developing a category 
involves determining its properties which can be then dimensionalized. Properties are 
"attributes or characteristics pertaining to a category" (Strauss & Corbin, p. 61 ). 
Dimensions refer to "location of properties along a continuum" (Strauss & Corbin, p. 
61). 
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Table 4.3. An illustration of Open Coding from Field Notes, Observations, and 
Interview Transcriptions 
Excerpt Sample of codes generated ( underlined) 
My focus was to clean a bit the code and push it back 
to community. If you want some code to be integrated 
in Linux kernel , you have to make it the way they 
want. So the code has to be really clean and organized 
the way they want. Y ou can develop code in many 
ways but not ali the ways are clean and acceptable by 
Linux kernel. A Iso provided some new versions of the 
patch. 
The process of code cleaning and integration is peer 
review process which involves revision, modification 
and submission of codes based on feedback provided 
by community in an iterative fashion . This kind of job 
is also called R&D and part-time took me about a year 
to finally integrate the code .. . tt took seven reviews to 
finally get the acceptance of the community and 
integrate the revised version. When we developed the 
enhanced version of the OS th en we pu shed it back to 
the FLOSS community .. . lf we come up with 
something very technically specifie and of no use to 
community, we will not share it back to community. 
So we build modules that are re-usable and we have 
site-specifie modules for which there is no point to 
share that code at ali. 
Because what happens is that by giving back what 
we've done, wejust put the name [ofthe OSS firm] on-
tine. Sure a company which uses this platform [TS-
5500] and wants well-done support they can access the 
program for free but what happens often is that often 
companies do not have the know-how to take it, put it 
on the board, and make necessary customizations 
which are often required ..... So often they see online 
that our company has done this ki nd of support before 
and they ' re sure that we can do it so they approach us 
with the ir request .. .. This is another approach for 
selling things. This is an investment we make for 
future. lt is true that I spend a lot of ti me to clean the 
code and develop the enhanced version . But it makes 
the name [of the OSS firm] appear online and it signais 
our capability, what we are able to do. The can see our 
1. Sharing codes, efforts, 
knowledge 
2. Integration of codes 
3. Conformity to community 
standards 
4. Novelty and creativity 
associated yvith collaboration 
5. Iterative mode of collaboration 
6. Feedback perceived as enabler 
to the iterative process 
7. Collaboration with community 
perceived as real R&D job 
8. Lengthy process of 
collaborating with community 
developers 
9. lndispensability of sharing back 
codes;_sharing perceived as part 
of the job 
1 O. Re-useable vs. site specifie 
modules 
11. Sharing back with community 
builds reputation for OSS firm 
12. Know-how perceived as key 
to benefiting from 
community-based version of 
technology 
13. Reputation causes customer 
attraction 
14. Contribution leads to 
reputation which acts as an 
advertisement 
15 . Code sharing viewed as 
investment 
16. Code sharing used as a 
method for signaling firm 
capability 
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work and how the code is cle8!l. Proprietary software 
firms rely too much on their marketing department 
which in the end cannot prove to customers what they 
are capable of doing. 
Some clients use communities and some asks us to do 
it. . . . For example, client ' X ' ... . sa id we have the time 
you want and asked us to push it back upstream when 
they signed the contract. They understand pushing 
back to the community is a good thing. . . They 
understood the process that code get reviewed . We tell 
them we can write really good stuff for you but we tell 
them ifwe push it back to community it will be perfect 
because thousands of developers will look at the code 
and fix whatever they could find . . . They know that the 
review process by community adds real value to the 
project. . . And every ti me I saw some generic part of 
the work that is not customer specifie I push it back to 
the community. They accepted it. .. . when customer 
doesn ' t tell us explicitly like the case of ' X', this 
happens implicitly and I push the generic part back to 
community. Ln this case, the customer is only dealing 
with us and has no link with community. They don't 
touch the middle [community] directly .. . if it is 
something generic, we don't need a customer to agree, 
but again that depends on the kind of license we agree 
with them. So a license decides on every line of code. 
Under proprietary license, we don't have the 
permission to push it to community but that does not 
happen often . 
17. Advertising Technical 
Capability 
18. OSS clients have options 
19. Client' s awareness of OSS 
methodology 
20 . Client' s collaboration with 
OSS finn due to their 
understanding of OS way. 
21. Client' s appreciation ofvalue-
added as a result of 
collaboration with community 
22 . Consent of client can play a 
role. 
23. Existence of Disconnection or 
!@P. between client and 
community 
24 . The licence agreed upon with 
client plays role in OSS finn-
community collaboration 
As an example (see Table 4.4), 1 use the abstract category of [HEALTHY 
COMMUNITY] which 1 have come up with in the course of this research. This 
category is a broad and abstract concept that is made up of a bundle of minor 
interconnected concepts. Therefore, to operationalize healthy community, 1 need to 
present ali other related concepts and explain their internai relationships. 
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Table 4.4. An Illustration of Open Coding and Categorizing 
Category 
HEALTHY 
COMMUNITY 
Properties 
Governance 
Diversity among developers 
R&D oriented 
Active 
History 
Heterogeneity among users 
Leadership 
Enterprises support 
Technology's commercial 
viability 
Dimensional range 
(concerning each incident) 
Strong ... ... ..... . ... Weak 
High ..... .. ....... . .. Low 
High . .. . ..... .. . ..... Low 
High ... .. ..... ...... . Low 
Long . . ...... . ....... Short 
High ................. Low 
Strong .......... . . ... W eak 
Strong .. .. . . ...... .. . Weak 
High ....... .. ... . .. .. Low 
Categories are especially instrumental to GTA, as they form the "basis of your 
theoretical sampling" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 73). This means that the researcher 
can have a clue on what to focus upon in the upcoming interviews or observational 
sites. In fact, "data collection and data analysis are tightly interwoven processes" 
(Ibid., 1990, p. 59). For example, while analyzing and collecting the data 
concurrently, 1 discovered the concept of "healthy community" . Consequently, I 
decided to use this concept as a guide or a keyword while talking with sorne other 
interviewees in order to find out if such concept really existed. It is however 
noteworthy to mention that not ali interviewees might refer to the same concept in 
those exact two words. Irrespective of form, 1 wanted to find more about the 
properties and their associated dimensions. This kind of ' detective work' further 
helped me to redu ce the level of abstractness of the inductive! y driven concepts. 
Axial coding refers to "a set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new 
ways after open coding, by making connections between categories" (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990, p. 96) or "by making connections between a category and its 
subcategories" (p. 97). Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggest a paradigm model through 
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which categories (i.e. , phenomena) are related. This paradigm includes a set of main 
relationships : a) causal conditions; b) context; c) intervening conditions; d) 
action/interactional strategies; and e) consequences (Ibid., pp. 99-1 07). Put simply, 
sorne categories may be related to causal conditions, white sorne others may be 
classified under consequences. 
For example, in this study, I discovered that 'lack of suitable dual-purpose leadership ' 
can lead to ' OSS project forking '; where the former refers to a "causal condition" 
while the latter is the "phenomenon" or "category" under investigation. Similarly, 
' clients ' active participation in iterative code development' can lead to 'sustainability 
of OSS development pro cess' . 
Furthermore, based on Strauss and Corbin (1990, pp. 101-104 ), context can play a 
role in explaining a relationship. A context "represents the specifie set of properties 
that pertain to a phenomenon" (Ibid., p. 101 ). lt is also, "the particular set of 
conditions within which the action/interactional strategies are taken to manage, 
handle, carryout, and respond to a specifie phenomenon" (Ibid. , p. 101 ). For example, 
it is important to find out about the conditions under which clients of OSS firms tend 
to actively participate in the process of OSS development. In addition, there are 
intervening conditions that refer to "broad and general conditions bearing upon 
action/interactional strategies" (Ibid. , p. 103). For instance, the absorptive capacity of 
clients conceming OSS technology can intervene in their participation. Next, 
actionlinteractional strategies capture those data that are concemed with "managing, 
handling, carrying out, responding to a phenomenon as it exists in context or under a 
specifie set of perceived conditions" (Ibid., p. 1 04). Lastly, consequences refer to 
certain outcomes of actions and interactions. Eventually, as axial coding captures the 
essence of relating categories and subcategories it also links properties and 
dimensions along with those. 
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Selective coding is the third type of coding which refers to "the process of selecting 
the core category [central phenomenon] , systematically relating it to other categories, 
validating those relationships, and filling in categories that need further refinement 
and development" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 116). The keyword in this process is 
integration, "making it all come together" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983; as cited in 
Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 117), or "getting the story straight" (Ibid. , p. 142). The 
axial coding serves the selective coding very weil as it is the process during which the 
categories have been worked out concerning their salient properties, dimensions, and 
associated paradigmatic relationships ali of which provide categories with riclmess 
and density (Ibid. , p. 117). The central to selective coding is the selection of core 
category and the relating of all major categories both to it and to each other (Ibid., p. 
142). If there is no single core category that says it ali , then the researcher must 
choose a name for the central phenomenon (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). For the finale , 
the researcher needs to validate the developed theory against the data and this 
validating process completes its grounding approach (Ibid., 1990). 
4.3.10 Data analysis in the context of present study 
In order to implement the GT A, 1 conducted a 'line-by-line analysis' of the field 
notes, memos and transcripts from day one the participant-observation stage and 
interviews began. However, sometimes when participants presented chunks of text 
(like a practical exarnple) to elaborate a certain phenomenon, 1 decided to code the 
' chunk' (i.e. , similar to a paragraph) as a whole to represent that particular 
phenomenon. Overall, the open coding session was done in two stages. The first stage 
was concurrent with data collection phase parallel to participant observation time. 
Later, having finished the participant-observation phase, 1 decided tore-engage in the 
open coding activity in order to benefit from the global perspective 1 gained about the 
whole experience and the data 1 gathered. At this stage, open coding was coupled 
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with the axial coding process. My familiarity with data and the already existing codes 
helped me use the second stage of coding more meaningfully and effectively so much 
so that categories and relationships were emerging and documented all along the 
process of open and axial coding. At the end, the open coding process - lasting for 
little over a month- generated close to 360 codes- an illustration of which has been 
already presented in Table 4.3 . 
As noted earlier, a category is a class of concepts in the sense that those concepts that 
seem to relate to a similar phenomenon and fit logically are grouped together under a 
higher order- i.e. , a more abstract concept called category. As the result of data 
analysis stage, 1 have discovered and formed five main categories (see Figure 4.2) 
each of which has their own set of subcategories and conceptual building blocks. The 
main categories are marked through BLOCK letters . These five main categories are: 
1) ACTORS; 2) TECHNOLOGICAL COLLABORATION; 3) 
INTERDEPENDENCE-INDEPENDENCE; 4) SUSTAINABILITY; and 5) 
SUCCESS. 
191 
Figure 4.2. Main Categories Formed Through Inductive Approach 
Technological 
Collaboration 
Actors 
Source: Author. 
4.4 Research evaluation 
4.4.1 Validity 
Interdependecne-
lndependence 
Howto 
develop a story 
line from the 
Sustainability 
Success 
Yin (20 11 , p. 78) defines a val id study as "one that has pro perl y collected and 
interpreted its data, so that the conclusions accurately reflect and represent the real 
world (or laboratory) that was studied". Maxwell (2009, pp. 244-245; as cited in Yin, 
2011 , p. 79) further emphasizes a seven-point checklist for ensuring the validity of 
qualitative research. There are: 1) intensive long-term [field] involvement; 2) rich 
data; 3) respondent validation; 4) searGh for discrepant evidence and negative cases; 
5) triangulation; 6) Quasi -statistics; and 7) comparison. 
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According to Maxwell (2009, pp. 244-245), intensive long-lerm involvement refers to 
producing a complete and in-depth understanding of field situations. Rich data 
encompasses detailed and varied data. Respondent validation means to obtain 
feedback from participants in order to !essen the risk of misinterpretation. Searchfor 
discrepant evidence involves testing rival or competing explanations. Triangulation is 
the process of collecting converging evidence from different sources. Quasi-statistics 
are the use of actual numbers instead of adjectives; and finally , comparison refers to 
explicitly comparing the results across different settings, groups or events. 
In this study, 1 have spent a year (part-time) in the largest OSS firmin Canada and 
have visited other OSS firms, clients ' enterprises, sat with severa! leaders of OSS 
firms, and have engaged in formai and informai conversations with managers, 
engineers, policy makers in order to gain different perspectives and compare and 
contrast opinions on similar phenomena. The duration of my field study and my 
intensive interaction with the context, in which the OSSTCs have been embedded, 
enhance the validity of this research. Furthermore, as 1 have built a good relationship 
with most of the participants and respondents, 1 could easily ask them to go through 
the transcribed interviews and alleviate any potential source of confusion in the 
documented data. Similarly, 1 could easily approach the respondents and ask them 
follow-up questions in case 1 was unsure of my understanding of sorne parts or in 
case 1 needed further explanations on specifie points or concepts. The following 
excerpts from the transcripts provide an illustration of the respondent validation 
effort. 
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Figure 4.3. An Illustration ofRespondent Validation: Excerpts from Interview 
Transe ri pts 
Witi{"Sft phoue we C<Ul ma{ntain OS client as withiu open source community it 1s 
·important to have a phoue numiug ou ope11 ~ource•bas~d distribution. Like Ubm11t1 which is a 
distribution based Ot}Liuuxkemel. 
lu teniewe1· 
How do you see the interactions between OSS fmns and proprietruy finns? 
h there a connection between the two? 
Do you see a connection? 
Is there a conflict between the two types of firms? 
Do we need proprietary fums at ali? 
In 1 en·iew ee 
I think they cau work together. . I 
rather prefer the prop1ietaty software firms did not exist any more becanse they do not offer 
optiu1al solutions. If you constrain the access to the product's source code you will Jose the 
efficiency. You exclude many who cau help. But I do not kuow if it is possible to wipe out 
proprietruy mode!. 
f\Jl!...YQll!:.$.SP-erience can be great for others too: the way vou architecture vot.lf configuration 
!l!.lS:iihÜcS.!!J1 .. Q!Ui·I;:.:!.!.JQL \hf:. f21\l!lnl.l.!.Îtv. 
I can give this 
IuterYiewee 2 (Thibault) 
The. fust reason that we do not release something is that it is not useful for the conmmnity. And 
the secrecy is the second one. 
Respondent validation also provides interviewees with the opportunity to take back 
words and phrases they may not have wanted or intended to say in the first place. 
This approach to data validation tends to enhance integrity as weil as confidentiality 
of corporate-sensitive issues. 
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In addition, I aimed to triangulate my findings. Triangulation captures the basic logic 
reflected by the principles of geometry in that multiple viewpoints allow for greater 
accuracy. Denzin (1978, p. 291) defines triangulation as "the combination of 
methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon". His perspective on 
triangulation refers to a "between (or across) methods" (Ibid. , p. 302) type which is 
the most popular use of triangulation (Jick, 1979). In the course of the present study, I · 
used direct observation (through participant-observation method), interviewing, and 
documentation in order to collect data. Further, I tried to include a variety of 
participants in the sample in order to increase its heterogeneity. Interviewing 
participants with different educational backgrounds, vanous ethnicities, 
miscellaneous industry experiences, offers me the chance to access a variety of 
opinions and the possibility to conduct corroboration. As Jick (1979, p. 602) claims: 
"It [triangulation between methods] is largely a vehicle for cross validation when two 
or more distinct methods are found to be congruent and yield comparable data" . Jick 
(1979, p. 602) further gives the example of possibility of studying the effectiveness of 
a leader through observing his behavior, interviewing him, and evaluating his 
performance records. In line with Jick's (1979) study, this research has built in 
mechanisms to ensure benefiting from triangulation technique. 
4.4.2 Generalizability or extemal validity 
Generalizability refers to "the validity of a theory in a setting different from the one 
where it was empirically tested and confirmed" (Lee & Baskerville, 2003 , p. 221). 
The concept of drawing generalizations based on research results has been "a major 
concem to those who do, and use research" (Lee & Baskerville, 2003 , p. 221); 
however, it needs to be approached differently within qualitative (inductive or ernie 
approach) and quantitative (deductive or etic approach) methodologies. In line with 
this argument, Yin (2009, p. 38; see also Yin, 2011 , pp. 98-102) mentions that: 
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"A fatal flaw in doing case studies is to conceive of statistical generalization 
as the method of generalizing the results of your case study. This is mainly 
because your cases are not 'sampling units' and should not be chosen for this 
reason" (Yin, 2009, p. 38). 
Following Yin' (2009, 2011)'s view on generalization, I can briefly touch upon two 
types of it: a) statistical generalizations; and b) analy tical generalizations. Statistical 
generalization is a more commonly recognized one (Yin, 2009); yet the one which 
has been also oftentimes not weil understood by researchers and IS researchers in 
particular (see Lee & Baskerville, 2003). 
In statistical generalization, "an inference is made about a population (or uni verse) on 
the basis of empirical data collected about a sample from that universe" (Yin, 2009, 
p. 38). Therefore, the researcher tries to establish a relationship between the research 
sample and the population it represents based on "numeric estimates" (Yin, 2011 , p. 
99). This is the common method of generalizing while conducting survey research 
(Fowler, 1988; Yin, 2009; Yin, 2011). Emphasizing generalizability is mainly a "key 
feature of the philosophical tradition of positivism" (Lee & Baskerville, 2003 , p. 229) 
where its "sole aim is to discover invariable universal laws goveming phenomena" 
and it "seeks to determine the universal laws goveming every observed phenomenon" 
(Kolakowski, 1968, pp. 58-59). 
According to Yin (20 11 , p. 98) particularistic nature of qualitative research which 
denotes "understanding nuances and patterns of social behavior" demands the 
researcher to study "specifie situations and people complemented by attending 
carefully to specifie contextual conditions". Lee and Baskerville (2003 , p. 231) claim, 
"a typical and legitimate endeavor in interpretive research is the study of a single 
setting". Therefore, in view of "particularistic feature" of qualitative research it is 
difficult to consider how findings can ex tend beyond the immediate study, and 
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become generalized to sorne broader set of conditions (Yin, 2011, p. 98). After ali, 
Campbell and Stanley (1963), inspired by Hume's truism (1993), posit that 
"induction or generalization is never Jully justified logically" and that "we cannot 
generalize at ali" (as cited in Lee & Baskervi lle, 2003 , p. 225). 
However, a qualitative researcher, who conducts a case study, needs to aim for 
"analytic generalization" and "avoid thinking in such confusing terms as ' the sample 
of cases' or the 'small sample size of cases', as if a single-case study were like a 
single respondent in a survey or a single subject in an experiment" (Yin, 2009, p. 39). 
Put simply, case study is concemed with analytic generalization in which scenario 
the researcher " is striving to genera/ize a particular set of results to some broader 
theOl'Y" (Yin, 2009, p. 43, emphasis added). 
Lee and Baskerville (2003) identify 'generalizing from description to theory' as a 
valid mode of generalizing from qualitative data. This involves using empirical 
statements as inputs to the generalizing process in order to develop theoretical 
statements that are considered as output of generalization (Lee & Baskerville, 2003). 
Walsham (1995a, pp. 70-80) explains that a researcher can start with facts or rich 
descriptions of a case and then move on to generalizing to concepts, to a theory, and 
also to specifie implications, or to rich insights. Furthermore, Lee and Baskerville 
(2003) draw on the tenets of GTA (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) such as building a theory 
deeply rooted in descriptive categories, and the emerging relationships among them 
based on properly collected and coded data. They take this approach to further note 
that "this squarely fits the phrase 'generalizing to theory' and the phrase 'generalizing 
from empirical statements to theoretical statements"' (Lee & Baskerville, 2003 , p. 
237). Lastly, Eisenhardt (1989, pp. 546-547) emphasizes the strength of developing 
theory from cases. She highlights the "likelihood of generating novel theory", the 
likelihood of building a theory that "is likely to be testable with constructs that can be 
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readily measured and hypotheses that can be proven false", and finally she mentions 
the likelihood that "the resultant theory is likely to be empirically valid" (Ibid. , pp. 
546-547). 
In this study, 1 follow three variations of qualitative methodology; namely, case 
study, participant-observation and GT A. 1, therefore, aim for analytic generalization 
which fits case study methodology and theory building approach of grounded theory. 
This mode of generalization is one that is "commonly practiced but not commonly 
recognized" (Yin, 2011 , p. 99). 
4.4.3 Reliability and ethical considerations 
Reliability means, "if a later investigator followed the same procedures as described 
by an earlier investigator and conducted the same case study all over again, the later 
investigator should arrive at the same findings and conclusions" (Yin, 2009, p. 45). 
lts goal is to reduce the errors and biases in the research (Yin, 2009). 
Yin (2009) proposes two techniques: 1) "case study protocol"; and 2) "case study 
database" . A researcher canuse these tools to enhance the reliability of his case study 
research. To enhance the reliability of this research, 1 used a detailed and 
comprehensive ' research protocol' and created a ' research database' . 
My research protocol includes three main stages. First stage includes preparing the 
'research proposa!' ; the second is undergoing the ' ethics training' related to research 
which involves human subjects; and the third is applying to the university ' s ethics 
board (i.e. , Comité institutionnel d' éthique de la recherche avec des êtres humains: 
CIEREH, UQAM) in order to receive the ethics approval certificate. 
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On a more detailed note, the research proposai includes all mainstream major parts 
such as introduction, problem statement, objectives, literature review analysis, 
preliminary research questions, research logistics (time, tasks, and cost scheduling), 
research methodology (theoretical approach, data collection methods and data 
analysis techniques), and proposed theoretical and practical contributions. My 
proposai has gone through the triple blind-review process by industry and academie 
experts in order to be deemed appropriate and worthy of investigation. Next, 1 took 
the research ethics ' training course with the principal research investigator in order to 
leam about the nuts and bolts of key issues in research ethics. 1 provided detailed 
responses (in form of a paper) to the three main sets of questions: 
1) What is the basic history that led to the development of research ethics 
policies of informed consent? 
2) What is the definition of informed consent? How does a researcher 
know that she bas obtained informed consent? (i.e. the conditions for 
seeking informed consent) 
3) Your research does not involve experiments with human subjects, but 
rather observations. How should the standards for informed consent and 
seeking participation of subjects be different, if any? 
Further, 1 embarked on making a formai application to CIEREH in order to receive 
the formai approval , which would further allow me to enter the site(s) of investigation 
and conduct the fieldwork. This application packages involves all detailed questions 
regarding major and minor ethical considerations of conducting fieldwork. To make 
sure no confusion would remain, and to err on the safe side, 1 also prepared an 
appendix to the application package detailing all nitty-gritty about the following 
issues: 
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a) Interview procedure (preamble, administration of interviews, clos ure) , 
b) Interview types, duration and number, 
c) How issues of anonymity and confidentiality are cared for , 
d) Data security management, 
e) Sample of interview protocol form (preamble checklist and sample 
interview questions, as weil as closure checklist) , 
f) Data transcription procedure (voice file arrangement, confidentiality and 
data management, transcription site) , 
g) Flowchart of the interview process, 
h) Consent forms (in English and French), 
i) Non-disclosure agreement. 
To further ensure reliability, I created a research database in both formats: electronic 
and hardcopy. The electronic database included audio and video data files; 
transcriptions; my field notes; secondary data files like news articles, documents, 
papers, etc. ; pictorial data files which included pictures I took from focused group 
discussions and conversational settings in which we used the whiteboard and charts. 
Further, I also kept those files that were very important in duplicate. I created the 
hardcopy database to keep a record of them under lock and key. Having used these 
two techniques, I ensured reliability of this research under strict ethical considerations 
and standards. 
4.5 Methodological contribution 
In consideration of aforementioned discussions, this research makes a modest 
methodological contribution due to its novelty to using case study approach in 
combination with participant-observation and GT A. Using a combination of the three 
variations of qualitative approach, on the one hand, and collecting a variety of data 
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sources, on the other, can lead to "data triangulation" as well as "methodological 
triangulation" (see, Yin, 2009, p. 116). All these efforts can help me more precisely 
capture the nuances of concepts and formulate a grounded theory of OSSTCs as they 
are embedded in the OSSD processes. 
Others have also profoundly progressed our understanding of the OSS projects and 
the factors contributing to their success. As an example, Steven Weber (2004) 
discusses the success of OSS projects (Linux, Apache) tlu-ough the lens of political 
economy. However, to the best of my knowledge, he does not go into detail to discuss 
his methodological approach or approaches that lends support to validity and 
reliability of his findings . In this research, 1 made no assumptions about the readers ' 
ability to discem how 1 arrived at the concluding remarks , claims, or explanations. In 
fact, the group of these efforts to create the possibility for conducting triangulation 
tends to positively bear upon the reliability and validity of the present study. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS: AN INDUCTIVE THEORY OF SUSTAINABLE 
OSS R&D AND INNOVATION PROCESS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to answer the study's primary and secondary research questions 
(see Table 1.1.) which are related to the ' nature of OSS value creation processes' and 
the 'principal actors' involved m the production, maintenance, and 
commercialization of strategie OSS solutions (i.e., collaboration-driven questions) . 
More specifically, the sections are designed so asto provide detailed explanations on 
' how' the key actors are interrelated to one another, and ' how' their technological 
collaborations influence the success and sustainability of OSS R&D and innovation 
process. The effort to unpack the ways of collaborations and the embedded details 
also encompass issues related to the enterprise clients' roles and functions (i.e. , 
market or client-driven questions). Furthermore, as the value creation process forms a 
major part of the open business model seesaw, as explained earlier in Chapter Two, 
by exploring how 'openness ' -associated with OSS development process- is 
exploited by different actors, we can better understand the internai workings of OSS 
OBMs. As a case in point, porous boundaries of OSS R&D projects enables and 
actually promotes ' third-partner dependencies' so much so that sorne enterprise 
clients can heavily invest in these projects and become influential stakeholders. 
However, this interdependent value creation network of firms and individuals poses 
the challenges concerning power distribution, using different mode of relationships, 
creating different capabilities and the conducive context that induces further 
collaborations, and perhaps most importantly creating a dual-purpose leadership (i .e. , 
leadership-driven questions) that ensures the technological collaborations are actually 
effective and goal-oriented. 
Thus, having analyzed data moving from details (observations and interview details) 
to generalities (groups of concepts), 1 have then re-organized the data and arranged 
this chapter around the five main inductively-driven categories (actors, technological 
collaborations, interdependence-independence, sustainability, and success), and 
delved deeply into each category's subcategories, and further detailed the conceptual 
building blacks of each downstream subcategory. Finally, 1 put ali these outcomes 
into perspective by delineating them through ' four core propositions ', a ' theoretical 
madel ', followed up by discussions and testable hypotheses. These two final 
outcomes form the global view of the inductive theory 1 have intended to develop 
based on the observations made in OSS industry. 
5.2 Concept of OSS technological collaborations 
5 .2.1 Background based on pilot interviews 
During my pilot study, 1 conducted two rounds of pioneering interviews with Savoir-
faire Linux (SFL)'s top management team; nan1ely, vice president of technologies, 
and the president (software engineers with more than 15 years of experience in ICT 
sector and OSS industry) in arder to have a preliminary understanding of constituents 
of OSS technological collaborations (OSSTC). Based on over three decades of 
experience, the president of the company has formed some ideas about the 
significance of including their enterprise clients into the OSS collaborative value 
creation process that includes OS service providers and developer communities. He 
views such integration advantageous for both clients, and the whole OSS community. 
Based on this view, he has proposed the "noeud borroméen" (i.e. , "Borromean 
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Links", BL) idea which 1s based upon the original mathematical concept of 
"Borromean Rings with Brunnian Property". Borromean Rings represents a 
connection of three independent elements symbolized in shape of rings. In their 
entirety, they stay connected unless just one of the rings is severed. This formulation 
of the three groups inform us of the incongruous combination of interdependencies 
among the building blocks embedded in the software development value chain; 
namely, enterprise clients, OS service providers like Savoir-faire Linux Inc. , and OS 
conmmnities. Therefore, the early discussions and brainstorming sessions have led 
me to develop a preliminary and fuzzy understanding of constituents of OSSTC 
embedded in OSS RDIP-one that is yet to be deeply investigated and supported by 
empirical evidence. Furthermore, we do not know about the underlying building 
blocks of these constituents; and, how they unfold in relation to other systemic 
elements. 
5.2.2 Origins and properties of"Borromean Links" 
The Borromean Links (BL) first appeared in the context of mathematics in the 
domain of the earliest works on knots (i.e., knot theory) by Peter Tait54 (Tait, 1876; 
See Cromwell, Beltrami, & Rampichini, 199855). The "Borromean (or Ballantine) 
link" (see Figure 5.1 below), according to Liang and Mislow (1994, p. 27)56, "is 
among the most fascinating of topological constructions: Three mutually disjoint 
simple closed curves form a link, yet no two curves are linked. Th us, if any one curve 
iseut, the other two are free to separate" . 
54 Tait, P.G. (1876). On Knots. Transactions- The Royal Society of Edinburgh, 28, 145-190. 
55 Cromwell, P., Beltrami, E., & Rampichini , M. (1998) . The Borromean Rings . The Mathematical 
Tourist. 20( 1 ), 53-62. 
56 Liang, C., & Mislow, K. (1994). On Borromean Links. Journal ofMathematical Chemistry, 16, 27-
35. 
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Figure 5 .1. Reduced Diagrams of Borromean Links in Tait' s Series 
(a) (b) (c) 
Note: (a) The Ballantine link, with 6 cross ings; (b) The link with 12 cross ings; (c) The link with 18 
crossings. 
Source: Adopted from Liang and Mislow (1994, p. 27) 
These links which demonstrate the property of being trivial, having removed any 
component, were further studied by Hermann Brunn57 in another early work (Brunn, 
1892) where they have been dubbed "Brunnian links" . Although Brunn referenced 
the Tait's examples, non of them used the term "Borromean" (see Cromwell et al. , 
1998). Thus, the earliest use of the tenn: Borromean, found in the lietrature of 
mathematics dates back to 1962 in which case an overview of knot theory was put 
forward by Ralph Fox58 (Cromwell et al. , 1998). "On pages 131-132, Ralph Fox uses 
the Alexander polynomial to show that the Borromean rings are truly linked" 
(Cromwell et al. , 1998, p. 53). 
Liang and Mislow (1994, p. 28) define "A n-Borromean link as a nontrivial link in 
which n rings, n > 3, are combined in such a way that any two component rings form 
a trivial link". They further define ring as "an unknotted closed (smooth or 
polygonal) curve" (Ibid. , p. 28) . Further they claim that using this definition, "all the 
members of Tait's series, including the Ballantine link, are 3-Borromean links" (Ibid. , 
p. 28). 
57 Brunn, H. (1892). Über Verkettung. Sitzungberichte der Bayerischer Akad. Wiss. Math-Phys, Klasse 
22, 77-99. 
58 Fox, R.H . (1962). A quick trip through knot theory. ln M. K. Fort (Ed.), Topo/ogy of ]-manifolds 
and related tapies (pp. 120-167). Prentice Hall , !ne. 
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Cromwell et al. (1998, p. 53) mention that "Tait used the Borromean rings and 
another link of similar construction to show that what he called 'belinkedness ' (now 
called linking number) is not sufficient to distinguish links" (see Figure 5.2). Each 
figure "shows an alternating, 3-component link such that each component is 
unknotted and no two components are linked". However, Tait (1876) concludes that 
"the two links are non-trivial and different"; thereby implicitly implying the idea that 
"an irreducible, alternating diagram has minimal crossing number-one of the recent! y 
proved Tait conjectures59" (Cromwell et al. , 1998, p. 53). 
Figure 5.2. Sorne 3-Component Links from Tait (1876) 
(a) (b) (c) 
Source: Adopted from Cromwell et al. (1998, p. 53) 
The Borromean symbol, therefore, is based on this symmetrical arrangement of three 
intersecting circles. This design of three interlinked circles is known as the 
"Borromean Rings". The three rings taken together are inseparable, but remove any 
one ring and the other two falls apart. Because of this property, they have been used 
in many fields as a symbol of strength in unity (see Cromwell et al. , 1998). 
The Borromean rings' concept, for example, has been used in the fields such as a) 
Chemistry: "Borromean DNA" (Mao, et al. , 1997), "Borromean Molecules" (Chichak 
et al. , 2004; Siegel, 2004), "Borromean Polymer Networks" (Carlucci et al. , 2003); b) 
59 See: a) Kauffman, L.H. (1987).State mode ls and the Jones polynomial. Topo/ogy, 26, 395-407; b) 
Murasugi, K. ( 1987). Jones polynomials and class ical conjectures in knot theory. Topo/ogy, 26, 187-
194; c)Thislethwaite, M. B. (1 987). A spanning tree expansion of the Jones polynomial. Topo/ogy, 26, 
297-309. 
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Physics: "Borromean Nuclei" (Austin & Bertsch, 1995; Zhukov et al. , 1993), 
"Borromean Quantum States" (Aravind, 1997; Kauffman & Lomonaco, 2002); c) 
Geometry (Lindstrom & Zetterstrom, 1991); d) Set Theory (Venn, 1880); and various 
art and culture related fields. 60 In the present document, when 1 mention the te1m 
Borromean Links, 1 refer to the Borromean rings as represented in the following 
illustration (Figure 5.3). 
Figure 5.3. An Illustration ofBorromean Links/Borromean Rings 
60 See: 1) Mao, C. , Sun, W. , & Seeman, N.C. (1997). Construction of Borromean Rings from DNA. 
Nature, 386, 137-138; 2) Chichak, K. S., Cantrill , S. J. , Pease, A. R., Chiu, S.-H. , Cave, G .W.V., 
Atwood, J.L. , & Stoddart, J.F. (2004). Molecular Borromean rings. Science, 304, 1308-1312; 3) 
Siegel , J.S. (2004). Chemical topology and interlocking molecules. Science, 304, 1256-1258; 4) 
Carlucci, L. , Ciani, G. , & Proserpio, O. M. (2003). Borromean links and other non-conventional links 
in polycatenated coordination polymers: Re-examination of sorne puzzling networks. Oyst. Eng. 
Comm. 5(47), 269-279; 5) Austin, S. M. , & Bertsch, G.F. (1995). Halo nuclei . Scientiflc American, 
272, 62-67; 6) Zhukova, M.V., Danilina, B.V., Fedorova, D.V. , Bangb, J.M. , Thompsonc, I.J ., & 
Vaagend, J.S. (1993). Bound state properties ofBorromean halo nuclei : 6He and 11 Li. Physics Reports, 
231(4), 151-199; 7) Aravind, P. K. (1997). Borromean entanglement of the GHZ state. Quantum 
Potentiality, Entanglement and Pass ion-at-a-Distance: Essays for Abner Shimony, eds. R. S. Cohen, 
M. Home and J. Stachel , Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp.53-59; 8) Kauffman , L. H. , & Lomonaco, S. J. (2002). 
Quantum entanglement and topological entanglement. New Journal of Physics, 4, 73 . 1-73.18; 9) 
Lindstrom, B., & Zetterstrom, H.-0. (199 1). Borromean circles are impossible . Amer. Math. Monthly, 
98(4), 340-341; JO) Venn, J. (1880) . On the diagrammatic and mechanical representation of 
propositions and reasonings. The London, Edinburgh and Dublin philosophical magazine and journal 
of science. July - December. 
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5.2.3 OSSTC: Advantages, vulnerabilities and the relevance ofthe "Borromean 
Links" 
OS software developers, in general, v1ew OSS development process as an 
"inclusionary" process of software development in that anyone who is capable and 
willing has the opportunity to voluntarily become part of the research and 
development (R&D) as well as the innovation process (RDIP). They believe, OS way 
is a powerful software development methodology primarily because it is efficient, 
innovative and effective. 
lt is efficient mainly because developers can draw on a wide range of already-existing 
technology packages and libraries in order to avoid reinventing the wheel. By doing 
so, the community of developers as a whole saves a lot of time and much re-
development costs. lt is also efficient because the technical problem solving process 
is not limited to a restricted pond of developers as is the case with proprietary 
software developers. Therefore, the chances of finding suitable solutions to newly 
emerging problems in a relatively shorter period are far more. Next, OS way is also 
highly innovative in severa! ways61. Developers do not always need to introduce 
technical novelties, rather they can reapply the existing technologies in new 
combinations and configurations to solve on-going problems and satisfy their needs. 
Further, OS way is very effective in that its application in customers' market is highly 
goal driven. Meaning that the real successful OSS solutions are those who fill up a 
gap and answer to a real customer need. The following quotes from the interviewees 
shed light on this issue. 
6 1 This view of innovation is consistent with Schumpeter' s thesis that innovation does not necessarily 
mean introduction of technical novelties, but reapplying the existing product designs and production 
methods in new market context also qualify for entrepreneurial acts of innovation (Schumpeter, 1934). 
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"Y ou have a huge base of work to build up on; you are not starting from 
scratch. There is a lot of tendency to reinvent the wheel in proprietary while 
there are more tendencies to reuse existing codes and improve it and 
contribute back; hopefully ... " 
(OSS developer/Maintainer) 
"!am following the developer's mailing list for the· Django projects which is 
the platfonn that we use he re at work; and, I get to know the evolution of the 
project because I get to know what the developers say about the project. I get 
to follow the discussions about the future of the project. That is why I get to be 
one step ahead. Recause if I follow the discussions, I get to know where the 
project [technology] is heading .. . And then if the customer needs something; 
for example, if he needs solutions that are made on that platform, I have this 
information because I have been reading it in that mailing list. By reading the 
mailing list activity I get to know about the infernal of the technology as 
weil." 
(OSS developer/IT consultant) 
However, although the OS way offers these three advantages, its development 
process demonstrates three key vulnerabilities long-term; these are maintenance, 
sustainability, and interoperability. These vulnerabilities are rooted in OSS original 
traits: 'openness' and 'collective development nature'. OSS offers the possibility to 
be used literally by anyone gratis whi le drawing on collective efforts to be created, 
maintained and progressed. These vulnerabilities are especially critical in case of 
OSS as it is software that is never finished; i.e., OSS is always in the state of flux 
being evolved into a more functional , more solid and reliable software solution. The 
following quotes from the interviewees shed light on this issue. 
"One of the things thal people seem to forget is, let 's say a project is a million 
dollars ... Ok, we have the mo ney and do the project; but, once you deploy the 
new system, you need to maintain it. You need to make sure il will be kept up-
to-date .. . it does not stop after the project is delivered. Y ou need to have 
bodies to operate the system and to maintain il and so on .. . " 
(IT department head of publicly-held enterprise client) 
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To illustrate the power points and vulnerabilities of OSS and its development process, 
1 have sketched a schema (Figure 5.4) based on the formai and informai discussions 
and interviews with the study participants. Figure 5.4 feeds on interactions of OSS 
developers (who belong to OSS firms and communities) and clients of OSS firms 
concerning severa! OSS projects (e.g., Odoo, formerly known as OpenERP, Liferay, 
Ring, etc.). Furthermore, Figure 5.4 is followed by Figure 5.5 that shows a 
microscopie view of interconnectedness among dependencies through a build-root 
graph of dependencies. 
As illustrated in Figure 5.4 and in a more detailed form in Figure 5.5, an OSS project 
is founded upon a range of interconnected ' libraries and repositories ' so much so that 
without these ' dependencies ' the overall project renders ineffective. 
For example, 'Liferay Portal ', licensed under GNU Lesser General Public License 
(LGPL), is an OS web platform including features commonly used for development 
ofwebsite and portais and is written in ' Java' programing language. Java itselfis free 
and OS software licensed under GPL with its core code available under free 
software/OS distribution terms. Therefore, Java- a 20-year old programing 
language- forms a foundation for Liferay and a source of strength since it is 
considered as one of the best programming languages with proven record of 
accomplishment. 
To provide another example, we can look at ' Odoo' which is an OS enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) software providing potential users (i.e. , mainly enterprise 
clients) an alternative to its counterpart proprietary ERPs62 . Odoo comprises three 
types ofmodules: a) Core or basic modules; b) Generic modules; and c) customized 
modules. The core modules (e.g. , base, account, sales, purchase, about 600 or so) 
62 Examples include SAP ERP, Oracle E-Business Suite, Microsoft Dynamics, NetSuite, as weil as its 
counterpart from OS world such as ADempiere, Compiere, OFBiz, Openbravo ERP, to name a few. 
210 
have been originally created by the main OS enterprise including the core developers 
of Odoo proj ect. These core modules are also being revised, further improved upon, 
and maintained mainly by the main OS enterprise behind the project but the company 
also includes the network of Odoo partners63 in Odoo RDIP. The generic modules 
(e.g., ' llOn_ca', 'purchase_landed_cost' , 'magentoerpconnect' , about 3000 orso) are 
mainly created through the developer commw1ity around Odoo. This community is 
comprised mainly of a network of partners. Lastly, the customized modules (e.g., 
'my _report') are specifically developed by each OSS firm based on the request of 
their clients. The customized layer of Odoo project is licensed under proprietary 
terms as their development process is financed by clients and these modules are 
critical part of clients' IS. The following quote is about the customized modules. 
" This [a customized module] gives the client the competitive advantage and 
this module will not be shared among the Partner Network sphere. Sometimes 
client if self builds this customized sensitive module." 
(Odoo community practice leader/department head) 
Although within the professional conduct, the proprietary rights concemmg 
customized modules are reserved for clients, this does not mean that those modules, 
technologically speaking, do not rely on core and general ones. Put simply, for 
customized versions torun smoothly and be fully effective, they need to be integrated 
into updated versions of their underlying dependencies; i.e. , core and general 
modules. 
As shown in Figure 5.4, the customized modules' leve! is built upon the basic and 
general modules' leve!, further supported by core code repositories and libraries (i.e. , 
dependencies). Therefore, if the evolution path of customized modules parts with that 
63 Partners include OSS firms and IT consultants that depend on Odoo as one of their main services 
they offer. 
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of their underlying dependencies through time, then it will become harder and harder 
(in terms of technical possibility and economie rational and cost efficiency) to 
maintain the inter-operability between customized version of modules and their 
underlying dependencies. Under such circumstances, the client may no longer benefit 
from the strengths of deploying OSS solutions as maintaining an 'orphaned' OSS 
without the support of communities. lt becomes highly costly, ineffective and making 
improvements or adding new features becomes a highly redundant process64 . 
64 Unless, the client deems so like in case of defense industry in which case operators only wou ld like 
to download and use OSS solutions to skip sorne primary R&D costs, and then develop the rest of the 
project and maintain it in-house. 
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These two quotes below further demonstrate how the enterprise clients view the 
significance of software maintenance. They reveal that getting software codes 
integrated into an OS platform is an achievement for enterprise clients for two 
reasons. First, they can save some costs of maintenance and they can subtly influence 
the OS technology trajectory as it bears "their" version oftechnology too. 
"ft is !rue in that you can lever age the product to adapt to your context. But at 
the same time, when you do that you have appropriated the product for 
yourself and after that il 's more difjicult to maintain the software in fine with 
eurre nt developments. So you have to be very [ careful]... it is important to 
know what you are doing! " 
(OSS enterprise client's IT department head) 
"When it eventually gets integrated into the [OS] platform, then 1 don 't need 
to maint ain il anymore ... like for the next 10 years so the modules thal 1 have 
added to this OSS gets integrated into the normal releases then 1 don 't need to 
maintain it anymore,· be cause it 's eilher maintained by the community or the 
provider thal 's behind it. That 's a bene fit for me be cause it benefits the 
community but for me at some point these things gonna evolve on its own and 
1 won 't need to maintain it anymore. Si nee we have limited resources the 
more others can do the better it is for us be cause we can work on other stuff. " 
(IT department head of publicly-held enterprise client) 
In essence, OSS develops gradually and consciously in communities of OSS 
developers through an iterative fashion where new developments are tested and tried, 
revised, modified, and edited and then pushed back downstream into the underlying 
dependencies in order to be further integrated and maintained. Therefore, 
sustainability of OSS RDIP lies heavily on maintaining the link (i.e., technological 
collaborations) among ali systemic elements in order to ensure evolution of the whole 
system in tem1s of evolution of its building blocks. This means that the sustainability 
of the OSS innovations is partly dependent on the existence and continuation of 
fruitful (i.e. , goal oriented) technological collaborations among the participating 
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innovators. In this sense, the notion of 'Borromean Links'- by demonstrating how 
interconnection among independent elements ( which are figuratively represented in 
form of rings) en sures unity of the who le- aptly captures the role of interconnections 
among OSS elements (i.e., dependencies) which ensure the unity of whole OSS as a 
unified system. This interconnection and interdependence fiuther ensures the 
sustainability of OSS evolution process on a macro leve!. Therefore, the key to 
understanding OSS collaborative RDIP is to gain an understanding of the nature of 
OSS technological collaborations. More parti cul arly, an understanding of OSSTC can 
also help us investigate OSS RDIP in terms of success and sustainability issues (See 
Figure 5.6). For instance, as the quotes show, since enterprise clients have incentives 
to integrate their modules into the core of the OS projects, they may have stake in 
their success and sustainability. 
Figure 5.6. Conceptual Interdependency between OSS Technological Collaboration 
and OSS Collaborative R&D and Innovation Process 
Understanding 
ofOSSTC 
U nderstanding 
ofOSS 
collaborative 
RD IP in terms 
of success and 
sustainabili ty 
Issues 
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5.2.4 Collaborative OSS R&D and innovation process 
The collaborative OSS R&D and innovation process (RDIP) is a process that relies 
on a collective participation of software developers to develop innovations, maintain 
them and ensure their sustainability. Nonetheless, we know little about the details that 
describe the actors, the interactive process itself, the specifie roles each actor plays in 
relation to this process, and how these roles are interrelated. To shed light on these 
concepts, 1 first touch upon the nature of OSS open and interactive process; then 
introduce the actors. 1 further specify actor~ ' roles, the relationships, and the 
collaboration process as weil as the leadership issues. 
First, based on the bottom-up data analysis (see Chapter 4), 1 can describe the nature 
of OSS RDIP in form of a "Water Purifier Madel" (WPM) where the useful 
knowledge needs to be co-created, constantly evolving, and flowing through an 
iterative and evolutionary review and development process which is open to ali actors 
for comments, amendments, and editions. Perhaps equally important to the 
innovation process is the final decision making which leads to approval of a dominant 
design or solution (such as a piece of code written to perform a certain function, a 
packaging method, a patch to fix a bug). Figure 5.7 schematically represents the 
WPM. 
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Figure 5.7. Water Purifier Mode!: Upstream-Downstream Interaction and 
Collaboration among Developers 
···-· ,.;·· -·,..-····-· 
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Source: This diagram is drawn by the author based on detailed explanation and the exact metaphor 
g iven by OSS developers. 
Note: This concept has been emerged repeatedly in severa] in-depth interviews. 
Figure 5.7, above, illustrates a development process which engages ali actors in an 
open interactive manner. In this mode!, illustrated in form of a metaphor, OSS 
comrnunity is perceived as a "water purifier", the apparatus that hosts a set of 
procedures that turns unusable water into drinkable water. The interactive and 
collaborative process that leads to knowledge co-creation is received as the 
"purifying process". The outcome: The cleaned, maintainable and useable code, is 
recognized as the drinkable and "purified water" which benefits the OSS firms and 
clients downstream. An OSS developer' s quotes capture the logic behind the water 
purifier metaphor. 
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" S o  b y  s h a r i n g  c o d e  w i t h  c o m m u n i t y  ( u p s t r e a m )  t h e  c o d e  g e t s  r e v i e w e d  l i k e  
w a t e r  w h i c h  g e t s  p u r i f i e d .  O t h e r w i s e ,  s o f t w a r e  f i r m  s h o u l d  d o  a l i  t h e  w o r k  
a n d  p u r i f y  w a t e r .  T h i s  i s  g o o d  f o r  c o m p a n y  a n d  c u s t o m e r  a s  b a t h  w i l l  e n j o y  a  
f i n e - t u n e d  p r o d u c t  . . . .  f t  i s  a l s o  g o o d  f o r  d e v e l o p e r  b e  c a u s e  n o w  f  k n o w  f  c a n  
w r i t e  g o o d  c o d e s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h i s  b e c a u s e  w h e n  f  c a r n e  h e r e  f  w a s  w r i t i n g  
s o m e  c o d e s  a s  a  s t u d e n t  b u t  i t  w a s  n o t  s o  g o o d .  T h e n  f  w r o t e  s o m e  s t u f f  a n d  
s e n t  f t  u p s t r e a m  a n d  t h e  g u y s  t o l d  m e  y o u  s h o u l d  n o t  d o  t h i s  a n d  y o u  s h o u l d  
d o  t h a t  s o  f  g a i n e d  a  l o t  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  b a s e d  o n  t h e i r  f e e d b a c k .  T h a t ' s  w h y  f  
l o v e  O S S  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  a l s o  g o o d  f o r  m e  a n d  f  a m  p e r f e c t i n g  t h r o u g h  m y  
c o l l a b o r a t i o n .  "  
( O S S  d e v e l o p e r  a n d  c o n s u l t a n t )  
" T h e  p r o c e s s  o f  c o d e  c l e a n i n g  a n d  i n t e g r a t i o n  i s  a  p e e r  r e v i e w  p r o c e s s  w h i c h  
i n v o l v e s  r e v i s i o n ,  m o d i f i c a t i o n  a n d  s u b m i s s i o n  o f  c o d e s  b a s e d  o n  f e e d b a c k  
p r o v i d e d  b y  c o m m u n i t y  i n  a n  i t e r a t i v e  f a s h i o n .  T h i s  k i n d  o f  j o b  i s  a l s o  c a l l e d  
R & D  p r o j e c t  a n d  p a r t - t i m e  t o o k  m e  a b o u t  a  y e a r  t o  f i n a l l y  i n t e g r a l e  t h e  
c o d e  . . .  f t  t o o k  s e v e n  r e v i e w s  t o  f i n a l !  y  g e t  t h e  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  
a n d  i n t e g r a l e  t h e  r e v i s e d  v e r s i o n .  W h e n  w e  d e v e l o p e d  t h e  e n h a n c e d  v e r s i o n  o f  
t h e  O S  t h e n  w e  p u s h e d  i t  b a c k  t o  t h e  F L O S S  c o m m u n i t y  . . . .  "  
( O S S  d e v e l o p e r  a n d  c o n s u l t a n t )  
T h r o u g h  k n o w l e d g e  s h a r i n g  a n d  c o l l a b o r a t i v e  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  s o f t w a r e  d e v e l o p e r s  c a n  
d r i v e  d o w n  t h e  h i g h  c o s t  o f  R & D ,  s h o r t e n  t h e  t i m e  t o  m a r k e t  o f  f i n a l  p r o d u c t s ,  a n d  
e n h a n c e s  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  r e s u l t s  d u e  t o  i n v o l v e m e n t  o f  t h e  b r i g h t e s t  s c i e n t i s t s  a n d  
d e v e l o p e r s  i n  t h e  R D I P .  T h e  o p e n  a n d  i n t e r a c t i v e  p r o c e s s  o f  R & D  a n d  i n n o v a t i o n  n o t  
o n l y  r e f l e c t s  t h e  c o r e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  o p e n  i n n o v a t i o n  b u t  a l s o  i t  v e r y  w e i l  r e s o n a t e s  
w i t h  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  l o g i c  a n d  m o t i v a t i o n s  o f  t h e  f i r m s  t h a t  e n t e r  i n t o  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  o r  
s t r a t e g i e  a l l i a n c e s .  T h u s ,  b y  d i g g i n g  f u r t h e r  i n t o  t h e  c o n c e p t  w e  c a n  b e t t e r  p o s i t i o n  
O S S  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  c o l l a b o r a t i o n s  a n d  i t s  R D I P  v i s - à - v i s  t h e  a f o r e m e n t i o n e d  t w o  
p e r s p e c t i v e s .  
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5.3 Constituents of OSS technological collaborations 
In Chapter 4 (see, sections 4.3.9 and 4.3.10), 1 explain the data analysis methods and 
how 1 apply them in the context of this study. Based on data analysis, 1 categorize 
conceptual building blocks into sub-categories and then into main categories (see 
Table 5. 1). This is a bottom-up approach which help us move towards levels that are 
more abstract- i.e. , from field observations and gathered data towards forming the 
broader concepts. 
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Table 5.1. List of the Main Categories Accompanied by Their Sub-Categories 
Underlying process Based on axial coding process Based on open coding process 
Categories Sub-categories Conceptual building blocks 
Attitude and perspectives; needs and 
OSS firms/ IT consultants incentives to engage in collaborative R&D 
and innovation strategy; rotes 
Attitude and perspectives; needs and 
ACTORS Enterprise clients/ Non- incentives (investment incentives ); key 
software enterprises or benefits; enterprise client typology 
organizations (collaboration, resources, strate gy, 
relationships) ; rotes 
Hobbyists and individual end- Attitude and perspectives; rotes and 
us ers importance of the ir contribution 
Context for collaboration Know-why; Know-who; Know-how; Training; Resources. 
Licensing types; useful and general vs. non-
use fui and specifie; secret ive vs. non-
Code sharing complexities secretive aspects; cost- time considerations; 
TECHNOLOGICAL ethical considerations; conditions and 
COLLABORATION consequences of code sharing. 
Dyadic and triadic relationships 
Relationships' typology (dimensions, nature, issues, related 
capabilities) 
Vision; setting objectives; managing 
Dual-purpose leadership technology; managing the fear of forking; 
managing/leading the 01 community. 
INTERDEPENDENCE Complementarity of Rotes and Borromean Links representing the concept 
- INDEPENDENCE functions of interdependence-independence 
Technology levet Software inter-operability Software maintainability 
SUSTAINABILITY Resource levet 
Continuous tangible resource allocation 
Continuous intangible resource allocation (Based on selective Existence of dyadic relationship 
coding process) Relationship levet Existence of triadic relationship 
Leadership levet Existence of effective dual-purpose leadership 
Quality of software code; maintainability 
SUCCESS Technological success and interoperability; quality of technology 
(Based on selective management process 
coding process) High commercial viability; diversity in user Commercial success base; financial status (revenue model); 
project leadership 
Source: Author. 
221 
5.3 .1 Identifying act ors and exploring the impacts of the ir diversity 
Upon interacting with the data, and based on preliminary pilot interviews, I have 
identified 'ACTOR' (and the heterogeneity associated with it) as one of the key 
categories in the domain of OSS collaborative RDIP. The actors within the OSS 
innovation process have a dual role. They are perceived as both "innovators" and 
"users". Based on the interviews with variety of OSS developers and users, I have 
developed three main sub-categories of actors who are building blocks of OSS RDIP. 
These three are : 1) OSS jirms or IT consultants; Enterprise clients or non-software 
enterprises (including their IT departments); and 3) Hobbyists and individual end-
users (see Figure 5.8). These three groups, together, form the concept of community 
of OSS developers. Had we removed OSS fmns, hobbyists and clients' IT 
departments from the OSS ecosystem, then the concept of community of OSS 
developers would have shrunk to a handful of core developers who had created or 
invented a technology in vacuum with little interaction with the outside world. 
Since there has been growmg interest m adoption of OSS solutions by many 
governments around the world, severa! interviews point towards inclusion of 
government bodies as users and innovators within OSS ecosystem. Further secondary 
sources of data66, part of which have been recommended by key informants, confirm 
this trend. Therefore, I tend to include government bodies within the category of 
enterprise clients. 
66 Please consult the following links for further information with regards to depth and breadth of OSS 
adoption by different govemment bodies around the world: a) European Commission ' s Open Source 
Observatory (https: //joinup.ec.europa.eu/community/osor/description ); b) Major OpenOffice.org 
Deployments (https://wiki.openoffice.org/wiki/Major _ OpenOffice.org_ Deployments). For example, 
the Report on the International Status of Open Source Software 20/0 shows that: "the United States, 
Australia and the Western European countries lead the development and adoption of open source 
software." The report is available online on the website of the European Commission ' s Open Source 
Observatory at https ://jo i nu p. ec.europa. eu/ co mm uni ty 1 epracti ce/ do cu ment/ es/ gl-report-i nternati on a 1-
status-open-source-software-20 1 O. 
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The ACTOR category, therefore, forms a very abstract concept as it encompasses a 
variety of innovators/users who get involved in the collaborative RDIP having 
different attitudes and perspectives; needs, wants , and incentives; R&D and 
innovation strategy (RDIS); resources; specifie roles; technological capabilities; and 
management and leadership capabilities. 
Furthermore, as the Figure 5.8 shows, each category, in general, tends to be 
motivated by a major incentive. For instance, OSS firms , which are in the business of 
providing different services to satisfy changing needs of their clients, are more 
looking for innovations and innovative technological solutions, while clients are in 
need of stable solutions to rely on them for longer term smooth running operations. 
Figure 5.8. Three Main Actor Categories ofCollaborative RDIP 
Community ofOSS 
developers and us ers 
OSS firms/ IT 
consultants 
(Innovation seekers) 
users Enterprise clients (Incl. Gov.) 
(Stability seekers) (Joy and persona! 
utility seekers) 
------ ----- ------ -------------- --- --- ----------- ------ -------- ----------- ------ --- --- ----------------- _1 
Source: This diagram is based on two main sources: a) the overall data analysis ; and b) "Tiki Wiki 
CMS Groupware"67 community case study 
67 See: https: //tiki .org/tiki-index.php 
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A) OSS firms 
OSS firms or IT consultancy firms can vary in finn size. They can be very small or 
micro firms with only a handful of software developers. They can also be medium-
sized firms having about 100 and more full-time developers. An OSS firm can also be 
a very large firm like Red Hat® which is shy of 10,000 employees68 . Irrespective of 
firm size, all OSS solutions providers share a core competency; i.e, to sell expe1iise 
on OS technologies. The following quotes bear the keyword. 
" . .. We self expertise, we don't self code!'' (OSS developer/consultant) 
"And sa the idea is thal ... as a company we want ta sel! our expertise. When 
you work on an application like that il helps you build up your expertise ... " 
(OSS developer/consultant) 
Therefore, 1 define an OSS finn as an enterprise that delivers value ta ils clients 
through selfing their expertise (i.e., their core competency) on adoption, 
customization and maintenance of OSS solutions based on what the ir clients ' need or 
want. 
For example, in one of my interviews with an OS project/comrnunity administrator 
(i.e. , key lea,dership position in this community), who is also an entrepreneur having 
his own consultancy firm, he comrnents about OSS firms and mentions that: 
"The ir business is ta use Tiki, de play Ti ki for various customers and projects 
and ta basically deliver value ta their customers. Sa, what typically happens is 
that every few weeks they have a new project which can fast a year or two and 
they basicalfy take Ti ki and they deploy and configure it and add features to it 
ta make their customers happy. They are pretty core [to the R&D and 
innovation process]. Sure, they are very core certain/y to the new fe atur es thal 
68 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red _ Hat 
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they add their innovation. So consultants basically using Tiki as a tool for 
their need and then it could be just adding more stuffto Tiki. " 
CTiki Wiki CMS Groupware Community project administrator) 
During the interviews with OSS firms ' managers, chief technology officers, and 
department heads, it has become clear that these actors have a "positive attitude" 
towards playing a constructive and collaborative role in the RDIP despite having 
different levels of resources measured in terms of qualified labor, time, and funds. 
Sorne of the quo tes shed light on this aspect. 
"We gain social proof that we are already the re doing things. " 
COSS developer/consultant) 
"That's what the open source is about: sharing codes for the benefit of 
others. " 
COSS developer/consultant) 
"And we got to discuss with those guys [Liferay developers' community] and 
we shared our experiences and they came up with this very generic framework 
for provingfaceted sea!'Ch in Liferay. " 
COSS developer/consultant from Liferay division) 
However, OSS firms ' have a variety of "incentives" underlying their positive 
perspective to play a collaborative role in RDIP. 1 have investigated these incentives 
by not only interviewing the OSS firms ' developers and managers but also by looking 
at what OSS community leaders and enterprise clients view as OSS firms ' incentives. 
OSS firms have five main incentives, also rooted in their R&D and innovation 
strategy. These incentives are: 1) Building in-house R&D technological capability; 2) 
enhancing in-house technological absorptive capacity; 3) signaling in-house 
technological capability; 4) branding and marketing initiatives; and 5) Building the 
necessary social capital through having a good relationship with OSS community. 
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Like any enterprises in the business world, OSS firms are organizations with limited 
resources, as the majority of them are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
However, these OSS SMEs are typically connected with OSS communities which are 
partly ideology-, and partly value-driven. At the same time, they are also dealing with 
enterprise clients which are mainly profit-driven with strict budgets, deadlines and 
expectations set for their IT needs. Therefore, OSS firms' decisions about making 
investments in collaborative RDIP are based on a variety of incentives. They must 
boost their in-house R&D capabilities in order to be able to remain innovative (i.e. , to 
enhance firm-level innovation capability). Yet, their resource limitations coupled 
with their open approach as weil as OSS technology attributes (i.e. , being dependent 
on many other branches of software technology which exist outside the firm 
boundaries) do not allow them to build ali teclmologies in-house. They need to 
develop R&D projects under OSS RDIP in connection with OSS world. The in-house 
R&D project helps them gain new technological capabilities and in parallel enhance 
their in-house R&D absorptive capacity through OS licensing agreements that allow 
them to build upon already existing projects collectively and profit from them. 
In Savoir-faire Linux (SFL)- my principal case and participant observation site- for 
instance, the firm initiates a few of these in-house R&D projects including SFLphone 
(now called 'Ring')69 in order to boost the company's in-house R&D and absorptive 
capacity in the domain of telephone or VoiP (Voice over IP) technology. The 
following quotes provide an insight on the nature of capacity or technological 
capability building through in-house efforts that are shared with OS cornmunities. 
"He [CEO] wants to develop a home solution for VofP (OS version). So, the 
technology is not developed as a request of a client. ft is total/y our CEO's 
idea. He wants to make sorne branding to show communities that SFL is not 
only client driven, but he wants to do something for community. ft is a small 
69 The official website for this technology is : http://ring.cx/en/. 
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project but if is getting bigger and bigger. ft is like an OS branding. .. to gain 
respect and build popularity. " 
"1 think it [SFLPhone or Ring] was an insightful decision because there is 
now more demand than ever for those kind of applications. And so the idea is 
thal, I'm guessing, as a company we want to self our expertise. When you 
work on an application like thal, it helps you build up your expertise of the 
domain of telephone and Vo!P in.fi'astructure. So, if you build this application 
and then in the process you re ally learn the domain weil, and the demand for 
that kind of thing has gone up 1 be lieve ... If the question is how you make 
mo ney with that, 1 don 't know ... We contribute the most 1 gues s. " 
(Core developer ofOSS finn's in-house free software R&D project) 
This quote also provides an insight on the finn's incentives (e.g., technology 
signaling, marketing, and business development). 
"SFLphone is used for advertising and to attract people to use .fi'ee software 
in their telephony infrastructure. So, if people [potential clients] are using a 
software for voice over IP phone and they find SFL phone so they would say 
Oh this company must know about Vo!P telephony. Which we do and that's 
the marketing part of il. We have the packaged version of SFL phone for 
Debian and Ubuntu. " 
(Core developer of OSS finn' s in-house free software R&D project) 
Further to technology-related issues, as the quotes suggest, such investments in OSS 
R&D projects help the OSS finn build its brand and popularity in the OSS ecosystem. 
These initiatives make sure the finn is an active member of OS ecosystem and is 
contributing to promoting OSS technology. If the R&D project becomes a popular 
one, the core enterprise contributor behind it will also enjoy the popularity. For 
instance, since October 2016, Ring has become officially become a GNU package 
and in 2017 it has been listed in Free Software Foundation (FSF)'s High Priority 
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Projects (HPP). 7° For an OSS firm who significantly rely on support of OS 
communities, these news are of strategie importance. Such efforts also lead to a very 
effective advertising and marketing campaign which signais how technologically 
capable the OSS firm is, when it comes to the technology under spotlight. 
Furthermore, while interacting with OSS developers, 1 realized that " OSS is about 
people and not only the technology ", said by an OSS firm ' s manager. Therefore, 
developing a ''positive reputation" and "good relationship" with community of 
developers is an important part of a firm's RDIP strategy. One CEG/entrepreneur 
mentions the following quote reflecting these insights. 
"Also 1 want to mention that today big companies have realized that it is nol 
so much about IP but it is about people. fT technology is about the people you 
have, especially in the open source world. Like case of LibreO.ffice, 1 did not 
go out and buy the LibreO.ffice technology. 1 hired the certified core OS 
engineers that work on LibreO.ffice and that is the real asset. You have to 
convince people to work with you. So big companies like Google they need to 
go out and convince OS people to work with them. They need to be seen as 
good OS citizens. Red Hat and Intel are seen as good OS citizens. Google is 
really really bad. So, companies with bad reputation have hard time hiring 
OS engineers. ft is important that they care about OS engineers because most 
of them are extremely passionate programmers and extremely good at what 
they do; and, in most cases, they control the projects; and, that they would 
like to influence further. So, the se big companies are fighting over people and 
not technology and for thal they need good reputation in the OS world. 
(CEO/Founder of an OS firm) 
"Community is about relationship and there has to be strong relationship for 
you and for them .. . Because, we know the OS community ... We are working 
with them and we know that they are working on many different projects ... like 
a librarian who knows where the books are ... 1 mean; it 's a question of 
70 See the two websites: 1) https: //blog.savoirfairelinux.com/en-ca/20 16/ring-official-gnu-package/; 
and 2) https:/ /b log.savoirfaire 1 i nux.com/en-ca/20 17 /ring-free-software- foundation-h igh-priority-
projects/ 
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knowledge. Like being aware of the se kinds of projects, how to jind them and 
how to use them ... We speak to them and we are on the Internet with this 
community every day. So we are very well aware of everything thal is going 
on. 
(CEO/Founder of OS firm) 
Therefore, OSS firms' involvements in collaborative RDIP are part of their strategy 
to build a strong relationship with OSS communities and enhance their social capital 
as the result of their relationships. To build ties with community projects' members 
forms a strong incentive to get involved in collaborative RDIP. 
OSS firms also play a unique set of roles in the collaborative RDIP. Before touching 
upon their roles, I present an excerpt from an interview with the R&D personnel of 
an OSS firm which has been the result of an entrepreneurial effort to turn an OSS 
project (LTTng) into a commercial product in the market place. 
"He tried at jirst to submit the code to the community but this did not work! 
Recause community was not interested in his work. .. so Matthew moved on, on 
his own. He did not rea/ize that there was a market for his project to build a 
company for that. That was not his jirst goal. His goal was to provide the tool 
to the community anyway possible. That was very altruistic! That's a lot 
work. .. that's the OS way! You provide value before asking for commercial 
side of it. So he did that project during his PhD study. After that, he wanted to 
continue his Ph.D. work. .. so why not starting my own company and be my 
own employee. Then sorne people found the project cool and useful and 
expressed their needs. So we provided consulting. And, that's how Efficios got 
started. We have a very small niche market. You need to have really special 
debugging needs. And we are trying to lower the barrier of entry to use our 
tools. So there are many tools to use for debugging performance issues and 
there are plenty of them available for debugging Linux. BUT, sorne of the 
problems that you need to solve will need highly specifie tools like our tool. So 
it real! y depends on the ki nd of issues you have. " 
(Project R&D and developer) 
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The above excerpt clarifies a major gap that persistently exists between invention or 
technology creation-development and successful commercialization in the OSS 
community projects; i.e. , 'the Jack of interplay and balance between technology push 
and market pull of R&D and iimovation'. Lack of necessary financial resources, 
professional testing and quality assurance (QA), integration of end-user feedback in 
the R&D process are among the key vulnerabilities of OSS projects that are 
developed in public domains. The following quote from BigB!ueButton project 
leader acknowledges further these vulnerabilities. 
"1 would argue that al! of the successful OS Projects have very strong 
commercial interests where the commercial company see the economie benefit 
of having a strong project. A lot of challenge with OSS is the quality of 
softvvare itself. 1 cal! this end-user experience. ft is the QA process. How can 
you test it? When the commercial company takes your OS project and 
embedded into their own product and ship to their customers, it will go 
through the ir QA teams. They will find bugs that you would never be able to 
find. If you make available professional services and that commercial 
company can engage you as one of the developers of the project, for helping 
them to commercialize or embed your project then not only you will earn 
revenue from that, and you must be able to earn sorne revenues from an OS 
project. An OS project with no revenue is not going to be viable in the long-
run. A lot of times when you create an OS project from scratch, it's gonna be 
hard to sustain unless there is an ecosystem in which commercial companies 
can build upon and contribute back to the softvvare .. . " 
(BigB!ueButton project leader) 
Therefore, based on the thick descriptions, we can clearly recognize the emerging 
and very specifie roles of OSS firms in the collaborative RDIP. They play a 
significant role in terms ofjilling the gap between invention and commercialization. 
In fact, they provide financial support; professional testing and QA; as weil as 
proving experienced workforce who knows both worlds: the world of enterprise 
clients and market needs as weil as the world of passion-driven OSS developers and 
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hackers. Figure 5.9 provides an example of how an OSS firm engages m 
collaborative RDIP. 
Figure 5.9. Linear Built-To-Order Collaborative R&D and Innovation Process 
Different resources 
(time & money) and 
capability levels 
Client A needs a 
feature . 
Client 8 cannot pay 
for the feature . 
Client C is willing 
to test it and deploy 
it. 
Client D does not 
want to deal with 
the community. 
Innovation process 
management (within cluster 
of clients) 
Dual-purpose leadership 
(1 nnovation process management 
within community) 
2 
OSS firm 
3 
Tiki Wiki community 
Key Characteristics of Community Leadership 
1 )Relationship management 
- Client-consultant relationship 
- Consultant-community relationship 
2)Collaborative project management 
3)Coordination mechanisms 
Source: Based on the interview with the project adrninistrator ofTiki Wiki CMS Groupware 
community 
Based on Figure 5.9, OSS firm is approached by different clients with different 
needs and/or conditions as well as technological capabilities. For example, one client 
may have enough financial resources but they cannot afford using a Beta version of 
OSS product. Therefore, they need to use the tested and tried version of software. 
Another client may be a non-for profit organization (NGO) that does not have 
enough budgets to pay to use a fully tested debugged version, but they agree to use 
the Beta version of the OS technology and help its development by going through 
the testing phase. Y et, another client may have good amount of end-user feedback 
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that can enhance the user friendliness of the fini shed module. ln this case, OSS firm 
plays a key role in managing the R&D process by managing and aligning the 
different needs, interests and capabilities of clients harmoniously. The OSS firm can 
present this opportunity to the OSS community (here, e.g., Tiki Wiki conununity) in 
order to build upon the conununity-based version of teclmology and respond to 
individuals ' needs. 
In short, OSS firms have unique incentives to engage in collaborative RDIP and they 
benefit differently by interacting with different kinds of client organizations and 
software developers. Client enterprises represent different needs and they would form 
an important properties of OSS development and revenue model. 
B) Enterprise clients 
Enterprise clients include a variety of firms from different industries and sectors 71 . 
All of these firms have IS-related needs that can be responded to through integrating 
OSS solutions (tools, applications, etc.). The scope of activities of these clients is 
very diverse too. Sorne of them deploy OSS solutions to run their manufacturing 
operations, sorne others incorporate OSS into their embedded systems and ship them 
out to the end users, and sorne rely on OSS to offer online services to their end-
users. Therefore, the strategie importance and commercial value of OSS technology 
differs moving from one client to another. One of the OSS firm 's CEO interviewed 
in this study defines a client in the following manner. "Client is anybody who needs 
software and the product you are developing, anyone" (CEO/Founder of OSS finn). 
71 For example, in case of Savoir-faire Linux Inc ., they come from aviation and aerospace, cloud 
computing, defense and space, electrical-electronic manufacturing, hospital equipment and services, 
industrial monitoring, telecommunications, financial services, IT -Software engineering, transportation, 
entertainment, just to name a few. 
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A community leader characterizes OSS enterprise clients in terms of their " IT 
departments" and the role they play as iimovators within the OSS project' s RDIP. 
"fT departments have stuff to do. They have to make the ir organizations more 
efficient. And, thal goes by providing tools to their organizations, and they 
have two choices either they can buy the tools or they can use open source 
stuff. But if you use the open source stuff the OSS stuff may not do what they 
exact/y need so they can choose to influence the project so thal 's why over a 
ten-year period a huge component of the contributions in Tiki cames from fT 
departments ! ... So, a client needs something, and so he writes it for themselves 
and then he just puts it as open-source .. .. fT departments tend to be generally 
more about stability because they pick Tiki for f eatures they had so they just 
want il to work! And they want to face as f ew problems as possible. " 
(Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Community project administrator) 
Despite their differences, clients have a variety of motivations for choosing OSS 
solutions. This often leads to further adoption of OSS tools as opposed to proprietary 
products. These incentives are expressed by them in form of benefits they enjoy 
through migrating towards adoption of OSS solutions. 
Among key benefits clients mention are: 1) gaining flexibility associated with using 
OSS; 2) accessing community-based solutions to already existing problems that they 
are now faced with; 3) avoiding complications associated with incorporating 
proprietary licensed software into downstream products; 4) reducing costs associated 
with licensing fees and royalties; 5) benefiting from professional supports offered by 
OSS firms ; and 6) saving on in-house R&D costs. 
"Flexibility" is a key subcategory (concept) which means different things to different 
clients. It is viewed as a key benefit because it gives clients the possibility to access 
and use a technology that can be modified, optimized, and studied if . needed. 
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Flexibility also refers to the OSS attribute that allows engmeers to collectively 
develop new features and improve their quality in the public domain. Ali these 
attributes associated with flexibility are enabled by the openness associated and 
guaranteed by the OSS licensing type. Table 5.2 presents the breakdown of the 
flexibility concept including the relevant quotes. 
In OSS world, existing answers can be obtained and applied to the relevant context 
without any fees being paid. Furthermore, clients can avoid patent infringements or 
costly licensing fees for a large number of users that are associated with embedding 
the proprietary licensed software into downstream products. In fact, OSS solutions 
can be often appropriated and incorporated into other products without paying royalty 
fees and signing contracts. However, this very much depends on the size of 
deployment. One IT department head mentions that: 
"For example, if I'm doing ECM software, for a company our size there can 
be .... Si nee we have close to 10,000 employees, the licensing fees are going 
to be a lot smaller than what we would pay for a comparable solution under 
proprietary licensing. " 
(IT department head of publicly-held enterprise client) 
"Licensing cast is very important. ft doesn 't even compare. ft 's a lot cheaper, 
initially, in regards to acquisition cast to deploy most OS solutions that it 
would be for something thal you need to purchase like proprietary 
software ... But what you 're not gonna pay in li cense fees you are going to pay 
in consultancy fees or deployment fees . So there 's this myth that OSS is fi-ee! 
Well, maybe if you use that in your base ment. But for a company our size, it 's 
never free, f mean the deployment cast, training, all of that it 's gonna be 
similar and in sorne case more expensive than proprietary software. " 
(IT department head of publicly-held enterprise client) 
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Table 5.2. Unpacking the Concept ofFlexibility 
Flexibility as ... 
Possibility to identify 
problems 
Accessing community 
technological support 
a) Ability to influence the 
technology trajectory 
b) Ability to change in the 
' right ' direction to 
create positive network 
external ities 
Ability to customize the 
software while using 
Ability to optimize internai 
services and products 
manufacturing operations 
through tailoring the OSS 
tools and solutions 
Source: Author. 
Quote(s) 
" ... if we have some trouble with the product we can point where 
exact/y the problem lies easily. This is in contras/ with the 
commercial product that is closed. ft is easier for us to 
understand the problem thal is built in the product if we use 
OSS. " (OS enterprise client IT department) 
"The community is often muchfaster and a/ive in responding to 
our proble1ns. We like the community support . .... Based on my 
experience with Liferay, the community is ve1y responsive. " 
(OS enterprise client IT department) 
" We can actually do changes to the system and add modules 
and they can be given back to the community and then they can 
become part of the actual solution whereas if f develop 
something next to Microsoft ward 1 sincerely doubt thal 
Microsoft will ever integrale il into their software. " (IT 
department head of publicly-held enterprise client) 
"On the fT side, we do provide value to actual bus users and 
metro users through mobile apps and websites and things like 
thal. But on the fT side we also provide quite a lot of value to 
our internai customers. For example, managing the tires f or the 
metro system; weil, you can 't buy a system th at manages tires 
f or the metro systems because worldwide there are probably 
less than 5 metro systems thal use tires. So we need custom 
applications f or things like that .... So there is so much demand 
coming from our internai customers thal we need to respond 
to ... So when they have a problem they come see us. " (IT 
department head of publicly-held enterprise client) 
"Clients can tai/or free software to the ir needs easier. The fact 
thal in Linux you gel al! these improvements f or security and 
performance it's not magic, it's not a coincidence ... having thal 
kind oftransparency, empowering people to be able to tailor the 
sof tware to their needs leads to these kinds of improvements. " 
(OSS developer) 
"Certain/y, we could argue thal we were able to do certain 
things or change certain functionalities of our system because 
we had access to libre softwar e, already available technology. 
J'm t1y ing to give you an example to that .. . using some robust 
and already proven ... good to operate with solutions ... reduce 
our cast of operations. The ratio of f eatures vs. bugs or 
defects ... because we use these already proven OS technologies, 
which is part of Linux kernel... " (VP of the enterprise client) 
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Thus, the costs reduction associated with adopting OSS solutions may be offset by 
migration and consultancy fees . However, still there is, overall, sorne sizeable cost 
saving associated with adoption of OSS solutions, claimed by our cases. One VP of 
enterprise client claims that "overall, it is often less cos tl y to acquire software if it is 
OSS. " Furthermore, enterprise clients' incentive to choose an OSS solution also is 
rooted in the professional support associated with that solution. A client in financial 
industry mentions the following quote. 
" We expect to have support for the project. So, we chose a kind ofOSS project 
that cornes with commercial support. We did not choose an OSS project that 
does not ajJer enterprise support. So for us it 'sa good combination." 
(Enterprise client IT project manager) 
Lastly, enterprise clients may have internai R&D projects that can be completed with 
much less development costs only if they rely on sorne OSS projects out there. Their 
incentive to use OSS is mainly to avoid reinventing the wheel and continue their 
novelty projects privately building upon the technologies available in commons. The 
following quote highlights this point. 
"We have another example where we have used an OSS project but just to 
avoid starting from scratch so we took an OSS project and we modified the 
application. But we decided to use it like a start-up project and after that we 
used the application and leveraged it. But after that when you want to 
upgrade it, it is more difficult so it is important to know what you do. If you 
want to upgrade or adapt it is important to know that dawn the raad having 
made tao many changed to the original software, it would be tao difficult to 
adapt to the community version." 
(Enterprise client IT project manager) 
However, the benefits that accrue to clients cannot be realized in vacuum; meaning 
that they can very much depend on certain complementary elements. For instance, 
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'cost saving' associated with adoption of OSS solutions is a confusing concept. On 
the one hand, it is very tangible financial saving up front, if software licenses do not 
have to be purchased. On the other hand, the clients need to undergo service support 
fees and training fees. Clients report that if they wish to use the OSS solutions for a 
long period, they need to be aware of issues associated with OSS maintenance over an 
extended period and take the necessary measures to ensure maintainability of their 
OSS tools and solutions. Therefore, as shown in a remark made by one of the clients 
below, a meaningful cost saving benefit can be realized by remaining connected and 
interactive with the community of developers. 
"A lot of times with OSS ... The fact that you do have access to the source 
code ... the re may be some features thal don 't do what you want them to do so 
there 's gonna be more customizations. So to me, one of the main benefits is 
that if you deploy OSS and re main as true to the original version as possible 
then the cast for a company our size [large firm] would be beneficia!. For 
example, if I'm doing ECM software, for a company our size the re can be .... 
Since we have close to 10, 000 employees, the licensing fees are going to be a 
lot smaller than what we would pay for a comparable solution under 
proprietary licensing. 
(IT department head of publicly-held enterprise client) 
"One of the things that people seem to forget is, let 's say a project is a million 
dollars ... Ok, we have the mo ney and do the project. But once you deploy the 
new system, you need to maint ain it. Y ou need to make sure it 's kept up-to-
date. So, there is cost to that. Al! the growth in the system size that you 
provide ... if does not stop after the project is delivered. Y ou need to have 
bodies to operate the system and to maintain it and so on. And now our issue 
is adding more people, because more people cast more money, that we don 't 
have. 
(IT department head of publicly-held enterprise client) 
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Similarly, the concept of jlexibility ' which comprises five elements, as shown in 
Table 5.2, again is a fuzzy and conditional concept in that a client can benefit greatly 
from flexibility under the condition that their IT department is connected with OSS 
community and collaborates technologically with the community developers. 
Fundamentally, issues like community support, injluencing technology trajectory, 
creating positive network externalities, making and enjoying customizations that 
survive through the passage of time, and successful optimization that is built upon and 
supported by interconnect OS libraries and dependencies, all and all form the concept 
of flexibility. At heart of the building blocks of flexibility lie ' connection and 
interaction' with OSS community of developers. The following quote elaborates on 
the concept of flexibility. 
"Sometimes the OSS project changes often. 1ts develo'pment is very jàst, and 
sometimes it is very difficult to re use the same application be cause the AP 1 
has so much changed that it is more difficult to integrale it. So sometimes the 
OSS projects are moving so fast that it is very difjicult to integrale the new 
version. So, it is difficult to use an OSS project because we know that it won 't 
be the same in one year. 
(OS enterprise client IT department) 
"When it [ customized feature or newly developed feature] eventually gets 
integrated into the [OS] platform, then 1 don 't need to maintain it 
anymore ... like for the next 10 years so the modules that 1 have added to this 
OSS gets integrated into the normal releases then 1 don 't need to maintain it 
anymore; because it 's either maintained by the community or the provider 
that 's behind it. That 's a bene fit for me be cause it benejits the community but 
for me at some point these things gonna evolve on its own and 1 won 't need to 
maintain it anymore. Since we have limited resources the more others can do 
the better it is for us be cause we can work on other stuff. " 
(IT department head of publicly-held enterprise client) 
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Apparently, benefiting from a 'rapidly evolving technology ' that lives in a public 
domain requires the users to remain ' actively connected ' with the technology source 
and main development platform through their teclmological collaborations. 
Remaining actively connected ensures that client' benefits ( e.g., flexibility, cost 
saving, etc.) continue to remain as strengths of their choice of using OSS, rather than 
tuming into vulnerabilities in their ISs. Therefore, as shown in Figure 5.1 0, adoption 
of OSS solutions by enterprise clients can lead to obtainment of certain key benefits 
only under conditions of 'active connection and collaboration ' (Filter or condition) 
· with OSS community of developers. Therefore, establishing technological 
collaborations do matter for clients who want to optimally benefit from their OSS 
adoption choices. 
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Having realized the intermediate role of clients ' technological collaboration with the 
community developers of the source project puts the spotlight on the concept of 
COLLABORATION. In fact , the degree and mode of collaboration and connection 
seem to influence the proposed relationship between adoption of OSS and the accrued 
key benefits. Based on the nuances that differentiate clients from one another based 
on their technological collaboration, 1 propose the ' client typology ' ( see, Figure 
5.11 ). 
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Figure 5 .11. OSS Enterprise Client Typology 
Indirect vs. Direct Connection 
QA. The Conservatives 
High indirect collaboration 
High indirect connection 
QB. The Luddites 
Low indirect collaboration 
Low indirect connection 
QC. The Champions 
High direct collaboration 
High direct connection 
QD. The Reticent 
Low direct collaboration 
Low direct connection 
Quadrant A (QA, The Conservatives) includes clients that have a positive attitude 
towards adoption of OSS and OSS philosophy and ideology. They appreciate OSS 
development methodology and are very well aware of the fact that the promises made 
by this technology in form of accrued benefits are at the expense of clients' remaining 
connected with OSS projects and community of developers and actively collaborate 
in the RDIP. The IT departments of the enterprise clients that fall un der this category 
know quite a few different OSS projects and technologies and have a general opinion 
about how their needs can be responded to by adopting a particular solution. 
However, they have neither deep expertise and technological capability nor the 
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necessary resources (time and labor) to directly c01mect and collaborate with OSS 
projects' community members. Therefore, they view OSS firms as both a tool to 
indirectly connect and collaborate with OSS communities and as a source of 
guarantee for support and security oftheir systems. 
"Sometimes we se nd a patch or a little new feature but direct/y to SFL and not 
the community. So we are not Jully integrated into the community. We prefer 
to send the patch or information to our partner SFL. SFL has already the 
ability to communicate sorne new features to Liferay and they have more 
power to push new things like the Canadian French translation. They are 
already pushing the Liferay to integrate the plug-in. We try to pass it by 
SFL. " 
(OSS enterprise client) 
ln addition, although these clients do not have high leve! of in-house OSS 
technological capabilities (OSS-specific absorptive capacity) which allow them to 
directly connect with OSS community and interact with them in R&D projects, they 
try to support OSS methodology and sustainability of OSS projects by indirectly 
investing in OSS development through their service provider. This indirect 
investment and involvement includes allowing more time to OSS firm to participate 
in iterative software development process with experts in community and get the 
codes (new modules or packaging methods) integrated into the main technology 
platform. Moreover, clients accept to share part of the added costs incurred by OSS 
firm in order to ensure that the firm assigns developers to collaborate with 
community on the assigned projects. ln addition, the client explicitly authorizes the 
OSS firm on the matter of code sharing process with community. The following 
quotes highlight the clients' rationale for doing so, as told by OSS developers. 
"Sorne clients use communities and sorne asks us to do it .... For example, 
client 'X' .... said we have the time you want and asked us to push it back 
upstream when they signed the contract. They understand pushing back to the 
community is a good thing ... They understood the process that code gets 
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reviewed. We tell them we can write really good stu.fffor you but we tell them 
if we push it back to community it will be perfect because thousands of 
developers will look at the code and fix whatever they couldfind ... They know 
thal the review process by community adds real value to the project ... And 
every time 1 saw some gene rie part of the work that is not eus tomer specifie 1 
push il back to the community. They accepted il. . .. In this case, the eus tomer 
is on! y dealing with us and has no link with community. They don 't touch the 
middle [ community] direct/y ... " 
" ... Customers must be patient and willing to support to be able to use 
purified water downstream. " 
"ft depends on the customer type. Some customers know OSS so they 
understand what it is and what our task is. Some others have just a software 
need and they want us to respond to it. These clients do not really know about 
OSS communities. " 
"So the customer and community invested in the campaign with money, 
testing and bug report and the development was done by two partners/service 
providers. " 
Lastly, these clients view OSS solution as a means to gain competitive advantage as 
they can work around solutions to enhance their productivity gains. Therefore, 
magnitude of their OSS adoption is quite significant and as they have engaged in 
building relationships with OSS firms, they will incur high switching costs if they 
decide to suddenly switch from one OSS firm service provider to another. 
Quadrant B (QB, The Luddites) includes clients that look at OSS solutions just 
through the same lenses they use to consider proprietary ones. They do not have 
necessarily a positive attitude towards OSS and its community-based development 
methodology. They are mainly interested in reducing costs, and this motivates them 
to adopt OSS solutions if they are comparable with proprietary solutions. The 
benefits associated with using software that gives them flexibility do not significantly 
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influence their decisions. Fw1hermore, they face resources shortages that prevent 
them from collaborating even if they intended to do so. One of the clients explains 
that they ask: 
"ls the re value for us ... that 's a bigger question ... certain/y in this company is 
not clear the value of il! What would be the value of dedicating some portion 
of te a ms to contributing to OS ... 1 don 't think that this is the business equation 
that has been solved yet, that anyone would be comfortable saying yes 
absolutely this makes sense for our business be cause x, y, and z. 
"Do we have lime, given the small size of this group he re .. . ft 's very difficult 
for us to invest ... our reason of the business "raison-d 'etre " is not to build 
software for sake of building software. We build products and services in 
exchange for payments for very niche markets." 
(OSS enterprise client) 
In case of the Luddites, magnitude of their OSS adoption is quite low and therefore 
they have very low switching costs associated with their choice of OSS adoption. 
Their IT departments are dominated by engineers mainly trained in proprietary 
software environments. Therefore, they do not have an in-bouse OSS technological 
capability that can enable them to directly connect with OSS communities. For them, 
OSS firms are just IT service firms that satisfy a need. Building a strong relationship 
with OSS firms or communities around the projects they use is not an important 
issue. These clients may even require strict confidentiality agreements and do not 
allow OSS firm to share any code back with community. Thus, when the OSS firm 
develops a module for them, almost ali the maintenance issues become the client's 
responsibility unless they sign a contract with an OSS firm for services and support. 
OSS firms supplying such services put it as the following. 
" What they do purchase from us are: services, training, customizations, 
installations, analyses for development and sometimes also we provide access 
to the community so we are the ir single point of contact with the community. 
So, instead of dealing with whatever the number of suppliers that you could 
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work with in a community, our customers just deal with us and we deal with 
the complexity of the community ... " 
COdoo department head in OSS firm) 
"There are some who are pretty much against open source and are 
reluctantly using open source solutions and they use it only because it is the 
best loo! for the job. " 
COSS firm developer and department head) 
"We are part of the community but they also need to interact with the 
community. " 
COSS firm developer and department head) 
Quadrant C CQC, The Champions) includes clients that have a positive attitude 
towards adoption of OSS and free software philosophy/ideology. They appreciate 
OSS development methodology and are very weil aware that the OSS promises in 
form of benefits are due to clients' remaining connected with OSS projects and 
community of developers and actively collaborating in the RDIP. 
"Y es, 1 think the re is value be cause the nearer you are to community, the 
more rapidly and easily you can find alternative solutions, push changes, 
make sure of your direction and use the power of community. " 
COSS enterprise client) 
"If you want to push sorne change, if you are ne ar developers it is easier ... 
Community can help you if you have to make changes or maybe there is a 
work-around ... Sorne times you want to know if you are in the right direction, 
and community can help you with this ... Sorne times you need to imagine of a 
new solution or if the re is an already existing solution for your purpose. " 
COSS enterprise client) 
The IT departments of the enterprise clients that fall under this category know qui te a 
few different OSS projects and technologies and have a good amount of knowledge 
with regards to how their needs can be responded to by adopting a particular solution. 
However, they do not have very specifie expertise, strong and close connections with 
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each of the OSS projects under their radar. Nor have they necessary resources like 
time and labor to build a trust-based relationship with ali those communities around 
the projects they need. Furthermore, although they know that those projects are 
valuable, they need a guarantee from an OSS finn in order to justify their decision 
among the top managers and obtain their backing for migrations to OSS. 
" We are more driven by projects and functionality delivery ... . more than 
what 's going on out there [in communities}. Of course, when we design 
solutions we do a fair job of auditing what 's out there [in communities] 
doing a survey of what 's being used in solving these particular problems. In 
that sort of ... that who le rejlection or thinking is associated with what X 
ross jirm} can give us. os jirm for us is a pair of hands to implement a 
solution. We rely on their expertise to vet or influence our design or 
technology choices obviously; but, the value they bring to us is because they 
have experience with many different projects we know that from the get-go 
it 's going to be a high quality technology. They [OSS firms] re duce the risk 
factor. Without them, we have to spend more time evaluating our choices 
making sure we are going the right way. Their consultancy cornes wilh a 
certain weight ... " 
(IT department head of publicly-held enterprise client) 
In addition, these clients have acceptable leve! of in-house OSS technological 
capabilities that allow them to directly connect with OSS community and interact 
with them in R&D projects. For example, one of the clients mentions that: 
"On our team we have people who know very weil Java language so we 
choose an OSS which is written in Java. So our developers more easily 
understand the architecture or if we have sorne trouble with the product we 
can point where exact/y the problem lies easily. This is in contrast with the 
commercial product that is closed. ft is easier for us to understand the 
problem that is built in the product if we use OSS. " 
(OSS enterprise client) 
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Although they do not have abundance of resources to build long-term and very strong 
relationships with communities, they have relationship building capabilities to 
remain in connection with key OSS projects' community members and engage . in 
knowledge transfer process. The client collaborates with community through bug 
reporting and bug fixing (submitting patches). They also develop some features and 
try to get them integrated into the core project through iterative development process. 
The following quote sheds light on some ofthese remarks. 
"OS is very important for us. 1 think, and contrary to many other 
organizations, we have really positioned ourselves in the community. Any 
developments that we do we wanna give it back to the community. Because a 
lot of times companies of our size or type they 're gonna take OSS, they 're 
gonna modify it, they 're gonna add to it, but they 're gonna keep it to 
themselves. We 've decided a while aga thal anything thal we develop thal 
can be good for the community we 're gonna give it bac k. For us it 's 
important to re ally get into the norm of real OS process of not just taking but 
giving back also. " 
(IT department head of publicly-held enterprise client) 
"Sorne clients who came to us they are already very weil in contact with 
communities. They already began to have sorne contacts and ask questions and 
contribute back to community. But they hire us to achieve their goals faster! " 
(OSS firm department head) 
"When it [ customized feature or newly developed fearure] eventually gets 
integrated into the [OS} platform, then 1 don 't need to maintain it 
anymore ... like for the next 10 years so the modules thal 1 have added to this 
OSS gets integrated into the normal releases then 1 don 't need to maintain it 
anymore; be cause it 's either maintained by the community or the provider 
that 's behind it. That 's a bene fit for me be cause it benefits the community but 
for me at sorne point these things gonna evolve on ils own and 1 won 't need 
to maintain it anymore. Since we have limited resources the more others can 
do the better it is for us be cause we can work on other stuff. " 
(IT department head ofpublicly-held enterprise client) 
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Lastly, these clients view OSS solution as a means to gain competitive advantage as 
they can work around solutions to enhance their productivity gains. Therefore, 
magnitude of their OSS adoption is quite significant and as they have engaged in 
building relationships with OSS firms and sorne comrnunity projects, they will incur 
high switching costs if they decide to switch from one project to another or change 
their OSS fim1 service provider. 
Quadrant D (QD, The Reticent) involves clients that have a positive attitude towards 
adoption of OSS and OSS philosophy/ideology. They appreciate OSS development 
methodology and are very weil aware of the fact that benefits associated with OSS 
are at the expense of clients' remaining connected with OSS projects and community 
of developers and actively collaborate in the RDIP. 
"Do 1 hope to reach that kind of leve! [full integration with comrnunity]? ... 
absolutely .. . thal would be great ... the re are certain are as I would love to be 
able to influence community in certain ways where we see greater benejits 
from tho se communities ... absolutely ... that 's the intention .. . and we tend to do 
that through our partnership we have with SFL and other jirms. " 
(OSS enterprise client) 
The IT departments of the enterprise clients that faU under this category know few 
OSS projects and technologies and have a general opinion about how their needs can 
be responded toby adopting OSS solutions. However, they do not have the necessary 
expertise or resources to choose among similar options and undergo the migration 
alone. As they are not weil connected with OSS community projects and as they have 
very limited resources, they cannot afford to go through the learning curve and even 
commit mistakes in adoption process. Therefore, they rely on OSS firms' expertise to 
help them choose the right OSS solution from the "healthy community" and they are 
willing to skip the learning curve and risks of making mistakes by letting the OSS 
firm be in full charge of the project. 
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"1 think eventually over lime client can go to the community and they don't 
need us. We see this mode! regularly. 1 mean customers coming to us f or a 
certain leve! of expertise, training, etc. to get them to a certain point and then 
they take it back to themselves. And then at one point when they get stuck 
again the come to the madel but this is like an in-and-out relationship it is 
not a consistent one. " 
(OSS developer and department head) 
These clients use OSS firm as a guarantor to ensure that they can get support in case 
they face a problem; however, they also try to remain connected with comrnunity as 
weil and make an effort to collaborate as much as they can however little. The IT 
department of these enterprises includes personnel with limited OSS technological 
capabilities that allow them to directly approach OSS comrnunities and interact with 
them in R&D projects. Y et, the ir expertise leve! is qui te limited and cannot full y 
benefit the community knowledge repertories. Their relationship building capability 
is also quite limited, as their personnel are not closely connected with OSS projects. 
Many may lack having deep experience working with comrnunity projects in 
capacities of core developers or maintainers. Irrespective of their resources and 
capability limitations, these clients make an effort to pose questions to comrnunity 
members and try to report bugs directly to comrnunity to remain connected and 
collaborate directly however limited. The following quotes shed some light on these 
re marks. 
"Well, they need us be cause like any other software the re is a learning curve 
involved and even more with ERP systems.. . May be things evolve over 
time .. . Customers need us but sometimes they don't because they can manage 
the modifications on their own. ... Recause migrating an ERP system is not 
like updating any other software. ft is a project in itself and there is a lot of 
risk involved with migration. OpenERP customer would need to do a lot of 
debugging and scripting to have a working migrated system. lnstead, you 
ship your database to Belgium (home to OpenERP), they do the migration 
and then return your new version of ERP to you. So you don't have to take 
care of everything. Bug/ix, migration, security alerts, functional support; and 
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optional hosting if you want ... Y es. We have customers going to OpenERP 
Apps finding modules that they want us to do the testing. We have customers 
on OpenERP forums asking questions to community members and they 
challenge our decisions and choices. We provide them with our advice. They 
ask questions in forum like "1 have been told that we should be doing this 
particular business function this way ... " so the se presence in forum is to 
make sure or conji.rm that what they have been told to do is actually the best 
way to do it. " 
(OSS developer and department head) 
"They don 't want to spend a year and a half to be in re ally good contact with 
community to find out about the best practices and incur ali the cost. For 
example, going in the wrong path and correct it later on. So, it is much 
cheaper to bring someone in like SFL with good knowledge about the best 
practices with the OSS tools; and to know where the tool is going; and the 
counseling on whichfeature to use and not to use. Recause somefeatures are 
not going to stay there long and will be disappear saon. " 
(CIO of OSS firm) 
"We had on our team a gentleman who was a maintainer of an OS 
project .. . and that was great and we benefited from that and OS community 
benefitedfrom that as well." 
(OSS enterprise client) 
"But we are not jully active in exchange of information with community. ft 
needs time to participate in OSS projects. The time you need to spend with 
the community; to be there. So, we have to be careful how much time we are 
using to socialize in community, to do the social activity. For us Liferay is a 
product and we want to have the solution fast. Y ou can se arch in community 
to find your answer but when you have no answer we prefer to go with our 
support fine because we know that we would have the answer faster because 
they have the ability to provide the answer faster. We know that we could 
have the support. So relationship with community implies more time. " 
(OSS enterprise client) 
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Lastly, these clients view OSS solution as a means to gain competitive advantage as 
they can work around solutions to enhance their productivity gains; but due to their 
resource and technological constraints they cannot be highly active with community 
of developers. Magnitude of their OSS adoption is quite high and as they have 
potentials to make strategie investments in there IT infrastructure to be more able to 
engaged in building relationships with OSS community projects directly and get 
involved with them. For these clients there is quite high switching cost if they decide 
to switch from one project to another or change their OSS firm service provider. 
Nevertheless, as they are not very much involved with communities and have not 
invested heavily in building relationships witb OSS communities, their switching 
costs are lower than firms in QC. 
" We did not push back many codes; be cause, our main interest is ta integrale 
the product into our systems. But, we participate in community by indicating 
if there is a bug in the product. Sa, we participate by telling them where the 
bug is. Sometimes we say in which class the bug is. And, sometimes we tell 
them where ta correct the bug. But, il is very difficult or 1 find that very tric ky 
ta correct the bug for them (for Liferay). So, we prefer to pinpoint the 
problem and verify if it is re ally the problem or it is a design issue. " 
(OSS enterprise client) 
C) Hobbyists/Entbusiasts and end-users 
Hobbyists and individual end-users form the third category of actors in the OSS 
collaborative RDIP. Interviewees view them mainly as volunteers who get connected 
with projects and collaborate for non-pecuniary persona! reasons including having 
fun, learning, satisfying sorne persona! , technical needs, and promoting their persona! 
ideological leanings toward free/libre software. One OSS project community leader 
describes this category in the following way. 
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" T h e y  d o  o p e n  s o u r c e  i n  t h e i r  s p a r e  t i m e .  T h e y  w a n t  t o  w o r k  o n  c o o l  
p r o j e c t s .  A n d  a l !  t h a t .  "  
( L T T n g  R & D  p r o j e c t  m a n a g e r )  
" T h e s e  a r e  t h e  p e o p l e  t h a t  a r e  e n d - u s e r s  o f  T i k i  a n d  t h a t  a r e  n o t  l i k e  
n e c e s s a r i l y  b i g  s h o t ;  t y p i c a l l y  p e o p l e  j u s t  w a n t  . . .  o n e  p e r s a n  u s i n g  i l  f o r  t h e  
p e r s o n a !  o r  f a m i l y  w e b s i t e .  A n d ,  t h e  h o b b y i s t s  a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  s t a b l e  
b e c a u s e  t h e y  c o m e  a n d  g o  a n d  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  g o i n g  t o  b e  t h e r e  f o r  a b o u t  5  
o r  1 0  y e a r s .  B u t ,  t h e r e  a r e  a  l o t  o f  t h e m .  A n d ,  i f  y o u  a d d  u p  e v e r y t h i n g  t h e y  
d o  t h e n  i t  ' s  a  l o t  o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  T h e  r e  ' s  n o  r e a l  b u s i n e s s  r e a s  o n  f o r  t h e m  t o  
d o  i t ,  t h e y  a r e  n o t  p a  i d ,  a n d  t h e y  d o n  ' t  r e a l !  y  n e e d  i t  f o r  t h e m s e l v e s  . . .  i s  j u s t  
t h a t  s o m e  p e o p l e  v o l u n t e e r !  S o  w h a t  ' s  i n t e r e s t i n g  i s  t h a t  h o b b y i s t s  b e c a u s e  
t h e y  a r e  v o l u n t e e r s  a n d  s o r t  o f  p i c k  t h e  i r  o w n  t i m e ,  o f  c o u r s e  t h e y  a r e  g o i n g  
t o  p i c k  s t u f f  w h i c h  i s  f u n  f o r  t h e m  t o  d o ,  b u t  t h e y  a l s o  g o i n g  t o  d o  s o m e  s t u f f  
w h i c h  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  f u n ! "  
( T i k i  W i k i  C M S  G r o u p w a r e  C o m m u n i t y  p r o j e c t  a d m i n i s t r a t o r )  
" A n d  t h e  o t h e r  t h i n g  j u s t  c o m e  t o  m y  m i  n d  w h a t  ' s  i n t e r e s t i n g  a b o u t  h o b b y i s t s  
i s  t h a t  t h e  h o b b y i s t s  o r  p u r e / y  v o l u n t e e r  a n d  t h e y ' r e  d o i n g  e v e r y t h i n g  j u s t  f o r  
t h e  r i g h t  r e a s o n s .  T h e y  a r e  n o t  p a i d  t o  d o  t h a l  t h e y ' r e  d o i n g  i t  b e c a u s e  i l  ' s  
g o o d .  A n d  t h e y ' r e  n o t  u n d e r  a n y  p r e s s u r e  o f  a n y  c o n t r a c t s  o r  a n y  d e a d l i n e s  
o r  a n y  b u d g e t s  . . .  T h e y  j u s t  d o  i t  b e  c a u s e  t h e y  t h i n k  i t  d e s e r v e s  t o  b e  d o  n e .  "  
( T i k i  W i k i  C M S  G r o u p w a r e  C o m m u n i t y  p r o j e c t  a d m i n i s t r a t o r )  
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  m a i n  r o l e  h o b b y i s t s  p l a y  i n  t h e  c o l l a b o r a t i v e  R D I P  i s  t o  " m a i n t a i n "  t h e  
i n n o v a t i o n s  t h a t  h a v e  a l r e a d y  h a p p e n e d  r a t h e r  t h a n  r e a l i z i n g  t h e m  o r  i n i t i a t i n g  t h e m .  
B u t  t h e n  a g a i n ,  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  O S S  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n f e r i o r  t o  d o i n g  " r e a l  R & D  
j o b "  a n d  i n n o v a t i o n  o f  t h e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  i n  f o r m  o f  w r i t i n g  n e w  m o d u l e s  a n d  f e a t u r e s  
t o  e n h a n c e  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l i t y  o f  t h e  s o f t w a r e  p a c k a g e .  B e c a u s e  a f t e r  a l l ,  a s  m e n t i o n e d  
b y  t h e  T i k i  W i k i  O S  c o m m u n i t y  l e a d e r ,  "  . . .  i f  n o  b o d y  i s  t h e  r e  t o  k e e p  t h e  m a i n t e n a n c e  
o f  t h e  t h i n g  [ n e w  f e a t u r e s / i n n o v a t i o n s ]  a n d  d o  t h e  h o u s e - c l e a n i n g  t h e n  t h e r e  a r e  b u g s  
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ail over the place th en it doesn 't matter if you have that Janey feature. " The following 
quo te highlight the role and significance of hobbyists /enthusiasts further. 
"In this case is not like live innovation but more of maintenance and clean-
up! House cleaning! Recause these are not the senior programmer, so they 
are not doing like big innovations but they are doing something which is 
necessary because you have your star programmers that do real/y the 
advanced stuff. But that 's not enough! Be cause you can do ail this Janey stuff 
but if nobody takes care of the documentation then nobody is going to use 
those features. And, if no body is the re to keep the maintenance of the thing 
and do the house-cleaning then there are bugs ail over the place that it 
doesn 't matter if you have that Janey feature . So, basically, the se are also a 
fundamental pillar of the community. Recause what they do is like drops in 
the bucket which in an aggregate form they also help sustainability and 
innovation of the community. " 
"in some cases because they have fresh eyes they find bugs because they are 
not going to write that core code but they are going to re ad it but it 's mostly 
that they are going to solve hundreds of small little issues and if you add ail 
that up .... " 
(Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Community project administrator) 
5.3.2 Technological collaboration and its conceptual dimensions unpacked 
"TECHNOLOGICAL COLLABORATION" is a multifaceted main category. 
Because of open coding and axial coding, I have managed to build this gestalt and 
abstract category through the emerging sub-categories of context, sharing routines, 
relationships' typology, and dual-purpose leadership. 
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A) The context for teclmological collaboration 
First, teclmological collaboration within shared OSS RDIP is a context-driven 
phenomenon. This means that without having the contextual elements in place, firms 
cannot collaborate successfully. Based on data analysis, I group contextual elements 
together around the following concepts: Know-why; know-who; know-how; Training; 
and Resources (see Table 5.3). 
For a firm to collaborate, it should first know 'why' this collaboration is necessary. 
The logic that underlines collaboration therefore refers to as know-why. In my 
interviews, ali three actor groups (OSS firms, clients, hobbyists) and community 
leaders and developers unanimously agree that the fundamental reasons for 
collaboration are project maintenance, sustainability, and inter-operability of their 
version of software with the on~that exists in public domain, the commons. Know-
how constitutes another context-related concept and it refers to having the necessary 
teclmological capability, relationship building capability, and relationships through 
which a firm can connect and share knowledge. Know-who further refers to knowing 
the key actors in OSS communities to make a targeted interaction in order to make 
sure the resources are used both efficiently and effectively. An example will clarify 
the se three dimensions of the context. 
Odoo, an enterprise resource planning software is quite a popular and solid OSS 
project with a professional community around it. If one Canadian enterprise client or 
OSS firm intends to have a feature developed in collaboration with one of the experts 
in the Odoo community, the initiator needs to know whom to contact (know-who) 
and how to proceed with the R&D process (know-how or expertise). The experts in 
Odoo community are not ali located in a particular geographie region, and certainly 
not ali are in Canada. Therefore, in order to remotely induce a behavior in (i.e. , to 
encourage participation of) an expert, there needs to be a channel (i.e. , relationship) 
254 
between the collaborators. More importantly, this relationship cannat necessarily be a 
legally binding one as the individual expert (a software developer) who is in, for 
example, Belgium, cannat enter into a contract with a firm in Canada due to high 
transaction costs associated with concluding such agreement. After ali , for a project 
that costs five to ten thousand dollars, it is often too costly to hire a lawyer and sue a 
foreign developer fitm from Belgium; should things go wrong. Such relationship, 
therefore, are often built on trust and familiarity. 
Table 5.3. Unpacking of the Concept ofContext for Technological Collaboration 
Context for 
col laboration 
Know-why 
Know-how 
Know-who 
Source: Author. 
Definition(s) 
• Actor knows clearly about the 
underlying reasons for getting 
engaged in technological 
collaborations. 
• The underlying reasons are a mix of 
self-interest and group interest. 
• Having in-house OSS technological 
capabi lity such as OSS-specific 
absorptive capacity that enables an 
actor to get engaged in the 
collaborative software R&D. 
• Having relationship-building 
capability so asto be able to 
connect with other collaborators. 
• Knowing the influential and most 
capable people in target projects. 
Consequences 
• Top management supports their IT 
departments' decision-making 
concerning resources allocation . 
• Adoption and integration of OSS 
becomes part of a long-term plan as 
opposed to a single-shot software 
acquisition policy. 
• The user turns into an innovator 
because they are wi lling and able to 
collaborate. 
• Ln long-term, the internai know-how 
(expertise) boosts and ensures further 
on-going collaboration. 
• The actor makes very targeted and 
effective investments in their 
relationship building efforts. 
• The actor increases the chances of 
getting the right responses through 
interactions, in a timely fashion . 
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On the plus side, know-how can be taught through training provided by OSS firms or 
it can be lem·nt through interaction with community members. Therefore, the finns 
can learn how to enhance their OSS-related absorptive capacities and relationship 
building capabilities through different stages of training. However, know-who is a 
matter of time and investments a firm makes in OSS communities and it cannot be 
built over night. 
Furthermore, context for collaboration encompasses having resources and allocating 
them appropriately . Resources are; natnely, having experienced OSS developers to 
assign them to projects, time to spend on collaborative developments with community 
members and get involved in iterative software development methodology. Resources 
are also a matter of ' know-why' . Almost ali SMEs and even large firms suffer from 
Jack of resources in their IT departments. Therefore, what makes them different in 
their resource allocation strategies is their perspective of why they should engage in 
this collaborative RDIP. Indeed, if a finn looks at OSS solutions as "a quick fix" with 
no long-term horizon, the IT department head cannot justify either spending of the 
status-quo resources or the request to obtain more resources. 
B) Code sharing routines and its complexities 
Sharing is another sub-category that lies at heart of the collaboration concept. lt 
involves code sharing with community of developers in public domain (i.e., 
commons). A key to successful OSS shared RDIP is code, knowledge and resources 
sharing. Code sharing does not only mean to build and develop technologies in form 
of features , modules; it also emphasizes the necessity to increase the quality of the 
written software and further make sure the project evolves in harmony with ali its 
dependencies and branches. Therefore, it plays a key role in project maintenance and 
sustainability . Code sharing also ensures that ali versions of the OSS remain 
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i n t e r o p e r a b l e .  I n t e r o p e r a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n  t h e r e f o r e  a c t s  l i k e  a n  i n v i s i b l e  c h a i n  a n d  
b i n d s  a l i  a c t o r s  o f  t h e  R D I P  t o g e t h e r  a s  a  u n i f i e d  s y s t e m .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  q u o t e s  ·  
i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  m e m b e r s  i n  m a i n t a i n i n g  c o d e  f o r  t h e  g o o d  o f  
e a c h  m e m  b e r .  
" W e  c a n n o t j u s t  s a y  c o m m u n i t y  i s  g o o d  a n d  g o  f o r  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  . . .  W e  h a v e  
t o  d o  i l  b y  o u r  s e l v e s  [  s h a r i n g  b a c k  a n d  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  c o m m u n i t y ]  o t h e r w i s e  
t h e  c o m m u n i t y  d r i e s "  
( O S S  f i r m ' s  d e v e l o p e r - L i n u x  k e m e l  p r o j e c t )  
" T h e  i d e a  b e h i n d  t h a t  [ s h a r i n g ,  c o n t r i b u t i n g  b a c k ]  i s  t o  e n h a n c e  t h e  q u a l i t y  
o f  t h e  t o o l s  ( L i n u x ,  i t s  d e p e n d e n c i e s ,  i l s  e c o s y s t e m )  w e  a r e  u s i n g .  W e  w a n t  t o  
m a k e  t h e m  b e t t e r .  I f  w e  w a n t  t h e m  t o  b e  b e t t e r ,  w e  h a v e  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  
c o m m u n i t i e s  . . . .  Y  e s ,  a l s o  b e  c a u s e  w e  a r e  n o t  j u s t  u s i n g  O S S ,  b u t  a l s o  w e  a r e  
c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  f r e e  s o f t w a r e  w o r l d .  S o ,  i t ' s  e a s i e r  f o r  u s  t o  g e t f e e d b a c k f r o m  
o t h e r  p r o j e c t  c o m m u n i t i e s .  W e  a r e  n o t  j u s t  l i k e  a  b i g  c o m p a n y  u s i n g  a l /  t h e  
s t u f f  a n d  n o t  g i v i n g  b a c k .  l f y o u  d o n ' t  g i v e  b a c k ,  p e o p l e  w o u l d  b e  l e s s  o r  a  l o t  
J e s s  w i l l i n g  t o  c o o p e r a t e  w i t h  y o u  i f  y o u  h a p p e n  t o  j u s t  u s i n g ,  u s i n g ,  u s i n g  
a n d  n e v e r  s e n d i n g  a n y t h i n g  b a c k  s u b s t a n t i a l l y .  "  
( O S S  f i r m ' s  d e v e l o p e r - L i n u x  k e m e l  p r o j e c t )  
" T h a t ' s  w h a t  t h e  O S  i s  a l /  a b o u t :  s h a r i n g  c o d e s  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  o t h e r s .  S o  
w e  k i n d a  t r y  t o  r e a l / y  a v o i d  s c e n a r i o s  w h e r e  c o m p a n i e s  b e n e  f i t  f r o m  s h a r i n g  
a  c o d e  b u t  t h e y  u s e  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  a s  a  s o u r c e  t o  l e a c h  w i t h o u t  g i v i n g  
a n y t h i n g  b a c  k  . . . .  "  
( B i g B l u e B u t t o n  p r o j e c t  l e a d e r )  
C o d e  s h a r i n g  i s  a l s o  a  v e r y  d e l i c a t e  p r o c e s s  t h a t  n e e d s  t o  b e  m a n a g e d  c a r e f u l l y .  O n  
t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  i t  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  c o s t  o f  R & D  a n d  p r o  l o n g s  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  p r o c e s s  d u e  
t o  i t e r a t i o n s .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i t  a f f e c t s  i s s u e s  o f  c l i e n t  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  a n d  s e c u r i t y .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  m a n a g i n g  t h e  c o d e  s h a r i n g  t a s k  a n d  i t s  p r o c e s s  i s  a  m a t t e r  o f  k n o w i n g  
b o t h  t h e  ' h a r d  i s s u e s '  ( t e c h n i c a l  i s s u e s )  a n d  t h e  ' s o f t  i s s u e s '  ( c l i e n t  b u s i n e s s - r e l a t e d  
i s s u e s )  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  i t s  p r o c e s s .  O n e  k e y  q u e s t i o n  i s ,  " W h a t  p a r t  o f  t h e  w r i t t e n  
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code can be and/or should be shared with communities in public domain?" and " Who 
makes such key decisions- which may have (negative/positive) repercussions?" 
Based on the interviews, I can detect severa! important considerations associated with 
· code sharing decision-making. First, the type of licensing can dictate the sharing task 
no matter what the preference of actors is. For example, if an OSS firm uses an OSS 
library that is under GPL licensing, the codes related to this component need to 
remain open source and must be shared with the community automatically. Second, 
OSS developers need to make a distinction between useful and general codes and 
non-useful , very specifie codes. This is mainly because sorne written codes are so 
specifie that may become irrelevant to the community of developers once shared, 
thereby remaining useless. This is in contrast with the case where an OSS developer 
comes up with a solid and improved packaging method that can be used by many 
developers in the community. Third, OSS developers need to distinguish between 
secretive and non-secretive information that can be revealed by chunks of codes 
where the code sharing exposes a client's private business or technology secrets. 
These chunks of codes, however useful, must not be shared. Fourth, code sharing 
with the community means spending more time on R&D and adding more costs to the 
overall project. In fact, this iterative process involves many back-and-forth 
discussions with the community experts in order to get the code quality enhanced and 
arrive at a cleaned version of the code in accordance with community standards. The 
goal is to get the best possible solutions integrated into the core so that they evolve 
along with the remaining libraries and features as time passes by. Therefore, an OSS 
firm and client need to negotiate the added lime and cost of RDIP, and share that cost 
proportionately. If a client does not agree with new deadlines or the estimated 
augmented costs, then the OSS firm will have to invest alone in this collaborative 
process. Fifth, code sharing reflects the ethics associated with OSS development 
process, which if ignored, it may have detrimental impact on the relationship of client 
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or OSS firm with OSS community. Ali of these are among key considerations related 
to code sharing process. The following quotes illustrate how managers balance the 
needs of community agents with those oftheir clients. 
"There is a gap between sensitive and non-sensitive information. Plus the 
experience you have in doing these parts. ft counts really. For example, in 
monitoring sofMare you do a lot of configurations. And you cannat really 
release them as these configurations contain fP addresses and sensitive 
information so you cannat release them back, for sure. So, it relates to the 
client's company so you can 't release them. But your experience can be great 
for others tao: the way you architecture your configuration and this can be 
great for the community. For example, f used a specifie template 
configuration or module in my solution. f can give this hint to the 
community. " 
(OSS firrn's monitoring practice leader) 
"If we come up with something very technically specifie and of no use to 
community, we will not share it back to community. So we build modules that 
are re-usable and we have site-specifie modules for which there is no point to 
share that code at al!. " 
(OSS firrn's developer) 
"On my first project it was exact/y like that. The client wanted an application 
just for himself and was not interested in sharing the source code with the 
community. But f used different open source libraries and in the project we 
used two licenses. One license we used for the library and this was an open 
source license. So, il was for the community and the client couldn 't keep itfor 
himself. The rest of the project was exclusive/y for the client and he could do 
whatever he wants with the source code. ft was in-house source code because 
it was al! developed in SFL for the client. So the decision on sharing the 
source code and developed solutions can be part/y made with the client 
present at the table of negotiation. ft is the question of licensing. If you find a 
library that is useful for the client's project and it can be anything like 
eus tom components. So, we have to follow the original license of the library. 
If it is like GP L license, you can 't refrain sharing. ft must stay open source 
and we have to give back the code. " 
(OSS firrn's developer) 
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"Our intention is not necessarily to contribute fo OS We do, 1 mean when we 
have to, like because ofGPL and ail these contracts. We do contribute back 
to community but this is not our intention ... we are not doing what we do 
be cause we want to contribute. For us is a by-product [code sharing and 
contributing back to OS community ]" 
(Enterprise client R&D manager) 
My focus was to clean a bit the code and push it back to community. If you 
want some code to be integrated into the Linux kernel, you have to make il 
the way they want. So the code has to be reaily clean and organized the way 
they want. Y ou can develop code in many ways but not ail the ways are clean 
and acceptable by Linux kernel. 
(OSS firm ' s developer) 
The process of code cleaning and integration is peer review process which 
involves revision, modification and submission of codes based on feedback 
provided by community in an iterative fas hi on. This kind of job is also cailed 
R&D project and part-lime took me about a year to finaily integrale the 
code .. .ft look seven reviews to finaily get the acceptance of the community 
and integrale the revised version. When we developed the enhanced version 
of the OS then we pushed it back to the FLOSS community .... 
(OSS firm's developer) 
"Even though 1 jind it hard to be lieve be cause you just have to erase the file 
(file license.texte) ifyou erase it you can remove its traces. Y ou know il is the 
question of ethics. 1 also cannat keep it a secret be cause we are working for 
example on SFLphone together and if people see a huge chunk of codes 
coming from nowhere then it is not a good behavior. Y ou have to give back 
credit to people who did it and say it is their work. " 
(SFLphone R&D personnel, developer) 
Overall, the code sharing plays a pivotai role in collaboration process; having 
significantly positive consequences for the sustainability of collaboratively developed 
software technology and the community around it. Each actor groups merits from the 
code sharing process. However, as explained above, there are conditions that must be 
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met before code sharing. Table 5.4 presents the conditions necessary for code sharing 
as weil as its consequences. 
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C) Relationships ' typology 
Relationships are central to OSS development process. For example, an OSS firm like 
Savoir-faire Linux has forged a very strong tie with Odoo, Liferay, Debian, and 
Linux Kemel communities of developers and has officially developed strategie 
partnerships with the enterprises backing these communities. By doing so, the 
company has high level of resource-dependency; but, forging a strong relationship 
with the communities allow the OSS firm to mildly influence the technology 
trajectory within those communities and reflect or voice its clients' needs effectively. 
Based on the data analysis, new relationships emerge as categories and I have formed 
two major types of relationships; namely, Dyadic; and Triadic relationships (see 
Table 5.5). 
Dyadic relationship refers to a relationship that exists between two actors; and they 
are of three types: 1) OSS firm and its client; 2) OSS firm and the community of 
developers around the project; and 3) enterprise client and community of developers. 
Triadic relationship, on the other hand, involves a tripartite relationship mode that 
exists among three actor groups during the collaboration. 
The dynamic of dyadic relationships between an OSS firm and community of 
developers reflects knowledge sharing routines that are bidirectional and continuous. 
lt also includes quite high resource dependencies. Power distribution is between OSS 
firm and the project community (mainly core developers and leadership). As there is 
no perfect power distribution, one of the two parties may sit in the steering seat and 
have more bargaining power in the collective decision making process. 
Dyadic relationships between OSS firm and community of developers are mainly 
trust-based; meaning that, they are forged through a long term, and effortful 
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collaboration and relationship building work, mainly initiated by the OSS fim1. They 
are the most fruitful relationships and the most costly ones as either of the pm1ies has 
invested a lot of time, effort, and resources in order to maintain the relationship in a 
mutually beneficiai state. 
Table 5.5. Typology of the Relationships an1ong Firms and Communities 
Relation- Dimension Nature Associated Related 
ship type issues capability 
OSS firm- Mainly trust 
project based 
•OSS 
community • Power distribution Absorptive 
• Resource capacity 
OSS firm-client Con tract- dependency • Relationship Dyadic based 
• Two-way bui lding 
Knowledge-sharing capability 
Client- project Contract and routines 
community trust-based 
• OSS 
• Power distribution Absorptive 
• Resource capacity OSS firm-client- Mainly trust- dependency • Relationship Triadic project based • Tripartite building 
community 
Knowledge-sharing capability 
routines • Leadership 
capabi lity 
Source: Author. 
Dyadic relationships between OSS firm and their clients are mainly contractual. 
Clients approach OSS firms with their IT needs and sign a contract that also includes 
a licensing agreement with the OSS firm. Therefore, there are clear objectives and 
expectations set from outset of the project. There is bidirectional knowledge flow 
between client and OSS firm in that the OSS firm leams about the BM and business 
affairs of the client organization in order to be able to customize most efficient! y and 
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effectively the IT services and modules. The knowledge routine dictates client to 
contact OSS firm in case they need to highlight a problem, a bug or if they have any 
recommendations. Therefore, the client is not connected with the community of 
developers arow1d the OSS project. The client' s IT department also attempts to go 
through stages of training to learn about the fundamental aspects of the OSS solutions 
and tools being used in order to be able to use the technology and provide internai 
support if necessary. The power distribution is between OSS finn and client and is 
mainly based on the type of contract signed between them. If the client intends to 
influence the technology trajectory, they prefer to go through OSS finn because the 
client has no relationship with the on-line community. 
Dyadic relationships between client and OSS project community members are mainly 
trust-based but they can also be based on formai contracts signed with the community 
leadership or goveming body. As shown earlier in Figure 5.11 , the ' OSS enterprise 
client typology' , the types of clients that establish dyadic relationship with OSS 
communities fall under quadrants C and D. They normally have in-house IT personnel 
and expertise (OSS absorptive capacity) to connect with source oftechnology directly 
and share knowledge bi-directionally. There are sorne resources dependencies as 
clients directly rely on community resources concerning satisfying their IT needs. 
However, power distribution is not necessarily balanced and it depends on how 
significant client's role and resource allocation to project are as well as how strong the 
leadership and govemance of OSS project is. According to interviewees, OSS projects 
aim to keep the "source of gravity" inside the community project by managing the 
influence of extemal forces on the project leadership. For example, there have been 
instances where the client' s influence has been so high that they could even acquire 
the whole OSS project and turn it into a closed proprietary project. 
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In contrast, triadic relationships only exist when OSS firm, their client, and OSS 
community of developers engage in collaborative RDIP together by sharing 
knowledge, investing resources, and managing the process in a tripartite fashion. 
Building, managing and maintaining tripartite relationships seem to be simultaneously 
the most rewarding and the most challenging. It is the most rewarding mainly because 
ali resources, knowledge and feedback , and technological capabilities merge together 
in the OSS development process so much so that the generated synergy as an outcome 
of the tripartite collaboration leads to (self-)sustainability of the development process. 
As client and community are involved tightly, the teclmology being developed 
responds almost impeccably to the client needs and at the same time draws on ali 
possible available sources of development. 
It is also the most challenging type of relationship mainly because the 
diversity/heterogeneity of participants is at its highest with each having different 
interests, expectations, and leveZ of technological capability. While leaming and 
experimenting together, they need to align their needs and wants, expectations, and 
remain steadfast on the innovation track in order to produce results and meet project 
milestones. In other words, they must form a goal-oriented network. Further, their 
continued technological collaboration is necessary to sustain the project over time and 
ensure long-term project maintainability. This in turn results in an OSS solution or 
tool that is highly interoperable among three actor groups. Therefore, they can 
continue building upon the collaboratively developed technology. Open governance 
and leadership are therefore central to holding the actors together. 
Furthermore, irrespective of relationship type, actors must have two main capabilities 
in order to be able to collaborate and share code. The first capability is OSS 
absorptive capacity. Absorptive capacity originally refers to "the ability of a firm to 
recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate il; and apply il to 
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commercial ends" (Cohen & Levinthal , 1990, p. 128). In context of collaborative OSS 
R&D, it needs to be very specifie as mainstream software engineers in corporate 
North America are mainly trained by an education system that highly favors 
proprietary software and is also promoted and supported by proprietary (software) 
corporations such as Microsoft, IBM, Apple, etc. Therefore, for either client or OSS 
fum to be successful in benefiting from OSS technology and be able to play a role in 
its development, it is highly critical to have in-bouse OSS expertise. This has also 
been a challenge for OSS firms whose main task is to offer services on OSS software 
tools and products. The fo llowing quotes illustrate the difference between OSS 
engineers and the mainstream <mes as weil as the shortage of OS engineers in the 
industry. 
"SFL does not grow very weil right now. We do not have enough resources. 
Today 1 have ta tell my customers that due ta Jack of human resources 1 
cannat respond ta their needs and cannat work on their projects. Market is 
big enough and we would like ta hire more engineers but there are not good 
enough engineers out there. We are ta/king about open source software so we 
want engineer profile because they need not on/y know how to operate the 
system but also they need to understand how the system works. For example, 
a Windows technician does not know how the software works. He operates it, 
and that's al! he knows. For every new version, he needs to be retrained; 
whereas in case of open source of course you need to know how to operate, 
but you need also to know how it works behind the scene. " 
(Odoo practice team leader) 
"There are no technicians in open source, there are on/y engineers. That's 
where companies gain productivity by having engineers who know how the 
systems can be configured to match the needs of the company. " 
(Odoo practice team leader) 
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"Today it takes me about a year to hire and train someone in OpenERP 
department and bring him to speed with other team members. Recruiting and 
training a new OpenERP team member should be the job of middle 
manager. " 
(Odoo practice team leader) 
The second capability is "relationship building capability". It is especially important 
under circumstances where either client or OSS firm needs to directly c01mect with 
OSS project communities. Within OSS ecosystem, relationships are mostly trust-
based, meaning that because individuals know each other or are bound with each 
other based on shared values and norms they engage in knowledge transfer and 
resources sharing. It is literally impossible to write and safeguard a contract for any 
activity a firm intends to do in public domain. However, there are big collaborative 
projects which may demand ali parties to enter into some written agreements but 
overall it is a developer's relationships that get the job done. The following quote 
illustrates how communities provide support for OSS firms . 
" We have also this strong relationship with the community. We are like a 
gateway for anyone, for any company to reach the relevant community 
member. For example, fast week the customer wants a feature that 
unfortunately 1 don 't have the resources internally to provide it,· and it would 
take a lot of lime to exp! ain the project and train one developer to be able to 
provide the feature. So, 1 just contacted a few friends from the community on 
the web, and they told me they could provide it in one day! So two days after, 
1 got the module providing the feature . So 1 skipped the learning curve, 1 
skipped the availability of my team and my resources but 1 am still able to 
provide the service through my relationship with the community. " 
(Odoo practice team leader) 
In addition to the aforementioned two capabilities, triadic relationship demands the 
actors to create some "leadership capability". As three actor groups need to share 
knowledge and resources together while having a heterogeneous set of interest and 
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expectations, the key to successfully identify, share and complete project tasks and 
meet the milestones is to have sound leadership capability. This capability is further 
discussed un der a separate category as it en compasses a myriad of factors. 
D) Dual-purpose leadership 
The interviews with OSS core developers and individual hobbyist, those in project 
management positions in OSS firms and clients' organization and most importantly 
people in leadership positions in communities, have led to discovery of the DUAL-
PURPOSE LEADERSHIP category. Indeed, if actors, collaboration and relationships 
form the bricks of collaborative OSS RDIP, the leadership is the mortar that glues all 
these constituents of OSS ecosystem together. More specifically, within OSS projects 
where it is a matter managing bath technology (and all associated issues) as well as 
people through time, issues of management and leadership tend to merge together 
giving rise to the emergence of the key concept of "Dual-purpose Leadership". Table 
5.6 demonstrates the breakdown of the concept. 
Primarily, a dual-purpose leader of a successful OSS project is a visionary leader who 
knows or at least has a good sense of the destination of the project's technology. They 
tend to think long-term when it cornes to the evolutionary path of the technology and 
they think of the "relevance" of the technology to the future ' s market needs. The 
following quotes illustrate how leadership means having foresight or the ability to 
discriminate the successful from the failing. 
"Leaders need to have vision; some idea with regards to the nature of 
technology, ils evolutionary path and the future road ahead ... So in terms of 
vision, 1 think, it helps if you have a global ide a of where you want to go; so 
when things happen you can evaluate how they fit. " 
(Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Community project administrator) 
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"Good vision and good leadership are important factors of a healthy 
community. How to know what you want and filter out irrelevant requests 
which do not fall in the scope of the project. A project that ac ce pts everything 
ji-om everyone is gonna be slow and bloated with too many features wh.ich. are 
unusable, hard to fix and buggy. " 
(BigBlueButton project administrator/leader) 
"And 1 tend to think long-term and you know think of what we have today 
which are really popular like Facebook and Apple. Today they are pretty big! 
Who knows in 10 years or 15 years .. .. remember the ti me when JCQ was a big 
thing and now is Skype! ... So for me we have to be careful with stuffwhich is 
useful today because who knows if it's going to be around in the future .. .1 
want Tiki has the capacity to evolve as needs evolve! ... So the vision ofTiki is 
not to define something pre-determined, but to accommodate changing 
needs. " 
(Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Community project administrator) 
"The problem is if you don't plan for future when the future arrives we are 
screwed. So thinking long-term means sometimes okay let's do this properly is 
going to take more time today but in the future we will be fine. " 
(Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Community project administrator) 
"So my th.eory is our evolution path is way better than that. So because our 
evolution path is better we can evolve better and we can adapt to the 
circumstances of whatever technology throws our way. " 
(Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Community project administrator) 
"So whatever we do has to work in the next version as well so because we are 
always thinking of the future we are always keeping things future-proof " 
(Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Community project administrator) 
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Table 5.6. Breakdown ofthe Concept ofDual-Purpose Leadership 
Dual-purpose 
leadership 
Vision 
Setting objectives 
Managing 
technology 
Managing the fear 
offorking 
Managing/ leading 
the OSS 
community of 
actors 
Source: Author 
Building concepts 
• Having long-term vision , 
• Being future-oriented or forward-looking with regards to 
technology evolution path, 
• Planning for future and embracing the flexibility to adapt 
technology in the course oftime. 
• Setting project ' s goals, objectives, milestones, 
• Clearly communicating project roadmap with community 
members. 
• Potential for commercialization (closing the gap between 
clients and community), 
• Technological sustainability, 
• Economie sustainability. 
• Leader's attitude (Reasoning with people; Favoring 
compromise over demise), 
• Request management considerations, 
• Technology management considerations, 
• Conflict resolution mechanisms, 
• Acting with resolution and determination in critical times. 
• Managing the collective power to create synergy, 
• Coordination mechanisms, 
• Promoting concept of open governance, wa lking the talk, 
• Ensuring transparency in decision making process. 
Second, leaders tend to set clear goals, objectives and standards and communicate 
them with the members. They also organize the important milestones chronologically 
so that the community of developers works together towards agreed-upon deadlines 
and deliverables. 
"The goal is stability, usability, and features, in that or der. So if the feature is 
not stable, it doesn 't matter how useable the features are ... " 
(BigBlueButton project administrator) 
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"Have a predictable system, people know what to expectfrom us .. . to be able 
to have a solid commercial ecosystem. The consultants need to be able to tell 
customers what to expect! And fT departments need to be able to tell their 
users when the next release is coming out and when the new features are 
available. If you don't have that predictability !hat is just like nothing 
happens. Everybody is waiting for everybody. " 
(Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Community project administrator) 
"So if we have two options in form of systems which bath fun.ction, we would 
go for the simpler one. " 
(Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Conmmnity project administrator) 
Third, leadership of a collaborative RDIP places a great deal of emphasis on 
commercial viability and sustainability of the OSS project. The main idea is that if 
there is value-added R&D that solves a real market need, then the project will gain 
extemal contributions in form of human capital, testing for quality assurance (QA), 
and funding. These conditions collective! y lead to sustainability of the project both in 
terms of technological as weil as economical sustainability. As stated by the 
BigBlueButton project administrator (see the following quotes), a viable OSS project 
generate revenues, and creates benefits that can go back to the community. 
"1 would argue thal ali of the successful Open Source Projects have very 
strong commercial interests where the commercial company sees the 
economie bene fit of having a strong open source project. " 
"One of the factors in evaluating a community is to fi nd out if it is backed up 
by an enterprise, or if the community is involved in offering a commercial/y 
viable or commercial solution. If they are R&D-contributed you can make 
profit out of it and therefore your OSS firm can invest more into thal 
community. So, OSS firm takes part in enhancing the community and making 
it active. The more commercial companies that have embedded the open 
source software ... Y es, you could say a code that is solving a market problem. 
Y ou have a code base that is weil structure and weil maintained. " 
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"An open source project with no revenue is not going to be viable in the long-
run. A lot of times when you create an open source project from scratch, it's 
gonna be hard to sustain unless there is an ecosystem in which commercial 
companies can build upon and contribute back to the software ... So what 
happens next is even if they ship and nothing else happens, the product has 
gotten more stable along those bugs fixed in the core, developers around the 
product has earned revenue, and you have a design win. Y ou have reached a 
milestone in your open source project where a commercial company has 
embedded your software into the ir product. " 
(BigBlueButton project administrator) 
In the absence of successful leadership and cohesion with the community, a project 
may lose leadership and eventually break up into its different projects- the 
phenomenon referred to by leaders as "forking". Dealing with "Project Forking" is 
one of the most significant incidents that can happen (quite frequently) in life of an 
OSS project. Practitioners perceive this phenomenon as an indispensable part of the 
life of an OSS project. lt can significantly influence the project's future and the 
cohesion of the community around it. This phenomenon emerged frequently in my 
interviews, so 1 decided to design a few questions around it and ask interviewees more 
aboutit. 
"So eventually a fork eats up a lot of energy be cause a bunch of people star! 
deciding where they are going to go because you may fee! that this fork is 
initiated due to technical reasons so you are okay with it but then you are still 
losing some of your developers. " 
(Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Community project administrator) 
Overall , project forking is perceived as a phenomenon that entails a split in the focus, 
labor and scope of the original communily project. lt occurs when the community as a 
who le cannot reach an agreement over the direction of technology development. Thus, 
the developers part in two or more groups where each continues in a different 
direction and tries to evolve the technology differently. The disagreement can be due 
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to interpersonal conflicts, purely based on developing negative feeling towards one 
another, or technological conflicts or a mix of both. Many respondents tend to view 
forking as something negative rather than positive. 
Interpersonal disagreement arises when two influential group of developers develop 
negative feelings towards one another which in turn result in Jack of mutual 
understanding and cooperation working towards a common goal. Negative feelings 
can be rooted in "excessive prideful personalities", "feelings of t~chnological 
superiority" weil beyond peers, ill-formed verbal behavior and manners, constant 
feelings of resentments, leadership's hoarding the project ' s authority and code base by 
being stubborn excluding others from being beard and taking a part in collective R&D 
process. Sometimes Jack of delegating responsibility to other developers or Jack of 
team spirit can lead to bottled-up grouses that later cause forking. Therefore, forks 
that happen due to interpersonal or soft issues are the ones that perceived as 
absolutely "badforks" which are also mostly doomed to fail and shrive away. 
"The badforks happen due to a political problem or even worse when there is 
a persona/ problem, like when two people hate each other; and, the reason for 
for king is be cause they can 't stand each other. That 's sad. " 
(Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Community project administrator) 
Technological disagreements on the future destination of the project seem to appear 
when a cluster of participants in a community proposes a specifie technological 
trajectory that is fundamentally beyond the scope of the project. At !east, the proposai 
leads to an intense argument. This is mainly the case where negotiations and 
discussions on finding the middle ground to keep different interests converging fail 
mainly due to unavailability of a middle ground regarding a hard technological 
solution. It is not necessarily due to soft issues (i.e., interpersonal disagreements ). 
Although when forking happens people feel disappointed, the restructuring of the 
community based on technological grounds lead to survival of the main community 
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and birth of a new technology group (i.e., the fork). The forked project may or may 
not succeed in the long-term. Regardless of whatever the fate of the forked project 
may be, this is perceived a rather "goodfork:' compared to the previous scenario. 
"If you 're creating the fork be cause you have reason to be lieve that that's the 
best thingfor the project and thus you thinkforking is good. Jfyou're trying to 
run the existing project and you are doing your best there and somebody does 
a fork, you may fee! that you know they're just diluting the energies and we 
should al! work together .. .. " 
"If a fork happens due to technical reasons, a technical disagreement on the 
future of the project and this is interesting because this is related to your 
question of when do you say no? .... I'm saying you a/ways try to find a 
compromise. But sometimes you cannat find a compromise because the 
proposed technology is fundamentally different. And there is no middle 
ground because you cannat do bath! Well then what do you do? So that is a 
good reas on for for king if no one group can convince the other group. 
(Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Community project administrator) 
Given that forking is sometimes inevitable, how do leaders manage the fear of 
fOl-king or even resolve it? Based on the data, dealing with forking phenomenon 
seems to be a matter of certain hard managerial skills and soft issues related to 
leading a group of people. First, leader's attitude is very important in approaching the 
conflictual situations to nip the issue in the bud. One project leader mentions that: 
"A bad compromise [that can be technologically inferior to the original plan] 
that brings people back to working together is more preferable than a 
[technologically] good decision which leaves people angry with bruises." 
(Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Community project administrator) 
Therefore, a leader who intends to avoid conflict 'promotes' the attitude that 
accommodates different opinions through compromises or a middle ground solution. 
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"If one group wants one thing then this group has to understand what other 
group wants. Everybody in the community has to understand what the other 
people need to be able to find a compromise. Is not necessarily the case that 
what 1 need is better than what you need. The case is thal we al! need stuff 
and we have a shared resource so the question is how we can work together 
to get al! we need without causing problems and people are very reasonable 
so once they understand what other people needs are they are OK with it and 
then we find the solution. So the re is a lot of negotiations the re and this does 
not necessarily al! go through the project leadership in a sense that if there 
are different points of views people will find a solution ... . ft is very rare thal 
these negotiations go up to leadership leve! and we need to argue for that. " 
(Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Community project administrator) 
Furthermore, leadership is aware that conflicts are mainly due to diversity among 
comrnunity developers . Heterogeneity of developers (actors) lead to various needs 
and wants. Therefore, they tend to manage the diversity and resulting conflicts 
through certain initiatives that 1 group them under 'request management 
considerations': 
• Distinguishing between needs and wçmts, 
• Respecting innovators ' needs and wants, 
• Trying to understand and analyze the requests from a technology development 
perspective and how they will impact the whole project such as what are their 
long-term effect on project sustainability, how do they fit with already 
existing features and project roadmap, how can these new requests (if 
responded to) be supported and maintained long-term, 
• Trying to go for experimentation rather than straight cold reject as much as 
possible, 
• Conducting post-experimentation evaluation to reach a consensus, 
• Making a collective decision. 
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Thus, it is quite clear that request management considerations are part of Jeadership ' s 
attitude towards reaching a feasible compromise and taking a middle road rather than 
upsetting the coilaborators up front. The key is to remain as a team and function 
harmoniously as one. The Jeader's attitude, the way s/he handles diversity and how 
s/he orchestrates the team effort towards reaching milestones play a critical role in 
managing conflicts. 
However, leading a conununity is not ail about soft issues and managing people ' s 
requests. lt can also involve hard issues associated with technology management. 
Indeed, compromises can happen at technological leve! too. This study's data show 
that leaders can break the vicious circle of conflicts Jeading to community break-up 
(see Figure 5.12) by resorting to certain technology management-related 
considerations (i.e., the hard side of dual-purpose leadership) so as to keep 
technological disagreements at minimum. Interviewees report the following methods. 
1) To avoid building an over-complex system with large breath of scope: 
Over-complex systems end up having a large number of technological 
features targeting very different market segments. This means the project 
becomes a cumbersome one having severa! centers of gravity beyond the core 
parameter (e.g. , Drupal). The project therefore is hard to manage. For 
example, as many extensions are heavily developed by one segment (e.g., 
different firms ' IT departments); managing ail segments cohesively becomes 
a serious challenge for the community leadership. Therefore, many extensions 
may become obsolete, some die and some others evolve into a direction where 
they cannot become integrated back into the core. Some of forking based on 
technological conflicts reflects these cases. 
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2) To consider skill and competency level of community contributors: Sorne 
communities enjoy having a wide array of developers with varying levels of 
skills and competencies. There are senior programmers who can handle 
complex coding systems; average programmers who shy away from too 
complex systems; junior programmers who can only work with parsimonious 
systems; and power users who are sporadic code writers with limited 
capabilities. Once the leadership cannot coordinate properly these differences, 
one group may start a fork based on lack ofteclmical compatibility. 
3) To know about technology positioning and act accordingly: A community 
project is similar to projects in free market economy in that you need to offer 
a technology which has certain attributes and serves a range of purposes. This 
helps keeping the developers concentrated on the project goal and come up 
with innovations that are fundamentally aligned with project goals. In cases 
where there is opportunity for a technological forking, the two projects do not 
cannibalize on one another' s target segment as each addresses a different set 
of technological issues. 
Figure 5.12. The Vicious Circle ofConflicts Leading to Project Forking 
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Conflict 
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Next, leadership uses "conjlict resolution mechanisms" to organize the community of 
developers (OSS firms, clients, even hobbyists), as well as the decision making 
process; and, it provides a channel for resolving conflicts. These mechanisms may 
include monthly webinar, informai get-togethers, and casual face-to-face meetings 
over a beer or coffee just to discuss the itching matters. These informai mechanisms 
capture the very social and human aspect of conflict resolution , and they can be even 
embedded in formai coordination mechanisms such as yearly conferences or happen 
independently. The key to reducing tensions and resolving conflicts is to have an 
"open, direct and ji-iendly communication" with different parties and to facilitate 
constructive discussions. Conflicts can be largely avoided when people have already 
developed a social relationship and the intended resolution emerges when people 
know each other bath on persona! as weil as professionallevels. The following quotes 
clarify this issue further. 
"Just by speaking and drinking some beer. No 1 am very serious! We do face-
ta-face meeting at each Eclipse calf or con and drinking some beer perhaps is 
a better way to do collaborations with different companies in open source 
projects. 1 am very serious about that. And after thal you know this person you 
are in contact in the mailing list, you know his taste; you know he is smart, 
and you don 't want to ... . okay, let 's discuss, let 's fi nd a way to do something 
which is goodfor you and me; and that 's just because ofyou! We are humans, 
we are not robots. If you would like to work with somebody else you would 
work better and il will work better when you don 't care about the strate gy of 
your company but when you know each other and you appreciate each other 's 
perspectives andfind a solution in the middle. " 
(Eclipse foundation board member) 
"And one of the things that we've done a lot is a lot of physical meetings 
called Tiki Fest so we travel we go to cities .... Nowadays, most of the active 
people have met quite a few of the other active people so even if there are 
some disagreements it is difjicult to tell someone to **** off on the mailing 
list if you had a beer with them fast month. " 
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" S o  i f y o u  w a n t  t o  a v o i d f o r k i n g  a n d  h a v e  a  h e a l t h y  c o m m u n i t y  i n  g e n e r a l  y o u  
n e e d  t o  h a v e  a  c o n j l i c t  r e s o l u t i o n  m e c h a n i s m  . .  S o  t h i s  h a s  a  l o t  t o  d o  w i t h  
b e t t e r  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  s o  f o r  e x a m p l e  o n e  o f  t h e  t h i n g s  t h a t  w e  h a v e  i s  t h a t  
w e  h a v e  a  m o n t h l y  w e b i n a r .  "  
" S o  o f  c o u r s e  w e  h a v e  d i s c u s s i o n  f o r u m s  a n d  m a i l i n g  l i s t  w h e r e  p e o p l e  c a n  
a s k  q u e s t i o n s  a n d  a n y b o d y  c a n  m a k e  a  p r o p o s a i  b u t  s o m e b o d y  c o u l d  m a k e  a  
p r o p o s a i  t h a t f a l l s  b e t w e e n  t h e  c r a c k s  a n d  h e  m a y  f e e !  t h a t  h e  d i d  n o t  g e t  a n  
a n s w e r .  B u t  i n  t h e  m o n t h l y  w e b i n a r s  w h i c h  f a s t  t w o  h o u r s  i n  m o n t h l y  
c o m m u n i t y  c o n f e r e n c e  c a l f  w e l l  a  l o t  o f  t h e  m a i n  p e o p l e  a r e  t h e  r e  i f  s o m e o n e  
b r i n g s  u p  t h e  q u e s t i o n  t h e y  a r e  g o n n a  g e t  a n  a n s w e r .  S o  t h e r e  i s  a t  ! e a s t  a n  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  t a l k  a b o u t  i s s u e s .  J u s t  t o  b e  c l e a r ,  i f  y o u  w a n t  a  b u g  j i x e d  t h a t  
d o e s  n o t  m e a n  i t  i s  g o i n g  t o  b e  j i x e d .  f t  i s  a  d o - a c r a c y  ( w h e n  y o u  d o  
s o m e t h i n g ,  t h e n  y o u  d e c i d e ) .  N o  b o d y  w o r k s  f o r  a n y b o d y ,  b u t  p e o p l e  w i l l  t r y  t o  
h e l p  e a c h  o t h e r  a n d  p e o p l e  a p p r e c i a t e  t h a t .  S o  1  t h i n k  t h e  f a c t  t h e  r e  ' s  a  l o t  o f  
d i s c u s s i o n s  l i k e  t h a t  i t  r e d u c e s  t h e  t e n s i o n s .  "  
( T i k i  W i k i  C M S  G r o u p w a r e  C o m m u n i t y  p r o j e c t  a d m i n i s t r a t o r )  
F i n a l l y  y e t  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  l e a d e r s  t e n d  t o  r e s e r v e  t h e  r i g h t  t o  i n t e r v e n e  o n  o c c a s i o n s  
w h e r e  t h e i r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  a n d  p r o m p t  a c t i o n  c a n  s t o p  a  d a m a g i n g  b e h a v i o r  i n i t i a t e d  
b y  s o r n e  p e o p l e  - a l s o  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  ' ' p o i s o n o u s " .  P o i s o n o u s  p e o p l e  a r e  d e s c r i b e d  a s  
t h o s e  w h o  a r e  p r o b l e m a t i c  b y  t h e i r  v e r y  o w n  n a t u r e ;  m e a n i n g  t h a t ,  t h e y  a b u s e  t h e  
o p e n n e s s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  c o m m o n s  i n  o r d e r  t o  d i s r u p t  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  f l o w .  T h e  
f o l l o w i n g  q u o t e  d e s c r i b e s  t h e m  f r o m  a  l e a d e r ' s  p e r s p e c t i v e .  
" W h e n  y o u  h a v e  a n  o p e n  c o m m u n i t y  i l  i s  r e  a l l y  c o o l  a n d  t h a t  w o r k s  w e i l  b u t  
e v e r y  o n c e  i n  a  w h i l e  w e  g e t  s o m e  n e g a t i v e  p e o p l e  c a l l e d  a s  p o i s o n o u s  p e o p l e  
i n  G o o g l e  o r  t o x i c  p e o p l e .  A n d ,  t h i s  i s  a  t y p i c a l  t h i n g  i n  a n  o p e n  c o m m u n i t y .  
T h e s e  p o i s o n o u s  p e o p l e  t y p i c a l l y  h a v e  i s s u e s  a n d  t h e y  u s e  t h e  o p e n n e s s  t o  
p o i s o n  t h e  p r o j e c t  a n d  t h e y  a r e  a / w a y s  n e g a t i v e  a n d  t h e y  a / w a y s  f i n d  
p r o b l e m s .  "  
( T i k i  W i k i  C M S  G r o u p w a r e  C o m m u n i t y  p r o j e c t  a d m i n i s t r a t o r )  
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So on these occasions, it is necessary for the leader to step in, in a resolute manner, 
and dismiss those selected individuals who just tend to disturb the flow no matter 
wh at. 
''You just let people do stuff but when there are poisonous people it's 
important for the leadership to deal with them. So we have not had them for 
severa! years but we have had before and at some point you have to tell them 
you have to GO! And that's difficult for an open project because in an open 
project you a/ways try to get people so you don 't have the reflex of kicking 
someone out! But sometimes you need to do it and that 's a power that the 
leadership must maintain, that 's the capacity to expel someone! " 
"At the end, there is a/ways a handful people in leadership position. Thal is 
the nature of things and the reason why these people are in leadership 
position is that other people trust them. And they think, okay, weil, if that's 
what they think we will move along with it until another group of people takes 
over and replaces them. So we have to protect the community,· and, if the re 's 
some people that are difficult then we warn them and eventually expel them 
from the project. " 
(Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Community project administrator) 
Fifth, dual-purpose leadership is all about "managing and leading the OSS 
community" and the diversity embedded therein. The power of the OSS communities 
lies in their knowledge diversity and the synergy they can create. Based on 
interviewees, I can define synergy as "how a mutually synergistic combination of 
distinct capabilities, knowledge, and resources becomes more than their individual 
sums ". By this, I mean that the advantageous combination of knowledge, capabilities 
and resources of the three actor groups (OSS firms, enterprise clients and hobbyists) 
lead to an added-value which cannot be achieved through combination of any of the 
two such as two OSS firms, or one OSS firm and one client only. Nevertheless, to 
manage and lead open communities (i.e., ambidexterity built into dual -purpose 
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leadership), leadership tends to mind several issues such as coordination mechanisms, 
open governance, and transparency in decision-making process. 
Coordination mechanisms play a pivotai role mainly because the landscape of OSS 
development and diffusion has been changing, so much so that strategie OSS projects 
are evolving into a different form. Let me explain this issue further. 
lt is true that even today most of the OSS projects are created based on an 
individual's itching need, passion, and/or curiosity. In a sense, one person invents the 
teclmology and attempts to develop a community arow1d it. For example, consider 
"Tig" and "LTTng" projects' beginning years. These are but just two instances I have 
studied by way of interviewing their core developers and community leaders. I 
categorize these projects under the category of "Individual-based OSS development 
and diffusion" . The following quote clarifies how these projects started by an itching 
need of an individual. 
So the founder started few of these project in an experimental phase during 
his PhD. Mathew is still a Linux Kernel developer and he is widely recognized 
in the Linux Community as "the guy for tracing! " So he is re ally an expert in 
that field and another field which is RCU So Matthew started contributing to 
Kernel during his undergraduate study. So he tried to find out about how do I 
have issues with my systems? How do I debug them at kernel leve!? At the 
lime there was no easy solution. So he started the project oftracing the kernel 
to find out what is happening exact/y and to be able to debug the specifie 
system or problem. So it was technology push in a sense that he was 
scratching this issue ... may be as the re was sorne research interest in that are a 
and also there was his own persona! need as he was working tightly with the 
Kernel. So there was research interest and persona! need. 
(LTTng Project R&D) 
There are also other categories that I have developed concerning OSS development 
and diffusion trend. The second category: "OSS firm-based OSS development and 
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diffusion" class includes those OSS projects which are created and initiated by OSS 
firms. For example, Savoir-faire Linux initiated two projects (SFLphone or Ring, and 
SFL vault) and turned them into open source. These are part of the in-house R&D 
strategie initiatives where management and leadership are centralized within the OSS 
firm. Thus, the center of gravity of the community lies within the firm. Figure 5.13 
illustrates the typology of OSS projects development and diffusion developed in this 
study. 
Although these two categories lead to formation of OSS cornrnunity of developers, 
since their "center of gravity" (management, leadership, key decision making) is 
firmi y located within a small group of individuals (one or two key developers in case 
of the first category) or affected significantly by the firm policies (in case of second 
category), the dynamics and diversity of community may be limited. The following 
quo te from L TTng community illustrates this Jack of diversity. 
"So one of the projects that Matthew is an expert on it is quite research 
oriented. ls leading edge on the technology side. And Matthew is one of the 
few experts in the world on the fi' ont ... When the center of gravity is within the 
project that brings in interesting challenges! Like how do you ensure having a 
healthy community? If all the expertise lies within one guy, and that one guy 
gets hit by bus .... !mean bus factor! ... Matthew is maintaining 3 projects and 
the other 2 guys maintain each one project. So we have 5 projects and 1 
contribute to all. There are other people who contribute but maintainer's job 
is real/y a different thing. Maintainer is like a leader. So they decide on which 
patch is ok to enter and which patch is not ok to be integrated. Or even 
determining the direction of technology is to a certain extent dependent on the 
maintainer. " 
(LTTng Project R&D) 
The third and the fourth categories of OSS projects are the ones that are closer to the 
concept of strategie OSS 1 have been pursuing in this research. The third category is 
"Community-based OSS development and diffusion" like Tiki Wiki community where 
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the OSS project 1s managed and led by a group of key maintainers and the 
community around the project is very diverse and dynamic. The fourth category 
includes "OS foundation -based OSS development and diffusion" like Eclipse 
foundation which hosts over 250 OSS projects. Issues of coordination mechanisms, 
open governance, and transparency in decision-making are among the key factors 
that ensure that the community is managed and led towards generating synergy. 
Therefore, these factors have become ali critically important in these two types of 
OSS development typology. 
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Figure 5.13. OSS Technology Development and Diffusion Typology and Strategies 
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Coordination mechanisms are important tools in hands of dual-purpose leadership to 
organize: a) the diversity of community of developers (OSS firms, clients, even 
hobbyists) ; b) the decision making process; and c) to create the synergy. Coordination 
mechanisms also act as indirect conjlict resolution mechanisms to prevent or stop 
disagreements from blowing out of proportion and disturbing the synergy. 
Coordination mechanisms include creation of associations or foundation - depending 
on the policies of the country in which they are registered. These associations help 
the leadership to manage different projects and diversity of contributors. In these 
associations, like formai organizations, different positions are created and clear raies 
are assigned. By breaking down responsibilities and tasks through delegating 
authority, decision making can be decentralized and therefore individuals can act 
more effectively. As a result, people can be more easily heard, objectives can be set 
and communicated collectively, and feedbacks are gathered and taken into account 
duly . Scheduled formai conferences and seminars as weil as newsletters are among 
the tools which ensure people that there are formai scheduled channels to just get 
together and communicate. Furthermore, issues like scheduled releases or testing and 
quality assurance are managed through these formai coordination mechanisms. 
"lnside Eclipse severa/ hundred companies work together and al/ the 
companies release on the same day ... The re are just some ru les in place and 
we do the walk together on the same timeline. ft takes a lot of coordination. 
For example, if you want to be on the release train, al/ your tests must be 
green. Testing and quality assurance must be passed. Before April there is an 
IP ji-eeze. You cannat change your IPI anymore. Eclipse automatically uses 
tools to ensure thal you are not changing your IP 1. And if you make any 
changes, you can keep continuing but you are not any more on the release 
train. And this is bad for the visibility of your project. So these kinds of ru/es 
force you to be better and enhance your quality. " 
(Eclipse foundation board member) 
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"Architecture council sets the standards. They are ten strategie members and 
persans who are elected by committers ... Now the architecture 's work is to say 
or suggest what the proper ways to do plug-ins are so that they al! work 
together ... Voting is comingfrom "al! " committers, non-members too. 1 or 2 
persans are elected by members of Eclipse. " 
(Eclipse foundation board member) 
"So most of the active members of the community got together in France, 
Strasberg and we had a meeting for severa! days and we tried to decide about 
what do we do? We al! agreed that the current system was bad. OK! So we 
came to the conclusion that the best way to do it is to have fixed release 
schedules, every 6 months there's a new version but every 3rd release is 
called the long-term support (LTS). " 
(Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Comrnunity project administrator) 
The case of foundations illustrates how organizations create and enforce coordination 
mechanisms. Eclipse Foundation, for example, performs: a) project management 
related tasks; b) managing legal issues; c) managing branding and marketing issues. 
Project management tasks include establishing procedures for: project initiation, on-
going monitoring the projects ' activity level, evolutionary path, quality assurance, 
and conducting maturity assessment. (See Figure 5.14) 
Eclipse foundation ensures that there is a clear path for OSS developers to initiate and 
launch projects by creating standards and putting in place a healthy ecosystem where 
there is collaboration and competition so as ensure the projects are active and relevant 
to the needs in the markets. Monitoring of activity level of the projects ensures that 
the foundation is not hosting dead or dormant projects. Moreover, the foundation 
provides engineering architecture advice and services for quality assurance checks to 
make sure ail projects are compatible with one another technologically and evolve as 
a family of interrelated technologies. The foundation also looks into maturity leve! of 
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projects to ensure they are progressing through different stages of development and 
are not stuck in their development process. The following explanatory quotes fmther 
clarify the tasks of a foundation. 72 
"We can create a feature with better architecture and easier maintenance as 
the feature is now inside the core project. So a large part (more than 30%) of 
our business concerns evolution and creating improvements inside the OSS 
projects for clients. " 
"If a project does not have any activity during 2 years, the Eclipse project 
will approach the project owners and ask if they want to evolve the project. If 
no one cares anymore, the project will be killed and archived. So each project 
in Eclipse is al ive! If you go to source forge. net for example, the re are many 
projects that are not active. Y ou don 't know if they are a/ive or maintained. " 
"Or for example, we may have a customer who raises awareness over a ticket 
and show it to us, but then we say, this is not a problem on our side. It only 
concerns your technology. It may be a problem of compatibility with a 
product we just don 't care about. Then we would say fix it yourself. They may 
exist and say you have to fix it because it is your project, but we would say no 
we don 't care. So if the client exists we would say, pay the contract, pay the 
support and we fix it for you and for your own usage. And also 30% of 
turnover co mes from bug fixing and making this ki nd of improvements. If you 
want a new icon to do a new action inside the project, then yes, good idea and 
we will do it in 20 16! But the potential client, the user may say no 1 want it in 
2 months from now, and we would say, ok then pay for it. And it is good for 
everybody because usually customers when they use proprietary softvvare, if 
they want to add a new feature or request for it and pay for its development, 
they would say no. They would say, it is our own road map and we don 't want 
you to pay us to do something which is not on our road map. " 
72 Maturity assessment is quite a new concept at Eclipse Foundation. For them, it is an on-going issue 
to tackle. To conduct maturity assessment, they rely on different data from sources like: the activity on 
news group; the re-activity of the news group; the number of tickets; which tickets have been 
improved; which ones are stiJl buggy; how long does it take for a project to fix critical bugs; how many 
users a project has; etc. Together, these metrics provide a notation on the question , if a project is 
mature or not. It is not only about quality, but it is about maturity. So to determine project maturity is 
quite a complex topic. 
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"There are some services for quality checks. First, Eclipse provides some 
architecture advice. Sa inside Eclipse there are 2 kinds of projects. Projects 
thal are part of a release train and those that are not part of a release train. 
Once a year in June on the same day we release about 100 projects. Al! these 
projects are compatible with one another .... Jnside Eclipse severa! hundred 
companies work together and al! the companies release on the same day. But 
in Eclipse, it is not on top of other projects. There are just some rules in place 
and we do the walk together on the same timeline. ft takes a lot of 
coordination. " 
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The Eclipse Foundation is also responsible for taking care of the legal issues. Since 
commercialization of strategie OSS project bas come to the fore on agendas, the 
foundation needs to be sure that professional enterprise clients will not shy away 
from incorporating OSS projects into their products and services on the basis of 
complications associated with legal issues. 
"Eclipse only contrais legal issues and requests project creators ta be specifie 
about the scope of the ir projects. Eclipse has human capacity and technology 
(tools) ta check codes and avoid duplication on somebody else 's copyrights. 
The foundation is very meticulous about that ta ensure that no legal issues 
will arise later. Each fine must be checked and controlled. " 
"The first reason is that Eclipse hasan IP check (Legal Point of View). When 
you are a software provider like Obeo and you target large professional 
corporations, it is very important for them ta make sure thal upon using the 
technology they are not faced with any legal issues about it. When you re-use 
a code from GitHub it is possible that part of the inside project code is 
protected by GPL licensing. Just imagine you are Airbus and your software 
has a GPL protected embedded library. Then, ail the code of the aircraft 
be co mes GP L. Can you imagine that, that 's tao ris ky. With this ki nd of 
foundation you are sure that the software is free from IP issues. " 
"With this kind of foundation, even the process of IP control within 
foundation can be contra/led. Sa commercial corporations can force the 
foundation ta use the same process they use internally. For example, When 
Oracle needs a new tool for cloud, they say that you can use any project of 
Eclipse foundation without being forced ta go through the internai process of 
IP checking at Oracle because we know that the Eclipse Foundation do the 
job by themselves. Sa for companies like Oracle, that is the only way ta use 
oss. " 
Finally, Eclipse Foundation manages the branding (logo, trademark) and marketing 
issues in order to lead the projects towards having a strong brand equity and 
worldwide recognition. They provide a "channel ta promote the project" on their 
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webpage so that the newly initiated and run projects can benefit from a well -known 
and highly visited platform. They also provide chances for project leaders to become a 
speaker at Eclipse conferences in order to promote their projects within the relevant 
community. 
"Eclipse foundation provides the trademark to broadcast at a worldwide 
scope. In GitHub, you just post your project and then everything else is on 
you. No one knows your project; while inside Eclipse you have a channel to 
promote it. Eclipse webpage is a good place to promote as il is jàmous. Then 
there is Eclipse Con (Eclipse Conference) where you have a chance to 
become a speaker and promote your project. Sourceforge.net or GitHub 
provides hosting for the code but they don 't provide any infrastructure for 
quality check, long term support, etc. " 
"Or, the other way, you create a technology through a network of companies 
under a foundation brand name, like Eclipse Foundation. Something that is 
original inside Eclipse- what makes Eclipse different from Apache 
Foundation (exact/y the opposite) - for example, is that Eclipse allows for an 
ecosystem to exist. The foundation provides the logo, trademark and all 
infrastructure for technology promotion and diffusion. This leads to 
community-owned technology. In ecosystem, il is very easy to see who creates 
the technology. ft is easy for a project to find training, professional services, 
support from providers. In other foundations like Apache, they want to hide 
the technology creators. For example, Apache foundation provides some tools 
for ente1'prise management like SAP. They don 't want to create an ecosystem. 
For example each email of a committer in Apache is @apache. org. So you do 
not get to know who is behind the technology (as an organization). You know 
name of the guy but not the company he is affiliated with. In Eclipse is the 
opposite (@oboe.fr; or, @ericsson. com). We want to do business funding 
where you can do promotions. Because we want to create leadership not only 
on the technologies, but also from a company point of view. " 
Furthermore, the dual-purpose leadership model ensures open governance is in place. 
A CEO/founder of an OSS firm - which is tightly involved with Libreüffice 
community of developers and particularly the core development team - emphasizes 
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the difference between viewing OSS from an open licensing point of view and open 
govemance model. He notes that: 
"Samsung for example instead of building a real open source platform, they 
just lake OSS technologies, hire engineers and develop everything in-house 
with no open governance madel. ft is open source by license but NOT by 
governance madel! So that 's the main difference, right. If you want ta lake full 
advantage of the open source technology and open source methodology with 
everything it has to offer it is not about the license. The license is just a bit of 
a primary tool, the real advantage of open source lies in the real open source 
development methodology and an open governance madel. And this is where 
you will gel the long-lerm benefits of innovation and costs reductions. ft 's 
always about cast. If you install a proper open source system and build a real 
open source platform, you will really have medium ta long-term cost and 
innovation effect. And the problem is big companies like Samsung they don 't 
look at the long-lerm bene fils, and not even medium term. The ir entire focus is 
the next quarter. What is our next quarter look like? Companies still don 't 
know how ta engage in open source communities. They want ta control 
everything. Controlling and short lerm thinking are two main hurdles of 
moving towards open source. The companies like control and short term 
thinking. " 
(Collabora CEG/Entrepreneur) 
As earlier discussed, the nature of dual-purpose leadership requires ambidexterity to 
lead and manage OSS collaborative RDIP. Naturally, there is need for putting a 
visionary leader in place. lt is about promoting real OSS methodology that can only 
survive under real "open govemance mode!". Open governance is about meritocracy 
and delegating authority and power to influence the direction of technology 
trajectory to those who do most and make most significant contributions. 
"The key word in open source is governance mode!: basically how this 
project is technically developed? Who makes the decisions and who develops 
and contributes? What are contributors allowed ta do and what they are not 
allowed ta do? Each project has ils own governance rules. All based on the 
same criteria that anybody can contribute and it is meritocracy sa the more 
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you contribute the more influential you become and the more rights and 
power you have within that project. " 
(Collabora CEG/Entrepreneur) 
And "transparency" is an aiding tool, an enabler that is necessary condition for 
establishing open governance. lt permits actors to study contributions, evaluate them 
and probe further if necessary so there is no secret garden to hi de from others. 
''Y ou can study and evaluate the contributions of the committer as a persan 
and the company he is affiliated with. So when we say Obeo today is the 4th 
biggest contributor in Eclipse community; we can prove it as it is public and 
data are available public. " 
(Member of Eclipse board of directors) 
Overall, my data point toward a new trend that highly emphasizes creating 
foundations or associations of OSS projects. In other words, this new trend IS 
necessary to develop professional OSS RDIP that in real world can respond to 
professional and strategie needs of corporations (enterprise clients) and government 
bodies timely. OSS project leaders seem to be more inclined than ever before to forge 
borderless clusters through foundations and associations in order to orchestrate via 
dual-purpose leadership (manage and lead) the existing islands of OSS projects 
towards effectively meeting market demands. The dual-purpose leadership of a 
foundation also further ensures maintainability, interoperability and sustainability of 
projects. Figure 5.15 depicts this trend schematically. 
As Figure 5.15 illustrates, the OSSRDIP is evolving towards Open Technology 
Platforms (OTP), emphasizing the "power of platforms" (Parker et al. , 20 16). OSS 
technology platforms, however different from the mainstream understanding of 
platforms as represented by Uber, Amazon, YouTube, etc. (see Parker et al. , 2016), 
they share similarities such as being able to create network effects, and benefit from 
economies of scale and scope. 
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Figure 5.15. Institutional Forms and Institutional Evolution of Open Source Software 
Source: The author. 
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5.3 .3 Interdependence-Independence 
Having developed and explained the mam categories of actors and collaboration 
along with their subcategories and conceptual building blocks, 1 now introduce the 
conceptual category of "INTERDEPENDENCE-INDEPENDENCE" as one of the 
main categories of this study. The concept of INDEPENDENCE refers to the fact that 
each actor is an independent entity in the OSS ecosystem. An OSS firm, an enterprise 
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client, or an individual hobbyist each has their own agenda to engage in OSS 
technological collaborations. They are also free to choose how to connect with each 
other and share their knowledge resources. For example, a client can very weil 
choose to only deal with their OSS firm service provider through building and 
nurturing a dyadic relationship. Another client, however, may prefer to initiate and 
continue the collaborative R&D project from the very beginning through the triadic 
relationship encompassing its IT department, an OSS firm and the community of 
developers around the OSS project. Still another option for a client is to simply 
download the OSS tool and continue its development through its own closed IT/R&D 
department. 
Fmihermore, the leve! or intensity or involvement in R&D project as measured 
through amount of resources devoted to prototyping and full feature development, or 
amount of determination to create necessary OSS absorptive capacity and 
technological capabilities through long-term investments, is a matter of choice at the 
discretion of individual actors . 
However, the notion of independence does not nullify, opposes or m1mm1ze the 
importance of the concept of INTERDEPENDENCE. Rather, the two notions are 
interwoven. Within the collaborative OSS RDIP, each actor plays a unique and 
specifie set of roles which is complementary to tho se of the others. 
As a case in point, consider the role a client enterprise can play in the 
commercialization process of OSS technology. OSS projects that are initiated by 
hackers and geeks (i.e., enthusiasts) in the OS communities may or may not have any 
potential for cormnercialization. When Matthew-the master mi nd behind L TTng 
project- first tried to submit his proposai in form of a set of codes to Linux 
community, his proposai was not received with open arms, nor enjoyed much 
296 
community support. It simply did not work "because community was not interested". 
Luckily, he kept working on his technological ideas out of passion through his PhD 
work. Neither the comrnunity nor the inventor himself knew about the 
commercialization potential of this Linux kernel tracing tool technology. Only later 
on, when Matthew finished his PhD research, he became serious about career 
building and commercializing his project. More precisely, Matthew's colleague said: 
"He tried at first to submit the code to the community but this did not work! 
Because community was not interested. But at the lime Matthew moved on his 
own he did not real ize there was a market for the project to build a company 
for that. That was not his first goal. His goal was to provide the tool to the 
community anyway possible. That was very altruistic! That's a lot work ... 
that's the open source way! Y ou provide value befOJ'e asking for commercial 
side ofit. So he did that project during his PhD study. So, after that he wanted 
to continue his PhD work, he taught, so why not start my company and be my 
own employee. And then some people found the project cool and useful and 
expressed their needs. So we provided consulting. And that's how EfficiOS got 
started. " 
(L TTng project R&D) 
Had there been other OSS firms or enterprise clients involved in the process of 
decision making over Matthew's technological proposai, things could have been 
probably turned out differently. Fortunately, LTTng became comrnercialized through 
the entrepreneurial effort of its inventor leading to inception of the small enterprise 
called EfficiOS. The comrnunity around LTTng also grew bigger and gained 
popularity so much so that L TTng was deemed as one of the accepted OSS projects to 
host a rn entee for code writing mentorship pro gram 73 called "Google Sumrner of 
73The project abstract: Recently, with the rapid development of cloud computing there is a huge 
movement towards di stributed data aggregation and Big Data analytics. Although there are many tools 
that deal with the aggregation and visualization part, like Facebook's Scribe or Twitter ' s Zipkin there 
are few tools that deal with trace creation and how tracing can have the !east possible overhead. 1 am 
interested in connecting L TTng's low-impact nature with the scale and visualization capabilities of 
Scribe and Zipkin. 
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Code"74 in 2014. The case of LTTng project highlights the role of diversity of actors 
and specifically inclusion of perspectives of industry clients and OSS firms that 
tightly work with them in detecting commercial value of an OSS project. 
Perhaps the concept of triadic relationships (as a subcategory) discussed under 
technological collaboration category can also be viewed as yet another example which 
leads us to form the notion of interdependence among actors, roles, resources, and 
relationships. In fact, interdependence is a meaningful concept because there are 
independent actors in the ecosystem. A firm, an organization or an individual needs to 
be independent in order to be able to benefit from interdependence. 
In the process of interviewing the IT department head (also playing role in strategie 
management of the firm) of a large enterprise client, 1 realized how rewarding and 
crucial the triadic relationships could be. In this particular instance, the enterprise 
client makes a conscious decision through strategie IT -related discussions with the 
OSS firm ' s consultants to forge a long-term strategie tripartite R&D relationship with 
an OSS project called 'Shinken'. The tripartite relationship was forged through 
connecting a development team from client's IT department with one of the leading 
core developers of Shinken project and additional expert support from OSS firm 
service provider. The idea was to avoid acquiring the OSS project through directly 
buying the whole project and tuming it into closed software. Instead, the client 
(Source: https://www.google-
mel ange.com/gsoc/project/detai ls/google/gsoc20 14/marioskogias/56686009164 75904 ). 
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"Google Summer of Code" is a global pro gram th at offers student developers stipends to write code 
for various OSS projects. " We work with many open source, free software, and technology-related 
groups to identify and fund projects over a three month period. Since its inception in 2005, the 
program has brought together over 7,500 successful student participants from 97 countries and over 
7,000 mentors from over l 00 countries worldwide to produce over 50 million !ines of code" . Through 
Google Summer of Code, accepted student applicants are paired with a mentor or mentors from the 
participating projects, thus gaining exposure to real -world software development scenarios and the 
opportunity for employment in areas related to their academie pursuits. ln turn, the participating 
projects are able to more easi ly identify and bring in new developers. Best of ali , more source code is 
created and released for the use and bene fit of ali. 
(Source: h ttps://www. googl e-mel ange. corn/ gsoc/ document/show/ gsoc _pro gram/ google/ gsoc20 14/about_page) 
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enterprise intended to invest in the project and pool resources and capabilities together 
in order to meet their objectives. By doing so, the Shinken project became stronger 
and more technologically and economically viable and sustainable as they received 
funding, additional human resources, and target market feedback. The client saved a 
lot of money by doing shared R&D in public domain instead of incurring all costs of 
R&D in-house - while enjoying higher quality R&D outcome due to using the power 
of a community. The OSS firm managed to fill the technological gap that existed 
between client IT depmtment and Shinken project while providing support guarantee 
for an extended period of time. 
There are many more similar examples and cases in my formai and informai 
interviews, short discussions and observations that suggest coexistence and 
intertwining of interdependence and independence in OSS projects. However, what 
seems to be more important is the impact of this interwoven notion, and how we can 
interpret it in conjunction with other main and sub-categories discussed earlier. 
Finally, the concept of interdependence-independence can be schematically 
represented by the ' augmented view' of Borromean Links (Figure 5 .1 6), as it is 
emerging from the interviews. 
Figure 5.16 is built upon the conceptual subcategory of "relationship" and the 
relationship typology it discusses: i.e., dyadic vs. triadic relationships. lt represents 
the ' augmented view' of Borromean Links because it also discusses the nature, type 
and role of relationships. On a more specifie note, ali three rings ( enterprise client, 
OSS firrn, and community) are interdependent despite being independent actors. If 
one disconnects, the other will do so (i.e., representing core concept ofunity). 
However, the zones are related through different kinds of relationships. The three 
zones (A, C, and D) host the dyadic relationships. These relationships highlight 
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independence of one actor group from the other. They also emphasize the duality of 
actors ' technological collaborati ons in OSS RDIP . "Zone 8 ", on the other hand , hosts 
triadic relati onships among three actor groups in which case the three actors ' 
resources dependency, integrati on and direct collaborati on seem to be in motion. 
Overall , irrespective of actors' engaging in either dyadic or tri adic relationships, the 
notion of interdependence represents the conceptual glue and refl ecti on of a reality 
that a il three actor groups are an indi spensable part of the collaborati ve OSS RDJP. 
Each brings in a specifi e set of capabilities and skill s, plays a particular ro le, and 
complements the other two in thi s process. 
Figure 5.16. An Augmented View of the Borromean Links Mode! of OSS 
Deve lopment 
Already ex isting 
OSS .firms, clients, 
am/ hobbyists! 
Source: Au thor has adopted the bas ic concept of Borromean Lin ks mode! fro m the 1 iteratu re, and 
augmented the conceptual relat ionships based on the primary data gathered from interviews 
and observations. 
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5. 3 .4 S ustainabi 1 i ty 
Interviews with a wide variety of the OSS actors and secondary data with regards to 
participant's role in the open and collaborative innovation process, their vision and 
perspective, attitudes and motivations, resources allocation, ali point towards the 
sustainability of communities and OSS technology development process as being 
essential. In fact, what distinguishes pre-dominantly OSS from closed software is its 
ability ta live and thrive in the public domain- experiencing a dynamic evolutionary 
!ife which makes the software technology, its development process and its growth a 
sustainable phenomenon. Obviously, 'openness ' and ' flexibility' associated with OSS 
development process allow resources and knowledge to flow among actors in order to 
enrich the RDIP. 
As a case in point, OSS firms economically enjoy sustainability through providing 
their supports and expertise long-term. One OSS firm 's department head mentions 
about the underlying reason to keep investing in community of OSS projects as : "Ta 
be able ta offer [our clients] support in the long Lerm" . Client enterprises also benefit 
from sustainability and view it at the spearhead of their efforts due to different reasons 
earlier touched upon. For example, one large client corporation 's IT department head 
emphasizes that getting a newly written piece of code ( e.g., a new feature which 
performs a particular function for the client's operations) integrated into the core code 
in public domain has long-term benefits. Once the code is finally accepted and 
integrated, it will be maintained by the community of developers and evolve in 
harmony with other dependencies. The net result of this harmonious evolution in the 
commons is that the client's IT department frees some of its limited human resources 
from being worried about the sustainability of the feature they are relying on. 
"When if eventually gets integrated into the [OS} platform, then 1 don 't need 
ta maint ain if anymore ... like for the next 10 years sa the modules that 1 have 
added ta this OSS gets integrated into the normal re le ases then 1 don 't need ta 
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maintain it anymore; because it 's either maintained by the community or the 
provider thal 's behind it. That 's a bene fit for me be cause it bene fils the 
community but for me at some point these things gonna evolve on ifs own and 
1 won 't need to maint ain it anymore. Since we have limited resources the 
n'lore others can do the better it is for us be cause we can work on other stuff. " 
(IT department head of publicly-held enterprise client) 
Project leaders ' (administrators/maintainers) efforts to manage diversity and lead 
people as a cohesive unit towards achieving the projects ' milestones also suggest 
projects ' and collaborations ' sustainability as being essential. For example, the 
concept of dual-purpose leadership bears upon issues like effectively managing 
technology, people, their requests, and resolving the conflicts in arder to glue efforts 
together and reach the project objectives. This versatility in leading projects is critical 
to avoid unnecessary project forking and nurturing the group synergy. These 
examples are just a few to emphasize the contributing roles of other categories and 
subcategories towards promotion of the key concept of sustainability. In arder to 
further reduce abstraction associated with the core concept of sustainability, I propose 
to break it down into four levels: 1) Technology level; 2) Resources level; 3) 
Relationship level ; and 4) leadership level. 
The technological level encompasses two concepts of interoperability and 
maintainability associated with OSS. It hinges upon the inherent characteristic of 
software which is "modularity" . 
Modularity of software coupled with openness of the OSS development methodology 
allow and enable many developers to get involved in collaborative software design 
and production. However, as OSS evolves rapidly 75, it is cri ti cal for users to remain 
75 A quote form an enterprise clients ' IT departrnent shows rapid software evolutionary path. 
"Sometimes the OSS project changes often. lts development is very fast, and sometimes it is very 
difficult to reuse the same application because the API has so much changed that it is more difficult to 
integrate it. So sometimes the OSS projects are moving so fast that it is very difficult to integrate the 
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(constantly) c01mected with the project they are using or building upon in their in-
house R&D projects. Remaining in touch is captured through concept of 
"relationships" and ensures that the underlying software remains interoperable among 
ali platforms. Further, software that is not maintained becomes buggy, and ineffective. 
In long term, if an OSS that is not weil maintained, it will become technologically 
irrelevant to its conm1ercial and technological environment. lt does not inter-operate 
harmoniously with other dependencies and libraries and it ]oses its capability to meet 
market needs. Therefore, maintainability and interoperability go hand in hand and 
ensure the sustainability ofthe OSS from a technological perspective. 
In addition, to maintain a project so that the software remams interoperable and 
functioning, actors need to allocate tangible and intangible resources on a sustainable 
basis. Thus, the resources level concems the continuous tangible and intangible 
resource allocation to maintain the projects. Bilateral and trilateral knowledge flows, 
engineering expertise, end-user feedback, software testing results and quality 
assurances feedback are ali essential resources for project survival. Furthermore, 
sharing the cost of R&D through crowd funding, and donations provide the financial 
fuel to satisfy extrinsic motivations of developers to keep coding and remain active 
for longer time periods on the project. The following quotes explains role of QA and 
resources sustainability. 
"A lot of challenge with open source software is the quality of softrvare itself. 
1 cali this end user experience. ft is the QA (quality assurance) process. How 
can you test it? When the commercial company takes your open source 
project and embedded into their own product and ship ta their customers, it 
will go through the ir QA teams. They will find bugs thal you would never be 
able ta fi nd. If you make available professional services and thal commercial 
company can engage you as one of the developers of the project, for helping 
new version. So, it is difficult to use an OSS project because we know that it won ' t be the same in one 
year. Or the project won ' t live after one or two years. Soit is important to know if the project lives and 
won ' t disappear." 
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them lo commercialize or embed your project then nol on/y you will earn 
revenue from that, and you must be able to earn some revenue ji-om an open 
source projecl. An open source project with no revenue is not going to be 
viable in the long-run. A lot of limes when you create an open source project 
ji-om scratch, it's gonna be hard to sustain unless there is an ecosystem in 
which commercial companies can build upon and contribute back to the 
software .. . So what happens next is even iflhey ship and nolhing else happens, 
the product has gotten more stable along those bugs fixed in the core, 
developers around the product has earned revenue, and you have a design 
win. You have reached a milestone in your open source project where a 
commercial company has embedded your software into lheir product. " 
(BigBlueButton project administrator) 
" We share the effort be cause the re is no way one can make ali the effort al one 
and provide ali what the customers ask; and there is no way we can charge 
everything to one client. Y es. This might be pure/y R&D and 1 need to finance 
it. .... The re is no way that one single company invest al one in this project and 
finance the full a mount. .. be cause no company is sure on the return on ils 
investment. " 
(Odoo project leader) 
"!just don't believe that unless you are getting economie benefit from 
working on an open source project that the open source project succeeds in 
the long lerm. There has to be an ecosystem around it where there is exchange 
of services and revenues generated. And of course this revenue goes back to 
development through funding developers or compensating developers'efforts. 
Linux is doing so weil because il has such a strong vibrant ecosystem. most of 
the committers are commercial companies who are benefiting economically 
from improvements to Linux. " 
(OSS project leader) 
The third level is the relationship level. lt includes the existence of dyadic as weil as 
triadic relationships. Together, they ensure resources mobility and therefore 
interoperability and maintainability as the end result. Therefore, sustainability of OSS 
projects, the community around them and the software itself hinges upon inter-
relationships as they are the vessels and veins of the OSS ecosystem through which 
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tangible and intangible resources flow fluidly. The following quotes illustrate the 
critical rote of relationships in the iimovation process and maintain quality of software 
development. Actors look at the relationship building as a strategie move as they 
know without them developing and maintaining high quality software is nothing but 
just a fantasy. 
"! think the quality of our products could be worse if we eut our relationship 
with open source. ft would definitely need community ... We learn fi' am it and 
we try ta build something better with it. " 
(OSS developer) 
"We have also this strong relationship with the community. We are like a 
gateway for anyone, for any company ta reach their relevant community 
member. For example, fast week the customer wants a feature that 
unfortunately 1 don't have the resources infernal/y ta provide it; and it would 
take a lot of time ta exp/ain the project and train one developer ta be able ta 
provide the feature. Sa 1 just contacted a few friends from the community on 
the web, and they told me they could provide it in one day! Sa two days after, 1 
got the module providing the feature . Sa 1 skipped the learning curve, 1 
skipped the availability of my team and my resources but 1 am still able ta 
provide the service through my relationship with the community ... " 
(Odoo project leader) 
"! work on strategie long-term relationships; and 1 farm those relationships. 1 
have known these people for many years and 1 go sel! strategie stories on why 
and how we can do il. " 
(OSS firm department head) 
"Sa we look at it like a strategie long term relationship rather than trying ta 
oversell at the start. My predecessor had that problem. He wanted ta oversell 
at the start and this scared the clients away .... So this is a perfect madel, we 
train you and teach you the expertise ta help yourself. We go ta the embedded 
part ta get them up and going. " 
(OSS fim1 sales manager) 
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Finally, concept of dual-pm·pose leadership helps putting ali p1eces of the puzzle 
together in harmony. lt enables us to realize the actors ' roles in a complementary 
fashion and depict the big picture they are meant to paint. Leadership glues these 
pieces together and en sures they re main connected, as ti me passes by. Th us, the 
leadership leve! emphasizes alignment of all other three levels together effectively to 
ens ure sustainability. 
5.3.5 Success 
The concept of SUCCESS is a very fuzzy notion. Even when we consider 
interdependence-independence of actors, govemance structures, leadership, and 
sustainability, there can be differences of opinion in OSS context about success. lt 
means different things to different people, and different actors measure it differently. 
lt is a multi-faceted notion with severa! factors contributing to it. In this research, 
success bas emerged as a concept which has two main components: technological side 
and commercial side. Most of the subjects in this study view the two as 
complementary to one another. Thus, the two, together, build up the success category. 
Technological success is perceived as the quality of software code, its maintainability 
and interoperability, as well as the quality oftechnology management process. In fact, 
a successful OSS tool is viewed as one that functions well, performs solidly, and 
fulfills the technological expectations (i.e., a functionalist perspective). 
The quality of software code is very important from the functionalist perspective. The 
software that is buggy, ànd that it crashes frequently cannot be considered reliable and 
trustworthy. Issues like long-tem1 interoperability and maintainability are also 
conceptual ingredients of technological success. At one point, even if there is an OSS 
tool which is technologically superior to a competing counterpart because of quality 
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of coding and packaging, it may not become a technological success if it lacks the 
interoperability feature and if it cannot be matched with other software tools- an 
indirect quote from an OSS software developer. Technologically successful OSS tool 
is, th us, a relevant tool that fits the lm·ger body of tools. In brief, a piece of code, tool, 
or an application that functions in connection with others. 
There is also the management issue associated with technological success. For 
example, there may be an OSS tool which is highly interoperable with other tools and 
may even be popular but since the community of developers around the software is 
not technologically vibrant or not managed properly, then enterprise client users tend 
to shy away from incorporating that tool into their information systems' 
infrastructure. The issue is that the technology cannot be trusted because the 
community around it is a questionable one. One interviewee about SugarCRM 
mentions that: 
"From the ones I have seenfall off the chart is because they weren't managed 
properly... Like Sugar CRM ft was a very popular technology and it was 
against sales force. But then the code became like a spaghetti soup you know 
like tao many chefs and not enough management on top of that. So the 
developers couldn 't develop what they wanted, and it got messy and the 
developers' time got wasted and it became frustrating and the community 
directions were bad ... In fact; managing the community matters and the 
community has to police itself. You see allthose successful communities they 
are managed, maintained and they have described selected raad map. They do 
all these things thal require a structure. Community takes a lot longer because 
it is a community approach but they continue on. They sometimes have to 
adapt ... " 
(OSS firm sales manager/OSS evangelist) 
On the other hand, commercial success is a function of four main factors: a) high 
commercial viability (market demand); b) diversity in user base (enterprise clients, 
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OSS firms); c) jinancial status (revenue mode) and profit generation); and d) project 
leadership. 
High commercial viability is reflected in market demand for a particular OSS 
technology. When a project is commercially successful , its OSS technology gets 
integrated into professional enterprises ' software tools and products. This is what 
some interviewees have called a "design win". 
"! would argue that ali of the successful Open Source Projects have very 
strong commercial interests where the commercial company see the economie 
bene fit of having a strong open source project. " 
(BigBiueButton community leader) 
For example, Odoo (formerly known as OpenERP) is an OS enterprise resource 
planning software (ERP) which has been in market demand for severa) consecutive 
years since its inception enjoying an upward trend of adoption by a variety of 
enterprise clients. Despite having technology competitors from both proprietary (SAP 
ERP, Oracle E-Business Suite, etc.) as weil as open source (ADempiere, OFBiz, 
Openbravo ERP) worlds, Odoo bas successfully served many client enterprises 
worldwide. Projects with commercial viability are those capable of responding to real 
market needs. 
"OpenERP has raised $10 million dollars in funding to support its R&D 
efforts and commercial growth. As part of the growth strategy OpenERP is 
rebranding to Odoo, to better rejlect its expanded are as of focus in CMS & 
Ecommerce and POS applications beyond the core ERP function. Odoo has 
improved ils pricing and included a free version for up to two us ers for very 
small businesses to enjoy a complete/y integrated suite of business solutions. " 
(PRNewswire, May 16, 2014, San Fransiscof6 
76 Source: http://www .pmewswire.com/news-releases/openerp-becomes-odoo-and-closes-1 0-mill ion-
in-funding-259488771 .html 
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Furthermore, commercially successful OSS projects are those which gain diversity in 
their user base, meaning that enterprise clients from different industries are keen to 
use the tools for different purposes. The diversity of user base means injecting the 
comrnunity of developers with different types of valuable end-user feedback with 
regards to functionality matters and testing the software in real !ife situations. These 
valuable knowledge flows have also positive impacts on technological success of the 
project as they contribute to quality enhancement measures and further 
interoperability of the software itself. 
Moreover, majority of subjects view commercial success as a matter of financial 
status of the project- therefore adding an economie perspective to it. More 
commercial viability means more companies are willing to invest in collaborative 
R&D and project maintenance. Every project needs to have certain number of highly 
professional developers, or as some cali them "star code writers", in order to take 
care of advanced coding requirements and architecture design. So their work is not 
pure! y altruistic and they need to be reimbursed for part of their efforts through OSS 
project funds. Therefore, a project that is comrnercially successful is one that has a 
revenue mode! in place to be able to keep those star code writers in the project and 
improve professional aspect of the technology and serve clients professionally. 
"An open source project with no revenue is not going to be viable in the long-
run. A lot of limes when you create an open source project from scratch, it's 
gonna be hard to sustain unless there is an ecosystem in which commercial 
companies can build upon and contribute back to the software ... " 
(BigBlueButton community leader) 
"Unless the community is based on a 'revenue-driven mode!' which acts as the 
community and as the enterprise like SFL. Liferay is a good example. They 
are community, there is an open source software involved but they charge 
service fees. They are not in a non-for profit situation. So you can't say they 
are pur ely community when they are charging mo ney .... " 
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(OSS enterprise client, financial sector) 
Finally, the rhetorical question that sorne interviews have highlighted along their 
discussions concems: Who is going to lake care of commercial aspects of an OSS 
project? Based on the interview data with commercially viable and thriving OSS 
project leaders, I have come to realize that effective leadership is not the one that only 
focuses on technological issues, but also it is the leadership that has "business sense" 
and knows about private sector organizational issues like branding, marketing, quality 
assurance to ensure client satisfaction, etc. 
"The goal is stability, usability, andfeatures, in that arder. So if the feature is 
not stable, it doesn 't matter how useable the features are .... ft is not just 
possible to do a BBB if you had many people making many contributions. The 
challenge for our software is not so much the development, it 's the 
testing ... and very tight control over the quality of the product .... Weil, once 
we, the committers, merge something into the core or to master, take on the 
responsibility to support it ... So, contributors will come and go, but they are 
real/y contributing to the things that are on our roadmap. Because once il 
goes in, we can 't rely on the external developers to a/ways be around ... we as 
the committers basically have to make sure that whatever goes in is solid ... " 
(BigBlueButton project leader) 
"So you can write a lot of software and if doesn 't ... how about good brand. .. If 
Jlook at il from marketing point of view,· a brandis a promise of sorne bene fit 
and the delivery of that benefit. So in BBB we promise stability and ease of 
use. And ifwe don't deliver thal then there is a negative brand ... we release on 
quality, not date ... " 
(BigBlueButton project leader) 
Ali in ali , teclmological and commercial successes together build the concept of OSS 
project success where the two key components are interlinked and complementary so 
much so that without one the other cannot be realized. 
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5.4 Putting categories in perspective: The core propositions and the theoretical mode! 
Having analyzed each conceptual category in detail , 1 have managed to shed light on 
the black box of their related and interrelated conceptual building blocks including 
their overlap with other categories, and subcategories. This effort has enabled me to 
classify my findings of this chapter under two interconnected subsections: a) The 
Core Propositions; and b) A Theoretical ModeZ. The propositions developed here 
encompass the interrelationships among concepts and explain how they make sense 
in relation to one another. These propositions further touch upon severa! existing 
conceptual overlaps. The theoretical mode!, on the other hand, presents schematically 
how the independent, moderating, intervening, and outcome variables are related and 
influenced by one another. 
5.4.1 Developing the core propositions 
Table 5. 7 presents the four core propositions which forrn the inductive theory of OSS 
technological collaborations developed ground up in this research. lt aims to clarify 
each main and subcategory, and explicate how the categories are related to one 
another. More specifically, propositions focus on the connection between 
relationships, leadership role, and contextual factors and their impact on the outcome 
constructss: sustainability and success of technological collaborations and RDIP and 
explain them in more detail. In follow-up, Figure 5.17 schematically demonstrates 
how the categories are linked. 
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Table 5.7. An Inductive Theory ofOSS Technological Collaborations: 
The Core Propositions 
A the01·y of successful and sustainable OSS tech . collaborations: Core propositions 
Context: Composition of actors and their diversity within OSSTC 
Pl. The diversity of actors (including enterprise clients)- under certain conditions (i .e. , 
context for collaborations: know-who, know-how, know-why)- is likely to positively 
influence both the sustainability and success of collaborative OSS RDIP. 
Context: Technological collaborations and typology of relationships 
P2a,b. Existence of either dyadic or triadic relationships is likely to enhance the success 
and sustainability ofOSS collaborative RDJP, and projects that host them accordingly. 
P2b. Having observed that triadic relationships include more pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
resources, diversity of (tacit) knowledge and capabilities; they tend to be more effective in 
enhancing chances of project success and sustainability. 
P2c. Having observed that ' tripartite collaborations' involve more diversity of incentives, 
there is more chances for conflicts to arise; and, it is more likely for disagreements to lead 
to dissolution of projects. 
P2d. ' Dual-purpose leadership ' tends to play an intervening rote on the relationship 
between tripartite collaborations and success and sustainability of RDJP. 
P2e. ' Dual-purpose leadership ' tends to play a moderating rote on the relationship 
between dyadic collaborations and success and sustainability of RDIP. 
Context: Contextual factors' impact on success and sustainability of RDIP 
P3. Contextual factors (2 Ks) are likely to indirectly influence the success and 
sustainability of RDIP. Put simply, contextual factors tend to enhance the quality of 
technological collaborations and ensure further goal-oriented developments. 
Context: The interplay between success and sustainability of OSSTC and projects 
P4. In view of the particularities, vulnerabilities of OSS technology, and empirical data 
inputs (observations), there seems to exista strong interdependence between success and 
sustainability constructs. Therefore, they tend to influence one another and covary. 
Source: The author. 
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5.4.2 The theoretical mode!: Identifying the key factors influencing the success and 
sustainably of collaborative OSS RDIP 
The theoretical mode! (Figure 5.17) is one of the main outcomes of this research 
project. This mode! is built ground up -i.e. , inductively- based on primary data 
collected through observations and interviews. It comprises five core conceptual 
categories and it aims to demonstrate how the typology of relationships (dyadic vs. 
triadic relationships) among actors influences the sustainability and success of 
collaborative OSS R&D and innovation process. Thus, the two conceptual categories 
of "sustainability" and "success" form the outcome variables of this theory. The 
propositions presented in detail in the preceding subsection explicate the 
interrelationship an1ong the conceptual building blocks of this mode!. 
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5.5 Discussions 
Past research (Weber, 2004; Hang et al. , 2005 ; Kelty, 2008; etc.) has tried to 
understand OSS collaborations and collaborative software methodology. However, 
the ir approach and foc us have been different from tho se of this study. 
Kelty (2008) focuses on free software to approach collaborations and coordination. 
He focuses on Minix vs. Linux and describes Linux success due to accepting almost 
everything and having no goals (Kelty, 2008, pp. 218-219). He claims that 
"coordination in free software privileges adaptability over planning" (pp. 218-219). 
He sees adaptability as a process that "involves more than simply allowing any kind 
of modification; the structure of FS coordination actually gives precedence to a 
generalized openness to change, rather than to the following of shared plans, goals, or 
ideals dictated or controlled by a hierarchy of individuals" (Kelty, 2008, p. 211). He 
also stresses the concept of need-based contributions or need development and views 
it as an organic process. ln short, Kelty's arguments i~nore the distinction between 
Free and OS software, downplays the role of strategie planning in collaborative 
software development, and while underlying need-based contributions, he views that 
as an organic rather than a managed process. 
On the contrary to Kelty ' s approach and focus, this study distinguishes between free 
and open source and mainly focuses on commercial open source software tools and 
projects that will be integrated into a variety of information systems in a wide range 
downstream industries- i.e. , a commercial business case software. Hang et al. (2005) 
also studied OSS as a business opportunity and not merely an ideological 
phenomenon. 
The themes and processes emerging from · the data (e.g. , dual-purpose leadership-
Table 5.6; seven stages of development from the Eclipse Foundation-Figure 5.14; 
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etc.) suggest the significance of professional and rigorous project management and 
calculated technological collaborations in order to ensure success and sustainability 
of the projects and collaborations . For instance, two in-depth case studies of 'Tiki 
Wiki' (OS content management system) and 'BigBlueButton' (OS web conferencing 
system) show how managing technology development process, forecasting the future 
technology trajectories, and effectively leading the OS goal-oriented networks can 
create positive network extemalities and sustainable OSS development process. 
Furthermore, involving large number of people is not the on! y solution to responding 
to the needs. In fact, in order to understand needs we need to understand the 
demography of actors engaged in software development. Weber (2004, p. 71) also 
underlines the shortage of data on demography of the OS communities and 
emphasizes the relative importance of any particular contribution or even the leve! of 
effort that any individual puts in. Indeed, it is not always about the quantitative 
measures. Rather, qualitative side matters too. For this and many other reasons, the 
interviewed OSS firms and community leaders have emphasized the role of enterprise 
clients in the collaborative RDIP (see Figure 5.11. OSS Enterprise Client Typology). 
Just imagine a community primarily dominated by hobbyists. They do not necessarily 
have end-users to account for. This means their needs are more passion or persona! 
utility driven. However, in case of a financial organization or a transport company, as 
a user of OSS, there are serious expectations of smooth functionality downstream. 
Taking this functionalist approach to software development and using the pool of 
talents from the commons requires a strategie client need management system (See 
Figure 5.9. Linear Built-To-Order Collaborative R&D and Innovation Process). 
Moreover, sorne researchers (e.g. , Weber, 2004) does not deal with the issue of 
pecuniary compensation or economie/profit side of OS projects in detail. Nor he 
correctly sees the reasons for heavy reliance on the commons. Weber (2004, p. 75) 
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states that "a good programmer is Jazy Iike a fox" who is "always searching for 
efficiencies". His argument is, writing quality codes is a daunting task which takes 
time, and since these OS programmers do not get "directly paid" for their time spent 
on coding, they have "a particularly strong incentive" to use the OS commons- i.e., 
already existing libraries and tools. 1 partially agree with this argument and in fact 
sorne of these claims emerged from my findings as well (albeit not in those exact 
words). 
However, two major arguments are missing here. First, as the analysis of cases of 
BBB and Tiki Wiki communities reveal , commercial or economie sustainability is 
central to sustainability of the OSS RDIP. Relying on commons is not only due to 
developers ' laziness or the logic of avoiding the reinvention of the wheel. Developers 
are motivated to save time and avoid reinventing the wheel in order to reduce the 
costs of OSS R&D and increase the margins. Many of professional OSS developers 
are actually coming from public and private enterprise. For them, using the commons 
is a way to save cost. 
However, saving costs of software R&D projects explains for part oftheir reliance on 
the OS commons. Other reasons, such as ' creating positive network extemalities ', 
' influencing technological trajectories ' in 'the direction' they find appropriate for 
their future downstream products, and ensuring 'maintenance ' and ' interoperability' 
of their information systems long term are among the other reasons to act like "a lazy 
fox". 
Based on these observations and pnmary data, 1 therefore can complement and 
progress the core propositions (Table 5. 7) and the theoretical mode) (Figure 5 .17) by 
proposing the following testable hypotheses. 
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Hl. Inclusion of enterprise clients- provided thal they are actively engaged-
early on in development process has a signijicant and positive impact on 
technological and commercial suc cess of OSS projects. 
H2. The existence of a dual-purpose leadership tends to positively and 
signijicantly influence the success and sustainability of RDIP. 
H3. Contextual factors are likely to have a mode rate effect on the relationships 
between actors and their collaborations and success and sustainability of 
RDIP. 
H4. There seems to be a covarying effect between success and sustainability of 
OSS RDIP, so much so that if there is an increase in one, the other is positively 
influenced and will tend to be increased as well; and vice-versa. 
Hypotheses three is particularly important because we cannot only discuss why 
developers should engage in collaborative development but also consider how they 
can do so. Collaboration is empowered by, and, takes place within a ' specifie 
context' . Such context is identified by three main elements: 'know-why', 'know-
how', and 'know-who'. Know-why refers to the logic underlying the collaboration. 
Know-how captures the necessary technological capability (both leve! and intensity), 
relationship building and maintaining capabilities. Know-who refers to knowing the 
key actors with whom collaboration is to be initiated and maintained in order to 
engage in goal-oriented interactions. Each element has both 'internai' and ' external' 
consequences. Internai consequences refer to changes to be made internally in order 
to support the collaboration. For example, a client enterprise's top management level 
needs to authorize IT department with further resource allocations towards tripartite 
collaboration. External consequences involve ramifications of each element on 
success and sustainability of OSS technological collaborations and projects. For 
instance, if adoption and integration of a particular OSS module falls under a long-
term client enterprise IT strate gy, then their continued collaboration ensures further 
sustainability of OSS project under focus. Overall, the three ' contextual elements', if 
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m place, seem to indirectly influence the success and sustainability of OSS 
technological collaborations and projects. More specifically, they seem to influence 
the ' quality of collaborations' captured through dyadic and triadic relationships and 
tend to moderate the connection between ' relationships ' and ' success and 
sustainability ' issues. 
Finally, teclmological and commercial successes of OSSTC seem to be interlink.ed 
with two subcategories of sustainability; namely, technological and resources Jevels. 
In fact, the concept of teclmological success captures issues such as software 
interoperability and maintainability which also build technological level of 
sustainability. Concept of commercial success touches upon diversity of user base 
and revenue mode! of the project which tightly corresponds with resources leve! of 
sustainability. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the two outcome 
variables of success and sustainability co-vary. Thus, since the two concepts of 
success and sustainability share similar conceptual building blocks while having their 
own differences, it is likely that the two outcomes co-vary. This means that when 
sustainability of an OSS RDIP increases, it likely increases its success with it; and 
vice-versa, when the success of the OSS collaboration enhances, it likely enhances 
its sustainability. 
5.6. Conclusion 
In this Chapter, 1 have explicated the character of OSS RDIP and technological 
collaborations through highlighting their main conceptual building blocks and 
showing how they are related and how they can influence one another. These details 
provide us with a finer-grained understanding of the internai workings of OSS 
innovation process and how each actor functions in relation to the others. In addition, 
1 have clarified the interdependencies and interrelationships that exist an1ong the key 
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concepts through development of four core propositions, four hypotheses, and a 
theoretical model. The main goal of this theory building process has been twofold: 
first, to identify, characterize, and detail each pivotai element of the OSS R&D and 
innovation process; and second, to clearly demonstrate how the main elements are 
intenelated. The ultimate objective is to ensure that OSS teclmological collaborations 
effectively lead to success and sustainability of OSS projects. Therefore, to this end, 
the propositions and hypotheses developed in this Chapter provide an explanation on 
how the key elements make sense when they are considered together. Finally, by way 
of unpacking abstract constructs and discussing them at a more tangible and 
operational leve!, I suggest that OSSTCs and OSS RDIP depend on sorne important 
contextual factors ; namely, technological trajectories, network externalities, 
heterogeneity of actors which defy clusters in conventional sense, the rents which 
accrue to different kinds of actors (i.e., no Ricardian rents), and the uncertainties 
interwoven with path of the OSS technology development process. In the next 
Chapter, I intend to take a deeper look at OSS technological collaborations by way of 
comparing them with conventional strategic/technological alliances. This approach 
helps me to put the inductive theoretical insights developed under OSS technological 
collaborations in perspective and be able to bridge the crossroads between OSS and 
alliances literatures. 
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CHAPTER VI 
FROM ALLIANCE FORMATION TO PLA TFORM DEVELOPMENT: AN 
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF OSS TECHNOLOGICAL 
COLLABORATION 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter' s main goal is to further theorize about OSS technological collaborations 
(OSSTC) and develop an alternative perspective which explains the platform view of 
OSS RDIP. To realize this goal, 1 first argue that OSSTC is different from 
conventional strategie alliances (e.g., joint ventures) and informai cooperation. In 
fact, they represent a ' new breed of animal ' in the jungle of interfirm cooperation. 
Despite mirroring severa! traits of strategie alliances ( e.g. , using formai interfirm 
contracts as conduit for knowledge transfer), OSSTC are different from them as they 
often take place through informai , short-term, and trust-based relationships. Yet, 
OSSTC do not fall under the laissez faire informai cooperation because they are 
strategie, comrnercially goal-oriented efforts which are significantly influenced by 
organizational issues such as rigorous project management, leadership, motivational 
issues and reward system, to name a few. In addition, the nature of OSS technology 
(i.e. , modularity, demonstrating characteristics of public goods, interoperability 
needs, evolutionary character, and network externalities) makes the case of OSSTC a 
unique one to conduct comparative studies. Thus, OSSTC is not tl1e identical twin of 
either strategie alliances, or informai cooperation; they are simply a horse of a 
different color. 
Moreover, earlier literature on 01 has extensively discussed the ever increasing 
phenomenon of openness in association with BM, strategie management, fim1 ' s 
innovation performance, and has even shed light on rudimentary yet fundamental 
questions in regards to degree of opermess and its consequences. However, a genuine 
OSS technology platform can neither be classified in terms of strict proprietary forms 
of platforms ( e.g. , Uber) nor can it be full y understood through the lens of Or where 
its core emphasis is on how opening up the innovation process can benefit or hamper 
firm-level innovation performance. Therefore, r believe OSS platform represents an 
Open Collaborative Technology Platform (OCTP) which may benefit from the 
doctrine of or, but it deviates from the conventional thinking when it cornes to one 
comerstone of its strategie usefulness: i.e. , long-term continuity and evolution. This 
central objective coupled with different nature and role of dual-purpose leadership 
developed in Chapter 5 lead us to view OSS technology platforms as OCTP where 
continuity is perceived as much critical as openness in the collaborative RDrP. 
Therefore, to develop and characterize OCTP, 1 identify seven dimensions, extract the 
relevant concepts from alliances literature and organize them around these 
dimensions. Further, 1 use the emerging concepts from Chapter 5 to distinguish 
OSSTC from conventional alliances. Finally, the characterization of OSSTC based on 
these seven dimensions form the theory ofOSS OCTP. 
6.2 OSS technological collaboration vis-à-vis strategie alliances concept 
'Technological collaboration' acts as the engine of OSS RDIP, without which success 
and sustainability of OSS projects are at risk. It also relies on four main 
subcategories: 1) Context; 2) Code sharing complexities; 3) Relationships; and 4) 
Dual-purpose leadership. Further, each ofthese subcategories is comprised of severa) 
conceptual building blocks. For example, relationships in our model includes ' dyadic ' 
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and ' triadic ' types where each has its own issues, challenges, and requires a distinct 
set of capabilities. 
Collaboration is a concept somewhat opposite to ownership, and mergers and 
acquisitions. lt is in fact perceived as an ' alternative' to both markets and hierarchies 
which lie at the heart of transaction cost economies, TCE (Williamson, 1979, 1981 , 
1985 1991). In short, in order to benefit from a product or a service, firms are faced 
with three main kinds of decisions: a) togo aboutit alone and make it in-bouse; b) to 
obtain the product or service through purchasing it from the market; or c) to realize 
their demands through jointly producing it with another partner or other partners 
(e.g., Das & Teng, 2000). Collaboration is about using the third option: i.e. , co-
production through partnership. This concept has been extensively studied in the 
context of strategie or technological alliances. For example, Niosi (1995 , p. xi) 
highlights the significance of' strategie alliances' during 1980s and consider them as 
one of the most important "organizational innovations" in modem business world. 
There are severa! definitions of strategie alliances in the literature. For example, they 
can be defined as: 
" .. . agreements characterized by the commitment of two or more firms to 
reach a common goal entailing the pooling of their resources and activities" 
(Teece, 1992, p. 19). 
"purposive strategie relationships between independent firms that share 
compatible goals, strive for mutual benefits, and acknowledge a high leve! of 
mutual dependence" (Mohr & Spekman, 1994; as cited in Kale et al. , 2000, p. 
218) . 
"any independently initiated interfirm link that involves exchange, sharing, or 
co-development" (Gulati , 1995, p. 86). 
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"long-term contractual agreements between two or more enterprises aiming at 
development of new or improved product or process teclmologies" (Niosi, 
1995, p. 3). 
" .. . cooperative relationships driven by a logic of strategie resource needs and 
social resource opportunities" (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996, p.137). 
" ... voluntary arrangements between firms involving ex change, sharing, or 
codevelopment of products, teclmologies, or services" (Gulati, 1998, p. 293). 
" ... voluntary cooperative inter-firm agreements aimed at achieving 
competitive advantage for the partners" (Das & Teng, 2000, p. 35). 
Strategie alliances in the literature are approached through different terminologies. 
Hagedoorn (1993 , pp. 371 -372) views them as "strategie teclmology partnering", in 
which sense it captures an "interfirm cooperation for which a combined innovative 
activity or an exchange of technology is at ]east part of their agreement". He further 
emphasizes the "strategie character" of alliances in that the agreement between parties 
encompasses "the expected long-term effects of the agreement on the product-market 
positioning of at !east one of the partners". Therefore, two dimensions: "long-term 
perspective" and "contracts" become an indispensable part of the strategie alliances. 
Niosi (1995, p. 3) views a technological alliance (synonymously: technical alliances, 
collaborations, partnerships) as a "particular case of interfirm collaboration" that falls 
somewhere between "informai knowledge sharing" and "mergers and acquisitions". 
He defines teclmological alliances as "long-term contractual agreements between two 
or more enterprises aiming at development of new or improved product or process 
technologies" (Niosi, 1995, p. 3). Thus, Niosi (1995) deliberately focuses on formai 
cooperation to the exclusion of "short-term, informai teclmological cooperation" 
while developing the theory of "flexible or cooperative innovation". Furthermore, Das 
and Teng (2000, p. 34) view strategie alliances essentially as the result of "resource 
integration amongfirms" and formulate a general resource-based view of them. 
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In the present research, the 'collaboration' category leads to sustainability and success 
of OSS RDIP, and it reflects severa! attributes and characteristics of technological 
alliances. In fact, it acts as a conduit for transfer of tangible and intangible resources 77 
such as: Knowledge and technological expertise, competences, learning and 
experiences, funds and donations, to name a few. However, it also differs from 
strategie alliances in that collaboration in OSS industry can be short-term, without 
formai contracts, and also it can involve a technological partnering between firms and 
individuals, firms and network of people, between individuals and foundations, etc. 
OSS technological collaborations also have a strong social dimension and this makes 
them different from the concept of "technological alliances" as studied by Niosi 
(1995). In addition, the 'technology roadmap' within OSS projects is not cl earl y 
defined and fixed; i.e., it can change as the surrounding technological dependencies 
change. Therefore, in order to develop an inductive and integrative theory of OSS 
RDIP, it is appropriate to draw on empirical and theoretical literature on alliances to 
highlight the points of dissimilarities between theory of OSS development and that of 
alliances. 
6.3 Overlaps between strategie alliances and OI: The shared conceptual caveats 
One of the main criticisms on 01 framework rests upon the fact that the principles 
underlying closed innovation mode! have almost never existed and that they are 
misleading (for details see: Trott & Hartmann, 2009). Even a cursory examination of 
the past literature on strategie alliances highlights this point. Severa! theorists have 
already considered alliances as a middle ground between the firm and the market, 
highlighting the 'blw-ring' boundary of the firm (Lindsey, 2008; Baker et al. , 2002; 
Garvey, 1995; Williamson, 1979; Richardson, 1972; Macaulay, 1963; Gomes-
77 Wernerfelt ( 1984, p. 172) defi nes resources as "th ose (tangible and intangible) as sets which are tied 
semi-permanently to the firm". 
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Casseres et al. , 2006) or what has been perceived as firm 'permeability' within or 
framework ( e.g. , Dahlander & Gann, 201 0; Elmquist et al. , 2009). This situation is 
further exacerbated mainly because the 01 concept is principally received as "a firm-
centric paradigm that is primarily concerned with leveraging external knowledge to 
improve internai innovation and thus the firn1's economie performance" (Piller & 
West, 2014, p. 29). This firm-centric, economie approach towards innovation 
modeling pushes or even further towards the theory of alliances as opposed to 
promoting the concept of 'open technology platforn1 development' and 'distributed 
innovation networks '. 
In fact, maJor factors underlying the very existence of strategie alliances (or 
sometimes worded as technological alliances, strategie interfirm partnerships and 
collaborations, etc.) which have been mentioned in the literature already include the 
very few erosion factors (see Chapter 2, Sections 2.2. and 2.6, for further information) 
and reasoning behind opening up the business models as mentioned by Chesbrough 
(2007b; 2003a, b, c) and even go beyond them. 
Growing ubiquity of strategie alliances or interfirm collaboration has been 
emphasized in many important works in the past decades including, but not limited to, 
Hagedoorn (1993); Niosi (1995), Mowery et al. (1996); Grant & Baden-Fuller (2004). 
The seminal work of Hagedoorn (1993): "Understanding the rationale of strategie 
technology partnering ... " provides a comprehensive overview of motives underlying 
formation of (strategie) interfirm technology cooperation. Hagedoorn (1993, p. 373) 
classifies the motives into three major categories: 1) motives related to basic and 
applied research and some characteristics of technological development; 2) motives 
related to concrete innovation processes; and 3) motives related to market access and 
search for opportunities. 
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More specifically, according to Hagedoom (1993 , p. 373)78, the first class of motives 
concems: a) "increased complexity and intersectional nature of new technologies, 
technological synergies, ... , access to scientific knowledge or to complementary 
technology"; b) "reduction, minimizing and sharing of uncertainty in R&D"; and c) 
"reduction and sharing of costs of R&D". 
The second class involves: a) "capturing of partner's tacit knowledge of technology, 
technology transfer, technological leapfrogging"; and b) "shortening of product 
lifecycle, reducing the period between invention and market introduction [time to 
market or TTM]". 
The third class of motives finally include: a) "monitoring of environmental changes 
and opportunities"; b) "intemationalization, globalization and entry to foreign 
markets"; and c) "new products and markets, market entry, expansion of product 
range". 
Others (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Mowery et al., 1996; Niosi, 1995; Hamel, 1991 ; 
Kogut, 1988) have also shed light on other motives to form strategie partnerships. For 
example, in an attempt to develop a theory of joint ventures (N)- as a form of 
strategie alliances- Kogut (1988, p. 319) mentions, firms may opt for N as opposed 
to other modes such as licensing, or acquisition because it can act as an "instrument of 
organizational learning" . Therefore, firms fom1 a N in order to trans fer the 
knowledge that is embedded in the organizational context which "cannot be easily 
blueprinted or packaged through licensing or market transactions" (Kogut, 1988, p. 
319). 
78 Hagedoorn ( 1993) draws on a broad range of literature to build the three main categories of motives 
and form their subclasses. For the complete list ofunderpinning works please refer to the original work 
cited in the references section of this dissertation. 
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Hamel (1991) studies intemational strategie alliances and maintains that collaboration 
provides a means for a partner to internalize skills of the other and consequently to 
improve its position within and without the alliance. This highlights the issue of 
"inter-partner Jeaming". He further shows that not ali partners are equally skillful 
learners and this asymmetry with regards to learning capability can change the 
balance of bargaining power between partners. 
Niosi (1995, pp. 9-11) acknowledges the previous research on the factors which 
explain technological alliances and cooperation among independent firms and 
emphasize the most important ones as: a) "realizing R&D economies of scale"; b) 
"accelerating irmovation"; c) "capturing the knowledge of users"; d) "reducing risk 
and unce11ainty"; e) "coping with short !ife cycles of products"; f) "capturing other 
complementary assets"; g) "searching for standards"; h) "using new methods of 
management"; i) "responding to government incentives"; and finally j) "capturing 
regional externalities". 
Mowery et al. (1996), also mention about main motives underpinning alliances in 
terms of sharing cost and risks of innovation (Mowery, 1988); perceived shrinkage in 
product life cycles; coordinating and formulating technical standards and ' dominant 
designs (Grindley, 1995); gaining market power (Porter & Fuller, 1986); acquisition 
of partner's technological capabilities (Mariti & Smiley, 1983; Khanna, 1996). 
Further, Mowery et al. (1996) emphasize that firm-specific technological capabilities 
are often tacit knowledge and are subject to considerable uncertainty with regards to 
their characteristics and performance. Thus, they show that in some alliances, 
'absorptive capacity' plays an important role m explain the extent to which 
technological capability has been transferred. 
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Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004, p. 62) further claim that viewing alliance fonnation as 
a "vehicle for organizational leaming" has impeded the development of effective 
knowledge-based view of alliances. Therefore, to them, alliances are mostly 
advantageous because they allow partners to ' access' knowledge rather than ' acquire ' 
it. Others have also made distinction between different modes of knowledge sharing. 
For example, Hamel (1991) emphasized the differences between gaining access to 
partner's skills and intemalizing them. 
Thus, reviewing the literature on alliances with regards to major factors which 
underpin their fom1ation and explain their existence leads us to a major conclusion 
that existence of strategie alliances properly explain the essence of arguments made 
by Chesbrough about "why companies should have open business models"79 where he 
highlights: innovation inefficiencies, rising costs of R&D and shortening product !ife 
cycles as weil as the possibility to enjoy open experiments (Chesbrough, 2007b). In 
fact, the major factors underlying the existence of alliances aptly capture 
Chesbrough' s justification for open business models. 
Furthermore, motives to choose strategie alliances in lieu of direct ownership through 
market obtainment or mergers and acquisitions, as discussed above, is an implicit 
definition of the original conceptualization of OI: "a paradigm that assumes that firms 
can and should use external ideas as well as infernal ideas, and infernal and external 
paths to market, as firms look to advance their technology" (Chesbrough, 2003a, p. 
XXIV). This is exactly what alliances try to do. In fact, "openness" defined as: "the 
pooling of knowledge for innovative purposes where the contributors have access to 
the inputs of others and cannat exert exclusive rights over the resultant innovation" 
(Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007, p. 57); lies at the heart of strategie alliances, 
otherwise how could the partners move along their technological collaborations if 
79Chesbrough, H. (2007b) . Why companies should have open business models . MIT Sloan 
Management Review, 48(2) , 22-28. 
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they had reverted to concealing practices m partnership80. Gomes-Casseres, 
Hagedoorn, and Jaffe ' s (2006) study on the role of interfirm alliances as a conduit for 
technological knowledge sharing is yet another seminal work on the role of openness 
between partners and how they accrue benefits from it. Gomes-Casseres et al. (2006) 
reveal that the magnitude of the knowledge flows between alliance partn.ers is greater 
than flows between pairs of non-allied firms. Therefore, it is no wonder that openness 
is needed and it helps. Certainly, it is not a magic when different studies have shown 
that alliances can increase the value of the finn , particularly if they include the 
transfer or pooling of technologies (see Chan et al., 1997). In addition, the empirical 
findings in the literature of technological alliances and their underpinning theories 
shed light on the fact that the ' six fundan1ental principles of 01' (Chesbrough, 2003a; 
See Chapter 2, Table 2.1) have been highlighted long bef ore they have been 
represented by Chesbrough. 
The 'main caveats' shared between conventional strategie alliances and OIP are that 
they both emphasize "accessing" or "acquiring" external knowledge and other sorts of 
resources and that they are extremely firm-centric. Y et, the emerging concepts and 
theory from Chapter 5 shows us a somewhat different reality about OSSTC and OSS 
RDIP. These two are not merely to 'access' resources, but they also aim at 
developing an 'open and collaborative technology platform' (OCTP) which must 
remain accessible to participants in order to sustain over time. Eclipse platform is one 
such technology platform which not only facilitates knowledge and resources access 
but also ensures sustainable new knowledge creation- a point not so deliberately 
discussed in the aforementioned literature of neither alliances nor 01. Thus, in the 
following section, 1 will critically analyze the core theories explaining alliances, 
identify their gaps, use their strengths and lay the foundation of a specifie theory the 
explains OSSTC as a distinct form of strategie alliances. 
80 See Kale at al. (2000) for a discussion on how partners share know-how and capabilities through 
strategie alliances while protecting themselves from opportunistic behavior. 
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6.4 Theories of strategie alliances and their implications for a theory of OSSTC 
In view of breadth and depth of explanations on why firms should form strategie 
collaborations, the prior studies on alliances have gone weil beyond the contemporary 
reasoning of 01. Further, literature on alliances is well-rooted in long established 
theories such as transaction cost economies, TCE (Williamson, 1975, 1985); 
resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986, 1991); 
knowledge-based view, KBV (Grant, 1996); resource dependency theory, RDT 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal , 1990); 
relational contracting (Macneil , 1974, 1980); strategie behavior or strategie 
management (Porter, 1980a, b); agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976); 
bargaining power (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981); to name a few. Table 6.1 presents a 
brief overview of five key theories used in the literature of alliances with the intention 
of highlighting the conceptual relevance of these with OSS technological 
collaborations and the OSS technology platform. 
6.4 .1 Transaction cost economies 
The ory 
Economies, defined by Lionel Rabbins (1932, p. 16), is: "the science which studies 
human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have 
alternative uses"; and, from James Buchanan (200 1, p. 29) ' s perspective: "mutuality 
of advantage from voluntary exchange is . . . the most fundamental of all 
understandings in economies". This understanding of economies would lead scholars 
like Oliver Williamson (2005) to focus on perceiving economies as the "science of 
exchanges" (Buchanan, 2001 , p. 28). Therefore, 'economie exchanges ' is at core of 
Transaction Cost Theory of Economies (TCE) where it offers a framework to 
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understand a firm 's decisions in regards to whether to conduct an activity internally 
or externally (Williamson, 1979, 1981 , 1991 ). TCE is comprised of two extreme 
governance modes: 1) markets; and 2) firms ; where the theory' s focus is on the trade-
off between the two (Ozman, 2009). TCE is originally devised to provide an 
explanation on wh y essentially a firm should exist (Barge-Gil, 2013) in which sense 
TCE holds that firms exist to minimize the costs associated with transactions (Coase, 
1937). 
Within the doctrine of TCE the "transaction" is the basic unit of analysis 
(Williamson, 2005, p. 43) where transaction costs are of three major kinds: 1) se arch 
and information; 2) bargaining and decision costs ; and 3) policing and enforcing 
costs (see Coase, 1937; also see Varian, 2002). 
Coined by Ronald Coase (1937), the term transaction cost is used to develop a 
theoretical framework for predicting when certain economie tasks would be 
performed by firms and when certain others would be performed on the market. The 
classic example of this would be ' vertical integration' which is a transaction in which 
a firm makes the make-or-buy decision (choice between market and hierarchy). For 
example, a firm may decide to internalize some production functions, through for 
example, mergers and acquisitions, in order to reduce the transaction costs more 
effectively. This can be a cast-effective preference under the condition that an 
exchange' s transaction costs (like purchasing from market) are higher than 
internalization costs. 
There are two main underlying TCE assumptions in regards to the economie behavior 
of agents. Firstly, agents are rationally bounded; and accordingly ali complex 
con tracts become unavoidably incomplete (Williamson, 1998). Secondly, they are 
332 
opportunistic which implies that firms are formed for "attenuating the ex post hazards 
of opportunism by ex ante choice of governance" (Williamson, 1998, p. 31 ). 
TCE, in comparison to neoclassical economies which views firm as a production 
function- i.e. , a technological construction (Williamson, 1998), draws selectively 
upon three fields: law, economies, and organization theory, in an attempt to better 
understand the complex economie organization (Williamson, 2005). TCE is therefore 
concerned with the allocation of economie activity across alternative modes of 
organization (markets, firn1s , bureaus, etc.); it employs discrete structural analysis, 
and it describes the ' firm ' as a ' governance structure' (Williamson, 2005 ; 
Williamson, 1998). 
Following the TCE's reasoning- which emphasizes a firm ' s governance structure-
Williamson (2005, p. 47) identifies three factors which have "pervasive 
ramifications" for governance (i.e. , elements influencing the firm ' s decisions). These 
factors are: 1) ' asset specificity' (e.g. , tangible and intangible assets); 2) the 
'disturbances ' to which transactions are subject (and to which potential mal-
adaptations accrue)- i.e. 'uncertainty ' ; and 3) the 'frequency' with which 
transactions . recur (which bears both on the efficacy of reputation effects in the 
market and the incentive to incur the cost of specialized internai governance) -i.e., 
' scale economies'. Further focusing on perceiving firm as a governance structure that 
is central to TCE, Williamson (2005) identifies three attributes for describing 
governance structure: 1) incentive intensity; 2) administrative controls; and 3) 
contract law regime. 
TCE and strategie alliances 
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Since TCE spotlights transaction cost efficiency as the motivation for cooperation, 
severa! researchers have found TCE useful in understanding the phenomenon of 
strategie alliances (e.g., Das & Teng, 2000). Sorne have applied TCE' s theoretical 
approach to the context of alliances to better understand the dynamics associated with 
their formation ( e.g. , Hennart, 1988, 1991 ; Kogut, 1988; Pisano, 1989; Williamson, 
1991 ; Gulati , 1995). 
For instance, the issue of ' partner' s opportunistic behavior' has been under spotlight 
and mainly examined through theoretical viewpoint of TCE (e.g. , Hennart, 1988; 
Kogut, 1988; Pisano, 1989; Williamson, 1991). The proposition is that a fitm ' s 
concern about its partners acting opportunistically is likely to lead to higher 
transaction costs. To ward off this potential hazard in collaborations, TCE research 
has suggested firms to adopt appropriate contractual agreements or governance 
structures (e .g., equity JVs) to address these concerns. For example, according to 
Hennart (1988), equity control can reduce the problem of opportunism due to the 
JV ' s aligning of the partners' incentives. Similarly, Kogut (1988, p. 321) raises this 
issue of "mutual hostage positions through joint commitment of financial or real 
assets" as this leads to "superior alignment of incentives", and stabilizing "the 
agreement on the division of profits or costs" . Pisano (1989)'s analysis of the motives 
for using partial equity investments (i.e. , N s) in collaborative relationships 
demonstrates that the use of equity linkages (as in biotechnology collaborations) is 
related to the potential transactional problems associated with transaction-specifie 
knowledge, uncertainty, and small numbers bargaining conditions. Thus, due to 
partners ' ex ante commitments to an equity alliance their concern for their 
investments reduces the possibility of opportunistic behavior over the course of the 
alliance (Pisano, 1989). 
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However, TCE has been challenged by sorne other researcher on severa! grounds. 
Zajac and Olsen (1993 , p. 132) highlight TCE' s weaknesses as: its "single-party 
analysis [as opposed to multi-firm orientation] of cost minimization"; and that TCE 
over emphasizes structural aspects (ex-ante/ex-post dichotomy vs . process). Thereby, 
the former leads to the negligence of the inter-dependence between exchange 
partners; while the latter ignores "processual aspects81 " (Zajac & Olsen, 1993, p. 
135). 
Ozman (2009, p.43) further classifies the criticisms on TCE into three: 1) notion of 
opportunism which can be obviated based on mutual trust between partners (forming 
a network); 2) the need for a more dynamic approach to understand networks in 
environments of rapid change (network governance issues go beyond the dichotomy 
offirm vs. market); and 3) the lack of social processes in TCE. 
More specifically in terms of strategie alliances, Gulati (1995) challenges the 
perspective offered by TCE concerning alliances as it uses "a singular emphasis on 
transaction costs" due to partner opportunism and advocates the use of contractual 
agreements or equity to resolve the issue. Such approach therefore gravely ignores 
the role of interfirm trust and the evolution of interpartner relationships (Gulati , 
1995). Kale et al. (2000) aptly inform us that firms which can build "relational 
capital" in conjunction with "an integrative approach to managing conflict" will be 
able to solve the dilemma of learning form their partners through alliances while 
simultaneously warding off opportunistic behavior. 
8 1 Zajac and Olsen ( 1993 , pp.136-137) argue th at "any fundamental transformation in 
interorganizational exchange relationships over time needs to be understood primarily in terms of 
developmental processes, rather than a sim-ple comparison of ex ante and ex post structural properties". 
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Next, Niosi (1995), in an attempt to develop a theory of alliances, casts doubt on 
whether the theory of transaction costs can explain the management of R&D. 
According to Teece (1989, p. 3-4; as cited in Niosi , 1995, p. 8), "cooperation is 
usually necessary to promote competition, particularly when industries are 
fragmented. Very few firms can ' go it alone' any more. Cooperation in turn requires 
interfirm agreements and alliances, [and] the boundaries of the firm can no longer be 
assessed independently of the cooperative relationships which particular innovating 
firms may have forged" . 
Thus, in view of deficiencies associated with TCE, and in consideration of the fact 
that a strategie alliance is a particular case of interfirm cooperation where it lies 
somewhere in the middle between informai knowledge sharing and mergers and 
acquisitions (Niosi, 1995, p. 3), perhaps other theories can be more useful in 
understanding technological alliances. Das and Teng (2000), for instance, mention 
that since firms basically form alliances in order to gain access to one another' s 
valuable resources, RBV of the firm can be received as a plausible approach to 
further understanding strategie alliances; a perspective shared with severa) other 
researchers (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati, 1998; Rothaermel, 2001 ; van 
de Ven & Walker, 1984) who have viewed alliances as a quest for obtaining 
resources. 
6.4.2 Resource-based view 
Theory 
On the contrary to TCE (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) which emphasizes the ' cost 
minimization strategy ' either through markets or hierarchies; the Resource-based 
View of the firm, RBV (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986, 1991) 
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emphasizes the relationship between what a firm possesses, in terms of its resources, 
and what the firm achieves, in the terms of its strategie positioning vis-à-vis its 
competitors. 
Barney ( 1991 , p.1 02) develops the idea th at "a finn is said to have a competitive 
advantage when it is implementing a value creating strategy not simultaneously 
implemented by any current or potential competitors". This strategy is unique and 
generates rents for the original firm as owner of the resources, because the 
competitors may not simply possess these strategie resources. Thus, this stream of 
thoughts in strategie management literature has established a close link between 
resources82 : "assets, capabilities, organizational processes, finn attributes, 
information, knowledge, etc." (Barney, 1991 , p. 101), and competitive advantage 
(Rumelt, 1984; Reed & DeFillippi, 1990) - where "a finn ' s competitive position is 
defined by a bundle of unique resources and relationships" (Rumelt, 1984, p. 557). 
Barney ( 1991) further characterizes these resources through a set of assumptions 
where: 1) strategie resources are heterogeneously distributed across firms; and 2) 
differences are stable over time (i.e. , resource immobility/stickiness). 
According to RBV, a firm's resources lead to sustained competitive advantage when 
they have four key attributes: 1) valuable; 2) rare; 3) imperfectly imitable; and 4) 
there cannot be strategically equivalent substitutes for these resources that are 
valuable but neither are rare or imperfectly imitable (Barney, 1991 , pp.99, 101 , 105-
1 06). Thus, RBV views a firm as a collection of sticky and difficult-to imitate 
resources (Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1986) which can generate firm rents through 
protection and deployment of them (Mowery et al. , 1996). 
82 Wernerfelt ( 1984, p.l72) defines resources as "those (tangible and intangible) assets which are tied 
semi-permanently to the firm" . 
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RBV and strategie alliances 
Having studied the rationales and motives underpinning the formation of strategie 
alliances ( e.g. , Hagedoorn, 1993 ), it becomes obvious th at many firms essentially use 
alliances to either acquire or access valuable and strategie resources which cannot be 
obtained otherwise (see Das & Teng, 2000; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004). RVB does 
not deny usefulness of TCE in that when efficient market exchange of resources is 
feasible, then "firms are more likely to continue alone" (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1996), and rely on market. However, there are certain resources (such as tacit 
knowledge or know-how, organizational capabilities and routines) that are not 
perfectly tractable through market transactions; these resources may have been 
interwoven with other resources or embedded in organizations (Chi, 1994). Thus, a 
firm is faced with two options: mergers and acquisitions or strategie alliances. Also, 
"because the absorption of rivais is often too costly, in the permanent drive for 
corporate diversification, mergers and acquisitions are Jess common, and technical 
cooperation has increased" (Niosi , 1995, p. xi). Consequently, the inefficiencies 
associated with mergers and acquisitions and the unobtainability of resources through 
market transactions have made the quest for valuable resources through strategie 
alliances a favorable option. This has also brought RVB and its derivatives (resource 
dependence perspective, and knowledge-based view) under spotlight to better 
understand alliances. 
V an de Ven (1976), qui te earl y, developed the idea that the process of building inter-
organizational relationships can be studied as a flow of resources among 
organizations. For example, a JV is formed when "two or more firms pool a portion 
of their resources within a common legal organization" (Kogut, 1988, p. 319). 
Kogut (1988) explains alliance formation as a conduit for organizational learning; 
offering a third yet complementary rationale next to TCE and strategie positioning. In 
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his view, a JV serves as an instrument by which "firms learn or seek to retain their 
capabilities" (Kogut, 1988, p. 323). Thus, ' acquiring the other partner's 
organizational know-how' and/or ' maintaining an organizational capability while 
benefitting from another firm ' s eurre nt knowledge or cost ad van tage' re main as key 
rationales for forming a strategie alliance. In this scenario, organizational know-how 
is perceived as a kind of valuable resource which cannet be obtained through market 
transaction; thereby remaining unexplained by TCE. 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) further adding to resource obtainrnent rationale 
introduce "strategie" and "social" explanations to explain alliance forn1ation. They 
provide evidence that firms in ' strong social positions ' or ' vulnerable strategie 
positions' tend to form strategie alliances. Indeed, TCE has remained ineffective in 
explaining strategie and social factors as propellers of firms entering into strategie 
alliances. 
Although informative, RBV has been challenged by a few authors. For example, 
Priem and Buttler (200 1) cri ti cize RBV for not paying enough attention to the 
appropriate context in which the resources are more or less valuable; or how the 
resources can be obtained and how do they generate sustainable rent? Others, like 
Miller and Shamsie (1996), emphasize RBV's lack of explanation with regards to 
when, where and how resources can be useful. Lawrence (1997) has also shifted the 
spotlight over the black box of processes through which particular resources provide 
competitive advantage. Further to these general criticisms, Das and Teng (2000) 
believe that RBV and its application to the context of strategie alliances are still 
under-explored and discuss how resource alignrnent between partners can directly 
influence collective strengths and inter-firm conflicts which in turn contribute to 
alliance perfonnance. 
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6.4.3 Resource dependence perspective 
Them·y 
Resource Dependence Perspective, RDP (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) stresses the 
notion of ' interdependence' among organizations based on the premise that no single 
firm possesses ali the resources necessary to achieve its objectives. A basic 
consequence of this assumption is that interfirm relationships constitute a strategie 
response by which firms can control their dependencies and reduce the uncertainty 
which may arise as the re suit of the ir dependence. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) view interdependence as an indispensable attribute of 
social systems/social interactions and state that: "interdependence exists whenever 
one actor does not entirely control ali of the conditions necessary for the achievement 
of an action or for obtaining the outcome desired from the action" (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978, p. 40). Within organizational setting where no single firm can ' go it 
alone'; "Interdependence is a consequence of the open-systems nature of 
organizations - the fact that organizations must transact with elements of the 
environment in order to obtain the resources necessary for survival" (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978, p. 43). Th us, "to understand the behavior of an organization you must 
understand the context of that behavior - that is, the ecolo gy of the organization" (p. 
1). Pfeffer (1987, pp. 26-27; as cited in Hillman et al. , 2009, pp. 1404-1405) provides 
the essence of the RDP in view of the concept and conceming the interorgànizational 
relations as: 
" 1) the fun dam entai units for understanding intercorporate relations and 
society are organizations; 2) these organizations are not autonomous, but 
rather are constrained by a network of interdependencies with other 
organizations; 3) interdependence, when coupled with uncertainty about what 
the actions will be of tho se with which the organizations interdependent, leads 
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to a situation in which survival and continued success are uncertain; therefore 
4) organizations take actions to manage external interdependencies, although 
such actions are inevitably never completely successful and produce new 
patterns of dependence and interdependence; and 5) these patterns of 
dependence produce interorganizational as weil as intraorganizational power, 
where such power bas sorne effect on organizational behavior" . 
Finally, Gray and Wood (1991 , p. 7) mention that "the focus is on minimizing 
interorganizational dependencies and preserving the organization ' s autonomy while 
recognizing that interorganizational relationships are necessary to acquire resources". 
RDP and strategie alliances 
Researchers (e.g. , Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976; Stearns et al. , 1987; Goes & Park, 1997; 
Elg, 2000; Yan & Gray, 1994, 2001 ; Das & Teng, 2000) have applied RDP to the 
context of strategie alliances and have informed us better about the formation and 
termination of alliances. 
Early research (Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976) supports RDP ' s application to JVs finding 
that JV s are comrnonly formed between interdependent firms. Empirical evidence 
also supports the use of interorganizational relationships to reduce domestic and 
international environrnental complexity and gain resources (Elg, 2000; Goes & Park, 
1997; Stearns et al. , 1987). Yan and Gray (1994, 2001) examine the balance ofpower 
between international partners, and find that alliances occur when organizations are 
mutually dependent but the partner controlling more important resources retains 
strategie control. Hall en et al. ( 1991) provide evidence th at changes in partners ' 
bargaining power prompt interfirm adaptation, not necessarily instability of the 
alliance. Inkpen and Beamish (1997) find that as one partner accumulates key 
resources from the other, the venture becomes Jess stable. In other words, when the 
bargaining power's balance between alliance partners shifts there is possibility for an 
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unplanned termination to take place within a JV (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). This 
research puts under spotlight the the relationship between learning through a JV 
alliance and diminishing cooperation. In fact, when a partner acquires knowledge and 
skills, then inevitably motivation for cooperation diminishes. However, Niosi (1995) 
bas emphasized that if alliances are capable of producing 'new knowledge ', as 
opposed to merely being a deviee to access and use partner' s know-how, their 
survival will not be easily jeopardized by diminishing learning factor. This is mainly 
because partners are constantly motivated to learn from one another- a condition 
ena bled by the existence and continuity of the alliance. 
Others (Levine & White, 1961 ; Aiken & Hage, 1968) mention that finns tend to enter 
partnerships if they perceive critical strategie interdependence with other firms in 
their environment. In fact, Gulati (1998, p. 299) emphasizes a condition where one 
organization has resources or capabilities beneficiai to, but not possessed by, the 
other. Richardson (1972), in a theoretical economie account, also proposed that the 
necessity for complementary resources is a key driver of interorganizational 
cooperation. 
RDP has been an informative view of in that it explains why firms rely on certain 
resources which lie beyond their finn boundaries and possessed by other 
organizations. It also shows that managers resort to interorganizational relationships 
and manage them in arder to exert control over their dependence and try to minimize 
them. 1t is a very useful framework to understand alliances and their 
interrelationships. 
Like other approaches, RDP has also been challenged on several fronts. For example, 
in a review written by Hillman et al. (2009) about three decades after its invention, 
the authors mention that RDP has not been yet well integrated with other theoretical 
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perspectives to consider the dynamic nature of these dependencies and power as weil 
as the multiplexity of interdependency (Hillman et al. , 2009, p . 1408). Fmthem1ore, 
more research examining multiple forms of interdependencies may be able to reveal 
of the conceptual perimeter of RDP (Casciaro & Piskorski , 2005). Lastly, more 
research considering the boundary conditions of RDT is needed (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
2003 , p. xxiv). 
6.4.4 Knowledge-based theory of organizational capability 
The Theory 
Knowledge-based theory (KBT) of organizational capability (Grant, 1996; Grant & 
Baden-Fuller, 2004), considers "knowledge" (emphasis on tacit knowledge or know-
how) as the most important strategie resource of the firm. KBT rests upon four theory 
streams: a) competition as a dynamic process; b) RBV; c) organizational capabilities 
and competences; and d) organizational knowledge and learning. The theory holds 
that, in view of strategie importance of knowledge and since it resides in specialized 
form among individual organizational members, then it is plausible to emphasize " the 
essence of organizational capability" as to integrate individuals ' specialized 
knowledge (Grant, 1996, p. 3 75). Contrary to TCE (Coase, 193 7; Williamson, 1985) 
which views a firm ' s key role as to minimize transaction costs ; KBT (Grant, 1996) 
highlights the key role of a firm as creating, storing, and applying knowledge (Kogut 
& Zander, 1992; Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996). 
KBT has two major assumptions about success: 1) "under dynamic competition, 
superior profitability is likely to be associated with resource and capability-based 
advantages than with positioning advantages resulting from market and segment 
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selection and competitive positions based upon sorne form of ' generic strategy"'; and 
2) "such resource and capability-based advantages are likely to derive from superior 
access to and integration of specialized knowledge" (Grant, 1996, p. 376). 
Following the KBT, there are two knowledge integration mechanisms: direction and 
routine. The former includes the process of codifying tacit knowledge into explicit 
knowledge embodied in rules and instructions (e.g., operating manuals) (Grant, 
1996). Therefore, it is the principal means through which knowledge can be 
comrnunicated at low cost between "specialists and the large number of other persans 
who either are nonspecialists or who are specialists in other fields" (Demsetz, 1991 , 
p. 172). The latter, routine, has its own unique function mainly because not ali tacit 
knowledge can be codified (Polanyi , 1967); and that any attempt to do so may be 
accompanied with substantial knowledge Joss. According to Grant (1996, p. 3 79) "an 
organizational routine provides a mechanism for coordination which is not dependent 
upon the need for communication of knowledge in explicit form". He further argues 
that following KBT, "the essence of an organizational routine is that individuals 
develop sequential patterns of interaction which permit the integration of their . 
specialized knowledge without the need for communicating that knowledge" (Grant, 
1996, p. 3 79). 
Furthermore, KBT stresses the link between ' sustaining', "continuai renewal of', the 
competitive advantage as weil as innovation and the new capabilities development. 
Such emphasis demands a firm; first, to extend their existing capabilities to 
encompass additional knowledge types; and second, to reconfigure existing 
knowledge into new capability types. The latter, as Grant (1996) emphasizes, seems 
to be more complex due to substantial costs incurred in tem1s of reducing the 
efficiency of knowledge integration; yet, it also perceived as even more important in 
gaining an edge. 
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KBV and strategie alliances 
Various studies view strategie alliances as means for sharing knowledge (know-how, 
technology, and organizational capability) and "organizational learning" (Kogut, 
1988); and others have received them as means for producing new knowledge, 
particularly in high-tech industries such as biotechnology and advanced materials 
(Niosi, 1995). Hamel (1991) views collaboration (i.e. , strategie alliances) as a means 
to internalize the other partner' s complex skills that are based on tacit knowledge. 
Alliances can short-circuit process of skill acquisition. Further, capacity to learn (i.e. , 
absorptive capacity) as in case of internalizing partner' s skill can create a bargaining 
power for either of the partners (Hamel , 1991 ). 
Mowery et al. (1996, p. 89) find that "equity JV s appear to be more effective conduits 
for the transfer of complex capabilities than are contract-based alliances such as 
licensing agreements". They also emphasize the importance of absorptive capacity in 
acquisition of capabilities through alliances. Further, lower levels of trans fer occur in 
unilateral contracts than in bilateral non-equity arrangements. 
Distinguishing between knowledge generation and application, Grant and Baden-
Fuller (2004, p. 77) argue that alliances serve as a means to access knowledge, and 
that they can "overcome the limits of firms in encompassing highly differentiated 
knowledge integration processes, while offering efficiencies in knowledge 
utilization". 
Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) make an attempt to find out about the ' black box' of 
knowledge sharing within Toyota' s network and successfully provide evidence that 
Toyota has the ability to effectively create and manage network-level knowledge-
sharing processes so much so that it gives the company an advantage leading to 
relatively higher profitability. These results emphasize the role of networks in 
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creating a strong identity and coordinating rules. Based on their findings, a network 
seems to be more superior (effective) to a firm when it cornes to ' creating', 
' transferring' and ' recombining' knowledge. This is mainly because there is higher 
leve! of knowledge diversity within networks. Overall , Dyer and Nobeoka (2000)'s 
study spotlights ' dynamic learning capability' and ' speed of learning vis-à-vis its 
competitors ' as two key factors which have led Toyota and its suppliers to gain 
sustainable competitive advantage. Such dynamic learning capability, to be effective, 
needs to extend beyond firm boundaries in order to create a competitive edge. 
Overall , KBT bas informed us of two main issues. First, specialized knowledge is a 
strategie asset that can lead to creation of competitive advantage. Second, to benefit 
from knowledge, firms must have the capability to constantly create, transfer, and 
recombine (new) knowledge; thereby extending their search for knowledge beyond 
their very own boundaries. 
Within past research on knowledge sharing through collaborations through networks 
others have also raised three main dilemmas. The first concerns how to motivate self-
interested network of members to participate in the network and to openly share 
valuable knowledge with other network members (Gray & Wood, 1991 ). The second 
involves the 'collective action' or ' free rider' problem (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). The 
third regards how to maximize the efficiency ( speed and ease) of knowledge trans fers 
among a large group of individual members (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). As the key to 
keeping the momentum, sustainability of competitive edge, is to constantly 
reconfigure existing knowledge into new capabilities, the last issue is of an 
exceptional value. Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) view creation of "multilateral ties 
among members (and a variety of processes for transferring knowledge)" as a 
solution to efficiency issue. 
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KBT also originally suffers from sorne weaknesses. Although it stresses the role of 
' flexibility of integration ' to gain sustained competitive edge, while highlighting the 
paramount role of networks in generating new knowledge, it bas paid little attention 
to make explicit arguments over "how" relationships among actors (firms, 
individuals) facilitate knowledge integration. Furthennore, it also does not elaborate 
on the role of necessary capabilities such as absorptive capacity in integration 
process. KBT further does not pay attention to other types of knowledge such as 
"know-who" or "know-why" as facilitators ofknowledge integration process. 
6.4.5 Relational view 
Theory 
At the heart of the Relational View (RV) of the firm lies the thesis that "a pair or 
network of firms can develop relationships that result in sustained competitive 
advantage" (Dyer & Singh, 1998, p. 675). This view of gaining competitive 
advantage is different from merely forming strategie alliances in that relational view 
emphasizes on interorganizational rent-generating process (Dyer & Singh, 1998) and 
the mechanisms which ensure sustainability of rents. In essence, the kind of 
relationship Dyer and Singh (1998) tend to emphasize is an ' idiosyncratic' one -as 
opposed to arm's length relationships which are based on so called watertight formai 
con tracts. 
Therefore, the collaborating firms 83 are able to generate relational rents84 through: 1) 
relation-specifie assets; 2) knowledge-sharing routines; 3) complementary resource 
83 The collaboration can have as few as two firms and/or as many as thousands like the 23, 000 
member banks of VISA organization. 
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endowments, and 4) effective governance to reach the stage of differentiai firm 
performance (competitive edge) and create supernormal profit; and also they are able 
to sustain doing so over ti me through: 1) inter-organizational as set connectedness; 2) 
partner sem-city; 3) resource indivisibility85 ; and 4) the institutional environment. In 
what follows, I briefly explain the tenets of RV from Dyer and Singh (1998)'s 
perspective. 
Rent-specifie assets are specialized strategie assets (see Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 
39) in which alliance partners heavily invest (Dyer & Singh, 1998). These assets are 
extremely valuable because they have a high degree of specificity and that they 
cannot be easily found in the market. Related to this issue, Williamson (1985) 
classifies asset specificity into three: site specificity, physical asset specificity, and 
human asset specificity. For example, a long-term rent-generating relationship 's fruit 
may be development of a customized machinery tool (physical asset) or transaction-
specifie know-how (human asset) which cannot be generated otherwise. 
The notion of knowledge sharing routines between firms has in its heart the fact that 
firms learn as they collaborate ( for example, March & Simon, 1958) and is defined 
as "a regular pattern of interfirm interactions that permits the transfer, recombination, 
or creation of specialized knowledge" (Grant, 1996; as cited in Dyer & Singh, p. 
665). In certain industries like biotechnology, this even becomes more critical in that 
those firms which are unable to establish leaming networks are doomed to stay at 
competitive disadvantage (see Powell et al. , 1996). Others have also emphasized the 
critical role of collaborative research especially in biotechnology mainly because it 
allows organizations to escape difficulties associated with knowledge internalization 
while letting them 'access' knowledge and human capital (Niosi & Hade, 1995). 
84 Relational rent is defined as "a supernorrnal profit jointly generated in an exchange relation-ship th at 
cannot be generated by either firm in isolation and can only be created through the joint idiosyncratic 
contributions of the spec ifie alliance partners" (Dy er & Singh, 1998, p. 662). 
85 Resource indivisibility is perceived as coevolution of capabilities (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
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However, creating collaborative knowledge sharing routines is not exactly a walk in 
the park. This is mainly because firm 's ability to exploit externat knowledge relies 
heavily on its absorptive capacity: "the ability of a firm to recognize the value of 
new, externat information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends" (Cohen & 
Levinthal , 1990, p. 128). Other issues like free riding and act of opportunism are also 
involved in this process. That is why establishing such routines demands partners to 
first develop 'partner-specific absorptive capacity ' 86 to make information and know-
how sharing feasible and easy as weil as enhance socio-technical interactions (Dyer 
& Singh, 1998). 
Complementary resource endowments is yet another indispensable part of RV and it 
refers to the "distinctive resources of alliance partners that collectively generate 
greater rents than the sum of th ose obtained from the individual endowments of each 
partner" (Dyer & Singh, pp. 666-667). These complementary resources are 
inseparable and indivisible in that neither firm in the partnership can obtain them in a 
secondary marketplace (Dyer & Singh, 1998). There are several challenges 
highlighted by Dyer and Singh (1998) with regards to this notion. For example, a firm 
must be capable to identify and evaluate partners with complementary resources. This 
relies on the extent to which a firm has access to precise and timely information on 
potential partners and their resources. Another challenge is system-culture 
compatibility of partners that enable them to coordinate actions ( e.g. , decision-
makings). 
Finally, effective governance plays a pivotai role in relational rent generation as it has 
a bearing on transaction costs and partners' willingness to get involved in value-
creation initiatives. Govemance structure, in other words, acts like a ' safeguard ' 
86 Partner-specific absorptive capacity refers to the idea that "a firm has developed the ability to 
recognize and assimilate valuable knowledge from a particular alliance partner" (Dyer & Singh, p. 
665). 
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which brings down the transaction costs thereby making it more efficient 
(Williamson, 1985). However, for safeguards to be economical (efficient) Dyer and 
Singh (1998) emphasize on self-enforcing agreements (as opposed to third-party 
enforcement of agreements). In sociology, these types of agreements are known as 
"trust/embeddedness". Regardless what they are referred to in different disciplines, 
the self-enforcing agreements are categorized as fom1al and informai safeguards 
where the fonner encompasses a situation where participants are financial and 
investment hostages ( e.g. , Williamson, 1983); while the latter in volves goodwill , trust 
and embeddedness (e.g. , Powell , 1990). 
Effective govemance (including safeguards and agreements) is important as it may 
reduce opportunism. The informai self-enforcing type is of particular importance 
because it relies on personal trust relations or reputation as govemance mechanism. 
Also, as cited in the literature, this type of governance seems to be the most effective 
and least costly means of safeguarding specialized investments and facilitating 
complex exchange (see: Hill, 1995; Sako, 1991; Uzzi , 1997). Therefore, based on 
Dyer and Singh (1998) for a finn to collect high rents, if would be beneficiai to rely 
on informai self-enforcing safeguards as they bring the transaction costs to a lower 
level vis-à-vis formai contractual governance structures which are very costly to 
create, monitor and enforce if so required. 
These four concepts elaborated above form the cornerstone of Relational View of the 
finn . Further, for a firm to sustain relational rents, Dyer and Singh (1998) emphasize 
interorganizational asset interconnectedness, partner scarcity, resource indivisibility 
and institutional environment. 
For example, a specifie highly specialized asset created as a result of the long-term 
inter-firm relationship based on mutual co-evolution of capabilities is useable in a 
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meaningful matmer only as long as the relationship holds (e.g. , Nissan-supplier 
conveyor belt; VISA brand name is collectively owned by participating banks). This 
suggests asset interconnectedness and resource indivisibility. In addition, the number 
of partners that have complementary strategie resources and relational capability is 
limited within an industry. Therefore, a first-mover advat1tage is a relevant issue. 
Lastly, institutional environment that fosters trust an1ong trading partners may 
facilitate the creation of relational rents (North, 1990). For example, in lapan, the 
institutional environment fosters goodwill trust and cooperation which in turn helps 
partnering firms enjoy sustainability in genera ting relational rents (Sako, 1991 ). 
Making inferences based on what has been mentioned so far, in general , the RV 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998) has severa! links with the idea of technological collaborations 
(strategie alliances), as well as open R&D and innovation process mainly because by 
expanding and complementing the resource-based view of the firm (see Lavie, 2006) 
it aptly maintains that a firm ' s critical resources may traverse firm boundaries and 
may be embedded in interfirm resources and routines. Therefore, it highlights 
interfirm relationships as an increasingly important unit of analysis for explaining 
above-average profits (Dyer & Singh, 1998) and emphasizes common benefits that 
alliance partners catmot generate independently (Lavie, 2006). 
RV and strategie alliances 
As stated earlier, RV of the firm is a promising perspective to adopt in arder to better 
understand strategie alliances. Sorne authors (Gulati, 1995; Kale et al. , 2000; Dyer & 
Nobeoka, 2000) have already emphasized the role of interfirm relationships as it is 
described in RV of the firm and especially in the process of governing collàborations. 
For exatnple, Gulati (1995) stresses the role of trust and persona! interaction in 
interorganizational relationships and shows how trust enables firms to reduce 
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dependence on equity structures to govem the relationships: suggesting that mutual 
trust between pm1ners reduces the fear of opportunistic behavior. 
Kale et al. (2000, p. 218) develops the notion of "relational capital " : "the leve! of 
mutual trust, respect, and friendship that arises out of close interaction at the 
individual level between alliance partners" . Relational capital can help firms 
successfully balance the acquisition of new capabilities (leaming) with the protection 
of existing proprietary assets in alliance situations. Thus, relation~! capital minimizes 
the likelihood that an alliance partner will engage in opportunistic behavior to 
unilaterally absorb or steal information or know-how that is core or proprietary to its 
partners. 
Finally, Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) build upon the original emphasis made in RV 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998) with regards to networks as central to explaining competitive 
advantage, and further use the case of Toyota to provide evidence that "a network can 
be more effective than a firm at the generation, transfer, and recombination of 
knowledge". Although a network is a powerful means for success because it allows 
diverse and tacit knowledge to flow an1ong its members, as in the case of Toyota, 
authors also emphasize the role of "coordinating principles" and nature of 
relationships as facilitators of know-how transfer and cooperation (Dyer &Nobeoka, 
2000). For example, redundant ties are helpful in locating valuable knowledge; while 
strong ties act as proxy for trust/social capital to facilitate actual transfer of tacit 
knowledge. 
Overall , RV distinguishes between legal contracts and self-enforcing agreements; 
proposing: " in general, self-enforcing mechanisms are more effective than third party 
enforcement mechanisms both at minimizing transaction costs and maximizing value-
creation initiatives" (Dyer & Singh, 1998, p. 670). Thus, self-enforcing agreements 
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can possibly lead to alliances ' having greater potential for relational rents. However, 
RV does not specify "how" alliances can create conditions to be able to enjoy self-
enforcing agreements. Further, while talking about mechanisms (asset inter-
connectedness; partner scarcity; resource indivisibility; and institutional envirorunent) 
that preserve relational rents, RV remains si lent on the ' nature of underly ing 
technology' and ' common goals' as mechanisms to preserve the relational rents. 
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ng (2000): R
B
V
 
sugge
sts 
th
e 
ration
ale fo
r 
a llia
n
c
es is 
"
v
alu
e
-
c
re
ation 
p
otential 
of 
finn 
reso
u
rc
e
s 
th
at 
a
re 
p
o
oled 
togeth
e
r.
"
 
Thu
s
,
 
re
so
u
rc
e
s 
attribute
s 
pro
m
ise 
a
c
c
e
ntu
ated 
v
a lu
e
-c
re
ation 
a
nd 
thu
s 
facilitate 
allia
n
ce fo
rm
atio
n
.
 F
u
rth
e
r
,
 
th
eir 
ge
n
e
ral 
RB
V
 
of 
allia
n
ces
,
 
e
m
ph
asiz
e
s sig
nifica
nt role of p
a
rtn
e
r 
reso
u
rc
e 
alig
n
m
e
nt 
b
ased 
o
n
 
sim
ilarity a
nd 
re
so
u
rc
e
 utilizatio
n
 a
nd 
that 
alig
n
m
e
nt 
dire
ctly 
affe
cts 
c
ollectiv
e 
stre
ngth
s 
a
nd 
inte
r-firm
 
c
o
nflicts in allia
n
ces
.
 
Ea
rly 
re
se
a
rch (Pfeffe
r 
& 
N
ow
ak
,
 
1976) 
supp
o
rts R
D
T
's 
applicatio
n
 to
 
JV
s finding 
th
at JV
s 
a
re 
c
o
m
m
o
nly 
fo
rm
ed b
etw
e
e
n
 inte
rd
ep
e
nd
e
nt firm
s
.
 
E
m
pirical evid
e
n
ce 
also
 
supp
o
rts th
e 
u
se 
of 
inte
ro
rga
nizatio
n
al 
relation
ship
s to
 
redu
c
e
 d
o
m
e
stic 
a
nd 
inte
rn
ation
al 
e
n
viro
n
m
e
ntal 
D
e ficie
n
cie
s/G
ap
s in th
e
o
ry 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
ln 
w
hich 
appropriate 
c
o
ntext
,
 
th
e 
re
so
u
rces 
a
re 
m
o
re 
o
r Jess 
v
alu
able 
(Prie
m
 
& 
B
uttle
r
,
 
200
1) 
H
o
w
 
th
e 
re
so
u
rc
e
s 
can
 
b
e 
obta in
ed 
a
nd 
h
o
w
 
d
o
 
th
ey 
ge
n
e
rate 
s
u
stainable 
re
nt? 
(Prie
m
 & B
uttle
r
,
 200 1) 
W
h
e
n
,
 w
h
e
re
 a
nd h
o
w
 reso
u
rc
e
s 
c
a
n
 
b
e 
u
s eful? 
(M
ille
r 
& 
Sh
a
m
sie
,
 1996) 
T
hro
ugh 
w
h
at 
pro
c
e
sse
s 
p
a
rtic
ula
r 
re
so
u
rc
e
s 
p
ro
vide 
co
m
p
etitiv
e 
ad
v
a
ntage? 
(La
w
re
n
c
e
,
 1997) 
L
ack 
of integ
rating 
R
O
T 
w
ith 
oth
e
r th
eo
retical p
e
rsp
e
ctiv
e
s to
 
co
n
side
r th
e dy
n
a
m
ic 
n
atu
re 
of 
th
e
se depe
nde
n
cies 
a
nd 
pow
e
r 
as 
w
e il 
as 
th
e 
m
ultiplexity 
of 
inte
rd
ep
e
nde
n
cy (Hillm
a
n
 et al.
,
 
2009
,
 p.l408). 
M
o
re 
re
sea
rch 
e
x
a
m
m
m
g 354 
K
now
ledge
-
based th
eo
ry 
(KBT) of 
o
rganizational 
capability 
(Grant & 
B
aden-Fuller
,
 
1995; G
rant
,
 
1996) 
u
nderstand 
the 
co
ntext 
of th
at behavior-
th
at is
,
 th
e ecology 
of the 
o
rganization
"
 
(p.l ). 
"RD
T 
recognizes 
the 
influ
e
n
ce 
of 
external 
factors 
on 
o
rgan izational 
behavior 
a
nd 
although 
co
n
strained 
by 
their co
ntext, m
an
age
rs can
 act to 
reduc
e 
en
vironm
ental 
u
n
certainty 
a nd 
depend
e
n
ce (H
illm
an 
et 
al.
,
 
2009
,
 
p. 
1404).
"
 
[
"[R]e
so
u
rce dependence theory view
s 
interfirm
 governance as a strategie 
re
spon
se to co
nditions of u
n
certainty a
nd 
dependence .
.
.
 "
 (Heide, 1994
,
 p
.
 72)
.] 
(
"The 
focu
s 
is 
on 
m
inim
izing 
interorga
nization
al 
dep
end
e
n
cies 
and 
prese
rving 
th
e 
o
rganization 's 
a
utonom
y 
w
hile recog
nizing th
al interorganizational 
relationships 
are 
n
ecessa
ry 
to 
acquire 
re
so
u
rce
s" (Gray & W
ood 1991
,
 p. 7).] 
K
BT 
rests 
upon 
4 
theory 
stream
s: 
a) 
co
m
petition 
as 
a dy
n
am
ic 
proce
ss; 
b) 
RBV
; 
c) 
o
rganizational 
capabilities 
and 
co
m
petences; 
and 
d) 
o
rganizational 
know
ledge 
and 
le
arning
.
 
ln 
K
BT
,
 
"K
now
ledge
"
 [ e
m
phasis 
on 
tacitlknow
-
how] is view
ed as 
"the m
o
st strategically
-
significant reso
u
rc
e of th
e firm
 (p. 375)
"
 
in 
dyn
a
m
ically 
co
m
petitive 
m
arket 
en
vironm
e
nts
.
 
Ce
ntral 
id
ea 
is: 
"the 
prim
ary role of th
e firm
,
 and the esse
n
ce 
(1994
,
 2001) 
M
ow
ery et a l. 
( 1996); K
ogut 
( 1988); Dye
r 
and N
obeoka 
(2000); K
ale et 
al. (2000); 
G
rant and 
B
aden-Fuller 
(2004); 
co
m
plexity 
a
nd gain 
re
so
u
rc
es (Eig
,
 
2000; G
oes & Park
,
 1997; Stearns et 
ai.
,1987)
.Y
a
n
 and G
ray (1994
,
 2001) 
ex
am
ine 
the 
b
alance 
of 
p
o
w
e
r 
betw
e
e
n
 
internatio
n
al 
partners
,
 
finding 
thal 
alliances 
o
ccu
r 
w
hen 
o
rganizations are 
m
utually dependent 
but 
th
e 
partner 
co
ntrolling 
m
o
re 
im
portant 
reso
u
rce
s 
retain
s 
strategie 
co
ntrol. 
lnkp
e
n
 
and 
B
ea
m
ish ( 1997) 
find 
th
at 
as 
o
n
e partner acc
u
m
ulate
s 
k
ey 
reso
u
rce
s 
from
 
th
e 
other. 
the 
v
enture becom
e
s less 
stable. O
thers 
(L
evi ne & 
W
hite
,
 
1961; Ai ken 
&
 
l-Iage, 1968) m
e
ntio
n
 th
eir p
erspective 
thal firm
s tend to enter p
a
rtn
e
rship
s if 
th
ey 
perceive 
critical 
strategie 
interdep
e
ndence 
w
ith 
other firm
s in 
their 
en
viro
nm
ent; 
w
here 
Gulati 
( 1998
,
 p
.
 299) em
ph
asize a co
ndition 
w
here o
n
e o
rganization has reso
u
rce
s 
o
r 
capabilities 
ben
eficiai 
but 
not 
po
ssessed by 
th
e 
other. 
Rich
a
rd
so
n
 
( 1972), 
in 
a 
th
eo
retic
al 
eco
n
o
m
ie 
acco
u
nt
,
 
also 
propo
sed 
th
al 
the 
n
ecess ity 
for 
co
m
plem
entary 
re
so
u
rce
s 
is 
a 
key 
driv
er 
of 
interorga
nizational co
operation
.
 
V
ariou
s 
studies 
view
 
strateg ie 
alliance
s 
as 
m
ea
n
s 
for 
sh
a
ring 
know
ledge (know
-h
ow
,
 
techn
ology
,
 
and 
o
rganizatio
n
al 
capability) 
and 
"
o
rganizational 
lea
rning
"
 
(Kog
ut
,
 
1988). 
H
a
m
el 
( 1991) 
view
s 
collaboration (i.e.
,
 strategie alliances) 
as 
a 
m
e
an
s to 
internalize 
th
e 
other 
partner
's 
co
m
plex 
skills 
w
hich 
are 
b
ased 
o
n
 tacit know
ledge
.
 A
llia
nc
es 
can 
short-circuit 
proce
ss 
of 
skill 
•
 
•
 
•
 
m
ultiple 
form
s 
of 
interd
ependencie
s m
ay rev
eal of 
th
e 
co
n
ceptual 
perim
eter 
of 
RD
T 
(Cascia
ro
 
&
 
Piskorski
,
 
2005) 
M
ore 
resea
rch 
co
n
 id
e
ring th
e 
bound
ary 
co
nditions of R
D
T is 
needed 
(Pfeffer 
&
 
Salan
cik
,
 
2003: xxiv) 
K
BT identifies 3 ch
ara
cteristic
s 
o
r 
k
n
o
w
ledge 
integ
ration 
pe
rtinent 
to 
co
m
petitive 
adv
a
ntage: 
a) 
efficiency 
of 
integ
ration; 
b) 
sc
ope 
of 
integ
ratio
n: 
and 
c) flexibility of 
integration. 
K
BT 
e
m
ph
asizes 
"fle
xibility of 
integ
ration
"
 in 
o
rder to 
su
stain 
co
m
p
etitive 
advantage 
through 
2 
dim
en
sio
n
s: 
a) 
extending 355 
R
elatio
n
al 
vie
w
,
 R
V
 
(Dyer
,
 1997; 
D
ye
r & Singh
,
 
1998) 
of 
o
rganizational 
c
apability, 
is 
th
e 
integration of [specialized] know
ledge [of 
m
a
ny individuals] (p. 375).
"
 K
no
w
ledge 
play
s 
a 
signitica
nt 
role in 
o
rganization
al 
c
apability. 
K
B
T
's 
assu
m
ptio
n
s 
about 
su
c
c
e
ss: 1) 
"
un der dynam
ic c
o
m
p
etitio
n
,
 
sup
e
rior 
protitability 
is 
likely 
to 
be 
a
sso
ciated 
w
ith 
re
so
u
rc
e
 
a
nd 
c
apability-
based 
advantages 
than 
w
ith 
po
sitioning 
advantages 
re
sulting 
from
 
m
a
rket 
a
nd 
seg
m
e
nt 
sele
ction 
and 
c
o
m
petitive 
positions 
based 
up
o
n
 
so
rn
e 
form
 
of 
'ge
n
e
ric strategy
'
"; a
nd 2) 
"
s
u
ch re
so
u
rc
e
 
and 
c
apability-based 
advantages 
a
re 
lik
ely to derive from
 
s
up
e
rio
r 
a
c
c
e
ss to 
a
nd integration of sp
ecialized know
ledge 
(p. 376).
"
 
RV
: "
a tirm
's c
ritical re
so
u
rc
e
s m
ay span 
finn boundaries and m
ay be e
m
bedded in 
inte
rfirm
 re
so
u
rc
e
s a
nd ro
utines
"
 (Dyer & 
Singh
,
 
1998
,
 
p
.
 
660). 
lt 
e
m
ph
a
sizes 
"
rela tio
n
ship b
etw
e
e
n
 firm
s
"
 
a
s 
"
u
nit of 
a
n
alysis
"
 
to 
u
ndersta
nd 
"
c
o
m
p
etitiv
e 
advantage.
"
 RV
,
 further
,
 highlights 4 
pote
ntial 
so
u
rce
s 
of inte
r-o
rga
nizational 
c
o
m
petitive 
advantage: 
1) 
relation-
G
ulati ( 1995); 
K
ale et al. 
(2000); D
ye
r 
and N
obeoka 
(2000); 
acq
uJSJtJon
.
 Further
,
 c
apacity to
 le
a
rn 
(i.e
., absorptive c
apacity) as in ca
se of 
inte
rn
alizing partner
's skill 
can
 create 
a bargaining pow
er for 
eith
e
r 
of th
e 
partners (H
a
m
el,
 199
1 )
.
 
M
o
w
e
ry et al. ( 1996
,
 p. 89) ti nd thal 
"
equity 
JV
s 
appe
a
r 
to
 
b
e 
m
o
re
 
effectiv
e 
c
o
nduits for 
th
e tra
n
sfe
r 
of 
c
o
m
plex 
c
apabilities 
than 
a
re
 
c
o
ntract-based 
alliances 
s
u
ch 
as 
licencing 
agreem
ents.
"
 
They 
also
 
e
m
ph
asiz
e
 
th
e 
im
p
o
rtan
c
e
 
of 
absorptive 
c
apacity in 
acquisitio
n
 
of 
c
apabilities through allia
n
ce
s
.
 F
u
rth
e
r
,
 
lo
w
e
r 
le
v
els 
of 
transfer 
o
c
c
u
r 
in 
u
nilateral 
c
o
ntra
cts 
than 
in 
bilateral 
n
o
n
-eq
uity a
rra
nge
m
e
nts. 
G
rant 
and 
B
aden-Fulle
r 
(2004)
,
 
disting
uishing 
b
etw
ee
n
 
know
ledge 
ge
n
e
ratio
n
 and app lic
atio
n
. 
a
rgue th
al 
a llia
n
c
e
s 
se
rv
e
 a
s 
a 
m
e
a
n
s to 
a
c
c
e
ss 
know
ledge
,
 
a
nd 
that 
th
ey 
c
a
n
 
"
o
v
e
rco
m
e 
the 
lim
its 
of 
tirm
s 
in 
e
n
c
o
m
passing 
highly 
differentiated 
know
ledge 
integration 
pro
c
e
sse
s
,
 
w
hile 
offering 
efficie
n
cie
s 
m
 
kn
o
w
ledge utilization (p.77)
."
 
G
ula ti ( 1995) stre
sses the role of tru
st 
a
nd 
p
e
rso
n
a! 
inte
raction 
in 
inte
r-
o
rganizational 
relationship
s 
a
nd 
sh
o
w
s 
how
 
tru
st 
e
n
able
s 
tirm
s 
to 
red
u
ce 
dependence 
o
n
 
equity 
stru
ctu
re
s to gove
rn the relatio
n
ships: 
s
uggesting th
at 
m
utual 
tru
st betw
een 
p
a
rtn
e
rs 
reduces 
the 
fear 
of 
su
ch 
opportunistic behavior. 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
existing 
c
apabilitie
s 
to 
in
clude 
n
e
w
 
know
ledge; 
b) 
re
c
o
ntiguring 
e
xisting 
know
ledge 
into 
n
e
w
 
type
s 
of 
c
apabilitie
s
.
 
K
B
T 
highlights 
th
e 
role 
of 
n
etw
o
rk
s 
(and 
"
so
cial 
n
etw
o
rk
s
"
: 
Lieb
e
skind 
et 
al.
,
 
1996)
,
 
a
nd 
rela tio
n
al 
co
ntracts 
as 
efficie
nt 
c
o
nd
uits 
for 
know
ledge 
integratio
n
,
 
w
h
e
re 
there 
is 
lack 
of 
p
e
rfe
ct 
co
rre
sp
o
nd
e
n
c
e 
betw
een 
th
e 
tirm
's know
ledge ba
se 
and 
its 
set of products. 
H
ow
e
ve
r
,
 
there 
is 
lack 
of 
e
xplicit 
a
rg
u
m
e
nts 
o
v
e
r 
"h
o
w
"
 
relation
ship
s 
a
m
o
ng 
acto
rs 
(tirm
s
,
 
individu
als) 
facilitate 
k
n
o
w
ledge integratio
n
.
 
lt 
also
 does 
n
ot 
e
xplic
ate 
the 
role 
of 
n
ece
ssa
ry 
c
apabilitie
s 
su
ch 
as 
absorptive 
c
ap
a
city in 
integratio
n
 proce
ss. 
K
B
T also
 does n
ot pay atte
ntion 
to 
oth
e
r 
type
s 
of know
ledge 
su
ch as 
"k
n
o
w
-w
h
o
"
 o
r 
"know
-
w
hy
"
 
as 
facilitato
rs 
of 
know
ledge integ
ratio
n
 proce
ss. 
RV
 distinguishes betw
een legal 
co
ntra
cts 
and 
self-e
nforc ing 
agreem
ents; 
proposing: 
" in 
general
,
 
sel f
-en
 forcing 
m
e
chanism
s 
a
re
 
m
o
re
 
effectiv
e 
th
an
 
third 
party 
e
nforcem
e
nt 
m
ech
a
nism
s both at m
inim
izing 
transactio
n
 
c
o
sts 
and 
m
a
xim
izing 
v
alu
e
-c
reatio
n
 
356 
Transaction 
co
st 
eco
n
o
m
ies
,
 
TC
E (Coase, 
1937;W
illia
m
s 
on
,
 1975
,
 1981
,
 
1985
,
 1998) 
speci fic 
assets; 
2) 
know
ledge 
sha
ring 
ro
utine
s; 3) co
m
plem
entary reso
u
rce
s and 
capabilities; and 4) effective governance. 
TC
E regards 
"transaction as the basic 
u
nit 
of an
alysis
"
 (W
illiam
son
,
 1981
,
 
p
.
 548)
.
 There are 3 m
ajor transaction 
co
sts: 
1) 
search 
and inform
ation; 2) 
bargaining a
nd decision c
o
sts; and 3) 
policing 
and 
e
nforcing c
o
sts (Coase
,
 
1937; 
V
arian, 
2002). 
TC
T's 
a
ssu
m
ptions 
in 
regards 
to 
the 
e
c
o
n
o
m
ie behavior of agents 
are: 
1) 
agents 
are 
rational ly 
bounded; 
a
c
c
o
rdingly 
a li 
c
o
m
plex 
c
o
ntracts 
becom
e 
u
n
a
v
oidably 
incom
plete 
(W
illiam
son
,
 
1998); 
2) 
th
ey 
are 
opportun
tsttc 
w
hich 
im
plies 
th
at 
firm
s a
re
 form
ed for 
"atten
u
ating the 
e
x
 post hazards 
of opportunism
 by 
H
e
n
n
art 
( 1988); K
ogut 
( 1988); Pisa
no 
( 1989); 
W
illiam
so
n
 
( 1 991 ); G
ulati 
( 1995) 
K
ale et al. (2000) d
ev
elop
s the n
otion 
of 
"
relational 
capital: 
"th
e lev
e! 
of 
m
utu
al tru
st, 
respect
,
 
and friendship 
thal 
a
rises 
o
ut of close inte
raction 
at 
th
e individual lev
e! b
etw
ee
n
 allia
nce 
partn
e
rs (p. 218).
"
 R
elational capital 
can 
h
elp firm
s 
succ
essfully balan
ce 
the 
acquisitio
n
 
of 
new
 
capabilities 
(learning 
of 
know
-how) 
w
ith 
th
e 
prote
ction 
of 
existing 
proprietary 
assets 
in 
alliance 
situ
atio
n
s. 
Thus
,
 
re latio
nal 
capital 
m
m1m1
zes 
th
e 
l ik
elihood th
at a
n
 alliance partn
e
r w
ill 
engage in 
opportunistic beh
avior 
to 
u
nilaterally 
ab
so
rb 
o
r 
steal 
inform
a tio
n
 o
r know
-ho
w
 thal is co
re 
o
r proprietary to its p
artn
e
rs. 
Literature 
o
n
 
strategie 
allia
nces h
as 
focu
sed 
exten
sively 
on 
'partner 
opportunism
' 
ex
a
m
ined 
m
ainly from
 
th
eo
retical 
view
point 
of 
TCE 
(Hennart
,
 1988; K
ogut
,
 1988; Pisano
,
 
1989; 
W
illiam
son
,
 1991 ). 
ln 
fact. 
a 
firm
's 
co
n
cern
 
abo
ut 
th
eir 
partners 
acting 
opportunistically 
is lik
ely 
to
 
lead to 
higher 
tran
saction 
co
sts. To 
w
ard 
off 
this 
potential 
w
eakness
,
 
research h
as suggested firm
s to adop
t 
appropriate co
ntractu
al agreem
ents o
r 
gove
rn
an
ce structure
s to address these 
co
n
 cern
 s. For ex
am
ple
,
 Kog
ut ( 1988
,
 
p
.
 321) 
rai ses 
this issue 
of 
"
m
utuaf 
h
o
stage 
positio
n
s 
through 
joint 
co
m
m
itm
e
nt 
of 
financial 
o
r 
real 
initiatives
"
 
(Dyer 
& 
Singh
,
 
1998
,
 
p
.
 
670). 
Thus
,
 
self-
enforcing 
ag
ree
m
e
nts 
can
 
lead 
to 
allia
nce
s
' 
h
aving 
greater 
potential for relatio
nal rents
.
 
•
 
J-lo
w
e
ve
r
,
 RV does 
not specify 
" how
"
 
alliance
s 
c
an
 
c
reate 
co
nditions to b
e 
able to 
e
njoy 
self
-en
 forcing agreem
ent s. 
•
 
F
u
rth
er
,
 
w
hile 
talking 
abo
ut 
m
echanism
s 
(asset 
inter-
co
nn
ectedne
ss; partner scarcity; 
resou
rce 
indivisibility; 
a
nd 
in
stitutional 
en
vironm
ent) 
th
at 
pre
se
rve 
relatio
n
al 
rents, 
R
 V
 
rem
ain
s s ile
nt on th
e 
'n
ature of 
und
erlying 
techn
ology· 
and 
'com
m
o
n
 goals
' as 
m
ech
a
nism
s 
to pre
se
rve the relation
al re
nts
.
 
•
 
Zajac 
a
nd 
O
lsen
 
( 1993) 
highlight TCE
's w
eaknesses as: 
its 
"single
-p
a
rty 
a
nalysis 
[as 
oppo 
ed 
to 
m
ulti
-firm
 
o
rie
ntation] 
of 
co
st 
m
inim
ization
"
 (p
.l32); and th
at 
TCE 
o
v
e
rem
ph
asizes 
structural 
asp
ects 
(ex-a
nte/ex
-p
o
st 
dichoto
m
y 
vs. 
process). 
Thereby
,
 th
e form
er lead
s to th
e 
neg lige
nce 
of 
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6.5 Theoretical consolidation and possible explanations in the context of OSSTC 
6.5.1 Actors, interdependence, and resources-based views 
The ' interdependence' of ' independent key actors' emerged in severa! cases 1 studied, 
and it was explained from empirical perspective in detail in Chapter 5. Obviously, 
OSS firms , enterprise clients, hobbyists, and comrnunity of OSS project engage in 
technological collaborations, having heterogeneous incentives. Irrespective of the 
differences which exist about their motivations, a closer look at their incentives show 
that collaborating partners are in quest for accessing (strategie) ' resources '. Thus, 
accessing knowledge (tacit know-how ), enhancing technological capabilities, 
learning new competences and creating the state-of-the art knowledge (Case of 
FFmpeg87 technology), and obtaining e.ffzciency (time and cost of development) are 
among key incentives shared by different groups of independent actors. 
TCE's (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) theoretical perspective - which underrnines 
or even "excludes cooperation" (Niosi, 1995, p. 8) - bas adopted singular focus in 
viewing economie organizations through the dichotomy of either markets or 
hierarchies. Therefore, it cannot explain the underlying reasons about voluntary and 
tight collaboration among firms and network of individuals within OSS RDIP. More 
specifically, TCE, by overemphasizing the role of hazards associated with 
opportunism and their negative influence on increasing transaction costs, bas 
deliberately ignored other plausible explanations ( e.g. , value associated with learning) 
which induce collaborative behavior among actors. Lastly, OSS technology is 
87 For example, the team of product engineering of Savoir-faire Linux tri ed to address three FFmpeg 's 
technologica l challenges in order to be able to further shape and adapt the TR-03 standards for 
broadcasters. This R&D effort required them to look at FFmpeg's internai s in the hope of getting a 
working TR-03/SDI pipeline processing up to a severa) HD streams on a contemporary server while 
benefiting from Ffrnpeg's easily available lower definition derivatives from the same video stream. 
About FFmpeg: it is the leading multimedia framework, able to decode, encode, transcode, mux, 
demux, stream, filter and play pretty much anything that humans and machines have created. It is 
licensed under LGPL 2. 1+ and GPL 2+. Available at: https://ffrnpeg.org/about.html. 
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regularly built upon the collective power of community of developers. 'Diversity of 
knowledge' and ' continuous development and improvement' are two key features of 
its perceived technological superiority over closed software technology. Therefore, 
even if acquiring an OSS project is possible, and in sorne cases it is also cost 
efficient, keeping the project open within the commons makes sense, for as long as 
common benefits associated with OSS development methodology are sought for. 
Thus, the core features of OSS technology development methodology, at heart of 
which lies technological collaboration, cannot be accounted for by a mere dichotomy 
perspective of market vs. hierarchy; thereby, highlighting the serious deficiencies of 
TCE with regards to explaining the OSS technological and strategie cooperation. 
Moving beyond TCE, however, other four theories (RBV; RDP; KBT; RV) seem to 
be more appropriate to explain OSSTC. 
RBV (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986, 1991) puts strategie resources 
and their role under spotlight. RVB, therefore, provides the rationale for formation of 
strategie alliances as these contract-based collaborations enable firms to access and/or 
acquire what they cannot otherwise obtain. RBV can also shed light, to a great extent, 
on OSSTC. Y et, it does not full y capture ali aspects of collaboration among actors. 
On a more detailed note, let us consider the two assumptions of RBV in the context 
of OSS industry. For instance, strategie resources (i.e., OSS-related know-how, 
trained and experienced hum an capital and technological capabilities) aie indeed 
heterogeneously distributed across firms; and in case of OSS projects across 
individuals and platforms as well. However, the assumption which notes that the 
differences among firms (and individuals, in case of OSS) are stable over time does 
not very weil reflect the nature of OSS development process. This is mainly because 
OSS RDIP is about developing open and collaborative technology platforms which 
are continuously evolving and creating new knowledge. The strategie knowledge 
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resources owned by a particular firm or a parti cul ar group of individuals alone cannot 
per se lead to sustained competitive advantage. This is mainly because OSS strives 
within an open ecosystem or through OCTP in which there is no 'stable ' knowledge 
equilibrium. This issue of having evolving and multiple knowledge equilibriums 
makes OSS a unique case. In fact, a firm can gain sustained competitive advantage 
through using proprietary-licensed customized strategie OS features and modules in 
its manufacturing process; nonetheless, sin ce the top layer (or strategie part of 
technology) relies on a supporting layer which is shared in the comrnons or the 
platform and which catmot be owned perfectly by a single firm, the competitive 
advantage of the firm cannat be sustained unless the supporting layer is sustained too. 
This technological inlerdependency within OCTP, th us, links and relates ali 
independent actors together in a particular fashion - which can be explained partly 
through RDP and parti y through RV of the firm. More specifically, these theories are 
complementary because RBV has remained silent with regards to ' how ' key 
resources can be obtained and under what circumstances and through what processes 
they can generate rents (see Priem & Buttler, 2001). 
According to RDP (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), interfirm relationships are formed as a 
strategie response through which managers can control their dependencies and reduce 
the uncertainty associated with them. Such perspective appositely can be used to 
explain why OSS firms, enterprise clients, core development tearns of communities 
and hobbyists ·are together viewed as an interdependent system and schematically 
represented through the Borromean Links (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2). As explained 
earlier in Chapter 5, each actor group brings in a different type of know-how, and 
technological capabilities which complement those of the other actor groups and 
ensemble create the superior technological synergy. This complementarity 
perspective of resources which have been also mentioned in the literature of alliances 
as key driver of interorganizational cooperation ( e.g., Levi ne & White, 1961; Aiken 
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& Hage, 1968; Richardson, 1972; Gulati, 1998; Das & Teng, 2000) clearly explains 
the interdependence and interconnectedness among actors within OSS ecosystem and 
more particularly within OSS shared R&D and Ïlmovation processes. 
However, much of OSS knowledge resources and technological capabilities are tacit 
(i .e. , OSS know-how or in industry terminology: "OS expertise"); dispersed among 
and residing within individuals' heads. KBT has already emphasized "knowledge" as 
the most important strategie resource of the firm, and that the main function of firm is 
to integrate the dispersed, specialized knowledge (Grant, 1996; Grant & Baden-
Fuller, 2004). lt has also discussed the specifie role of organizational routines (as 
opposed to direction) as a mechanism for tacit knowledge transfer and integration 
(Grant, 1996). lt also highlights the continuai renewal of gained competitive 
advantage through: a) extending the existing capabilities to encompass additional 
knowledge; and b) reconfiguring existing knowledge into new capability types 
(Grant, 1996). 
If we remain focused on tacit knowledge or know-how as the key strategie resource 
to build, maintain, and re-innovate OSS tools and modules; then, both RBV ' s and 
KBT's arguments to obtain and integrate this strategie resource to remain relevant to 
competitive arena are plausible. However, the key questions remains as "how" to 
obtain them and "under what circumstances" obtaining knowledge resources are most 
efficient and effective (valuable). In OSS industry, "relationships" are considered as 
the 'central conduit' for creating, accessing, storing, sharing, integrating, and 
applying know-how embedded in OCTP. These six functions (Figure 6.1), therefore, 
shift our attention to RV (Dyer & Singh, 1998) to further explain OSSTC. 
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Figure 6.1. The Six Functions of Relationships Embedded in OSSTC 
-----------------.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Open and Collaborative Technology Platform 
Fonctions of 
relat"ionships 
embedded in 
OSSTC 
Sharing 
\ kno1~~~1dge / 
\___/ 
\ 
' !.. ---------- - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --' 
Source: The author. 
6.5.2 Technological collaboration and relational view 
Strategic/technological alliances are mainly "long-term contractual agreements 
between two or more enterprises aiming at the development of new or improved 
product or process technologies" (Niosi, 1995, p. 3, emphasis added). OSS 
collaborative RDIP (as a proxy for strategie and technological collaborations within 
OSS industry) bear certain traits that put them in an awkward position when 
compared to strategic/technological alliances. 
On the one hand, just like strategie alliances, OSS projects can be long-term and 
based on written contractual agreements orchestrated through foundations and 
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associations ( e.g. , Eclipse Foundation). On the other hand, many of them are based on 
"relational contracts" (Macneil , 1974, 1980) formed between individuals or between 
firms and individuals; and, they can even be short-term. Even in the context of formai 
OSS collaboration agreements, as emphasized by almost ali interviewees, a huge bulk 
of collaborations takes place through relationships governed by trust and familiarity . 
Thus, R&D and innovation efforts within OSS projects can, to a great extent, rely on 
relational exchanges. 
Opposite to market exchanges or so-called watertight contract-based exchanges such 
as JVs, relational exchanges take place on the basis of a historical and social context, 
such as trust. Heide (1994, p. 74) asserts that "relational exchange .. . accounts 
explicitly for the historical and social context in which transactions take place and 
views enforcement of obligations as following from the mutuality of interest that 
exists between a set of parties ... ". Furthermore, OSSTC resemble greatly the 
interorganizational "rent-generating process" which is emphasized through the "RV" 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998). These interorganizational relationships which are sources of 
competitive advantage in that they can generate rents are viewed as idiosyncratic ties 
that are typically different from arm' s length relationships based on contracts (e.g. , 
case of strategie alliances). 
Although RV of the firm originally spotlights "firms" and their "inter-organizational 
collaboration" thorough "inter-relationships", 1 can extend the theory to include a 
wider range of innovators such as OSS developers as individual actors (both 
professionals, and hobbyists), OSS foundations and associations, expert teams, and so 
on. The core issue here is that collaborating entities can generate relational rents 
through "relation-specifie assets", "knowledge-sharing routines", "complementary 
resource endowments", and "effective governance" (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
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1 must emphasize, applying the relational rent to OSS industry does not necessarily 
reflect the original sense in the RV of Dyer and Singh (1998). RV views relational 
rent as "a supernormal profit jointly generated in an exchange relationship that cannot 
be generated by either firm in isolation and can only be created through the joint 
idiosyncratic contributions of the specifie alliance partners" (Dyer & Singh, 1998, p. 
662). Within OSS context, although actors may not necessarily gain "supernormal 
profit" or 'above average profit' in the sense it bas been described within strategie 
management literature (March, 1991 ; Dyer & Singh, 1998); because of their 
investment in building interrelationships, they do benefit greatly from their 
collaborations. Chapter 5 elaborated in detail on each actor group' s motivations and 
incentives to engage in interrelationships and enumerated the benefits which will 
accrue to them. In short, OSS technological collaborations lead to: a) reducing the 
cost of software R&D; b) shortening the time to market; c) enhancing in-bouse 
technological capabilities and absorptive capacity; d) building new competencies 
through learning and accessing new know-how; e) improving branding and marketing 
efforts. Having viewed these benefits as ' relational rents' that participants can enjoy 
as result of their collaborations, 1 can move forward and examine the four tenets of 
RV. 
Within OSS technological collaborations, the "relation-specifie assets" are mainly 
"human assets" (Dyer & Singh, 1998) and their specialized know-how or tacit 
knowledge. This specialized know-how is generated, accumulated, and stored 
through long-term relationships working on different projects. When OSS developers 
engage in intensive and iterative interactions to develop, and improve the quality of a 
feature, and get it integrated into the core body of codes, they exploit "knowledge 
sharing routines" (Dyer & Singh, 1998) between other human assets in OSS 
communities. As these human assets have already been part of the OSS communities 
through prior experiences, they have a high level of "absorptive capacity" (Cohen & 
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Levinthal , 1990) which allows them to establish regular pattern of interfirm 
interactions which allow transfer, recombination or creation of specialized knowledge 
(Grant, 1996). 
Fm1hermore, the human asset which exists within each actor group (OSS firm, 
clients, communities) is a "complementary resource endowment" (Dyer & Singh, 
1998). Each actor group brings in a set of particular skills and technological 
perspective, feedback, and tacit knowledge to the technological collaboration. 
Together, not only they complement one another, but also can generate a ' synergistic 
value' that cannot be generated and sustained over time individually. 
More particularly, accessmg the tacit knowledge, learning new competences and 
enhancing technological capabilities which are among key motivations of getting 
involved in OSS collaborative RDIP are at the disposai of those who have heavily 
invested in the process. Therefore, the hazard of free-riding is, to a great extent, 
reduced. For example, a free-rider cannot enjoy inducing a behavior in another party 
through relational contract because S/he has not built the relational trust through prior 
intensive collaborations. Indeed, within OSSTC, self-enforcing agreements provide 
effective governance which greatly reduces the transaction costs and eases the 
transfer ofknow-how among project members. 
To conclude, RV complements RBV, KBV, and RDP. Y et, RV does not fully explain 
OSSTC because it is focused on firms and super normal profits through generating 
rents. Furthermore, my observations and interview data add sorne new dimensions to 
both empirical and theoretical perspectives on classic strategic/technological 
alliances. These new dimensions are used to differentiate this research from the prior 
efforts and provide an ' alternative perspective ' to better reflect the particularities of 
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OSSTC. Table 6.2 demonstrates the alternative perspective and sheds light on its 
points of departure from the existing theories. 
6.6 Open and collaborative teclmology platform as an alternative perspective 
"There is not, and never will be, a best theory. Theory is our chronologically 
inadequate attempt ta come ta terms with the infinite complexity of the real 
world. Our quest should be for improved the ory, not best the01'y, and for the ory 
that is relevant ta the issues of our lime. " 
Walsham (199 7, p. 478) 
Despite previous insightful efforts (e.g. , von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003 ; Weber, 
2004; Kelty, 2008) to better understand the black box of OSS projects as a socio-
economic phenomenon and to develop a theory for its technological collaborations; 1 
believe OSSTC is still a phenomenon in search for a proper theory since it lies 
between formai collaborations (i.e. , strategie alliances) and informai cooperation. 
Even it is more so because OSS phenomenon has been quite recently cited as the 
flagship of 01 framework (e.g. , Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007) - a highly general 
and abstract phenomenon by itself in need of a sound theoretical underpinning (see 
Chapters 2). The case of OSS, as representative of 01, is so dramatic that sometimes 
the socio-economic and technological gravity of OSS out-expands its 01 theoretical 
container. However, this shall not necessarily be viewed as a bad thing, because 
proponent of 01 paradigm have themselves confessed to the thin theoretical 
background of 01; thereby viewing it mainly as a practice-driven concept-although it 
may have consumption for a layman who has not surveyed the literature on 
collaborative R&D and innovation management. 
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On a more detailed note, the key pa11icularities of OSS teclmology makes it a unique 
case which carinot be adequately explained by a dominantly firm-centric approach 
such as OIP. In fact, modularity, evolutionary character, demonstrating traits of 
public goods (non-rivalry and non-exclusivity), depending on network extemalities, 
and being highly process oriented developed through open and collaborative 
teclmology platforms are among the key features of OSS which extends the 
discussion well beyond an open vs. close dichotomy. 
In this research, I have exploited a mix of participant observation, case study and 
· grounded theory approaches and applied them to the theory development process. 
Specifically, OTA is a fitting methodology when the researcher intends to cast light 
onto the fine cracks that are persistent in the already existing theoretical concepts 
(see, for example, Hamel, 1991 ). lt also enables a researcher to go beyond the 
conventional wisdom and extend the already existing theories by adding new 
conceptual blocks. The power of such research methodo1ogy lies mainly in taking a 
fresh perspective (see Locke, 1996) to the phenomenon under investigation and 
letting the systematic and empirical observations lead the researcher towards forming 
higher leve! abstract conceptual categories and stating their interrelationships. 
By rev1ewmg the maJor theories underpinning conventional (non-OSS) 
strategic/techno1ogical alliances, 1 managed to better position the emerging 
theoretical concepts of this research and evaluate their conceptual values. This bas led 
to providing a finer-grained perspective on OSS technological collaborations within 
shared R&D and innovation processes. Table 6.2 presents the ' alternative 
perspective' resulting from this research and sheds light on its points of departure 
from the existing theories. 
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6.6.1 OSS as a case of open and collaborative technology platform- OCTP 
Parker, Van Alstyne, and Choudary (20 16, p. 5) define a platform as "a business 
based on enabling value-creating interactions between external producers and 
consumers". Thus, a platform is "an open, participative infrastructure for these 
interactions and sets governance conditions for them"; and, its main goal will be "to 
consummate matches among users and facilitate the exchange of goods, services, or 
social currency, thereby enabling value creation for ali participants". If a platform 
enables interactions among "multiple groups of surrounding consumers and 
' complementors"', then it can be referred to as a "multi-sided platform" (MSP) 
(Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009, p. 163). In a nutshell, value exchange seems to form the 
centerpiece of any platforms be it from communication and networking industry ( e.g., 
Facebook) or operating systems' (e.g. , iOS, Android, Microsoft Windows). 
Others (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014) have taken a more precise approach in defining a 
platform and distinguishing between its two major types: internai/company specifie 
vs. external/industry-wide platforrns. The former refers to "a set of assets organized 
in a common structure from which a company can efficiently develop and produce a 
stream of derivative products"; and the later focuses on "products, services, or 
technologies that act as a foundation upon which external innovators, organized as an 
innovative business ecosystem, can develop their own complementary products, 
technologies, or services" (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014, p. 417). 
The mam attribute of platforms is their "network effect" (Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 
1986) which basically refers to a situation where the number of users of a platform 
can either positively or negatively impact the value created for each user (see Parker 
et al. , 20 16). In case a platform generates a positive network effect, the more users 
join a platform, the more value is created for the whole network members- just like 
the case of Uber where more riders attract more drivers and vice-versa. "MSPs [and 
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111 general ali platforms] are characterized by interactions and interdependence 
between their multiple sides" (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009, p. 164). Parker et al. (2016) 
views positive network externalities as the "main source of value creation and 
competitive advantage". 
Although platfmms share severa! core issues such as value exchange, network 
effects, and interdependence, not ali behave similarly with regards to issues like 
platfonns stability (reliability), long-term sustainability (viability) and overall 
collective success. More particularly, in case of "technology-based platforms" such as 
OSS platfmm where service and product offerings are inextricably intertwined, 
heterogeneity of members is at peak, and future of technology is both unforeseeable 
and debatable, the crux of the matter is more of 'what keeps the platform more stable, 
more viable, and more successful '. 
Earlier research ( e.g., Parker et al. , 20 16) bas mainly focused on company-specifie 
platforms such as Uber. In case of 'Uber', the platform leadership deals with two 
main factors: riders (X) and drivers (Y) where deriver's contribution is limited to 
offering a vacant seat in ex change of money (i.e. , incentive) while rider's incentive is 
to fill in that vacancy by contributing money. Platform leadership, thus, coordinate 
and facilitate the relationship between riders and drivers (See Figure 6.2). 
However, in case of OSS platform, it is more complex. First, there is another item to 
factor in, which is the ' technology' (Z) itself; one that is dynamic, that influences and 
can be influenced. Put simply, this third factor can bind platform participant or repel 
them if not managed properly. Moreover, the nature of leadership in an OCTP such as 
OSS platforms takes on different characteristics (See Figure 6.3). 
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Figure 6.2. A Model of Company-Specifie Platform 
Platform leadership (i .e. , a corporation manager) J Coo<dffiator/ faciHtato< 
X= riders Y= Drivers 
Source: Author. 
Figure 6.3. A Model of OSS OCTP 
Z: OSS technology (codes, 
tools, kernels, apps) 
Source: Author. 
Interaction/ value excbange 
Y: OSS Developers (paid and non-
paid) or Users (customers/buyers) 
Earlier literature on 01 has extensively discussed the ever increasing phenomenon of 
openness in association with business models, strategie management, firm 's 
innovation performance, and has even shed light on rudimentary yet fundamental 
questions in regards to degree of openness and its consequences. However, a genuine 
OSS technology platform can neither be classified in terrns of strict proprietary forms 
ofplatforms such as the case ofUber, Google Apps, TopCoder, Amazon or facebook, 
nor can it be fully understood through the lens of 01 where its core emphasis is on 
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how opening up the innovation process can benefit or hamper firm-level innovation 
performance. Indeed, OSS platform represents an open collaborative platform which 
can benefit from the doctrine of OI, but it deviates from the conventional thinking 
when it comes to one cornerstone of its strategie usefulness: i.e., long-term continuity 
and evolution. This central objective coupled with different nature and role of 
leadership Jeads us to view OSS technology platforms as an open and collaborative 
innovation platform where continuity is perceived as much critical as openness in the 
collaborative R&D and innovation process. Therefore, to characterize OCTP, I have 
identified seven dimensions and distinguish their nature from the existing literature. 
6.6.2 Unit of analysis 
My theory of OSSTC embedded in OCTP is not only concerned with firms but also it 
is concerned with ' individuals ' as building blocks of OCTP. It is also concerned with 
network of firms and individuals, role of communities of developers and ali the 
interrelationships embedded in OSS comrnunities. The distinction between firm-level 
and individual-level unit of analysis shifts the focus from considering drivers of 
competitive advantage from a corporate perspective to motivations and incentives of 
individuals who make significantly huge nurnber of contributions to sustain the 
shared technology platform. 
Furthermore, such theory tries to distinguish between "types of firms" involved in 
technological collaborations and platform development; namely, OSS firms, 
enterprise clients and for-profit proprietary software firms. Within the category of 
firms (more particularly about ' enterprise client'), one bas to also make a more 
focused distinction as the re are different types of enterprise clients (see Figure 5.11 ). 
Furthermore, by distinguishing between OSS firms, enterprise clients and other 
proprietary software firms, the theory can reflect the heterogeneous yet 
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complementary nature of resources that each actor group possesses; their impact on 
success and sustainability of OSS projects; and the challenges associated with their 
integration. 
6.6.3 Strategie resources and conduit for resources sharing 
I think, a them·y of OSSTC embedded in OCTP is essentially concerned with human 
assets or tacit knowledge (know-how). Thus, KBV (Grant, 1996) which squarely 
emphasizes the tacit specialized knowledge and role of firm as the integrator makes 
relevant discussions that can be applied to OSS technological collaborations. 
However, the new theory must also emphasize ' know-who ' as a strategie resource. 
This is mainly because human assets carry the know-how and. if they are not known 
by others and/or accessible then the know-how cannot be accessed, transferred, or 
learned (acquired). 
Furthermore, the most 'efficient' and 'effective' conduit for accessing the know-how 
within OSS OCTP is the ' informai relationships ' . The OSS engineers- who have 
worked on different OSS projects together- have over time developed a strong tie 
which is based on trust, a sense of familiarity, and certain level of learning capacity 
(absorptive capacity) which can facilitate the transfer of know-how in shorter time 
and at lower cost. 
'Relationships ' emerged as one of the mam subcategories of the ' technological 
collaboration' category. It captures ' dyadic ' and ' triadic ' modes and sheds light on 
issues like two-way and tripartite knowledge sharing routines. The relationship 
typology provides an explanation for why certain projects are more efficient and 
effective in meeting end user demands and sustainability of OCTP than certain 
others. In my observations, in projects where clients (e.g. , case of transport firm) 
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were more closely involved in developing and contributing to OCTP, were also more 
successful in creating network effects and influencing the teclmology trajectories. 
They could also more easily and accurately transfer know-how, and client's leaming 
capacity increased greatly. Furthermore, the cost saving on client side was more than 
those clients who simply relied on OSS firms through dyadic relationships. 
Thus, mainly contractual resources sharing routines may not work optimally within 
OSS projects embedded in OCTP. In OSS platforms most of the invaluable 
knowledge is tacit residing in individuals with ego and sense of OS or free software 
ideology. In this sense, RV (Dyer & Singh, 1998) which emphasizes interfirm 
relationships and knowledge sharing routines provides a pertinent explanation which 
fits why relationship building and the related capabilities are so important to build 
successful OSS teclmological collaborations. However, RV has little to say when it 
co mes to the 'underlying logic ' that derives actors to invest in building ' trust-based 
relationships ' and invest in creating ' relation-specifie assets ' within OSS OCTP. 
For instance, ' know-why ' which has emerged as a category within the context for 
collaboration (see Chapter 5) highlights the genesis for starting to build a 
relationship. Within OSS context, educating, informing, and training private and 
govemmental client enterprises as users of OSS technological tools that heavily 
depend on sustainability of OCTP are of paramount importance. lt is helpful to show 
them 'why they should, at al!, active/y engage and collaborate in shared R&D and 
innovation processes' and contribute to OCTP development. This sets the tone for top 
management to provide meaningful support for their IT departrnents by allocating 
them more resources (human resources, budget), ' expanded tolerance for risk ' and 
'decision making power'. 
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Finally, by taking a more encompassing RV towards understanding OSSTC, and by 
focusing on ' know-how' , ' know-who' , and 'know-why' we can also expand RBV 
(Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986, 1991) on three fronts. First, it 
specifies the key strategie resources within OSS context; so that we should adopt a 
finer-grained resource perspective that emphasizes intangibles more than the 
tangibles. Second, the issue of "how" the strategie resources can be obtained is 
resolved through complementary perspective of RV. Third, ' know-why ' sheds light 
on the point zero of embarking upon the relationship building journey in order to 
obtain resources and it also ensures the continuity of relationship maintaining and 
continuous strategie resources accessing. 
6.6.4 Governance 
Within the theory of OSSTC embedded in OCTP, ' trust-based or self-enforcing' 
agreements can lead to effective governance. To ensure the trust-based agreements 
are optimally functioning and to further avoid annoying, ineffective, or opportunistic 
behaviors, ' dual-purpose leadership' complements the governance of OSSTC and the 
platform as a whole. 
Throughout the literature on strategie alliances there has been a great emphasis on 
hazards of opportunistic behavior ( e.g., Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Pisano, 1989; 
Williamson, 1991) and how equity control s. (Hennart, 1988; Pisano, 1989) or "mutual 
hostage positions through joint commitment of financial or real assets" (Kogut, 1988, 
p. 321) can be used to reduce risks of opportunistic behavior; with sorne emphasis on 
social ties and role of trust (Gulati, 1995; Kale et al. , 2000). However, the ' nature ' of 
OSS technology, and the 'nature ' of benefits firms and individuals receive through 
contributing to OSS OCTP are different from those discussed under mainstream 
alliances literature. 
375 
OSS teclmology is characterized through: 1) modularity, 2) interoperability needs, 3) 
evolutionary character, and 4) network or platform externalities (Banik & 
Taherizadeh, 2014). Modularity refers to the fact that software is created efficiently 
by combining and integrating components that have already been created. However, 
in order for modularity to be exploited, it requires interoperability or compatibility, 
meaning that the components of a system must function smoothly when they are 
assembled together. Compatibility is a primary concern for software designers, since 
software provides a service that often cannot be disrupted. Development of future 
code must always therefore be forward looking (anticipating future needs) as well as 
retrospective ( ensuring that older systems can continue to work). Evolutionary 
character means that the software that is developed is always subject to being 
modified and improved. As an example, the average time before a new version of a 
mainstream Linux desktop operating system, is introduced is now just six months. 
This means that software designers must continually control what gets updated and 
weigh the pros and cons of introducing new changes that could compromise the 
stability and user base. Finally, the network externality refers to the benefits of a 
greater number of users sharing and developing the same software. Comrnon 
standards and lower Jearning and costs are typical network externalities. Increases in 
the user base allows the OSS product to be more attractive to users (as it often results 
in greater support and development) developers and even OSS firms because it 
enables one to leverage benefits of standardization. 
These four characteristics capture the nature of OSS teclmology. Obviously, actors 
that depend on OSS OCTP have great incentives to avoid opportunistic behavior and 
work together even in the absence of third-party en forcements . 
In addition, each actor group; be it OSS firm, enterprise client, or comrnunity of 
developers can serve their self-oriented needs and benefit from their collaboration in 
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the underlying platform development. For example, OSS firms enjoy building and 
boosting their own in-house R&D technological capabilities. Enterprise clients 
develop and maintain their desired feature through developer community (i.e. , 
commons). Core developer teams or community in general , attract financial resources 
and end-user perspectives by remaining in relationship with enterprise clients and 
OSS firms. These private benefits are therefore reasons to avoid opportunistic 
behavior and abide by the self-governing mechanisms. 
On top of these issues, OSS OCTP benefits more from triadic or network-level 
relationships. 1 specifically use the term ' triadic ' to make sure it includes enterprise 
clients on par with OSS firms, and other community developers. 'Network' leve) may 
be a confusing term here because it is all-encompassing and includes a lot of things 
without discriminating between the type and characteristics of the relationships. 
Triadic relationships have high potentials for resources transfer and more specifically 
know-how. However, they are more prone to conflicts and disagreements which 
could be persona! or technological and could eventually lead to project forking (as 
discussed earlier in Chapter 5). Thus, to ensure effective governance, a ' dual-purpose 
leadership' is needed to act as a mortar and glue the actors together, irrespective of 
their differences in wants, needs and technological capability levels. 1 have already 
explicated the conceptual building blocks of this concept, yet here 1 reemphasize the 
significant role of dual-purpose leadership in ensuring that: a) the relationships 
remain steadfast as conduit for resource sharing through ti me of collaboration; and b) 
the technological collaborations are managed, governed, and led smoothly, 
efficiently, and effectively. Dual-purpose leadership, as it means in this context, thus, 
is a new concept in my theory and it complements the RV (Dyer & Singh, 1998) in 
that it explains how alliances, here OSS technological collaborations, as weil as 
OCTP can create conditions to be able to enjoy self-enforcing agreements with Jess 
risk of dissolution and/or opportunism. 
377 
Table 6.2. A
n A
lternative Perspective of O
SSTC
 B
ased o
n
 O
bservations a
nd Em
erging Th ern
es from
 O
SS Industry 
D
im
ensions 
(Categories) 
U
nit of an
alysis 
K
ey strategie 
reso
u
rces 
Resource 
sharing co
nduit 
G
overnance 
Collaboration 
logic 
RBV 
Firm
 
Tangible/ 
intangible 
M
ainly 
co
ntractual 
M
ainly third-
party 
en forcem
ent 
A
ccess 
strategie 
reso
u
rces to 
gain C.A
. 
Existing theoretical perspective 
RD
P 
Firm
 
Tangible/ 
intangible 
M
ainly 
co
ntractual 
M
ainly third
-
party 
enforcem
ent 
O
btain n
ecessary 
reso
u
rces to 
m
an
age 
dependence and 
u
n
certainty 
KBV 
Firm
 
M
ainly tacit 
K
now
ledge 
(know
-how) 
M
ainly 
co
ntractual 
M
ainly third-
party 
en forcem
ent 
A
ccess and 
integrate 
specialized 
know
ledge of 
individuals to 
gain C
.A
.
 
RV 
Pair o
r n
etw
ork 
offirm
s 
Tangible/ 
intangible 
lnterfirm
 
relationships 
Em
phasizes 
self-
enforcem
ent; 
m
ainly inform
ai 
o
v
ern
an
ce 
Create relations-
specifie assets to 
gain C.A
. 
A
lternative (and co
m
plem
entary) 
theoretical perspective 
•
 Technology platform
,
 
•
 Pair o
r n
etw
ork of firm
s; Pair o
r n
etw
ork of fLrms 
and individuals; N
etw
ork of different co
m
m
u
nities 
of developers and their inter-relationships, 
•
 lncluding difference
s in 
types 
of o
rganizations: 
OSS firm
s 
vs. 
e
nterprise 
clients 
vs
.
 proprietary 
softw
are firm
s 
•
 OSS enterprise client typology 
•
 M
ainly intangibles: tacit know
ledge/hum
an asset
,
 
•
 K
now
-w
ho
,
 
•
 K
now
-w
hy
.
 
•
 lnterfirm
 
and 
inter-individual 
relationships 
and 
so
cial ties
,
 
•
 Borrom
ean Links co
n
cept. 
•
 M
ainly 
inform
ai 
self-enforcing 
governance 
m
echanism
,
 
•
 D
ual-purpose leadership
.
 
Private o
r inw
ard-lo
oking logic (corporate thinking) 
To 
serv
e private 
'pecuniary
' (e.g., 
reduce 
co
st 
of 
softw
are 
m
aintenance) 
and 
'n
o
n
-pecuniary' (e
.g.
,
 
enhance 
in-house 
R&
D 
technological 
capacity) 
incentives
.
 
Public o
r o
utw
ard-looking logic (platform thinking) 
•
 To 
"c
o
ntinu
o
u
sly" access technological know
-how
 
and hum
an assets; 
•
 To 
"c
o
ntinu
o
u
sly" create, share, im
prove
,
 ev
olve 
the u
nderlying codes (knowledge) and m
ake 
378 
1 nterpartner/ 
collective 
learning 
(learning-by-
co
ntributing) 
Prim
ary 
so
u
rces of 
ad van tage 
A
sym
m
etries in 
interpartner 
learning can 
have n
egative 
im
pact on 
collaboration 
and bargaining 
pow
er 
Scarce, 
v
aluable, 
inim
itable and 
hard-ta-replace 
reso
u
rces 
A
sym
m
etries in 
interpartner 
learning ca
n
 have 
n
egative imp~ct 
on collaboration 
and bargaining 
pow
er 
A
bility to 
m
an
age 
interdependencies 
and u
n
certainty 
N
ote (1): C.A
.: Com
petitive advantage 
A
sym
m
etries 
in interpartner 
learning can 
have n
egative 
im
pact on 
collaboration 
and 
bargaining 
pow
er 
O
rganizational 
capability to 
integrate 
know
ledge of 
individuals 
beyond firm
 
boundaries 
Pa1tner-specific 
absorptive 
capacity is key 
to learning a
nd 
know
ledge 
assim
ilation 
Relation-
specifie 
investm
ents; 
interfirm
 
know
ledge-
sharing ro
utines; 
co
m
plem
entary 
reso
u
rce 
endow
m
ents
,
 
effective G
ov. 
n
ecessary adaptions; 
•
 To 
"
co
n
stant/y" en
su
re interoperability
,
 
su
stainability
,
 and su
ccess of the u
nderlying 
latform
. 
•
 
lnterpartner learning has positive spillover effect 
in that: 
•
 it 
can 
im
pro
v
e 
the 
quality 
of 
u
nderlying 
co
m
m
o
n
 O
SS tools and platform
s
,
 
•
 it 
can 
lead 
to 
further 
know
ledge 
sharing 
practices
,
 creating 
n
ew
 know
ledge in form
 
of 
code co
ntributio
ns
,
 and innovations
,
 
•
 it 
co
ntributes 
to 
su
ccess
,
 
su
stainability 
and 
inter-operability 
of u
nderlying OSS tools and 
platform
s
,
 
•
 
Collective learning can strength
e
n
 the u
nity and 
cohesion ofthe OSS co
m
m
u
nity
,
 
•
 
Learning by co
ntributing
: learning takes place by 
co
ntributing to OSS developm
ent and O
CTP
,
 
•
 
Routine and dynam
ic learning capability
,
 
•
 
N
eed for dynam
ic Iearning equilibrium
s justifies 
co
ntinuous learning
,
 
•
 
Collective learning and w
riting industry platform
 
sta
nd
ard
s (e.g.
,
 FFm
peg) reduce u
n
ce1tainty leve! 
of u
nknow
n technology path
s
.
 
•
 
Interrelationships 
betw
een 
and 
am
o
ng 
individuals
,
 
n
etw
ork 
of individuals
,
 firm
s 
and 
co
m
m
u
nities
,
 
•
 
R
elationship-building capability
,
 
•
 
R
elationship-m
aintaining capability
,
 
•
 
O
SS-specific absorptive capacity
.
 
379 
6.6.5 Collaboration logic 
The theory that 1 am developing here is very much concerned with the ' logic' 
underlying the collaborations embedded in the OCTP. This is mainly because part of 
the collaboration takes place in the commons or public domain (i .e. , OCTP) where it 
cannot be heavily guarded nor its fruits can be completely appropriated by the actors. 
It is also partly due to the fact that OSS technology is always an 'unfinished 
business '; i.e., it is a technology in the state of flux: being added to and improved 
upon to make sure it functions smoothly in conjunction with other related tools and 
dependencies. Therefore, innovation participants must have sound logic to embark 
on allocating resources which could have been otherwise used, on a continuous basis. 
In this research (see Chapter 5), the results shed light on each actor group ' s different 
' private' incentives which can be classified into ' pecuniary ' and ' non-pecuniary' 
types. For exarnple, an enterprise client's logic to collaborate can be very weil the 
case of getting the much needed new feature built and integrated into the comrnunity 
core version so asto save on further maintenance costs (i.e. , pecuniary incentive). An 
OSS firm ' s technological collaboration on a specifie project may be purely to learn 
new technological capabilities interactively and enhance in-bouse R&D capacity (i.e. , 
non-pecuniary incentive). 
However, beyond private incentives which are the basis for the creation of the term 
' inward-looking logic', there is ' public or outward-looking logic' which encompasses 
the greater good; i.e. , sustainability of the technology platform. The nature of OSS 
technology, as discussed earlier, binds the actors together in that unless the 
underlying technology functions welland unless the so-called independent built-upon 
modules are up-to-date and in harmony with the core code, the users cannot enjoy the 
superior functionality oftheir OSS tools. For instance, in case where support for 'Red 
Hat® enterprise Linux 5.0 ' cornes to an end on March 31 , 2017, there will be a surge 
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of demand to upgrade to the latest version by organizations that depend on Red Hat® 
teclmology platform. The peril of remaining inactive is to accept high risk of 
exploiting vulnerabilities which include both security and functionality of 
infom1ation systems. 
Thus, the alterative perspective on OSSTC highlights a different kind of logic for 
collaboration on a shared platform. It emphasizes the collaboration logic which 
underlines: a) continuous access to technological know-how and human assets; b) 
continuous creation, sharing, improving, evolving code bases and making necessary 
teclmological adaptions; and c) constantly ensuring interoperability among 
interconnected systemic modules. The ultimate goal is to make sure the target OSS 
project, its underlying tools, core code, its dependencies and related modules remain 
'sustainable' throughout the time. The technological sustainability also encompasses 
the notion of ' technological success' which has emerged as a key category in this 
study. 
In the strategie management literature, resource-based theories such as RBV, RDT, 
KBV have emphasized the logic behind accessing strategie resources as a means to 
gain sustained competitive edge, and of course supemormal profit gains. However, 
within the alternative perspective I am putting forward , the sustainability of OSS 
project (modules, tools, platforms) is a prerequisite to arrive at other tangible 
monetary gains. For example, the tire manufacturer that uses severa! OSS tools in 
order to be flexible with its information systems and manipulate operations at will 
(without being concemed about or tied to a proprietary software giant) shall gain 
competitive edge vis-à-vis other players in the industry because they are using a 
uniquely flexible system that can bring forward production and meet market demand 
sooner than the rivais. If winter arrives two weeks earlier, they do not need to 
negotiate to-be-made software changes on short notice with severa!, proprietary 
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software vendors as they already have access to the software internai codes. 
However, they need to remain connected with the source code hosted by community 
because after ali the underlying tool is in public domain. 
Therefore, the alternative perspective provides logics which also demand a 
collaborative circumstance or condition for the resources to be effective and lead to 
competitive advantages. 
6.6.6 Learning 
'lnterpartner or collective learning' has a positive spillover effect in the theory of 
OSSTC embedded in OCTP. This is mainly because learning can lead to improving 
the quality of the OSS being collaboratively developed. Learning also positively 
influences knowledge sharing practices, code contributions, and innovations; and it 
positively contributes to success, sustainability and interoperability of OSS tools and 
platforrns. 
Furthermore, collective learning which is mainly ' learning-by-contributing' drives 
strength in unity and cohesion of the OSS community as it provides an invaluable 
incentive to those actively involved in the collaboration. Within OSS OCTP, learning 
is at disposai of those who are actually contributing to the OSS development process. 
Without getting his hands dirty through iterative and collaborative coding and 
mentorship process, an OSS developer cannot obtain the invaluable learning 
experiences. Therefore, the process of learning holds actors together as a learning unit 
which ensures cohesion throughout the process. 
In addition, OSS technological collaborations reflect the core idea of "partner-
specific absorptive capacity" which is conceived as key to learning and knowledge 
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assimilation within the RV (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Meaning that, to leam effectively, 
one must have the necessary OSS-related absorptive capacity. Sorne interviewees 
emphasized that the quality and nature of the question posed to the community 
reflects, to great extent, the depth of experience of the one behind the question. 
Therefore, top coders get attracted to well-formed intelligently-designed questions 
because they know they are getting engaged in an intellectual discussion. 
However, the conventional perspective on learning within strategie management 
literature and particularly within the domain of strategie alliances is quite different. ln 
fact, learning the much needed know-how and capabilities have been considered as 
one of the key reasons to justify an alliance (Kale et al. , 2000). Within the literature 
of strategie management and alliances, sorne authors (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; 
Hamel, 1991) have studied fmns from "skilled-based view" which considers a finn as 
portfolio of ' core competencies and value-creating disciplines' (i.e. , firm-specific 
skills) rather than a portfolio of product-market entities (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). 
Having focused on ' acquisitions of skills ' as the logic for alliance formation, authors 
have emphasized the role of ' out-learning' one' s partner in making the laggard 
leamer dependent and redundant within the partnership (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). 
Hamel ( 1991, p. 1 01) argues that in collaborations where leaming in form of 
'intemalization of know-how' is the objective then the longevity and stability of the 
partnership may not be useful proxies for the collaborative success. Thus, the 'race 
for leaming' bas received considerable attention (Khanna et al. , 1998; Das & Teng, 
2000) emphasizing the possibility of opportunistic behavior of partners to outleam 
one another and causing instability in partnership. 
The above argument on existing asymmetries in interpartner leaming and its negative 
impact on joint collaboration and bargaining power (see Hamel, 1991) is in line with 
RBV, KBV, and RDP in that each partner is in search for a strategie asset (e.g. , 
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know-how) to gain an edge and once the know-how or capability is internalized the 
collaboration can become instable as the target is hit. 
However, OSS technological collaborations rely on technology platform which 
should be constantly evolving and therefore in need of dynamic knowledge 
equilibriums. Partners learn, learn further, unlearn, and learn again in the course of 
developing, improving, and maintaining the software tools and products. Thus, the 
learning process does not reach an end stage so that one partner feels independent 
from the other and leaves the relationship. There may be cases where actors get more 
involved in the collaboration and then distant themselves for a while in form of "in-
and-out relationships", yet in order to optimally benefit from the key OSS projects 
they need for their own operations, the partners need to remain connected and active 
within the OSS community. Consequently, the nature of technology and need for its 
sustainability make 'learning' a routine that pulls partners further together than 
drifting them away from their collaborative effort. In short, routine learning demands 
participants of OSS technological collaborations to develop a dynamic learning 
capability which extends through time and ensures sustainability of OSS OCTP. 
6.6.7 Primary sources of advantage 
My theory of OSSTC embedded in OCTP perceives 'primary sources of advantages ' 
differently from those mentioned in strategie alliances based on resources-based 
views (e.g. , RBV, KBV). Traditionally, RBV emphasizes possession of the resources 
that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and hard to become substituted as critical 
to gain sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991 ). 
RV (Dyer & Singh, 1998) shifts the spotlight on reiation-specific (i.e. , unique to 
interfirm relationships) assets, knowledge-sharing routines, complementary resource 
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endowments, and effective governance (i.e. , mainly trust based) to provide a finer-
grained explanation of role of resources and interfirm relationship in relation to 
gaining sustainable competitive edge. In this research, by looking deep into OSS 
technological collaborations, 1 can begin to shape a theory which complements these 
two perspectives and extend them by being more meticulous with sources of 
advantage. 
Within OSS technological collaborations, individuals ' social capital through strong 
and weak ties plays a significant role in enabling organizations and individuals to 
access human assets or know-how and build the opportunity to create relation-
specifie assets. Inkpen and Tsang (2005 , p. 151) define social capital as: "the 
aggregate of resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the 
network of relationships possessed by an individual or organization" . This is a 
powerful concept which emphasizes the paramount role of interrelationships as the 
bedrock for other important factors. For instance, knowledge-sharing routines, 
accessing and integrating complementary and specialized knowledge resources, 
collaborating without the presence of third-party enforcements, and creating as well 
as accessing dynamic multiple knowledge equilibriums to insert fresh know-how into 
the project, ali in aU rely on the interrelationships. Therefore, the ' relationship-
building' and 'relationship-maintaining' capabilities are two significant 
complementary elements to interrelationships. 
Prior literature bas emphasized the role of interfirm relationships in form of alliances 
to access extemal knowledge resources (Gulati , 1998; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999; 
Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004)- a notion that bas been viewed as firms ' attempts to 
retain knowledge externally (e.g. , see, Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009). 
Accessing extemal knowledge (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004) and "connective 
capacity" as the ability to establish links to other elements-making connections- to 
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facilitate knowledge access (Lulm1atm, 1995) have been re-emphasized in the more 
recent literature on knowledge management (Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009). 
Others (Kale & Singh, 2007) have also emphasized the role of "relational 
capability"88 (Lorenzoni & Lipparini , 1999) in alliances' leaming process and viewed 
the concept as "the capacity of the organization to create, extend, or modify a firm's 
resource base, augmented to include preferred access to the resources of its alliance 
partners" (Kale & Singh, 2007, p.996). 
Yet, despite these efforts to highlight the role and importance of interfirm 
relationships in terms of "connective capacity" or "relational capability"; 1 still think 
that the two broader concepts needs to be broken down in order to be further clarified 
in the context of OSS technological collaborations; where most of the knowledge is 
tacit; and where the quality and existence of the individual-to-individual connection 
plays a significant role in facilitating generation and transfer of knowledge. 
In the process of this research, the two notions of 'relationship-building' and 
' relationship-maintaining' capabilities emerged as key ingredients which can 
complement the notion of "relational capability" (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999) 
which is "capability to interact with other companies ... accelerates the lead firm's 
knowledge access and transfer with relevant effects on company growth and 
innovativeness (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999, p. 317)." 
1 define ' relationship-building capability' as: The capability to get engaged with 
another actor (firm, individual, a team) in the process of code development and code 
or knowledge sharing based on mutual trust and reciprocity. As the relationship is 
88 Relational capability is the "capability to interact with other companies ... accelerates the lead firm's 
knowledge access and transfer with relevant effects on company growth and innovativeness 
(Lorenzoni & Lipparini , 1999, p. 317)." 
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built, it needs to be maintained to be effective. ' Effectiveness' here is central to 
benefiting from the relationship as it encompasses successful ' knowledge access ', 
and ' knowledge transfer' between and among partners. 
'Relationship-maintaining' capability refers to the necessary actions actors must take 
to make sure the connection between actors is sustained throughout the shared R&D 
and innovation process. For instance, remaining engaged in the iterative code 
developing process, sharing back the internai code developments with the 
community, sharing and integrating the specialized in-bouse know-how with other 
experts in the development process on a continuous basis are among cornerstones of 
relationship-maintaining capability. 
In addition, ' OSS-specific absorptive capacity' is required to make sure each partner 
has enough technological competence and capability to understand the others and 
thus able to perform (to code) in harmony with the rest of the group. Originally, 
"absorptive capacity", acting like a sponge, refers to "the ability of a finn to 
recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends" (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p. 128). Within the context of OSS 
technological collaborations, a developer' s prior OSS mentorship, persona! and 
professional experiences89, past track records, cultural compatibility, and deep 
collaborations with OSS core developers, ali in ali, lead to building up a very specifie 
OSS expertise which encompass: know-how, know-why, and know-who. This 
specifie expertise is called here ' OSS-specific absorptive capacity ' and 1 recognize its 
significant role in maintaining the relationships. 
89 By ' persona! experience ', here 1 mean the playing-around activities a developer takes part in in order 
to enjoy, have fun and simply learn a few things about OSS tools and techno logies; wh ile ' professional 
experience ' captures the coding activities an OSS deve loper performs in capacity of a hired, salaried 
engineer within the context of his or her work responsibilities. The distinction is important because a 
professional experience cornes with accountability towards superiors, clients and even professional 
community-based projects and this brings the discussions into the strategie OSS with real client market 
as opposed to for-fun projects. 
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Together, the relationship-building, -maintaining capabilities, and OSS-specific 
absorptive capacity form the primary sources of advantage within the the01·y of OSS 
technological collaborations in OSS OCTP. This is mainly because they ensure 
access and transfer of know-how as in tacit knowledge, and therefore success and 
sustainability of shared OSS R&D and innovation process and the platfom1 as a 
whole. Lastly, once relationships are maintained, the element of continuity which is 
embedded in maintenance leads to ' different knowledge equilibriums ' to co-exist. 
This in turn provides diversity of fresh knowledge which feeds OCTP, its growth, 
success, and survival. 
6. 7 Conclusion 
1 reviewed and critically analyzed five major theories (TCE, RBV, RDP, KBT, RV) 
which have been extensively used to approach, understand, and explain strategie and 
technological alliances. This analysis coupled with the particularities of OSS 
technology and the emerged themes from Chapter 5 can justify my claim that they 
cannat fully reflect and explain the nature of OSS technological alliances in the 
context of their shared R&D and innovation processes. It is especially so if we take a 
platform view of OSS development - i.e. , OSS OCTP. Out of five theories, four; 
namely, RBV, RDP, KBT, and RV embody insightful concepts which can be applied 
to the context of OSS OCTP. 1, therefore, extracted the relevant concepts and 
organized them around seven dimensions that 1 developed as a guiding torch. Such 
arrangement helped me clearly identify the areas where OSSTC is different from 
conventional strategie alliances (see Figure 6.2). Thus, the seven dimensions and the 
OSS-related conceptual developments and clarifications, together form an alternative 
perspective or a theory of OSS open and collaborative technology platforms. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDA TI ONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the concluding remarks by discussing theoretical contributions, 
managerial implications, limitations, and the avenues for further research. First, this 
study makes five main theoretical contributions which fall at the crossroads of the 
research fields of OSS, OI, OBM, and strategie alliances based on empirical evidence 
gathered from OSS industry projects. Second, the present research also offers key 
managerial implications that can benefit practitioners not only in software and/or OS 
software industry, but also those from other different downstream industries (music 
and entertainment, transport, auto part manufacturing, financial and banking, to name 
a few) who consider either adoption and integration of OSS tools/solutions, or are 
thinking about expanding their reliance on OSS projects. Third, this study discusses 
three main limitations and finally it ends by recommending four ways to advance this 
line of research further. 
7.2 OSS technology: A useful empirical tool for developing 01 and platform theories 
My focus in this empirical research bas been on the OSS technology which is 
inherently a unique technology (see Section 3.4). lt is highly modular, being always 
in a state flux with uncertain technological trajectories and evolving industry 
standards. lt demonstrates the traits of public goods and heavily depends on positive 
network extemalities in order to have a sustainable RDIP. These particularities, 
therefore, significantly influence the way OSSTC functions and how they are 
managed. 
In the recent literature of distributed and collaborative RDIP (e.g., von Hippel & von 
Krogh, 2003), OSS has been tightly associated with the concept of 01 (e.g., 
Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007; Gruber & Henkel , 2006; Maxwell, 2006). This 
association has extended to the point that OSS has been perceived as "the poster 
child", "a great exemplar" of 01 concept, and/or a fertile ground to study and 
theorize about 01 (Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007; West & Gallagher, 2006; Morgen 
& Fümegan, 2010). On a more detailed note, 01- while emphasizing the adoption of 
01 strategy- encourages firms to open up their business models (i .e., OBM concept) 
in order to more effectively create and capture value from their 01-based initiatives 
(Chesbrough, 2007b). OSS -as popularized through the lens of 01 in recent years-
has been also studied as a showcase by those whose objective has been to look deep 
into the OSS firms' processes and explain how OBM functions (e.g., Perr et al. , 
2010). More specifically, as OSS is gaining more and more momentum and is 
becoming an indispensable part of software industry, 01 has become a more relevant 
framework to study how private enterprises have ventured into exploiting the 
opportunities offered by OSS industry (West & Gallagher, 2006). 90 
However, fundamentally speaking, OIP is criticized on three major fronts. It lacks 
solid theoretical underpinning (e.g., Lichtenthaler, 2011; van de Vrande et al. , 2009) 
- an issue which is still valid (Vanhaverbeke & Cloodt, 2014). 01 has been built upon 
fuzzy pillars so much so that it has been labelled for being "old wine in new botties" 
(Trott & Hartmann, 2009)- meaning that, such a thing as closed innovation (which 
has been used to justify OI) never existed. Moreover, there are severa! research 
shortcomings, many uncharted research domains, and dearth of extemal validity of 
9
° For example: Gassmann, (2006); Henkel (2006); West and Gallagher (2006); Dittrich and Duysters 
(2007); van de Vran de et al. (2009); Enkel et al. (2009); Gassmann et al. (20 1 0). 
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the concept (see Chapter 2 for more details). Based on these caveats, one should take 
the usefulness and appropriateness of OI concept in studying OSSTC with a pinch of 
salt. 
Moreover, based on my rev1ews of OI literature (see Chapter 2), I conclude that 
openness is the essential condition for adopting OIP, but it is not the sujjicient 
condition to benefit from collaborative R&D . Issues like appropriate governance, 
managing network externalities, honing the right absorptive capacities, to name a 
few, are among the significant factors that must be discussed at a higher 
organizational leve!. In addition, the overemphasis of the existing literature in 
framing openness as dominant/y afirm-centric phenomenon which is subject to firm-
level managerial discussions (see, Piller & West, 2014) poses a limited 
conceptualization of openness and 01. This coupled with the dearth of understanding 
of "the interactive and reciprocal nature of "coupled innovation processes" 
(Chesbrough & Bogers, 2014, p. 19) becomes a more pressing issue specifically in 
case of OSSTC embedded in OSS R&D projects. OSSTCs include multi-sided 
platform-based interactions among a plethora of firms, community of developers and 
individuals who collectively develop software modules in the commons or the public 
domains. Thus, OI ' s predominantly firm-centric approach does not adequately 
explain them. 
Additionally, the review of the BM' s literature makes the case for claiming that it is 
not a well-equipped concept to deal with the openness, open strategy, and more 
importantly, OSS. BM, as it seems, is still very corporate-centric, focused on firm-
level sustainable competitive advantage, customer segment and revenue focused, and 
the internai structure of the firm (See Chapter 2). Although the bulk of the literature 
tends to position the concept in the thinking of conventional strategie management, 
i.e. , P011er' s five forces (1980a), recently scholars have acknowledged that BM 
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expands firm boundaries and that it is becoming more focused on value creation 
processes. Still, BM does not seem to have become attuned to OI or UI concepts 
where value creation and capture processes are not readily situated within 
organizational boundaries. It certainly is poorly suited to explain the core and 
nuances of OSSTCs. 
Moreover, based on the discussions on OBM (See Chapter 2) , we can conclude that, 
for BM to fit into OIP, it must adopt an open strategy and step outside the 
organizational boundaries. Put simply, BM needs to transform into OBM in arder to 
become relevant to discussions on open and distributed innovation. The discussions 
on OBM, therefore, are more useful in the context of OSSTCs as they have begun to 
tap into ecosystem way of value creation, partner networks, platforms, and alliances. 
All these concepts, however, are subject to detailed investigation in arder to reflect 
the particularities of OSS technologies and their development processes. 
In addition, there is a shifting focus which targets the notion of 'value creation 
processes ', its ' complexities', and the ' central role of customers ' in designing 
'customer-focused value creation processes' (see Zott et al. , 2011 ; Teece, 2010, 2007; 
Monis et al. , 2005; Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). Having realized that the 
processes of value creation and value capture are two distinct issues (although they 
can be intenelated), the former has received little attention compared to the latter 
(Nickerson et al. , 2007). In addition, previous studies have mainly looked at the 
pivotai role of BM in technology commercialization process at the level of individual 
firm (see, for example, Chesbrough &and Rosenbloom, 2002; Bjorkdahl, 2009; Calia 
et al. , 2007). Therefore, they have ignored the role of individuals, communities and 
networks in creating value and commercializing the newly developed technologies- in 
short, paying little attention to importance of BM at ·industry leve] (Zott et al., 2011 ). 
Furthermore, the paucity of research in examining the role of commercial clients of 
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OSS solutions/products associated with issues such as success and sustainability of 
OSSTC and projects (which are embedded within the scope of OBM) have created a 
theoretical hollow in the intersection of 01, OSS, OBM research fields . Also, Piller 
and West (20 14)' s latest attempts made to further theorize the concept of 01 highlight 
more research gaps with regards to governance of collaboration process, 
collaboration infrastructures, and supporting capabilities. For instance, we need to 
understand whether or under what conditions OBM adopted by OSS firms can lead to 
positive network externalities and continuous value creation. 
In consideration of these existing gaps, this dissertation makes severa] key theoretical 
contributions. 
7.3 Theoretical contributions: Bridging OSS, 01, OBM, and strategie alliances 
concepts 
The results of this research- as laid out in Chapt ers 5 and 6- ad vance the litera ture of 
OSS, 01, OBM, and strategie alliances in the following ways. 
7.3.1 Platform perspective vs. Firm-centric-view 
1 have characterized the particularities of OSS technology and studied OSSTC 
embedded in OSS RDIP adopting a lens of technology platforms. Therefore, this 
study breaks away from the mainstream 01 approach - which is "a firm-centric 
paradigm that is primarily concerned with leveraging external knowledge to improve 
internai innovation and thus the firm ' s economie perforn1ance" (Piller & West, 2014, 
p. 29). My perspective is also different from some of the earlier OSS researchers ' 
approach such as Weber (2004). For instance, Weber (2004, p. 8) clearly mentions: 
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"My starting point for explaining the open source process is the lens of political 
economy. I will situate the puzzle to start in modern concepts from political 
economy and then say more precisely why open source challenges some 
conventional theories about the organization of production, and how it affects 
and is affected by society." 
My theory introduces the phenomena of OSSTC and OSS RDIP as a technology 
platform-centric phenomenon, i.e. , Open and Collaborative Technology Platform 
(OCTP). This view seems to better suit the key particularities of OSS and more 
comprehensively inform us about complexities involved in OSSTC and OSS shared 
RDIP. For instance, one of the reasons professionals and firms engage in 
collaborative development and maintenance of the OSS technology platforms is to 
possibly influence technology trajectories and shape the future industry standards to 
suit their products and services. If the platform remains closed to the public access, 
then they cannat create any network effects. Therefore platform opetmess ensures the 
potential for further adoption and creation of positive network effects; while 
continuous collaboration and contribution ensure sustainability and viability of the 
platform. 
7.3.2 New knowledge co-development vs. Accessing and acquiring knowledge 
OIP and theory of strategie alliances focus most of their attention on debating the 
strategie usefulness of accessing, or acquiring resources which lie beyond firm 
boundaries (See Chapters 2 and 6). Therefore, when OI or strategie alliances 
discusses the concepts of BM innovation, contract-based learning and resources 
sharing, collaborating on R&D projects, comrnercializing through second or third 
parties and gaining an edge in the incumbent industries, there is always a power 
asymrnetry, a free-riding hazard, or simply an unfair condition due to incomplete 
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contracts underlying collaborations, where one partner may get the lion' s share and 
win the collaboration race. 
On the contrary, the results of this research (Chapter 5 and 6) show that in cases of 
OSSTC and OSS RDIP, there is another key incentive underlying collaborations; i.e. , 
' creation and co-development o[new knowledge ' (i.e. , software technology in form 
of codes, featmes, packaging methods, writing new industry standards, etc.) on an 
OCTP. Actors - either private firms as users or software developers or individuals or 
large public organizations- have Jogical incentives to remain connected and maintain 
their relationships- often in the absence of contracts- because if OCTP (i.e. , the 
commons) grows and sustains, ali participants will benefit from the underlying 
technologies. The incentives are logically justified not only based on firm-level or 
individual leve! benefits (as the case of past studies presented un der Section 3.5 .1 , 
and Table 3.1) but also based on platform, network leve! or collective incentives. 
Such ecosystem-based view ignores the hazard of freeriding because software 
genuinely has the traits of public goods (i.e. , non-rival, non-exclusive), so if more 
people join the OCTP and use it, it does not shrink in value. In fact, the more users 
jo in the OCTP, the higher will be the value of the network and platform - a 
phenomenon also known as network extemalities. In addition, bilateral and 
multilateral contributions (see discussions on relationships in Chapter 5) ensure that 
the platform keeps developing and new technology standards are being added. 
7.3.3 A ' detailed' analysis ofthe nature ofOSS value creation processes 
One ofthe main value-added and distinctive featmes ofthis research lies in its ability 
to identify key concepts related to OSSTC and OSS shared RDIP and explain them in 
extensive details. In fact, I delve into the 'nature of OSS value creation processes'-
as an important and indispensable part of OBM - and clearly identify actors and 
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explicate their key characteristics, incentives, raies, and how they collaborate (i.e. , 
context for collaboration, relationship typology, code sharing complexities, and dual-
purpose leadership) in arder to illustrate why and how OSSTC and OSS RDIP can 
become successful and sustain long term . Others have also studied OSS 
collaborations in detail (e.g. , Weber, 2004; Hang et al. , 2005 ; Kelty, 2008 ; and many 
more, see Chapter 3), and significantly contributed to our understanding of the tapie. 
However, concerning certain aspects associated with OSSTC and RDIP, they did not 
go to the so-called ' inner core' of the subject matter. One reason could be due to their 
adoption of only interview-based data collection ( e.g., the case of Weber, 2004 ). 
For instance, consider important concepts such as 'flexibility ' benefit provided by 
adoption of OSS-based information systems; ' learning ' as result of engaging in 
OSSTC and shared RDIP; ' know-who' and ' know-why ' underlying technological 
collaborations; ' complexifies associated with code sharing routines'; 'dual-purpose 
leadership' constructed ground up from minute conceptual building blacks gathered 
through a mix of qualitative methodology, including participant observation method. 
These details collective! y enrich the developed theory (Figure 5.17. The Theoretical 
Madel of OSS Technological Collaborations), and strengthen its explanatory power 
in terms of ' why', ' how', ' under what circumstances' (see, for more details, Whetten, 
1989) and distinguish it from the earlier efforts. Severa! examples clearly highlight 
the contributions of this research to shed light on the important nuances of OSSTC. 
For example, Weber (2004) highlights the issue of field testing; and, he mentions 
how the Jack of rigor in testing can negatively impact OSS development. He further 
discusses and highlights the role of using many diverse individuals in arder to 
generate patterns of use which are inherently unpredictable by the OSS developers. 
Nonetheless he does not go into more detail to treat diversity at a micro leve!. He 
does not identify and characterize enterprise users of OSS as a possible source of 
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knowledge feedbacks which can enhance and shorten the commercialization of OSS 
tools and solutions. However, based on the nuances that differentiate clients from one 
another according to their leve! of technological collaboration, 1 classify clients into 
four distinct groups (the conservatives, the luddites, the champions, and the reticent) 
and discuss their roles, capabilities, and incentives in detail (See, Chapter 5, Section 
5.3.1 , Part B, Figure 5.11). 
Other examples include the notions of 'flexibility ' (See, Table 5.2. Unpacking the 
Concept of Flexibility), and ' meaningful cost saving benefit' (Figure 5.1 O. 
Relationship between Clients ' Adoption of OSS Solutions and the Accrued Benefits). 
Past studies (e.g. , Li et al. , 2011) have identified these as "extrinsic motivation" but 
have not exactly studied their significance and nuances of their conceptual 
differences. Nor have they explained how these benefits can influence participants ' 
decisions to engage or not to engage in OSSTC and shared RDIP. The grounded 
theory approach (GTA) coupled with participant observation method provided me 
with a unique opportunity to understand, analyze and unpack these conceptual 
nuances and advance the OSS literature on these fronts. 
Y et another example concems the 01 literature on the different approaches that firms 
adopt to manage the ir relationship with community of OSS developers ( e.g. , 
Dahlander & Magnusson, 2005, 2008). Dahlander and Magnusson (2005) propose a 
typology of three different approaches (symbiotic, commensalistic, and parasitic). 
However, they do not treat the nature of OSS technology as a significant factor that 
binds participants and provides an underlying logic for collaboration. 
In this research, 1 identify inherent particularities of (OS) software and make a case 
for collective and sustainable development. The two concepts of ' Water Purifier 
Model' and 'Borromean Links ' together illustrate the inescapable interdependencies 
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about software modules and their evolutionary character. These concepts further 
explain why firms and individuals may prefer a "symbiotic" relationship over 
"parasitic" one. Furthermore, the client typology (Figure 5.11) also discusses 
different cases based on their degree of collaboration (high vs. low) and type of 
connection (indirect vs. direct) with OSS communities. This type of detailed analysis 
provides a finer-grained understanding of different levels of collaboration and 
explains the underlying reasons- therefore, progressing the work of Dahlander and 
Magnusson (2005). 
7.3.4 Development oftwo detailed theories ofOSSTC and their implications 
The two theories that I have developed in this dissertations: 1) ' An Inductive Theory 
of OSS Technological Collaborations' (See Section 5.4 for details such as models, 
core propositions and hypotheses); and 2) 'OCTP As an Alternative Perspective' (See 
Section 6.6 for models and details on the seven dimensions of the theory) provide two 
complementary perspectives of OSSTC. 
The first inductive theory- a bird ' s-eye view of collaborations- identifies the key 
factors and explains their dependencies and how they influence (positively or 
negatively) the success and sustainability ofOSSTC and OSS shared RDIP. 
For instance, notions of success and sustainability are among the debatable and fuzzy 
concepts within OSS literature, and even more so as far as "success" of OSS projects 
is under spotlight (e.g. , Asay, 2014; Sen et al. , 2012; Subran1aniam et al., 2009; Lee 
et al. , 2009; Crowston et al. , 2006; DeLone & McLean, 2003 , 2002, 1992; Rai et al. 
2002; Seddon et al. 1999; Seddon 1997; Raymond, 1999). By clarifying these 
concepts at different conceptual levels, and explaining how deeper layers of 
technological collaborations (e.g. , dyadic and triadic relationships) and the 
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circumstances under which they can influence success and sustainability of OSS 
RDIP and OSSTC, this research provides a theoretical framework that can guide 
research for further empirical investigation. The four core propositions and the 
follow-up hypotheses try to explain and accentuate the roles of enterprise clients, 
dual-purpose leadership and tripartite relationships in contributing to success and 
sustainabil ity of OSSTC. 
On a more detailed note, the concepts of ' dual-purpose leadership' and ' contextual 
factors ' in capacities of intervening and moderating constructs help us better explain 
how the relationship between OSSTC and outcome constructs (success and 
sustainability) are affected. lt is the details as such which make this inductive theory a 
useful framework to study OSS phenomenon. 
The second theory - which is partly inductive and partly elective- distinguishes 
OSSTC from the conventional strategie or technological alliances and clearly 
characterizes them based on ' seven key dimensions ' (unit of analysis, key strategie 
resources, resources sharing conduit, govemance, collaboration logic, interpartner or 
collective learning, and primary sources of advantage). 
As a case in point, the literature of strategie or technological alliances v1ews 
asymmetries in interpartner leaming as negatively impacting the longevity of 
collaborations and shifting the locus of bargaining power from one partner to another. 
Thus, the ' race for learning' has received considerable attention (Khanna et al. , 1998; 
Das & Teng, 2000) emphasizing the possibility of opportunistic behavior of partners 
to outlearn one another and causing instability in partnership. On the contrary, my 
theory - OCTP as an alternative perspective or the alternative perspective of 
OSSTC- views the notion of ' leaming' differently and conceptualizes it in a manner 
that suits the OSS context, respecting the inherent particularities of OSS technology. 
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In fact, in my theory of OSSTC, interpartner learning has positive spillover effect in 
that it can improve the quality of underlying conll11on OSS tools and platforn1s, lead 
to further knowledge sharing practices, creating new knowledge in form of code 
contributions, and innovations, and effectively contribute to success, sustainability 
and inter-operability of underlying OSS tools and platforms. Therefore, collective 
learning can strengthen the unity and cohesion of the OSS comrnunity. I also explain 
that learning takes place in form of ' learning by contributing' . This means that a free 
rider cannot learn much, a notion also highlighted by von Hippel and von Krogh 
(2003). Fm1hermore, l view learning as a ' routine leaming' which is dynamic and 
requires a ' dynamic learning capability ', therefore, the need for having dynamic 
learning equilibriums justifies continuous learning. Collective Jearning and writing 
industry platform standards ( e.g., FFmpeg) also reduce uncertainty lev el of unknown 
teclmology paths. 
7.3.5 Open and collaborative value creation platform as an example ofOBM 
The recent decade has witnessed an unprecedented nU111ber of attempts to further 
explore the BM black box from conceptual and empirical perspectives so as to 
improve its conceptual clarity as well as formulate empirical tools for managers to 
design BMs (Taran et al. , 2015 ; Robins, 2013 ; Baden-Fuller & Haefliger, 2013 ; 
Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010; Teece, 2010; Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010). 
Among other individual publications (e.g., Zott & Amit, 2007), special issues91 are 
evidence of the focused effort to converge scholarly attempts towards unifying the 
subject. While more definitions and perspectives on BMs would appear to be 
contributing to convergence of the definitions, in fact, their heterogeneity have 
allowed for divergence on severa! issues related to the topic. For example, in view of 
9 1 One can consult special issues such as Long Range Planning (2013 , 2010), R&D Management 
Journal (20 14), International Journal of Innovation Management (20 13). 
400 
· the shortening product life cycles, rising costs of R&D, shrinking margins due to 
stifling competition imposed by new (entrepreneurial) entrants fim1s have tumed the 
spotlight on BM as a principal and standalone locus of innovation- a phenomenon 
which has been gaining momentum in the past decade, termed "business mode) 
innovation" (BMI). 
However, our understanding of BM and BMI concepts is still limited. Moreover, 
based on the discussions on OBM (See Chapter 2), we can conclude that, for BM to 
fit into OIP, it must adopt an open strategy that functions beyond organizational 
boundaries. Put simply, BM needs to become open in order to be relevant to open and 
distributed innovation discussions. Thus, OSS and looking into OSSTCs provide a 
fertile research ground to develop some theoretical insights about internai workings 
of OBM ("how") and "why" different players must actively engage in OSSTCs to 
create value long-term. 
In Chapter 5, the sections on OSS technological collaborations and interdependence-
independence shed light on how and under what circumstances (i .e., conditions and 
consequences) actors can co-create value and capture part of that value through 
boundary spanning collaborations. For instance, subcategories such as context for 
technological collaboration, code sharing modes, relationships typology, and dual-
purpose leadership inform us of the details of the black box of collaborative and 
boundary spanning value creation processes within OSS projects. 
Furthermore, the conceptual notion of Borromean Links (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3 
Interdependence-Independence) provides insights on how the interdependence among 
actors is vital to creating a unique value for each participant that cannot be otherwise 
obtained (alone or independently), or through market transactions. This is mainly 
because within the collaborative OSS R&D and innovation process, each actor plays 
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a unique and specifie set of roZes that is complementary to tho se of the others. Th us, 
Borromean Links - which represents the twin concept of interdependence-
independence (see Figure 6.16) - makes a theoretical contribution to understanding 
the nature of value creation process embedded in OSS business models and therefore 
OIB. 
7.4 Managerial implications 
Table 7.1 selects and highlights the managerial or practice-oriented relevance of 
severa! concepts such as Borromean Links, Water Purifier Madel, flexibility, 
(meaningful) cost saving, client typology, nature of client technological 
collaborations, context for and modes of collaborations, as well as success and 
sustainability. 
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Table 7.1. The Summary of the Key Managerial Implications 
Theoretical concept Managerial implications (recommendations) 
Borromean Links 
Concept, and W a ter 
Purifier Model 
Breakdown of the 
concept of 
jlexibility 
Meaningful cost 
saving 
This concept can be used in designing the content of marketing and 
business intelligence documents in the following ways: 
a) To help the commercial clients understand the nature of OSS 
RDIP, and the underlying logic of iterative code sharing with 
communities, 
b) To inform the clients of their position as a key stakeholder in the 
R&D process as opposed to a passive user, 
c) To motivate them to engage actively and invest in the iterative 
code sharing process through allocating more time, money, and 
intangible resources as weil as permission to conduct share coding. 
The Borromean Links further helps core developers and key 
administrators how to realize the vital rote of enterprise clients in 
commercialization process of OSS. It can motivate them to change 
their perspective of clients from mere users to innovators . This will 
eventually lead to further technological and commercial success of 
OSS projects and sustainability of its development and growth over 
ti me. 
lt is a challenging task for OSS firm ' s managers and especially the 
sales team to enlighten enterprise clients having little experience 
about issues like the genuine benejits of adopting OSS solutions. The 
mainstream perception of OSS solution is that it is a less costly 
solution when compared to proprietary ones (i.e. , a pecuniary 
perspective). However, by unpacking the flexibility concept and 
revealing its various conceptual elements, firms can successfully 
inform clients of the real benefits such as influencing technology 
trajectories, and strategizing their business. They can explain what the 
intrinsic value of flexibility is and how it provides real customer 
benefits. 
Cost saving is often perceived as a key benefit sought by clients 
adopting OSS solutions. However, as this research has demonstrated, 
there is more to OSS than this virtue. The open architecture of OSS 
which allows for maintainability and sustainability provide a 
meaningful cost saving benefit. lt is one that emerges by remaining 
connected and interacting with the community of developers. 
Meaningful cost savings are thus not limited to acquisition costs, but 
also operation and maintenance (e.g. , modification, switching) costs. 
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Client typology and 
the nature of the 
client technological 
collaborations 
Context for, and 
modes of 
collaboration 
Success and 
sustainability 
This research ' s findin gs show that the degree and mode of 
collaboration and connection seem to influence the proposed 
relationship between adoption of OSS and the accrued key benefits 
such as flexibility and cost saving. Based on the nuances that 
differentiate clients from one another, the 'c lient typology ' (Figure 
5.11) informs OSS firms ' managers and leadership of communities to 
be aware of differences which exist among enterprise clients and the ir 
expectations. Therefore, the leve ls of commitment and investments, 
as weil as modes of collaboration are ali influenced by the type of 
enterprise client, OSS firm s and communities deal with. Therefore, 
they can benefit from these insights, and adapt their interactions to 
clients ' particularities . In case of long-term planning, dual-purpose 
leaders can use these insights to train and shift a position of a client 
from , for example, ' the conservatives' to ' the champions' in arder to 
enhance their involvements. 
These two issues are particularly insightful to those OSS firms and 
clients that are planning to enter into a long-term OSS technological 
collaboration over severa! projects. By knowing about the key 
contextual elements, and their consequences as weil as types of 
collaborations and relationships, bath OSS firms and clients can 
make informed decisions about how to strategize their involvement 
and resources allocations from the start. 
Knowing better about these fuzzy notions is significant to managers 
of OSS firm s, OSS community leadership, and managers of client 
organizations for at the end of the day, not al i factors associated with 
investments can be calculated through a cost-benefit analysis. This is 
because ' value' of a specifie project, module, or tool differs from finn 
to finn and individuals from business world or OSS technical world . 
There are different understandings of success and sustainability of 
OSS projects, its R&D process, and collaborations. Therefore, by 
better knowing the key elements associated with success and 
sustainability, clients, OSS firms, and community core developers can 
have meaningful and clear discussions with one another particularly 
when they want to forge triadic relationships. 
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Dual-purpose 
leadership 
Source: The author. 
If actors, collaboration and relationships form the bricks of 
collaborative OSS R&D and innovation process (RDIP), the 
leadership is the mortar that glues ali these constituents of OSS 
ecosystem together. The signiftcance of leadership is further 
underlined in collaborations because within OSS projects the people 
in power positions are required to manage technology (and ali 
associated issues) and people simultaneously in order to create 
synergy and realize the platfonn ' s key objectives. The emerging 
concept of ' dual-purpose leadership ' therefore is comprised of ftve 
core categories (vision, goal setting, technology management, 
managing the fear of forking, and managing/leading the OSS 
community of actors) as weil as a number of micro conceptual 
building blocks (e.g., coordination mechanisms, open governance, 
etc.). Delineating the se concepts (Chapter 5, Section 5.3 .2, Part D) 
therefore raises the leve] of awareness of managers about the 
importance of establishing a collective leadership and playing an 
injluential role in the leadership process. Figure 5. 15 demon strates 
the institutional evolution of OSS and shows that OSS RDIP is 
evolving towards Open Technology Platforms. Therefore, 
organizations, communities and individuals ali together are now 
viewed as stakeholders that can invest in their leadership efforts to 
make sure the ir technological self-interest is aligned with that of the 
group interest. 
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7.5 Limitations of the study 
This research has set out to explore, describe and explain the phenomenon of OSS 
technological collaborations and the shared R&D and innovation process that hosts 
them. Despite the insights generated within the scope of this research, the final work 
still suffers from severa! shortcomings. Particularly, the study's exploratory nature 
has made the research vulnerable to some criticism. For instance, according to Babbie 
(1999, p. 73), an exploratory research ' s findings may "seldom provide satisfactory 
answers to research questions, though they can hint at answers and give insights into 
the research methods that could provide definitive answers" (Babbie, 1999, p. 73). 
Thus, as this research is not an exception, in what follows , I discuss its major 
limitations and underline some avenues for further research. 
7.5.1 Research logistics and socio-cultural related issues 
Part of the research logistics includes the challenging task of preparing the list of 
potential participating candidates, obtaining their consent, and coordinating the 
schedules of these participants for interview sessions. In addition, having completed 
the interviews, I had to reach out to individuals to further reduce ambiguity, and 
avoid misrepresentations, as weil as to obtain their approval of the transcriptions of 
their interview sessions. The number of interviews was limited due to a number of 
practical constraints. 
First, because the participants were mostly individuals holding managerial positions 
(e.g., CEOs, VPs, project managers, entrepreneurs-founders, and R&D managers, to 
name a few), their time availability was limited (an interview session lasts for about 
45 to 60 minutes), and they had to schedule, reschedule, cancel, and reinstate the 
interview sessions as they found it convenient to their daily routine. In some cases, 
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the interviews were conducted with managers stationed outside Canada, therefore 
time difference played yet another role in interview coordination task. 
Second, although each interviewee received a consent form to sign, sorne managers 
(mostly those from large corporations) were not comfortable with the idea ofhaving a 
conversation with an outsider- there was a concern for confidentiality. In one case, a 
manager signed the consent form, conducted the interview, even sent a copy of the 
consent form to the company ' s headquarter to be kept as a record. However, 
unfortunately, the legal department advised him to cancel everything and request the 
researcher to refrain from using the data from the interview session out of the fear of 
competition. Sorne interviewees prefer to err on the side of caution, meaning that they 
could be providing selected details of the true reality. Such behavior is entirely 
understandable. In fact, since the adoption of OSS solutions can tweak clients' 
business models and create strategie advantages, and because questions of the 
explanatory nature tend to ask for underlying details which can reveal sorne clients 
secrets, the interviewees tend to shy away from the whole story. This issue coupled 
with the fact that interview session can sometimes lead to heated discussions, and the 
interviewee - who is principally an extremely technical person in managerial 
position- may lose control of what she or he can and cannot say makes it difficult for 
large corporation to be open to receiving strangers in their top management offices. 
Thus, these kinds of issues have imposed sorne limitations on data collection process 
(specifically in case oflarge organizations). 
Third, OSS people are people from a wide range of technical backgrounds and at 
times specifie OSS socio-cultural issues bind them together as a people. In general, 
based on the discussions put forth in Chapter 3 about free software and OS software, 
one can recognize that OS world is more leaning towards sharing, solidarity, free 
access and consumption which can be cautiously grouped together as a more 
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socialistic world. In fact, this umque socialist stance seen in OSS communities, 
makes a clear distinction between a world of sharing gratis (Free and OS world), and 
a world of selling the permission to use through license fees and royalties (World of 
Capitalism). Consequently, the business management researchers, like me, with no 
prior track record of contributing to OS world through code sharing and using free 
software solutions such as Libreüffice, FFmpeg, and Linux-based OS, may be looked 
upon as people who at !east support and promote the capitalist mentality by using 
proprietary software products and paying license fees and royalties to Microsoft, and 
Apple. Put simply, 1 am so much of an outsider to this group of elite and dedicated 
OSS developers. For instance, during my interviews, 1 came across the top-notch 
OSS developers whose formai education backgrounds were in music, philosophy, 
sociology, and even law to name a few. Even so, out of extreme passion for OSS, 
they mastered the trade through a self-learning joumey over a decade-long practice. 
Some interviewees were very much concemed with ethos of free software movement, 
some were more moderate, and some others were very much liberal and even open to 
coexistence between proprietary and free software. 
Ali these factors made me realize that 1 was dealing with a sensitive and 
heterogeneous audience. Thus, 1 had to tailor my strategies to connect, and conduct 
the interviews differently. For instance, since the first day 1 started my participant 
observation, 1 started using OSS solutions such as LibreOffice which is an OS version 
of Microsoft word, and tried to geta sense ofwhat it means to be part ofOSS culture. 
Sometimes, to make meaningful contacts with some potential candidates, 1 had to 
find a trusted third person to open the do or for me. Y et in some cases, 1 had to attend 
a seminar or a workshop on OSS to become familiar with the target person and build 
the necessary rapport before making any request for an interview. So, overall , 
although I received a tremendous amount of support during this research and met 
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with a lot of nice chaps, being an outsider to OS world was very challenging to get 
the interviews done. 
All these three factors: participants ' managerial position, confidentiality, and OSS 
socio-cultural values imposed a number of challenges on data collection process- not 
to mention the obvious issues such energy, time and expenses !ost due to extra 
administrative works, rushing to interviews on short notices, and getting back to 
office disappointed due to last minute cancellations. Therefore, I had undergone 
enormous amount of administrative and logistics work to get each individual into the 
final stages of interview and post-interview follow-up. 
However, despite all these issues, I managed to benefit greatly from the connections 
and friendships I developed through adoption of the participant observation method. 
With the help of the support of OSS activists within the Savoir-faire Linux Inc. , I 
managed to obtain new and information-rich informants to proceed and complete my 
research. 
7.5.2 The researcher's theoretical sensitivity: Merits and demerits 
Theoretical sensitivity refers to the persona! qualities, background, and experience 
that a researcher applies to the research and underlying data. Glaser (1978) and 
Strauss and Corbin ( 1990) require a researcher to reveal his "theoretical sensitivity" 
for the analytical process of grounded theory to be effective. In fact, a researcher's 
background can be a source of bias and prejudice clouding his impartiality in 
interpreting the data. 
In my case, lack of technical background in the field of software development and in 
particular OSS was both advantageous and disadvantageous. Being an individual 
from a social science background was a merit mainly because I did not have a frame 
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of reference both technical and conceptual to dictate me a preference for how things 
must be or how events shall happen. Such lack of specifie reference helped me 
remain impartial throughout the research. To better grasp this issue, only imagine the 
situation where I was an ideological free software developer or an OSS activist 
studying OSS phenomenon! From day one in the field , I could only view OSS from a 
favorable and supportive lens, thereby leaving no room for adopting a critical 
perspective. 
On the other hand, having a low level of theoretical sensitivity can be a limitation, 
specifically in high-tech arena such as software. Software world, and OSS world in 
particular, is replete with technical jargon. Respondents, "the [wei rd] technical guys" 
use very specifie terms and examples to highlight their points. Sometimes you may 
get lost in the technical details and specifies to the extent that main topic is forgotten. 
After ali , a technical person, a top-notch coder is amazed about the deep 
technological intricacies. It is therefore my job to make sense of details and classify 
them in an understandable and meaningful manner. And obviously, I am not a 
software engineer. Nevertheless, that does not mean I cannot study OSS phenomenon. 
It is just a more challenging task to me. 
Fortunately, under the supervision of my industry advisor- Mr. Jérôme Oufella (VP 
Technologies at Savoir-faire Linux lnc.)- 1 managed to catch up with the 
technicalities and the nitty-gritty involved in OSS R&D and innovation process 
through my industry internship period. For one year, 1 spent about two to three days a 
week at the company interacting with software engineers from different departments 
and domains (e.g. , product engineering, enterprise solutions, infrastructure, cloud 
architecture and big data analytics). Thankfully, 1 managed to add OSS-related 
savoir-faire to my toolbox and complete this research endeavor. 
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7.5.3 Challenges caused by abstraction of inductive theory building 
Inductive theory building, and more particularly grounded theory approach work by 
building conceptual categories from higher levels of abstraction. Therefore, in the 
process of categorizing events and activities to reach that higher leve! of abstraction, 
the researcher may experience a potentialloss of connection with reality (see Moffett, 
1968). More precisely, Paré and Smart (1994, p. 153) emphasize that "whenever we 
create categories for analysis 'we trade a Joss of reality for a gain in control '". Sin ce 
the objective of this research is to develop an inductive theory, there is the potential 
for the researcher to introduce a bias unintentionally through grouping conceptual 
categories based on similarities and losing the opportunity to notice differences. 
To overcome this challenge, 1 have tried to increase my theoretical sensitivity by 
doing the open coding process in two stages. First, 1 conducted open coding (i .e. , 
mainly ' line-by-line analysis ' ) while working in the field collecting the data. Next, 
once 1 collected ali data, 1 re-engaged with data analysis and conducted a month-long 
open coding session parallel to axial coding. Since 1 gained more familiarity with the 
data and had already investigated the confusing points and clarified the dubious 
issues and textual errors, the second coding session became more meaningful. 1 
gained a bird ' s eye view (a gestalt perspective) of the data, and consequently, 
employing an iterative constant comparative method helped me to come across 
categories and relationships that were clearly distinct from one another in nature. 
However, 1 must acknowledge that, still, if two different researchers use the same 
data they may come up with different categories. This is part of the inherent 
subjectivity associated with grounded theory approach. 
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7.6 Avenues for further research 
First, follow-up research is required to empirically test the proposed relationships -
hypotheses- theorized based on the theoretical mode) (Figure 5.17) discussed in 
Chapter 5 (Section 5.5). Although my qualitative analysis of the data and the follow-
up theoretical discussions in form of four core propositions (see Table 5. 7) suggest 
the role (i.e. , intervening and moderating) of 'dual-purpose leadership ' and the 
moderating role of 'contextual factors' , complementary large scale quantitative 
studies (i.e. , survey study) can further prove or disprove these claims. We need to 
know about the statistical significance of the theoretical concepts introduced here, 
such as the dual-purpose leadership. Furthermore, in this study, 1 suggest a 
covariance effect between the two constructs of success and sustainability. This, 
however, seems logical on theoretical level based on the emerging concepts, only a 
theory testing approach can provide some confirmation about such claim. 
Second, our case study approach to inductive theory building only allows for making 
theoretical or analytical generalizations (Yin, 2011 , 2009). In fact, case study is 
concemed with analytic generalization where the researcher "is striving to generalize 
a particular set of results to some broader theory" (Yin, 2009, p. 43). Therefore, to 
establish statistical generalization and make inferences about a population based on 
sampled data, further survey research -which is a common method for making such 
generalization (Yin, 2011 , 2009; F owler, 1988) - is required. 
Third, past research has not been sensitive to distinguishing between the nature and 
specifie characteristics of firms in connecting with and benefiting from OSS projects 
and communities. This research clearly distinguishes among OSS firms, enterprise 
clients, hobbyists, and core development teams and their roles in the collaborative 
innovation process. I suggest that the diversity of actors (including enterprise clients) 
- under certain conditions (i.e. , context for collaborations: know-who, know-how, 
41 2 
know-why)- is likely to positively influence both the sustainability and success of 
collaborative OSS RDIP (see proposition one in Table 5.7). Moreover, distinctions 
are made among OSS fim1s and enterprise clients concerning their strategies, levels 
of their technological and resources capabilities, and their influence on the leve! of 
their involvement. However, we need larger number of cases to analyze in order to 
better describe, and theorize these categories, and establish their boundaries in detail. 
Thus, follow-up qualitative research can build upon the perspectives offered in this 
work and enrich them through providing complementary or even contradictory 
evidences gathered through larger number of case studies. 
Fourth, Chapter 6 (Table 6.2), to the best of my knowledge, is the first conceptual 
attempt to develop an alternative theoretical perspective of OSS technological 
collaborations vis-à-vis conventional strategie alliances and informai cooperation. 
Further theoretical and empirical evidence needs to be collected to complement the 
qualitative and conceptual data gathered in this research and consequently strengthen 
the proposed conceptual claims. 
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APPENDIX 
A SAMPLE OF THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. How did you become familiar and eventually involved with OSS and OSS 
communities? 
2. Why do you interact with OSS communities? 
3. How do you collaborate with OSS communities? 
4. How do you develop solutions collaboratively? 
5. How do you make decision with regards to what code to share and what code 
to hold back in the R&D process? 
6. In your opinion, how can one motivate OSS developers to keep working on an 
OSS project (long-term)? 
7. How does OSS methodology impact the quality of OS software being 
developed? 
8. In your opinion, do you think sharing code back with community and making 
investments in building a relationship with its members worthy or can be 
justified economically? Please elaborate on your reasons. 
9. Please talk about clients of OSS firms . Who are they and how they are 
involved in the OSS development process? 
10. How do you view the role of enterprise clients in the OSS R&D process? 
11. How do you view the nature of leadership, and its role in the collaborative 
software development process? 
12. How do you see the interactions between OSS firms and proprietary software 
developers? 
13 . In your opinion, what are the main disadvantages of community-based OSS 
solutions and OSS in general? 
14. In your opinion, what kind of capabilities should an engineer have to work in 
a place like an OSS finn? (if we believe the proprietary software firm is 
different from OSS firm) 
15. How do you view sustainability issue within OSS ecosystem? 1 mean, when 
do you think an OSS project is a sustainable one? What are the contributing 
factors and what are the challenges, based on your persona! experience? 
16. Does your OS company have enough talented people to do the job or do they 
really need the community? 
17. How do you describe the relationship between your company and OS 
communities? 
18. Do you think, or is there a possibility that in the long-run customers influence 
the technology trajectory of OSS communities? 
19. How do you build trust to convince your clients to migrate to a risky solution 
such as OSS or at !east as it appears to be risky? 
20. Who are the contributors to your OS community? How do they interact with 
each other in research and project development phases? 
21. How is the innovation process organized? 
22. If somebody wants to grow in your community, is there a chance for new 
leaders to emerge in your context? What is the process of becoming a 
maintainer in your community? 
23. How do y ou perceive project forking? What are the positive and negative 
aspects of it? 
24. How does the following scenario impact your community? For example, if a 
private enterprise forks your project and builds on top of its core codes and 
commercializes it in its own product line. Does that diminish your 
community? 
25. What is a healthy community? 
26. What do you mean by "we sel! expertise?" What is "expertise"? 
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27. How do they teach operating systems in Canadian educational system? 
28. Do you believe the OSS developer and proprietary one have different set of 
skills? 
29. How do you evaluate a comment made by some OSS firms regarding the 
issue that "unless there is a commercial end user involved, testing will not be 
taken seriously"? 
30. Do you think some very professional OS communities eventually in the long-
tem1 end up organizing innovation process like proprietary software firms? 
31. Do community leaders have business instincts? 
32. How are innovations organized within community of developers? 
33. How do you manage diversity within your community of developers? 
34. How did you come to the point you decided to commercialize this OSS 
project? 
35. What types oflicenses you use for this project? 
36. Have you had the case when client come directly to you as community instead 
of going to mainstream consultancy firms? Could you please talk about some 
of the se instances? 
37. How do you keep your community members motivated? How do you keep 
them doing what they are doing? And to also become more· innovative? 
38. Do you have proprietary software competing with your OSS? 
39. What does your business modellook like and how does OSS adoption fit into 
that scenario? 
40. Do you engage with OS communities based on a long-term vision? 
41 . Do you have this idea on mind that you could or should play a leadership role 
while interacting and collaborating with OS communities? 
42. Why did you decide to adopt OSS solutions? And why did you choose this 
specifie partner for the migration process? 
43. What is value or value-added OSS to your business line? 
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